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Introduction: Moral Development Study in the 21st Century

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Questions of right and wrong, good and bad, lawful and unlawful, have been debated by philosophers, theologians, scholars, and ordinary people since ancient times. The moral domain represents humanity's answers to three questions: What is the right thing to do? How is the best state of affairs achieved? What qualities make for a good person? However, the scientific investigation of the moral life has a much shorter intellectual history than does philosophical and religious reflection; nevertheless, it is not new. Moral development theory and research emerged as a critical topic over 100 years ago, at the beginning of the 20th century. Thus, given this deep background, it may surprise readers to learn that this is the very first time that the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation has served as a forum to reflect on what we know about moral development and motivation and to integrate theory and research with practical implications for schools, communities, and childrearing. This book presents the products of the 51st Nebraska Symposium on Motivation: "Moral Development through the Life Span: Theory, Research, and Applications." The symposium was held in Lincoln, Nebraska, in April 2003.

Interest in moral development and motivation has been prominent in the field of psychology since Sigmund Freud's theory about the Oedipus complex and the formation of the superego. Indeed, dur-

ing certain earlier decades, especially the 1970s and 1980s, moral development was a hot and contentious topic among social and behavioral scientists. Various proponents of behavioral versus structural theories, such as Lawrence Kohlberg and Jacob Gewirtz, enjoyed squaring off in public and professional debates. Some important books, such as Lickona (1976), Kurtines and Gewirtz (1984), and Eisenberg, Reykowski, and Staub (1989), grew out of those debates, and, even today, these sources are useful for reading clear statements of the alternative theoretical perspectives, which are presented as competing approaches to the study and interpretation of moral development. However, following that lively but contentious period, the 1990s represented a quieter time of solid and steady gains in research study of moral development and prosocial behavior as well as a period of serious attempts at theoretical reconciliation and bridge building.

This volume presents some of the most significant fruits of that labor by distinguished and well-known researchers in the field. It is intended to summarize what we now know about moral motivation theory, research, and application across the life span. Although not all major theoretical or empirical traditions are covered here, the authors represent diverse theoretical orientations and methodologies that address many of the important issues in moral motivation. Various themes run throughout the chapters, and each chapter summarizes work that adds to our existing knowledge regarding moral development.

The Historical Background to Current Research

To understand our existing scientific knowledge of moral motivation, it is necessary first to consider some aspects of the historical, cultural, and contextual underpinnings of the major research going on in this field today. There is now a long and storied tradition of scholarly advances in the study of moral development. The first large systematic study of children's cheating, lying, obedience, and other "good" behavior was conducted by Hartshorne, May, and Shuttleworth (1930). James Mark Baldwin (1897), a developmental psychologist, and John Dewey (1930), a philosopher and educator, were two other Americans who did important foundational writing about the ways in which moral thinking unfolds in childhood, but they did not

test or document their theories with empirical research. Jean Piaget in Geneva, Switzerland, drew partly on the work of Baldwin when he invented new and productive ways to observe and interview children and then construct a framework with which to understand children's conceptions of games, rules, punishment, and justice and fairness (Piaget, 1932/1977).

Schooled in these early theoretical speculations and bodies of findings as well as in the sociological theories of George Herbert Mead (1967) and Emile Durkheim (1979), Lawrence Kohlberg initiated the contemporary era of systematic empirical research when, in the 1960s, he formulated his "cognitive-developmental" stage theory of moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1981, 1984; Kohlberg, Levine, & Haver, 1983) in the form of strong claims and invited the field to engage in dialogue on the basis of argument and empirical evidence. At Harvard University, Kohlberg worked with a series of colleagues and students who went on to refine, elaborate, or critique and revise his theory in major ways, extending its reach into such areas as domain theory and social conventions (Turiel, 1983), social perspective taking (Selman, 1980), ego development (Kegan, 1982), distributive justice concepts (Damon, 1977), sociomoral reflection (Gibbs, Basinger, & Fuller, 1992), women's "way of knowing" (Belenky, 1986; Gilligan, 1982), and cross-cultural studies (Edwards, 1979, 1985; Snarey, 1985). Methodological issues (measurement, reliability, validity) were central, and Ann Colby and Kohlberg (1987) published a manual to aid systematic methods of coding and scoring moral judgment interviews. James Rest at the University of Minnesota established a center devoted to research on moral development using a paper-and-pencil questionnaire based on Kohlberg's theory of moral development (the Defining Issues Test; Rest, 1979; for more discussion, see Narvaez, in this volume). Kohlberg was always deeply committed to making positive changes in human life and society and, with such colleagues as Clark Power and Ann Higgins (Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989), innovated methods of stimulating the development of moral reasoning and attitudes in school and prison settings.

Meanwhile, the theory aroused passionate debate and criticism (e.g., Gilligan, 1982; Kurtines & Grief, 1974). Not only were more behaviorally oriented psychologists eager to establish alternative methods for systematically studying prosocial values and behavior (see, e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1989; Staub, 1978), but also educators moved

quickly to establish alternative ways of promoting “character education” in schools as a way of fostering the development and practicing of attitudes and behaviors creating respect for others, caring attitudes, empathy, and appropriate cooperation with authority (see also Noddings, 1984). Many of these programs have thrived and become influential models (e.g., Battistich, Watson, Solomon, Schaps, & Solomon, 1991). Thus, the controversies stimulated a rising and vital field of study and helped set the agenda (pro and con) for much of the ensuing research and practice regarding moral development and education.

Since Kohlberg’s death in 1987, moreover, the field of moral development and education has continued to evolve and change. Its theoretical foundations have undergone important transformations, perhaps as the almost inevitable consequence of over 4 decades of accumulating empirical study as well as the sustained, extensive scholarly debate. In this volume, we present the views of six noted scholars concerning the most important recent findings. Our contributors synthesize work that has had, or is expected to have, a significant impact on moral development theory, research, and application.

The varied research traditions in moral development and motivation are linked to crucial differences in underlying metatheoretical assumptions. These philosophical and scientific assumptions are inherent to their perspectives, and they affect how each scholar both interprets observed moral phenomena and selects his or her research methods. In simplified terms, the issues can be considered by addressing a series of critical questions. (1) What *motivates* moral thinking and behavior? While emotions, intellect, and values may all be part of the story, what is most important for the researcher to study and describe? (2) Are *objective* standards or validating criteria (such as religious commandants or approval by society) necessary to judge and justify a person’s actions? Or, instead, are matters of right and wrong (good and bad) dependent on human beings’ *subjective choices*, which cannot be externally validated? (3) Are any moral rules or principles *universal* to all times and places, in the sense that they ought to be recognized by all human societies, or are moral issues necessarily specific and *relative* to cultural and historical contexts and circumstances? (4) What is the *nature of human beings* who make choices and engage in moral or immoral actions? Are they *active* and *autonomous* moral agents or, instead, *passive* persons whose behav-

ior is (fully) explained by processes of socialization/social influence or by unconscious emotions beyond individual control? (5) What is the place of *spirituality* or *faith* in moral development as well as in research? Can nonrational processes like the spiritual dimension of moral decisionmaking be investigated by moral researchers? Does *spiritual* development have a legitimate place in public school or community service programs that seek to promote moral development? (6) What scientific *methodologies* should be employed and what kinds of evidence brought forward to study moral motivation and development? Should *affective* or *cognitive* processes be the focus of attention? What kind of evidence about *actions*, or *observed behaviors*, is required to substantiate a research program? (7) Finally, what is the relation between moral development research and *childrearing and education*? That is, what can (and should) be fostered through processes of socialization or programs of therapy, reconciliation, and education? Are such efforts primarily intended to foster changes in people's *ideas* and *expertise* in rational decisionmaking, or, instead, are they directed toward creating changes in people's *emotions*, *feeling capacities*, and *sphere of concern*?

Because the philosophical, scientific, and educational issues that lie behind and drive each scholar's program of research make for interesting contrasts, we provide a preview of the volume and its dominant themes by considering what the authors have to say about each of these key questions. Readers will, we believe, find that the chapters provide stimulating and provocative reflections on some of the most important and timely issues of our day. The authors represent some of the sophisticated and up-to-date theories, research, and applications in knowledge about moral development across the life span.

What Motivates Morality?

Moral behavior is *intentional* behavior, but what motivates it? Kagan describes two essential motives as the foundation of moral behavior: first, an emotional motivation to gain sensory pleasure (and avoid pain); second, a cognitive motivation to confirm that one's behaviors, thoughts, or feelings are in accord with one's concepts or representations of what is good. Eisenberg focuses on the influence of empathy-related responding in motivating behavior. Although the primary

focus of her research in graduate school was moral reasoning, over time she became convinced that affective responses (empathy, sympathy, and personal distress) are as important as or more important than rationality (moral reasoning) in predicting both prosocial and antisocial behavior. Power and Narvaez seem to agree that moral motivation is an explicit yearning or desire to *be* good (virtuous, righteous) and to *do* good for self and others. Narvaez describes four processes fundamental to a moral orientation: moral sensitivity; judgment; motivation; and action. Power's model delineates cognitive, environmental, and spiritual conditions or experiences that push individuals to seek the good. Hart, a personality theorist, is interested in moral identity as a source of motivation. Identity is composed of experiences related to self-awareness, continuity through time and place, the self in relation to others, and the self as the basis for strong evaluations. It includes the important plans, goals, and values that form a basis for the individual's perceiving, judging, and acting. Hart acknowledges that personality attributes influence moral responses but reminds us of the social forces (community conditions) that can facilitate or mitigate those behaviors.

Finally, Staub provides the most elaborated discussion of moral motivations. He emphasizes a core set of basic human *needs*, such as needs for nurturance, affection, and guidance in childhood. Emotional deprivation and difficult and challenging environments usually frustrate the individual and lead to negative emotions, such as anger, envy, hostility, and aggression. Staub lays out a typology of moral motivations: (1) beliefs or principles, such as enlightened self-interest, the golden rule, or the sanctity of life; (2) altruism, which arises out of empathy, sympathy, compassion, and, occasionally, suffering; and (3) prosocial value orientation, which refers to a positive view of humans and a sense of responsibility for others' welfare. "Inclusive caring" (as opposed to in-group caring), moral courage, and positive bystandership are forms of moral motivation especially important to Staub.

Is Morality Objective or Subjective?

All researchers on moral development make some assumptions regarding the objectivity versus subjectivity of basic moral principles. Certainly, ethicists have debated questions about the truth basis of

morality and ethical decisionmaking for thousands of years without coming to a consensus. Scientists, too, make different judgments, having responded in contrasting ways to the complex issues involved. On the one hand, as moral researchers, they participate in the Western community of science, which inherits an ancient intellectual legacy of notions about truth seeking that is rooted in Greek philosophy, for instance, Platonic notions about moral “ideals” that can be and should be rediscovered by the rational mind. The Platonic tradition has endured in the influential works of philosophers such as Immanuel Kant (1785/1993) and, more recently, John Rawls (1971, 2001). Along that same line, most moral researchers are descendants of cultural-religious traditions that affirm some objective and universal basis to certain moral principles, all the major world religions (Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism) recognizing basic ethical laws or moral commandments.

On the other hand, contemporary moral researchers undergo training that immerses them in psychological concepts of consciousness and the self. They are exposed to developmental theories concerning childhood socialization and enculturation along with social-psychological theories about interpersonal influence that heighten recognition of the conscious and unconscious sources of individual decisionmaking and the influence of context. Along this same line, moral researchers as social scientists learn to appreciate the difficulty of choosing one single “correct” overarching theory that explains all aspects of human development, and they are trained in descriptive and predictive statistical analytic techniques based on probabilistic determinism. All these influences incline researchers to question whether moral decisionmaking can be truly objective.

Perhaps as a result of their scientific training, many moral developmental psychologists currently take the view that moral phenomena are interpreted and processed in unique ways by each individual, as stated by Narvaez in her chapter. For example, both Kagan and Staub devote major portions of their chapters to summarizing what they see as the most important and general cognitive mechanisms and developmental processes that can help account for the incredibly wide range of human moral choices and phenomena. Kagan suggests that there is a “good” to which human beings aspire, and he identifies a developmental cascade of processes that help account for individual and group differences in moral actions, yet he explicitly

rejects an objective basis to morality. At the Nebraska symposium, he sparked lively debate when he declared that there is no objective way to call immoral even the acts of people (e.g., terrorists) who destroy others in the service of moral ideals. While Staub also focuses on the life-cycle events that tend to promote the development of moral conscience and prosocial behavior, he differs from Kagan in believing that underlying the diversity of human judgments about morality is the basic perception that moral action is about not doing harm or injury to the self or others. Therefore, Staub comes closer than does Kagan to affirming an objective notion of morality.

Eisenberg emphasizes subjectivism when she describes how processes such as empathy-related responding, affectivity, and affect regulation powerfully motivate prosocial and discourage antisocial actions. She defines *prosocial behavior* as voluntary behavior intended to benefit another person and *altruistic behavior* as prosocial behavior primarily motivated by other-oriented, moral values and emotions rather than egoistic or pragmatic concerns. In other words, she asserts that prosocial behaviors might have many different motives but that altruistic behaviors have a much more specific underlying motive.

Hart takes a pragmatic approach and focuses on the intrapersonal and environmental influences of moral character development. Hart applies the notion of *moral luck*, which refers to the positive opportunities available in certain kinds of environments, to his conception of morality. He suggests that moral behaviors are contingent on social circumstances and opportunities as much as on personal qualities. Thus, the moral qualities of individuals can be fostered or hampered by experiences and opportunities in their environment.

In contrast to the others, Power takes the position closest to objectivism by holding to the central Kohlbergian insight that a sense of justice as fairness does, and should, underlie mature and principled moral reasoning. Narvaez, also a cognitive-developmental in the James Rest tradition, has moved away from Kohlbergian notions of principled moral reasoning to the extent of viewing mature moral reasoning as the product of "expertise." The objectivist orientations that are reflected in Staub's, Power's, and Narvaez's perspectives provide some contrast to the subjectivist orientations that are reflected in Eisenberg's, Hart's, and Kagan's perspectives.

Are Moral Truths Universal?

The tension between objective and subjective moral ideals becomes especially apparent when moral scholars debate the universal versus relative nature of moral values and judgments (e.g., Wong, 1984). In the present volume, most of the authors present paradigms that oppose extreme cultural relativism. Kagan is the exception. He argues that cultures with integrity have promoted very different a priori moral standards as moral ideals and that no one can be considered altruistic or prosocial without specifying the agent, the target, and the context of the action.

Leaving aside the issue of whether there are any cultural universals in the content of morality, all six contributors argue for some universal elements of moral motivation or moral development. Kagan posits a universal developmental sequence for the separate components of morality: an initial concept of prohibited acts; an ability to infer the thoughts of another; the acquisition of the value of the semantic concepts *good* and *bad*; the ability to relate past to present; and a recognition of social identity categories to which self belongs. Likewise, Staub, Eisenberg, Narvaez, and Hart claim that there are general cognitive *mechanisms* and emotional *processes* that underlie moral development around the world.

Power goes farther and suggests that these universal formal processes imply a culturally universal basis to the *content* of the human recognition of the good. For example, Power argues that desire for good is tied closely to a desire for truth, justice, and happiness, and he attempts to describe "the categorical, universal, and prescriptive features of the moral domain" (p. 199). Furthermore, Power notes the lack of focus by most researchers on the spiritual aspects of morality, and he asserts that, at the highest stages of moral development, there is transcendent understanding and appreciation of human existence.

It is important to note that the authors' perspectives on the generality of moral processes are not necessarily incompatible with other evidence on the culturally specific aspects of moral decisionmaking (Carlo, Koller, Eisenberg, Da Silva, & Frohlich, 1996; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987; Tietjen, 1986; Whiting & Edwards, 1988). For example, Eisenberg notes that her research suggests that cross-cultural differences in prosocial traits (e.g., moral reasoning) exist. Narvaez agrees but notes that the use of the Defining Issues Test reveals larger

within-group than between-group differences, after controlling for age and education. Staub (1989, 2003), who studies genocide and works to promote reconciliation and healing, is especially interested in societal-level forces and historical conditions that incline whole groups of people to accept authoritarian regimes or commit mass harm to others (see also Moshman, 2004).

One key to reconciling the different perspectives is to examine the multiple sources of between- and within-group variance and consider both additive and interactive effects (Carlo, Roesch, Knight, & Koller, 2001). Acknowledging the additive and multiplicative influences of moral outcomes would reflect the multidimensional, real-life complexity of individuals and enhance the ecological validity of moral development theories. Furthermore, beyond simply documenting individual differences, it is critical to understand them. Many or most aspects of normative moral thinking and behavior grow out of specific cultural contexts for which they may be generally *adaptive* (i.e., they allow people to function together in social settings, manage and control aggression, and negotiate individual striving; LeVine, 1994). For example, working in Kenya, Edwards (1979, 1985; Harkness, Edwards, & Super, 1981) documented that differences in the adult stage of moral reasoning among respected adults and elders (as measured by Kohlberg's structural system) were closely related to the context of daily living: whether conflict resolution was situated within the close setting of a face-to-face community (rural village) or, instead, within the impersonal institutions of a complex society with competing elites. However, adaptation is not the whole story of moral functioning. Any set of normative values or cognitive schemata can quickly become *maladaptive* and reactionary in the face of disequilibrating forces (overpopulation, famine, war, disease) or rapid transformations of economy, education, and technology that outpace individual and group capacities to adapt smoothly. Without attention to the possible impact of historical and societal conditions, there is a danger of overestimating the homogeneity of moral development in diverse social contexts.

Are Human Beings Active Moral Agents?

One of the common themes throughout the volume is the acknowledgment of individuals as active moral agents who have the capac-

ity to control their actions. Whereas some prior theories of moral conduct (e.g., radical behaviorist theories; Skinner, 1971) might have posited the individual as a relatively passive agent, most contemporary theories of moral motivation seem to adopt an interactionist perspective that acknowledges the individual as an active or autonomous agent. Interestingly, however, each theory may differ in terms of the specific impact accorded the environment and the degree to which individuals can modify or select their environment.

The chapters by Power and Narvaez provide examples of theories that emphasize the active role of the moral agent through cognitive and social information processes. Individuals are posited to respond to moral situations on the basis of their own unique perceptions, which make their action choices dynamic and unpredictable. Both Hart and Power acknowledge the role of the “moral self” as an agent of morality—and, hence, self-concept development is an integral part of moral development. Hart places the self inside the community when he discusses “moral luck,” or the socioeconomic community into which the child is born and how poverty and other adverse conditions can overwhelm a community’s capacity to provide its young people with adequate opportunities for public service. Eisenberg and Kagan offer a somewhat different but compatible conception of the active role of the moral agent via the individual’s affective tendencies. According to them, affectivity and affective regulation processes influence both cognitive processes and moral action choices. Two central issues in their scheme are the degree to which individuals are aware of their influence and the degree to which those processes are under individuals’ willful control. In a different but not necessarily incompatible perspective, Staub’s chapter provides the most elaborate account of the interaction between agent and environment.

What Is the Role of Spirituality in Moral Development?

Many theorists of moral development do not explicitly acknowledge the role of spirituality, but Power addresses this topic in depth. Power begins his chapter by referring to Kohlberg’s (1973) proposed “stage 7” (existential stage). The idea of moral development beyond stage 6 was speculative (and, therefore, usually neglected in current textbook descriptions of Kohlberg’s moral stage theory). In his paper on

stage 7, Kohlberg hypothesized that the developing person may seek a kind of cosmic insight or understanding that goes beyond the advanced and principled understanding of justice and welfare encoded in the postconventional moral judgment stages. Although Kohlberg was tentative in his hypotheses, Power has picked up on the invitation to speculate about cosmic or spiritual awareness as part of moral development. Power believes that individuals who have attained a sophisticated level of moral reasoning sometimes also thirst for a mystical and personal understanding of the relation between their moral self and the natural or supernatural universe. Their sense of transcendence and spiritualism can be a source of moral inspiration and motivation. Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence to support this notion, but Power provides compelling anecdotal descriptions of how deep spiritual convictions and commitment interplay with moral understanding and lead to moral actions and self-sacrifice (but see Colby & Damon, 1992; Oliner & Oliner, 1982). Furthermore, Hart studies young people nominated as "care exemplars," and he discusses findings that suggest that most of the adolescents became involved in their moral commitments through social institutions such as churches, service agencies, and schools. Clearly, this is an area that deserves more attention from future researchers.

What Methods Should Be Used to Investigate Moral Development?

It is evident from our discussion of the various metatheoretical assumptions that the experts contributing to this volume have employed different methodological techniques in their research. However, arguments about methodology did not dominate the discussion at the 51st Nebraska symposium. Perhaps this should not be surprising since debates that took place in the field 20 years ago about the superiority of different research strategies (e.g., clinical interview format, paper-and-pencil questionnaires, experimental observations of prosocial behavior, physiological measures of affective responding) have given way in recent years to a general acknowledgment of the potential benefits of using multiple methodologies. This transformation has yielded a rich pool of new information that promises to converge to provide a complex and differentiated conceptualization of moral development. We are moving toward a more integrated under-

standing that includes cognitive and emotional dimensions, micro and macro levels of analysis, and proximal and distal causal factors.

Power and Narvaez, who emphasize cognitive-developmental and information-processing approaches, use a combination of traditional and innovative methodologies to assess the cognitive components of moral development. Kagan, in contrast, is particularly interested in temperamentally based reactions to unfamiliar events and situations, and, therefore, he advocates longitudinal research on the interaction of physiological predispositions (reactivity) and emotional dispositions relevant to moral development (such as shame and guilt). Eisenberg provides a synopsis of her multimethod approach, which relies heavily on physiological markers, self-report and multiple-reporter measures, and observational techniques. In her chapter, she argues for the importance of carefully distinguishing different kinds of empathy-related responses and measuring them separately. Each affect—defined as *empathy*, *sympathy*, and *personal distress*—has different predictors and outcomes. For example, sympathy is associated with enhanced prosocial responding toward needy or distressed individuals, whereas personal distress reactions sometimes are negatively related to helping and sharing. Similarly, Staub relies on research findings from various methodologies but extends his analysis by reflecting on case studies of individuals and societal-level events. In contrast, Hart uses a case study approach and also borrows heavily from personality traditions in using large, archival data sets to examine the personality by situation interactions that predict moral functioning.

How Are Theory and Research Linked to Applications?

Questions regarding moral motivation become most significant when we begin to develop programs aimed at promoting and fostering moral development. Each of the chapters offers insights into the various sources of moral motivation and implications for childrearing or education. For example, Eisenberg's chapter indicates the heuristic value of distinguishing between several categories of empathy-related responses (empathy, sympathy, and personal distress) because each appears to be positioned differently along the pathways linking socializing events and long-term prosocial outcomes. High levels of sympathy and empathy are linked to more

positive outcomes, whereas high levels of personal distress (e.g., discomfort in the presence of someone needing help or comfort) tend to predict more negative outcomes such as low levels of prosocial behavior (e.g., avoidance). Kagan's chapter likewise suggests the vulnerability of highly anxious people to uncomfortable levels of guilt and shame. Although not discussed at length in the present volume, programs designed to foster empathic responding or to regulate emotional responding have been the focus or part of many prevention and intervention programs (e.g., Battistich et al., 1991).

The chapters by Power, Narvaez, Hart, and Staub go farthest in elaborating links between theory, research, and application. Power identifies three social contexts for promoting moral development: schools; prisons; and sports. Based on Kohlberg's theory, the *just-community approach* provided a rich source of innovation in moral education (Power et al., 1989). Power makes a persuasive argument that, although the just-community program was originally designed to foster moral judgment and reasoning through discussion and reflection, it actually affected behavior and motivation as well and involved changes in the moral atmosphere of the school, prison, or community program toward becoming a democratic and respectful community. Power's reflection on the impact of those pioneering projects provides compelling evidence on the links between moral cognitions, emotions, and behaviors.

In recent years, Power has turned his attention to implementing moral development through sports activities and participation. Similarly, Hart and his colleagues have developed a program designed to promote social responsibility and care through sports. The Sports Teaching About Responsibility and Respect (STARR) program is an exemplar of programs that can work under some of the most adverse social circumstances, given the unique potential of sports to attract and motivate young children and adolescents in situations where other approaches to character education may fail. These research-based, systematic ventures into changing moral character through participation in team sports will undoubtedly become the subject of much discussion and analyses by future moral developmental scholars.

Narvaez provides the most in-depth discussion of the application of moral education programs in schools. She summarizes in her chapter various techniques that practitioners, teachers, and profes-

sionals (and parents) can use to promote moral development in children. Based on a program developed for schools in Minnesota, Narvaez's approach is comprehensive and multidimensional and designed to address the four components of morality (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999).

Hart's chapter, as noted above, addresses how and why some adolescents come to have relatively more moral elements in their identity. Hart is interested in how identity comes to be invested in moral lines of action through opportunities to join with others in the activity or to be called to the activity by others. His work suggests the importance of community service for developing adolescents.

Finally, Staub's chapter focuses on raising caring and nonviolent children but also includes reflections on significant societal-level moral needs and challenges. Staub has long been interested in promoting active caring and helping, and he has helped create training programs for teachers, police, and others to reduce violence, racism, and the passivity of bystanders. He is also an expert on the roots of collective violence and genocide (Staub, 1989) and has spearheaded a project in Rwanda and worked with world leaders to promote healing, forgiveness, and reconciliation. His chapter finds echoes throughout the volume when he describes what we know about raising children to be "inclusively" caring, that is, children who care about all human beings. The theme of *moral courage*—going beyond the expected in the face of adversity—was important to all the contributors and participants at the 51st Nebraska Symposium on Motivation.

In conclusion, this volume represents a set of chapters equally guided by respect for diverse theoretical perspectives, for experimental as well as observational and interview methodologies, and for traditional as well as innovative approaches for studying the physiological, emotional, cognitive, and even spiritual sources of moral motivation and behavior.

We hope that the integrations, analyses, and speculations offered here will be provocative and that they will inspire a renewed interest in moral development theory and research as well as renewed optimism about their potential to be implemented at individual and collective levels of moral education.

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