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Is Corn Ethanol Economically Viable in the Long Run?

Richard K. Perrin
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, rperrin@unl.edu

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Is Corn Ethanol Economically Viable in the Long Run?

The corn ethanol industry is in the pits, with plants being idled and firms declaring bankruptcy. Not only that, but each month seems to bring a new study assailing corn ethanol because it doesn’t help the environment, or it doesn’t reduce dependence on foreign oil, or it drives up food prices, or it is harmful to health.

These assertions each have some basis, and they have gone far to undermine public policies in support of corn ethanol. So what then is the future for the industry? Can it survive without mandates and subsidies? To answer, we must first look at the cost structure.

During 2007-08, my colleagues and I conducted a detailed survey of production costs at seven recently constructed corn ethanol plants, one each in Nebraska, South Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Wisconsin and Michigan. We found that these plants were more efficient than generally thought, with lower carbon footprints than regulatory agencies have been estimating. The average operating costs for these firms in 2006-07, plus our estimate of capital cost is shown in Table 1.

If corn and other prices were the same today, these plants would be just about breaking even, as current ethanol prices are in the vicinity of this total cost. But corn costs are higher, raising cost by about $0.20/gal. Some firms currently have much higher capital servicing payments than the capital cost estimate here (due to short-term borrowing), creating cash flow problems they are unable to survive.

In the longer run, corn ethanol may have to compete without benefit of mandates or subsidies. The figure below helps to see how corn ethanol competes with petroleum.
Oil price is currently about $40/barrel, which if it persists, would translate to a wholesale (rack) price of premium gasoline of about $1.30/gal. With no blenders’ credit, the energy value of ethanol would then be, from the dashed red line, about $0.85/gal. and the energy value of corn would be only about $0.85/bu. The current blenders’ credit of $0.45/gal. raises these values to about $1.30/gal. and $2.50/bu.

Hence, corn ethanol cannot compete with $40 oil unless corn price is below $2.50/bu. with the current blenders’ credit, or $0.85/bu. without that credit. Looked at another way, with current corn price of about $3.50/bu., corn ethanol cannot compete unless oil prices rise to at least $55/barrel. Without the blenders’ credit, oil price would have to be at least $80/barrel for ethanol to be able to compete.

The federal biofuel mandate calls for 50% more corn ethanol by 2015. If the mandate holds, price premiums for corn ethanol will rise until the incentive for that quantity is achieved. Corn ethanol will be profitable. But faltering public support creates concerns that the mandate may be changed, and that the blenders’ credit may expire. In that case, the only hope for a profitable industry is that oil prices rise to $80/barrel or more, so that the industry can afford to pay $3.50-4.00/bu. for corn.
