The Debate over the Selection and Retention of Judges: How Judges Can Ride the Wave

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There is a surge in the debate in the U.S. over the methods of judicial selection and retention, with some rallying for merit-selection plans, others continuing to support judicial elections, and virtually no one proposing lifetime appointments. The impetus for this surge may be related to three recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,¹ Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,² and Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,³ and to the exploding amount of campaign funds raised in judicial elections. These factors seem to have once again brought to the forefront the judicial election method and consequently revitalized the merit method, which had been dormant for three decades. Whether this boost in the debate is tantamount to a new movement, a continuation of an old movement, a blip on the radar screen, a wave, or a full-fledged tsunami, remains to be seen. But one thing is clear: since the United States' inception, there have been periodic movements to change the method of selecting and retaining judges, and the methods have often been complex and convoluted.

There were essentially three major movements in the U.S.,⁴ which I will refer to as the “Original Lifetime Appointment Movement,” the “Jackson Democracy Movement,” and the “Progressive Reform Movement.” Not unlike the present debate, political, legal, social, and cultural factors have all served as the catalysts for these movements. Although there have been some slight variations, these movements essentially involve four different selection methods: lifetime appointment, partisan election, nonpartisan election, and merit selection and retention. These movements have been in a constant state of flux, with many states using constitutional amendments, legislative acts, ballot initiatives, and executive orders to both move in and out of the methods, and to make modifications short of complete overhauls. For example, 9 of 16 states that initially only used the appointment method switched to judicial elections for some level of their judiciary,⁵ 14 states changed from partisan to nonpartisan elections,⁶ and 15 states have changed from partisan or nonpartisan elections to some form of the merit method.⁷ When all is said and done, over the last 234 years, this activity has resulted in 39 states deviating substantially from their initial selection method. Notwithstanding these major changes, there have been far more slight modifications and failed attempts, than an actual change in judicial-selection methods. There were approximately 358 method modifications, including but not limited to, the creation of commissions, change in term lengths and periods, change in the mandatory retirement age, and change in the appointing authority.⁸ Additionally, there have been approximately 66 failed attempts to change methods.⁹

With the exception of some novel intermittent arguments, the debate over which method is best has remained fundamentally the same. While the parties taking up the various causes have changed over time, including former U.S. Supreme

Footnotes
2. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
6. Arkansas, California, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, and Washington.
8. See American Judicature Society, History of Reform Efforts: Formal Changes Since Inception, supra note 5.
Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, judges remain at the center of the debate. Within a historical context, this Paper will identify and discuss these movements and methods along with their catalysts. It will also set forth a snapshot of the methods currently used in each state, as well as state proposals and measures that could potentially affect these methods. In light of the recent Supreme Court cases, the Paper will discuss the impact that these methods may have on a judge’s conduct. Finally the Paper will specify and restate the arguments both supporting and criticizing these methods and will review the various proposals for stopgap measures. The goal of this Paper is to identify some of the new challenges and pitfalls for judges operating within every method of retention and selection given the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, and to educate judges about how these methods of selection and retention ebb and flow over time. Armed with this knowledge, and an understanding that change requires respect for the cultural differences of each method, judges should be able to take a leadership role in the debate.

I. MOVEMENTS AND METHODS

A. The Original Lifetime Appointment Movement

The first movement was very much influenced by the United States’ independence from England. In the American colonies, the “king had absolute control over the appointment and removal of Judges.” Because the founders were concerned about how judges in England were controlled by the king, they established in the Constitution lifetime appointments for all federal judges based on the advice and consent of the Senate. The U.S. Constitution was modeled after the Massachusetts State constitution, which was drafted by John Adams. Adams wrote that judges “should not be dependent upon any man or body of men. To these ends, they should hold estates for life in their offices; or, in other words, their commissions should be during good behavior . . . .” The original states followed suit with lifetime appointments, but the method of appointment varied, as “seven states selected their judges by the legislature and five states had the governor appoint judges who would then be

12. See id. at 4–5 (citing the Declaration of Independence).
15. Id.
18. Id.
20. MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. III, art. I; N.H. CONST. pt 2, art. 73, 78.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 17, at 9.
26. Id.
At the turn of the century there was a new round of debates between the appointment method and the election method proponents.

The first wave was between 1846 and 1860 when state constitutions were rolled out across the U.S. The debate between appointment and judicial elections played out at the constitutional conventions with some states giving the debate more attention than others. One scholar attributes this movement to a desire for greater judicial independence:

In addition to direct limits on legislative power, most of these conventions adopted judicial elections. Many delegates stated that their purpose was to strengthen the separation of powers and empower courts to use judicial review. The reformers pointed to results: elected judges in the 1850s struck down many state laws, while appointed predecessors had in any other decade. These elected judges played a role in the shift from active state involvement in economic growth to laissez-faire constitutionalism.

The reform focused on the appellate and inferior courts, with the states of Vermont, Indiana, and Georgia as the first three states permitting local governments the option to elect trial court judges. This trend was followed by Mississippi in 1832 and New York in 1846. By 1850, 7 more states also permitted elections and by the time of the Civil War, 24 states had an elected judiciary.

At the turn of the century there was a new round of debates between the appointment method and the election method proponents. Roscoe Pound, noted legal scholar, in a well known speech before the ABA in 1906, stated that "putting courts into politics, and compelling judges to become politicians in many jurisdictions has almost destroyed the traditional respect for the bench." As a result, there was another reform of sorts with the creation of nonpartisan elections in an attempt to remove national partisan interests from state and local elections and to clean up the patronage and cronyism. In 1927, 12 states employed nonpartisan elections, and three other states "had already tried and rejected nonpartisan elections." By the end of the movement, every state that entered the Union from 1846 to 1958 used either partisan or nonpartisan elections to select some or all of their judges.

C. The Progressive Reform Movement

The merit selection method was proposed for the purpose of removing judges from the pressures of running for political office. Merit-selection plans usually select judges through a nominating commission with gubernatorial or legislative appointment. After a specified term the judge stands for retention with no party affiliation or opponent and must receive a certain vote percentage to be retained. Some states use performance evaluations through commissions prior to the retention election, while others use non-elective means of retention, like reappointment. Although the merit selection and retention method, also known as the "Missouri Plan," was developed in 1913 as a compromise that combined the best features of appointment and election, it did not become a full-fledged movement until the 1950s and 1960s. In 1914, it was the American Judicature Society that first pushed for retention elections through its new director Albert M. Kales, who offered a nonpartisan court plan that featured the basic elements of nomination, appointment, and elective-tenure. Later, in

29. Hall, supra note 22.
30. Ohio, Kentucky, and Virginia devoted much attention; Iowa, Louisiana, and Missouri little attention; and "in only five conventions did the issue of popular election prove sufficiently controversial to require a roll-call vote before adoption." Id.
32. Hall, supra note 22.
33. Id.
34. Id.; see also Berkson & Caufield, supra note 28, at 1.
43. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, and New York. Id. at 8–9.
1926, Harold Laski first suggested that judicial commissions do the nominating.\textsuperscript{46}

California adopted a version of this plan in 1934.\textsuperscript{47} Soon thereafter Missouri adopted the most familiar version hence called “the Missouri Plan.”\textsuperscript{48} It is interesting to note that Louisiana, in 1921, may have been the first state to consider the merit-selection method and has since rejected countless proposals to adopt that method, as “at least one proposed constitutional amendment calling for merit selection has been introduced in all but one legislative session” since 1978.\textsuperscript{49} Similarly, Texas has rejected proposals to adopt the merit selection method numerous times, with ten rejections.\textsuperscript{50} Several factors, however, largely unrelated to judicial performance, converged to halt the spread of the merit-selection method. These factors included fractious constitutional conventions, a decline in public confidence in both public and private institutions, disenchantment with the merit method, and opposition to change.\textsuperscript{51} By the mid-1980s, “these factors essentially halted the trend to merit selection.”\textsuperscript{52}

II. THE SNAPSHOT

A. Current State Judicial-Selection Methods

All four of the judicial-selection methods just discussed are currently in use in various states. Sometimes states will even use some combination of several methods.\textsuperscript{53} As a result, appeals court judges, trial court judges, and county or municipal judges, may be selected or retained using different methods within the same state. Generally, 5 states use gubernatorial or legislative merit appointments without commissions.\textsuperscript{54} 14 states and the District of Columbia use merit selection through nominating commissions.\textsuperscript{55} 9 states use merit selection combined with other methods,\textsuperscript{56} 8 states use a partisan election system,\textsuperscript{57} and 14 states use a nonpartisan election system.\textsuperscript{58} In the 19 states that either use merit selection or appointments, judges are usually appointed by either the governor or the legislature,\textsuperscript{59} and then face either a retention election,\textsuperscript{60} or a reappointment process by lawmakers.

While there is no mandatory retirement age for either U.S. Supreme Court Justices or federal judges, with the exception of one lifetime appointment state, Rhode Island,\textsuperscript{61} the remaining states have a variety of mandatory retirement ages ranging from 70–75 years,\textsuperscript{62} or mandatory retirement with conditional provisions,\textsuperscript{63} or no mandatory retirement age at all.\textsuperscript{64} In 1991, two Missouri state court judges challenged the mandatory retire-

All four of the judicial-selection methods just discussed are currently in use in various states. Some states will even use some combination of several methods for selection and retention.
B. The Catalysts for the Current Debate

The current momentum for the debate may be attributed to several factors. First, there has been a profusion of cases brought by judges across the country regarding judicial campaign activity, culminating in two U.S. Supreme Court decisions: Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. Further, the U.S. Supreme Court recently decided Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, which may impact judicial campaign contributions. Lastly, the current debate may also be attributed to the rising rate of judicial campaign contributions and polls indicating public dissatisfaction with the judiciary as a whole.

1. RECENT UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES

a. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White

The question presented in White was whether the First Amendment permitted the Minnesota Supreme Court to prohibit candidates for judicial election “from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues.” The judge in question, in the course of his nonpartisan campaign, “distributed literature criticizing several Minnesota Supreme Court decisions on issues such as crime, welfare, and abortion.”

66. Id. at 467, 473.
68. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
69. White, 536 U.S. at 768.
70. Id. at 768–69.
71. Id. at 768.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 788.
77. ACLU of Fla., Inc. v. The Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094, 1097 (N.D. Fla. 1990) (explaining that “a person does not surrender his constitutional right to freedom of speech when he becomes a candidate for judicial office”); see also James J. Alfini et al., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 11-14 to 11-15 (4th ed. 2007).
81. See, e.g., In re Bybee, 716 N.E.2d 957 (Ind. 1999); In re Donohoe, 580 P.2d 1093 (Wash. 1978).
campaign statements and a judge’s ability to respond to questionnaires, relying on First Amendment grounds.82

The repercussions from the White decision took several forms: states repealed their announce clauses,83 issued advisory opinions,84 or declared that White did not affect their codes;85 judicial ethics commissions dismissed proceedings against judges;86 and judges commenced constitutional challenges.87 As evidenced by the extensive commentary regarding White,88 the Supreme Court’s decision has done little to settle what is and what is not protected judicial campaign speech. Ethics advisory committees and disciplinary bodies continue to enforce restrictions on judicial speech as long as the restrictions are narrowly tailored and differ from the restrictions struck down in White.89 The 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (“2007 Code”) takes a similar approach.90 As a result of White, the ABA added five comments to Rule 4.1 in the 2007 Code (paragraphs 11 through 15) that discuss the distinctions between various “announce clauses.”91 Although the 2007 Code offers a better definition of acceptable campaign speech, not all of the states have adopted the Code in toto.92 While the White decision addressed a candidate’s political speech during his or her own judicial campaign, it did not address free speech regarding a judge’s personal involvement in political activities outside of their own judicial campaign. Thus, it is quite possible that the White decision will spark a flurry of new cases.93 However, according to some scholars, the fear that the White decision would result in “rancorous free-for-alls” has not been realized.94

b. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission

Another important U.S. Supreme Court case involving free speech is Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.95

While the issue in White related to judges’ freedom of speech, the issue in Citizens United related to the free speech of a campaign supporter in a presidential election. In January 2008, appellant Citizens United, a non-profit corporation, released a documentary critical of then-Senator Hillary Clinton, a candidate for her party’s presidential nomination.96 Citizens United was poised to pay a cable television company to carry the documentary through video-on-demand during the 30 days prior to primary elections.97 There was a concern, however, that such action would violate the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), which prohibits corporations from spending general treasury funds on “electioneering communications”—defined as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that ‘refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office’ and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election.”98 Thus, Citizens United sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Federal Election Commission.99

The U.S. Supreme Court, in a controversial 5 to 4 decision, overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, holding that the “Government may regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether.”100 The Court struck down the portion of the BCRA that prohibited all corporations, both for-profit and not-for-profit, and unions from broadcasting electioneering communications, and thus also overruled a portion

82. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 77, at 11-13.
84. Ohio. Id.
85. Kentucky, Florida, and Georgia. Id.
86. California. Id.
87. E.g., Wersal v. Sexton, 613 F.3d 821, 826 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[Plaintiff] now maintains that the amendments to [Minnesota’s] solicitation clause do not cure its invasion of his First Amendment rights, and that the endorsement clause improperly restricts expression protected by the First Amendment.”); see also ALFINI ET AL., supra note 77, at 11-18 (“Unfortunately, the Court’s decision in White . . . has spawned a number of conflicting lower Court decisions and widely divergent attempts to conform state judicial ethics provisions to White.”).
88. See ALFINI ET AL., supra note 77, at 11-18 n. 95 (collecting various sources).
90. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 77, at 11-18.
92. As of June 18, 2009, 33 states plus the District of Columbia created committees to review the 2007 Code; 8 of those states adopted the Code in whole or in part, 7 states merely made revisions to their existing codes, and the committees in the other 18 states plus the District of Columbia had yet to complete their reviews. REPORT TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE 2007 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT PROPOSED BY THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 3 (June 18, 2009), available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/publications/pdfs/aba-report.pdf.
93. E.g., In re Hecht, 213 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. Spec. Ct. Rev. 2006). For a comprehensive discussion on similar cases brought both prior to and subsequent to the White decision, see ALFINI ET AL., supra note 77, at ch. 11. See also Nevada Standing Committee on Judicial Ethics and Election Practices, Advisory Op. JE10-005 (Aug. 2, 2010) (discussing the propriety of a judge conducting an event for another political candidate in his own home), available at http://judicial.state.nv.us/JE10-005.pdf.
95. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
96. Id. at 887.
97. Id. at 887-88.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 888.
100. Id. at 886.
of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, which upheld the same provision.101 This holding was based in part on the fact that the BCRAs prohibition on electioneering communications was an “outright ban on speech, backed by criminal sanctions.”102

It is comprehensible that Citizens United may impact judicial campaigns in election states because corporate expenditures are now unlimited. Although some scholars see Citizens United as “another tool for condemning” judicial elections,103 this case may also impact retention elections in merit-selection states. A judge in an election state is cognizant of the need to raise funds and run a campaign. In a retention election, however, the judge may be totally unaware of the need to raise funds or campaign until it is too late. Campaigning is not at the core of the merit method as it is with the judicial-election method; in fact, that is the principal distinguishing factor between the two. Typically, a judge in a merit-selection state cannot even lodge a retention campaign unless there is “active opposition.”104 One need not even fashion a hypothetical scenario to make the point. Currently in Colorado there is a somewhat active group of individuals called “Clear the Bench,” composed of a few state lawmakers and others who sought to vote out three Colorado Supreme Court Justices based upon some of their more controversial decisions.105 Unlike the organized 1996 campaigns of Supreme Court Justice Lamprier and the group opposing him—the first Supreme Court Justice in Nebraska history not to be retained by the voters106—even at the latest stages of the election cycle, other than some articles and editorials, there were no known monetary expenditures by Clear the Bench in Colorado. In a recent ruling, however, a state court required the group to register as a political committee which means that they can only accept donations under $525.00 per donor.107 None of the three Colorado Supreme Court Justices up for retention engaged in any campaign efforts. There was also a recent, successful effort in Larimer County, Colorado to oust two state court judges for their actions as former prosecutors, where the judges received an advisory opinion allowing them to publicly respond to the opposition.108 The most recent attempt to oust merit-selected judges occurred in Iowa, where the National Organization for Marriage spent $230,000 on television ads criticizing three state supreme court justices for their ruling in a same sex marriage case.109 Consider what would happen if a group seeking to oust a merit-selected judge or justice received a large corporate donation and waited until immediately prior to the retention vote to usher in a tremendous statewide campaign? The judge or justice will be ill-prepared, unfunded, and without an advisory opinion permitting response; in other words, they will be “sitting ducks.” In this sense, Citizens United may have an affect on retention elections in merit-selection states.


While Citizens United may indirectly impact all judicial campaigns, Caperton will have a more direct effect. In Caperton, the United States Supreme Court held that a judge’s failure to recuse himself when a campaign contributor appeared in his court violated the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.110 Prior to this case, contributions by persons or groups who represented a particular point of view, such as opposition to abortion or to capital punishment, were not precluded from making donations to judicial campaigns, but there was always a concern that significant public attention would lead to perceptions of favoritism.111 Caperton held that such perceived favoritism might be so great as to require mandatory judicial recusal based on constitutional concerns.112 Although the circumstances in Caperton involved judicial campaign contributions, this case has implications for any type of perceived judicial favoritism.

In December 2009, “Michigan’s Supreme Court issued new rules making it harder for justices to hear cases involving major campaign supporters,”113 and “Wisconsin became the third state to provide public financing for appellate court races.

101. Id. at 913.
102. Id. at 897.
103. Bartels, supra note 94.
104. See, e.g., ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5C(2); COLO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(2); IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(2).
111. ALFENI ET AL., supra note 77, at 11-58 to 11-59.
112. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265.
so that judicial candidates would not have to seek money from those appearing before them in court.\textsuperscript{114} In contrast, the next month, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was seeking to finalize a proposed order that said judicial campaign contributions do not require judges to step aside from hearing cases involving a supporter.\textsuperscript{115}

d. Collective Implications of White, Citizens United and Caperton

When one begins to apply these three cases collectively to a judicial campaign and election, things become convoluted. Consider a scenario where a judge receives a campaign contribution from an oil and gas corporation or an anti-abortion nonprofit corporation by virtue of a cable advertisement for the judge or against his opponent. Under Citizens United, in those states without contribution limits, the corporation may now expend an unlimited amount of advertising funds on behalf of a judge. Additionally, the judge, under his exercise of free speech rights as enunciated in White, may now openly state his opposition to the use of alternative energy or abortion. But one obstacle standing in the way of perceived or real judicial partiality is Caperton. Under these circumstances a Caperton argument would most likely result in the judge’s recusal from the case. But what happens under the same scenario when a different corporation with the exact same views as the contributing corporation comes before the judge? While the judge may recuse on the basis of a perceived partiality, there is no mandate for him to do so under Caperton. There is now a concern over the influence of politics in judicial elections as a result of of White, which permits judicial candidates to discuss their positions on various legal issues while campaigning, including issues that may come before them for decision.\textsuperscript{116} In response to White, the Missouri Supreme Court repealed their announce clause, stating that “[r]ecusal, or other remedial action, may nonetheless be required of any judge in cases that involve an issue about which the judge has announced his or her views as otherwise may be appropriate under the Code of Judicial Conduct.”\textsuperscript{117}

2. INCREASED EXPENDITURES IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

Even before Citizens United, private contributions to judicial campaigns were beginning to skyrocket and were playing a major role in the success or defeat of a judge running for a seat on the bench: “In the 2000, 2002 and 2004 election cycles, candidates raised $123 million compared with only $73.5 million in the preceding three cycles.”\textsuperscript{118} In a particularly astounding example, a group in West Virginia “raised at least $3.6 million to successfully beat an incumbent.”\textsuperscript{119} Similarly, the 2004 contest between Lloyd Karmeier and Gordon Maag, two Illinois Supreme Court candidates, raised almost $9.4 million, nearly double the previous national record.\textsuperscript{120} That amount topped the money raised in 18 of 34 U.S. Senate races decided that year.\textsuperscript{121} One could foresee these situations giving rise to backlash against a corporation for funding a judicial candidate, not unlike those typical to political campaigns. For example, in Minnesota, Target Corporation’s donation to a group that supported the gubernatorial candidate Tom Emmer has received harsh press from a variety of groups.\textsuperscript{122}

Fortunately, there are some small restrictions in the judicial campaign arena under both the 1990 and 2007 ABA Codes. Judicial candidates may promote their campaigns through advertisements under Canon 5C(1)(b)(ii) of the 1990 Code and Rule 4.2(B)(2) of the 2007 Code, with some restrictions related to the content.\textsuperscript{123} A judge engaged in judicial campaigns may also accept contributions. The financing of a judicial campaign is governed by Canon 5C(2) of the 1990 Code, which requires a candidate to create campaign committees, and Rule 4.1(A)(8) of the 2007 Code, which does not.\textsuperscript{124} Who may be on those committees and who may chair those committees varies from state to state.\textsuperscript{125} There are also constraints on the solicita-

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114. Id.


116. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2168, 2179 (2006) (asserting that all the Justices in White assumed that “[c]andidates for judicial office will find themselves under an obligation of some sort to speak out on controversial issues once they are libeitated to do so, while nominees for judicial office will not”). But see Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., “Announcement” By Federal Judicial Nominees, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1281, 1287 (2004) (asserting that the decision in White is not limited to elected judges, and that it affords appointed judges the same right to engage in political speech).

117. In re Enforcement of Rule 2.03, Canon 5.B(1)(c) (Mo. 2002) (en banc).


120. Goldberg et al., supra note 118, at 14–15.


123. Alfiniti et al., supra note 77, at 11-38.

124. Id. at 11-40.

125. Id.
3. PUBLIC DISSATISFACTION WITH THE JUDICIARY

Polling data that includes voters, business leaders, and judges themselves demonstrates the concern over the potential impact on the courts from special interest money. For example, 78% are very or somewhat concerned that judicial candidates must, among other things, raise more money and 79% of business leaders believe that contributions made to judicial campaigns have some influence on judges’ decisions. Further, more than 90% of the individuals polled believe that “judges should not hear cases involving individuals or groups that contributed to their campaign.” All of the public dissatisfaction with the judiciary, however, is not based solely on the conduct of judges in judicial elections. For example, even in merit-selection states, where there are no campaigns or campaign contributions, “the national trends in political trust of the judiciary in the last two decades are found to be reflected in the trends in the reported declines in the affirmative retention vote.” The American Judges Association White Paper entitled Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public Dissatisfaction stated that “Americans are highly sensitive to the processes of procedural fairness. It is no surprise, then, that the perception of unfair or unequal treatment is the single most important source of popular dissatisfaction with the American legal system.”

III. THE DEBATE

As one scholar noted, “it is fairly certain that no single subject has consumed as many pages in law reviews and law-related publications over the last 50 years as the subject of judicial selection.” There has been a continuum of associations, organizations, and individuals involved in the debate, all supporting various selection methods. In the past, these entities have included the League of Women Voters, Democracy South, the Institute on Money in State Politics, and the American Judicature Society—as the initiator of the merit method and its ardent supporter. Today, the American Judicature Society is still active in the debate, and is joined by the Brennan Center, the ABA, the Justice at Stake Campaign, a few state supreme court justices from around the country, and the Institute for Advancement of the American Legal System, lead by Justice O’Connor. Although the Conference of Chief Justices recognized the “hazards” of partisan judicial elections, it ultimately labeled partisan elections a “reasonable, constitutionally defensible method.” The National Center for State Courts has remained neutral on the matter. Various academics and commentators are divided, with some supporting judicial elections, allowing each constituent the opportunity to exercise his or her democratic vote, while others back a merit selection process, contending it insulates judges from politics.

The basis for three of the major movements and methods has lived on as part of the debate, as the proponents of judicial elections continue to argue that elections hold judges accountable to the public. The arguments, in their most basic terms, break down to “judicial accountability” through the election process, and “judicial independence” via merit-based selection. Electing judges is seen as consistent with our democratic ideals; allowing voters to decide maintains the independence of the judicial branch by taking appointment influence away from the other two branches. If the voters feel a particular judge is not doing his or her job properly, they can vote the judge out at the next election or, in some states, request a

126. Id. at 11-50.
127. Id.
130. Id.
136. Id. (internal citations omitted).
137. Statement of Jesse Rutledge from the National Center for State Courts (May 21, 2010).
138. F. Andrew Hanssen, The Effect of Judicial Institutions on Uncertainty and the Rate of Litigation: The Election Versus Appointment of State Judges, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 211 (1999) (noting that “when Americans want to make their judges independent they appoint them and when they wish instead to make them accountable they elect them.”).
Supporters of the election system maintain that election allows for less partisanship than appointment. Selecting judges through elections, however, requires candidates to campaign, ultimately involving speeches, debates, and raising campaign funds, making judicial elections more like legislative elections. Opponents of judicial elections note that large donations from certain special interest groups or even other lawyers can lower public confidence in the judiciary and potentially improperly influence a judge’s impartiality in his or her decisions. Elections are also viewed as part of a political process, while judges are expected to be insulated from politics. The basic idea behind elections—government by the people—conflicts with the notion that judges are not supposed to be influenced by the public’s will.

On the other hand, supporters of merit-selection systems emphasize how this model creates judicial independence. Merit-based appointments separate the judicial branch from politics and other possible outside influences. Backers of merit-based selection assert that the process ensures that the most qualified and competent candidates are selected. Generally, candidates are evaluated by lawyers, rather than the public, who are arguably better suited to assess a candidate’s relevant qualifications. Many states that use merit selection also have evaluation systems or retention elections in place to assure accountability. Additionally, merit-selection proponents purport that this mode of selection increases the number of minorities serving as judges and resolves the problem of voter apathy. But Chris Bonneau, a noted expert in judicial selection, suggests that voters are not apathetic, that they do indeed turn out for competitive judicial elections and that they are able to distinguish between candidates with prior judicial experience and those without prior judicial experience.

Supporters of the merit method also argue that judges who must campaign will be influenced by a campaign contributor’s ideology. Some scholars, however, believe that an apolitical selection process is fiction and that judges are not mere technocrats. In other words, they believe that the merit process is still politicized. They maintain that the merit method may lead to appointments that further the interests of the elected official’s political party since a politically elected figure, whether it is the governor or legislator, ultimately selects the judicial candidate. For example, New Jersey’s Republican Governor Chris Christie recently decided not to reappoint a Democrat to New Jersey’s highest court. Additionally, merit selection arguably erodes judicial accountability, making the appointed judges only answerable to fellow bar members or other community or political persons who helped to select them. Some even argue that most nominating commissions are attorney “centric,” which further removes the public from the judicial selection process. Various other challenges have been raised against the merit selection sys-

140. E.g., Cal. Const. art. II, § 14(b) (“Signatures to recall . . . judges of courts of appeal and trial courts must equal in number 20 percent of the last vote for the office.”).
142. See Selection of State Judges Symposium Transcripts, supra note 139, at 289.
143. See Mears, supra note 10 (noting Ohio Chief Justice Thomas Moyer’s opinion that campaign fundraising can diminish public confidence in the courts). In response to the possibility of improper influence, and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the American Bar Association and the states have debated different standards for when judges are required to recuse themselves. See John Gibeaut, Caperton Capers, A.B.A.J., Aug. 2009, at 21.
144. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400–01 (1991) (“The fundamental tension between the ideal character of the judicial office and the real world of electoral politics cannot be resolved by crediting judges with total indifference to the popular will while simultaneously requiring them to run for elected office.”).
146. See Hanssen, supra note 138, at 211 (noting the “long-standing consensus that appointive procedures protect state judges from political influence more effectively than elective procedures”).
150. Maute, supra note 147, at 1209.
151. Bartels, supra note 94.
152. Id.
153. See Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One “Best” Method?, 23 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 32 (1995) (“The forum for such political considerations has merely been shifted from the electoral arena to the commissions and the governor’s mansion.” (citations omitted)).
154. Id. at 32 n.218. (“While ‘merit’ systems limit the discretion of the governor regarding the choice of judges, the decision is still frequently based upon partisan political considerations because the individual appointed tends to be a member of the governor’s party.”).
155. See Terrence Dopp, Christie May Be Blocked in Replacing New Jersey Justice Wallace, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, May 3, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-03/christie-may-be-blocked-in-replacing-new-jersey-justice-wallace.html. Christie, the first Republican elected New Jersey governor since 1997, said he believes the panel has a history of “legislating from the bench,” but declined to reference any specific decisions from the justice who was not reappointed. Id. The governor said he made the move to begin reshaping the seven-member court, which was made up of four Democrats, two Republicans and an Independent. Id.
Some scholars believe that elective and appointive systems do not differ much in their actual operation.

In that case, the plaintiffs argued that because 3 of the 7 members of Alaska's nominating commission “are appointed by the Alaska bar association's Board of Governors, and because Alaska lawyers have a greater voice in the selection of the Board of Governors than non-lawyers, the state's non-lawyers are impermissibly denied an 'equal voice' in the selection of state court judges.”

Further, special interest groups can still play a role in merit-based selection if they have influence over members of the nominating commission or the judicial performance commissions who are typically political appointees. These commissions change with party politics and may influence whether a retention recommendation is given to a judge. Ten states use judicial performance commissions, which survey individuals who have interacted with the judge to evaluate the judge's legal ability, integrity, communication skills, temperament, and administrative capacity. One could imagine, however, scenarios where the data used in those commission surveys becomes misleading or flawed. Hypothetically, a judge may receive a “do not retain” recommendation from a commission with only five negative responses to a survey, where there were only ten total responses from a specific category of respondents, i.e. law enforcement. The commission may then state that 50% of that respondent category—law enforcement in this example—recommends that the judge not be retained. As a result, a mere five individuals may have the power to affect a judge's career. This is particularly troublesome in those states that have a mandatory threshold percentage to actually receive a “retain” recommendation from a commission. Additionally, there may be a disproportionate amount of responses in a given category that may also affect the judge's ratings. For example, if a judge is perceived to be defense oriented and he or she receives 100 responses from the general category of attorneys, only 20 of whom are defense attorneys and 80 of whom are prosecutors, the judge is unfairly penalized because the responses were not weighted.

While the debate over merit selection versus election ensues, no one seems to be proposing lifetime appointments as a method of judicial selection. But given the fact that the federal government and three states appoint judges without term limits, and the fact that judicial elections garner much disfavor due to judicial campaign activity, the appointment method is now certainly worthy of entering the debate. This approach would be consistent with how judges were first selected in the U.S. and it would eliminate some of the concerns raised by the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in White, Caperton, and Citizens United, in that it would extricate judges from all judicial campaign activity. The proponents of lifetime appointments argue that when judges are insulated from political activity, they become more impartial. Opponents would argue that, similar to merit-based systems, unlimited tenure would diminish the democratic process by taking away the public’s ability to vote in judicial elections. The opponents would also argue that, even worse than the merit-selection and retention system, unlimited tenure denies the public the chance to evaluate judges whatsoever—there would be no electoral mechanism for the removal of a judge, and thus judges would become less accountable to the public. Despite these concerns, every judge at every level in every state is always subject to a removal mechanism for cause.

The scholars, political scientists, experts in judicial selection, and professors in academia, take differing views on the subject. Some scholars believe that elective and appointive systems do not differ much in their actual operation. This is due in part to the fact that “most incumbent judges are rarely opposed for reelection, and the overwhelming majority of judges who face the voters retain their seats.” But retention vote percentages have been diminishing over time. Bonneau and Melinda Gann Hall, who are experts in the areas of judicial selection and politics, have empirically assessed and attempted to debunk many of the “reformers” arguments in their newly released book entitled In Defense of Judicial Elections. These scholars believe that those promoting the merit method use only normative information in their arguments; contrastingly, these scholars use empirical information in an attempt “to elevate the discussion of judicial selection

159. See DeBow ET AL., supra note 148; Maute, supra note 147, at 1209–10.
161. Mears, supra note 10; Rizo, supra note 10.
162. See, e.g., Croley, supra note 41, at 747 (stating that lifetime tenure can help avoid the “the biased administration of day-to-day justice. Judges who never have to seek or preserve electoral support have no incentive to please supporters”).
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Charles Roos, Editorial, Voter Distrust of Judges Goes Well Beyond Hufnagel, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Nov. 16, 1996, at 68A.
166. Bartels, supra note 94.
beyond the hyperbolic rhetoric.” They conclude that elections are the best way to select judges, though they acknowledge this method is not without its problems.

**IV. CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR METHOD CHANGES AND WHY THEY FAIL**

Kansas, Ohio, Minnesota, Nevada, West Virginia, and Texas have either tendered a proposal or are considering changing from the election system to the merit selection and retention system, or vice versa. Ironically, in Missouri, a state whose name is synonymous with merit selection—i.e., “the Missouri Plan”—there was an unsuccessful proposal to move from the traditional merit selection plan, through a nominating commission, to selection directly by the governor subject to confirmation by the senate.

Some scholars, coined the “standard account” scholars, believe that the selection methods are chosen based upon society’s responses to popular ideas at different historical periods. But other scholars believe that methods are changed and modified based upon the bargaining processes among relevant political actors, which include their preferences at the moment and their future political circumstances. For example, which method prevails is directly related to whether the political actors believe that they will remain in power and have an obliged judiciary. These scholars would also argue that the Jackson Democracy Movement was due to the nation’s lawyers seeking prestige as potential judges and not because of societal sentiment. These scholars have supported their position with empirical data.

The reason proposals for changes in these methods fail or succeed is influenced by cultural and socio-political considerations. According to sociologist Ann Swidler, culture is like a “tool kit” that people may use “to solve different kinds of problems.” A change in method could create “culture shock,” which “grows out of the difficulties in assimilating the new culture, causing difficulty in knowing what is appropriate and what is not.” Consider as an example if the judges, lawyers, and the electorate in Colorado, a merit-selection state, or Louisiana, an election state, were suddenly required to switch to the other method. This would be tantamount to telling those judges and others that they now have to speak Chinese without having taken a course in the language. These judges are indoctrinated and inculcated into their state’s existing selection method. Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, argued “that people are unlikely to jettison an unworkable paradigm, despite many indications that the paradigm is not functioning properly, until a better paradigm can be presented.” If a better paradigm is presented and a change is accepted, the next step
would be to implement a change management component. 183

V. INTERIM REMEDIES

A. Campaign Finance and Public Finance Laws

Prior to Citizens United, 24 states had laws banning or severely limiting corporate electioneering, 186 and 16 states either limited or completely banned corporate contributions to candidates. 187 The Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United will effect the removal of these corporate expenditure limits or bans. The National Institute on Money in State Politics noted the effect of the Court’s decision:

The “Citizens United v FEC” ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court has no effect on campaign limits in place at the state and federal levels but may effectively overturn laws in 24 states that ban or restrict corporations from funding [advocacy] for or against state candidates. In the 22 states that prohibit corporations from giving to candidates, individuals contributed about half of the money raised by candidates and non-individuals provided less than one-fourth. The reverse is true in the 28 states that allow corporate giving. 188

Elected judges are generally subject to the same state camp-


190. Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Missouri, Ohio, Texas, and Wisconsin. Id.


193. Office of the New Mexico Secretary of State, Voter Action Act, http://www.sos.state.nm.us/temp.htm (last visited Dec. 8, 2010); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19A-2, 3 (making public funding available to any “covered office,” which is defined as “any office of the judicial department subject to statewide election”).


198. Posting of Zachary Proulx to the Brennan Center for Justice blog, Also a Winner: Public Funding, http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/archives/also_a_winner_public_funding/ (Nov. 10, 2008).
cases challenging it on First Amendment grounds. In a notable example, the United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari over a First Amendment challenge to Arizona’s public financing statute in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett. In the meantime, however, Citizens United may pave the way for unbridled corporate contributions to judicial campaigns in states where there are no limits on corporate contributions to elections. But all of the concerns over campaign contributions to judicial campaigns may take a backseat if judges consistently perform well. As Judge Kevin Burke put it “the best anecdote or vaccine to all of the problems with the methods is consistently good performance by the courts. If there is public satisfaction with the 100 million cases heard each year, even Bill Gates won’t be able to buy a judge.”

B. Oversight Commissions

There has been a continuing call for the creation of judicial oversight commissions. The oversight performed by such commissions ranges from judicial education programs to an examination of judicial codes. For example, in 2006, the Kentucky Judicial Campaign Conduct Committee was formed, an unofficial, non-partisan organization. The Committee’s objectives include educating the public “about the important differences between judicial campaigns and campaigns for partisan political office,” helping candidates “campaign in an ethical and dignified manner,” monitoring advertising “to detect and deter improper campaigning,” and investigating complaints “about unfair campaign tactics and [issuing] public statements about such tactics.” The committee also asks judicial candidates to sign a campaign pledge, which states that the candidate will conduct their campaigns in accordance with the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct. The pledge further states that candidates will not engage in false or misleading advertising and will not make accusations that “impugn the integrity of the judicial system, the integrity of a candidate, or erode public trust and confidence in the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.” The National Center for State Courts recently added an Internet resource to aid those states that are contemplating the establishment of an oversight committee.

C. Mandatory Qualifications

While the merit method has minimum qualifications in place for judicial appointments by nomination commissions, elective states sometimes have little or no minimum qualifications for a judicial candidate. This might result in a new attorney without any legal experience running against an incumbent judge. Those states that have election methods should consider creating or strengthening judicial qualifications. Another approach is to establish statewide systems of independent judicial qualification commissions who will be charged with identifying and encouraging potential candidates to run for judicial office. These commissions would evaluate the candidates to ensure that whoever is on the ballot is indeed qualified.

D. Better Voter Education and Awareness

There are some scholars who believe that the most important agent for change lies in educating the public about the work of judges. To this end judges can increase their interaction with citizens and educate them about the judicial branch and the duties and obligations of a judge. But these outreach efforts need not be limited to judges. For example, “in Arizona and Missouri new 501(C)(3) organizations will work


200. 2010 WL 3267528, at *1 (U.S. Nov. 29, 2010).

201. Statement of Judge Kevin S. Burke, Hennepin County District Court Judge, Minnesota.


205. Id.


207. Scotland, supra note 135, at 1103.

208. For example, North Carolina, which elects their judges at every level, merely requires a candidate to be licensed to practice law. American Judicature Society, Methods of Judicial Selection: Selection of Judges, supra note 7.


The presupposition of the debate is that everyone, including the judges themselves, want a judge to be a “good” judge, and each method claims to produce the best judges.

F. Randomly Selected Citizen Commissions, Independent Paid Evaluators, Threshold Responses, Weighted Measurements, and Appeals Processes

The judicial-election method is not alone in needing some stopgap measures. There are inherent concerns with the merit-selection method: the risk that appointments to nominating commissions may be politicized, the attorney-centric composition of these commissions, and the potentially flawed methodology these commissions use to compile data on judges. To avoid the concern that politics and the bar influence commissions too greatly, states could form commissions in part by randomly selecting citizens from the rolls of registered voters from each congressional district. The remaining commission seats could be filled out with political appointments from categories such as higher education, labor, and of course, the law. This is the process used by the Washington Citizens’ Commission on Salaries for Elected Officials, which oversees judges’ salaries. To address the data-compilation problem, a state might follow the lead of Alaska, which has a court-watcher program to evaluate judges. Regarding concerns over the potential for statistically insignificant data and skewed results, states could require a threshold number of responses in each category of respondents or use a weighted measurement of those responses. States should also establish a simple appeals process for judges who believe that a negative evaluation violated their due process rights, as opposed to requiring a judge to appeal to a higher-level commission or resort to litigation.

VI. WHAT MAKES A GOOD JUDGE

The presupposition of the debate is that everyone, including the judges themselves, want a judge to be a “good” judge, and each method claims to produce the best judges. Measuring judicial quality has been researched and addressed by many. Which method produces the greatest judicial quality has been examined through the lenses of judicial discipline, sentencing practices, tort awards, frequency of litigation, frequency of discrimination suits, number of women and minority judges, and independence versus accountability. The question might also be tackled by asking what individual char-

211. Schotland, supra note 135, at 1100.
212. Alaska and Colorado (merit selection and retention); California, Oregon, North Carolina, Washington, and New York City (election). Id. at 1101.
213. Id. at 1100.
214. Id.
215. Id.
218. For example, Colorado permits complaints about district commissions to the overarching state commission, but there is no further process other than litigation. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-5.5-103(1)(p) (stating that the “state commission shall not have the power or duty to review actual determinations made by the district commissions”).
219. For an extensive report on the subject of judicial quality and judicial discipline, see REDDICK, supra note 195. The report suggests that the merit method may produce fewer unfit judges than judicial elections. Id. at 6. Another scholar found a “sharp distinction” between discipline rates of judges initially appointed and those who are elected, with more disciplinary actions regarding elected judges in at least three states. See Schotland, supra note 135, at 1087–88.
220. For a collection of sources regarding the affect of judicial selection on sentencing practices, tort awards, frequency of litigation, and frequency of discrimination suits, see Schotland, supra note 135, at 1087 n.36.
221. See M.L. Henry, Jr. et al., The Success of Women and Minorities in Achieving Judicial Office: The Selection Process (1985) (determining that findings indicate that appointment and merit-selection systems increase minority judicial representation to a greater extent than elective systems); see also Kevin M. Esterling & Seth S. Andersen, Diversity and the Judicial Merit Selection Process: A Statistical Report, in RESEARCH ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 7 (Am. Judicature Soc’y ed. 1999). But see Webster, supra note 153, at 33 (“Some conclude that the method of selection has little effect upon the number of women and minorities reaching the bench. Others conclude that, while contested elections result in fewer women and minorities reaching the bench than do other systems, women and minorities generally fare better under appointive systems than under ‘merit’ systems. Still others insist that ‘merit’ systems bring the greatest number of women and minorities to the bench. The answer to this apparent conundrum may lie in the scope of, and methods used in, the various studies.” (footnotes omitted)).
222. E.g., Dubois, supra note 133.
characteristics or qualities are desirable in a judge. In 1984, the ABA set forth the favored personal characteristics for a judge as integrity, legal knowledge and ability, professional experience, judicial temperament, diligence, health, financial responsibility, and public service.223 John Adams, in Thoughts on Government, stated that judges “should be always men of learning and experience in the laws, of exemplary morals, great patience, calmness, coolness, and attention. Their minds should not be distracted with jarring interests; they should not be dependent upon any man, or body of men.”224 Given this quote, it seems the merit-selection method may have an edge because it is easier for nominating commissions to ensure the presence of these qualifications, while at the same time judges will not be dependent on a “body of men.” But one should bear in mind that either method of selection—merit or election—has the potential to produce good judges. If the electorate is educated and the qualifications to run for office are high, the judge that is selected through the election method may also possess these desired traits. On the other hand, one must also remember that these desired qualities and characteristics are dynamic, not static—a judge selected through the merit method may ultimately become a “bad” judge. And even if the backgrounds and characteristics of judges are carefully scrutinized under both methods, a “stellar resume does not necessarily indicate an excellent analytical mind or first-class judicial craftsmanship.”225

VII. CONCLUSION

The various methods currently used for selecting judges have their roots in U.S. history. What began as the lifetime appointments method morphed into the three methods that can be seen in action in the states today: appointment, election, and merit selection. Movements involving politicians, organizations, and the electorate precipitated the development and popularity of each method. These methods have become more complex over time, with the states either modifying them or toggling between them. This complexity is now compounded by the Supreme Court’s decisions in White, Citizens United, and Caperton, which have all advanced issues related to judicial elections and campaigns, including free speech and campaign finance. These three cases impact almost all judges, regardless of how they are selected. Merit-selected judges may face the prospect of campaigning during retention elections, and thus, like their elected counterparts, may be affected by the ruling in Citizens United. It is only the lifetime appointed judges that need not concern themselves with the implication of that case.

But even though merit-selected and appointed judges may be able to elude the potential pitfalls of judicial campaigns, they must remain cognizant of the propriety of commenting on controversial issues that may come before the court—such comments now seem constitutionally sanctioned after the Supreme Court’s decision in White. Although a judge up for retention may not be as obliged to comment or announce their views as often as their elected colleagues who are conducting a campaign, they may still make statements on controversial issues that will be impacted by White. While the White case opens the door to judicial speech on controversial matters, the adoption and implementation of the 2007 ABA Code will hopefully clarify where the outer bounds of White’s implications lie.

Because Caperton intimated that judges might have to recuse themselves for perceived favoritism or partiality, this case may also impact both merit-selected and appointed judges. Despite the free speech protections in White, these judges might still face recusal or disqualification under Caperton if they comment or announce their views on a matter that later appears before them. Additionally, considering Caperton alongside Citizens United and the resulting clamor over funds being raised in judicial elections, judges need to be aware of who is contributing to their campaigns and the amount of funds given, and whether those two factors may create a perceived or actual bias with respect to any parties appearing before them. Collectively, these recent Supreme Court cases affecting the judiciary still leave much to be resolved.

These three cases, along with the ever-increasing funds raised in judicial campaigns and the continued dissatisfaction with the judiciary as a whole, have reignited the two-century old debate about which method of judicial selection is the best. Asking what method is “best” begs the question of what method produces the “best” judges. The answer depends upon which lens you are looking through. But even then, one must remember that a judge’s behavior and conduct may be dynamic, not static.

From the inauguration of the U.S., there have been many arguments for and against the varying methods of selecting judges. Although the election method may appear to be in dire straits, no one method is free from controversy, no one method is perfect, and there is no silver bullet for attaining perfection. What history tells us is that what a particular method claims to accomplish and what the evidence suggests that it accomplishes are sometimes different. More importantly, history tells


us that the debate may go on forever without any true resolution. While this Paper did not attempt to construct a hypothetical, perfect method, it did present some interim remedies. In the context of judicial elections, these measures include campaign finance reform, public financing of judicial campaigns, oversight commissions, mandatory qualifications, extended term lengths, and improved voter education and awareness. In the context of the merit method, these measures include randomly selected citizen nominating commissions, independent court evaluators, and improved court evaluation data through threshold responses, weighted measurements, and an appeals process for negative evaluations.

Although judges’ behavior and actions may be unfairly influenced by the judicial selection method used in their state, there are several means for keeping this undesirable consequence in check, including case law, advisory opinions, and judicial codes of conduct. But these factors should only serve as a baseline for what is acceptable conduct for a judge—it is not enough for judges to merely seek technical compliance with the fluctuating methods of selection and retention or the mechanics of judicial directives and mandates. Judges should take a leadership role and become visionaries. In this role, judges may encourage those individuals and organizations engaging in the judicial-selection debate to consider using their energy, talent, and capital to collaborate across the ideological divides and explore a selection method that both accentuates the positive and eliminates the negative aspects of the existing methods. This exploration must include sensitivity to the inculcated cultural and socio-political differences between all judges and all methods. It is not enough to substitute one method for another. To do so would be akin to replacing an engine in a car that has electrical problems in the hope that it would run more efficiently.

Building upon the extensive literature, the dearth of studies, and the numerous prior national and statewide summits and symposia on the subject matter,226 judges could harness and capitalize on the new fervor in the debate and seek to reframe it. To this end, the American Judges Association could build upon its previous White Paper on fairness, and continue to enhance the credibility of judges, by proposing and hosting a think tank, summit, or symposium on this subject. This approach should not only include judges, scholars, organizations, and lawmakers, as was done in the past to some degree, but should also include a missing component: the socio-cultural experts. This addition could address the difficulty with paradigm shifts, cultural change, and change management. This approach will forge relationships, advance the discussions, and hopefully create a new blueprint for judicial selection. We as judges need to look outside ourselves, think outside the box, shift the paradigm, and consider creating a selection method that recognizes and reinforces the true objective of selecting and retaining judges, that is, impartiality, independence, and accountability. The citizenry needs to trust that when judges are given a choice between impartiality and bias, honesty and dishonesty, and reason and capriciousness, judges will invariably choose the more honorable of these concepts.

Judge Mary A. Celeste is president of the American Judges Association. She is the Presiding Judge of the Denver County Court; she was appointed a member of that court in 2000. Celeste is a graduate of San Diego State University and California Western School of Law, where she was the editor-in-chief of the law journal and the recipient of scholarships, fellowships, and awards. While practicing law, she was a member of the Colorado Bar Association Board of Governors, the Career Service Authority, the Personnel Board for the City and County of Denver, the Denver Bar Association's Conciliation Panel, and the Board of Directors of the Colorado Women's Bar Association, and she is currently the president of the Women's Bar Association Foundation. She has published several articles and has been an adjunct professor of law at the University of Denver College of Law. Celeste has received the Judicial Excellence Award from the Denver Bar Association, the Judicial Excellence Award from the Colorado Women's Bar Association, the American Association of University Women's Trailblazer Award, and the Colorado Humanities Award. She presently sits on the Colorado Advisory Committee for the U.S. Civil Rights Commission.

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* This appendix was compiled from information found on the American Judicature Society website, http://www.judicialselection.us/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2010).