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FRIENDS AND ALLIES:
THE TONKAWA INDIANS AND THE
ANGLO-AMERICANS, 1823-1884

THOMAS W. DUNLAY

Historical models of Indian-white contact on the frontier emphasize conflict and hostility, yet historians are not unaware that whites and Indians interacted in many different ways in different regions and time periods. Even in cases of Indian-white conflict, it was not at all uncommon to find Indians fighting beside the whites against other Indians, often greatly enhancing the capabilities of the white forces. Some tribes were notable for their long-standing alliance with whites against other Indian tribes; examples include the Catawbas of South Carolina, the Pawnees of Nebraska, the Wyoming Shoshonis led by Chief Washakie, and the Crows of Montana.

A particularly striking example is the Tonkawa tribe of Texas, whose military cooperation with the Anglo-Americans, though intermittent, covered more than half a century. For the Tonkawas it was a period of repeated disasters and inexorable decline, during which they were forced into increasing dependence on the whites for survival. For the military forces of Texas and the United States, the Tonkawas' assistance meant a sometimes decisive improvement in their ability to cope with the Comanches and other tribes of the southern plains.

The reason for the Tonkawas' peculiar relation to the whites lay in their status in relation to other tribes in the region. According to eighteenth-century Spanish officials they were "disliked and even abhorred" by other Indians, although they were sometimes included in alliances of convenience. In the nineteenth century Captain Randolph Marcy described them as "renegades and aliens from all social intercourse with the other tribes." Captain John Ford of the Texas Rangers noted that they were the "black beasts" of the Brazos River Reservation in the 1850s, blamed by the other tribes located there for causing, through sorcery, various unfortunate occurrences. Even in the twentieth century older members of various southern plains tribes described them as witches.¹

Why was this small, nomadic hunting tribe in such bad repute with its neighbors? The obvious and often-cited reason was their known

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TONKAWAS
on the Southern Plains in the
Nineteenth Century

Original Range
of Tonkawas

Western Extent of
Indian Territory
in Oklahoma
cannibalism. There are enough accounts from eyewitnesses to confirm beyond reasonable doubt that the Tonkawas did, on occasion, have ceremonies in which they ate portions of their dead enemies, undoubtedly for religious purposes. For this reason, members of various tribes asserted, they killed Tonkawas when the opportunity offered, especially if they believed one of their kinsmen had recently been devoured by the abhorred tribe. Every man’s hand was against them, and their hand was against every man.²

Yet there may have been an element of hypocrisy and rationalization in this attitude. The Comanches evidently found the Tonkawas’ habits tolerable when the two tribes were allies against the Apaches in the 1700s. The Comanches and other tribes of Texas were accused of similar practices, though the evidence is not clear. It seems fairly certain that the Karankawas of the Gulf Coast, believed to be linguistically related to the Tonkawas, also ate human flesh. Perhaps the Tonkawas were particularly blatant and enthusiastic in their anthropophagy, and perhaps they clung to it in a period when other tribes were giving it up. Some historians suggest that the special hatred for the Tonkawas arose from their assistance to the whites, rather than vice versa, yet the attitude apparently existed in the eighteenth century when the Tonkawas were by no means on friendly terms with the Spanish. In any case, once they were established as pariahs and scapegoats, the common attitude apparently supplied its own confirmation: persecution no doubt prompted responses that in turn seemed sufficient justification for further persecution.³

The white response to the Tonkawas is equally interesting because of its contrast with present-day preconceived images of frontiersmen and their relations with Indians. The legendary Westerner supposedly believed that the only good Indian was a dead one, and the storybook Texan, in particular, never bothered to count the number of Indians he had killed. Examination of the facts, however, suggests greater complexity. The Texas frontiersman, especially before the Civil War, was often glad to have the help of friendly Indians. Those Texans par excellence, the Rangers, won many of their victories with the help of Indian scouts and fighting auxiliaries. The Lipan Apaches, as well as the Tonkawas, were frequent allies of the Rangers in the days of the Republic; Captain Jack Hays, the first great Ranger captain, charged a band of Comanches in company with the Lipan chief Flacco. The most articulate of Ranger leaders, John S. “Old Rip” Ford, freely acknowledged the value of the Indians’ services in his victory over the Comanches north of the Red River in 1858. If these allies do not figure largely in the histories of the Rangers, it may be because they do not fit in well with the myth of the heroic frontiersman.⁴

The situation was by no means unprecedented. From colonial days frontier Indian fighters had found it necessary both to adopt Indian fighting methods and to secure the aid of other Indians, trained from childhood in skills that few whites, starting later in life, could fully learn. There were always some whites on the frontier who recognized Indians as individual people. The good Indian was not necessarily a dead one; he might also be an Indian on the side of the whites. The attitude was not so much, perhaps, one of Hawkeye-Chingachgook comradeship as one of pragmatic cooperation for mutual advantage. Yet the unrelenting “Indian-hater,” who made no distinction between tribes, was generally less knowledgeable and less successful, even in combat, than the man who could come to some sort of agreement with some Indians.

Clearly the Tonkawas were cooperating with the whites fairly frequently by the 1830s. They were scouts for the Texas army in the war with the Cherokees in 1839, and they played a distinguished part in the victory over a massive Comanche raiding party at Plum Creek in 1840. They entered the latter engagement on foot, running beside the Texan horsemen, and emerged mounted on Comanche horses. They sometimes served as scouts against Mexican forces in the same period, and Texans may
have encouraged them to attack Mexicans on their own. A traveler in the Republic in 1842 reported that the Tonkawas "are of much service as spies, and always give the alarm when the Camanches [sic] come in."

Yet this cooperation and battlefield comradeship was always interwoven with mutual suspicion and fear and with contempt on the part of many whites. In the 1820s Stephen Austin forced Chief Carita to flog five of his tribesmen for stealing. There were always episodes where whites, justly or not, accused Tonkawas of stealing food or livestock, or worse. Rip Ford reported an episode of 1849 in which two Tonkawas were accused of eating a white man. They admitted the act but excused themselves on the ground that he was not really a white man, but a German—an indication that the Indians had picked up their white neighbors' prejudices to the extent of trying to play on them. When all reservation Indians were driven from Texas in 1859, the Tonkawas had to go, although many Rangers and experienced frontiersmen doubted the justice or the wisdom of the move, or the accusations of crime that prompted it.

By the late 1850s the Tonkawas were cooperating with federal forces as well as with the Rangers. Some accompanied a small expedition against the Kickapoos in 1857. In 1858, besides their services with Ford's Rangers, the Tonkawas and other Brazos Reserve Indians were in Major Earl Van Dorn's bloody victory over the Comanches in Indian Territory. The forced removal of the Tonkawas caused some bitter feelings against the Texans, yet in 1860 members of the tribe were again campaigning with the Rangers in Indian Territory.

To the Tonkawas the Civil War brought disaster. Residing near Fort Cobb, Indian Territory, at its outbreak, they chose to sign a treaty of friendship with the Confederacy. This action really amounted to a continuation of their historic relationship with the Texans. On October 23, 1862, various tribes ostensibly of Union affiliation attacked the Confederate Indian agency at Fort Cobb and followed this up with a massacre of the nearby Tonkawa village. One hundred thirty-seven Tonkawas reportedly died, including Chief Placido, who had frequently led his warriors against other tribes for the whites. The massacre may have been either in revenge for the alleged eating of a Caddo boy or the result of the Tonkawas' Confederate sympathies. In any case, it is likely that the participants paid off a number of old scores.

After this disaster the remaining Tonkawas seem to have split temporarily. A portion remained in Indian Territory and scouted for Confederate Chickasaw Indian cavalry. The remainder returned to Texas, asked to be allowed to live there, and offered their services to the state against the Comanches. Some state and Confederate authorities found the idea attractive, among them John R. Baylor, who a few years earlier had been the leader of the movement to remove the reservation Indians. He now assured the Tonkawas that he wanted to avenge the death of his old friend, Chief Placido.

Texas was in need of the Tonkawas' services, for the Confederacy never was able to provide adequate frontier defense, and the state suffered from the general decline of the currency. Yet bureaucratic and legislative slowness, division of authority between state and Confederacy, and lack of funds apparently prevented full utilization of the Tonkawas' willingness to serve. While most of the noncombatants lingered about the settlements, begging for food, a portion of the fighting men did participate as scouts in various operations against the hostile tribes. Ranger leader Buck Barry remembered Chief Castile from this period as "my friend and clever scout.

After the war most of the surviving Tonkawas were still in Texas and had been joined by a few Lipans. They had no place to go, for they feared to return to Indian Territory and there was no reservation for them in Texas. By early 1867 Governor J. W. Throckmorton of Texas concluded that living around the settlements had left the tribe so "demoralized" that nothing could be done with them except by military force. Eventually he was able to
persuade the federal military to take over custody of the tribe. In 1867 they were domiciled for a time at Fort Belknap, then moved to the new Fort Griffin on the Clear Fork of the Brazos River when Fort Belknap was abandoned.

This relocation provided a temporary solution to the problem of where they should go, for the army once again had need of them. In the wake of the Civil War, a much-reduced regular army was confronted with a series of Indian conflicts throughout most of the vast Trans-Mississippi West. On the Texas frontier the Comanches and Kiowas had continued their traditional raids through the war years and were not prepared to give up their accustomed way of life for confinement on a reservation. Though reduced in numbers by disease, they were still the “Lords of the South Plains.” They were immensely superior in mobility to the U.S. Cavalry and were operating in country they lived in and knew intimately, but a country whites considered a wasteland. Similar problems confronted the army all over the West, and despite the whites’ ultimate advantages in numbers and technology, military success against the hostile nomads often proved elusive.12

To cope with the problem the army turned to the old method of using Indians against Indians. The Army Act of 1866 contained a provision for the enlistment of Indians “to act as scouts” for a period of up to six months, during which time they would receive the pay and rations of regular cavalrmen. The act simply regularized a practice the army had followed intermittently and haphazardly since its founding. Captain John Lee, commanding Fort Griffin in 1869, considered the Tonkawas a “great acquisition to scouting parties” because of their tracking skills, knowledge of the country, and understanding of the ways of the hostile tribes. Whatever success had been obtained by forces operating out of Fort Griffin,
Lee believed, was in large measure due to the Tonkawa trailers. Like other Indian scouts, they made it possible for the regulars to find and strike the hostiles, taking away at least some of the enemy’s former advantages of invisibility and surprise. Thus after 1867 the Tonkawas settled near Fort Griffin in their own village, with a number of the able-bodied men regularly reenlisted as scouts.

The benefits for the Tonkawas were obvious. They had nowhere else to go and no friends among the Indians except the Lipans. They had always lived by hunting buffalo and deer, believing that their first ancestor had been brought into the world by the wolves and that they must always live as the wolves did, never settling down and farming. Yet if they ventured on the plains to hunt, the far stronger Comanches would seize every opportunity to destroy them. With only 150 persons left, they could not afford any more losses. Their only safety lay with the army, and fortunately the army had need of their skills. The arrangement was mutually advantageous, and the Tonkawa tribe became a little military colony like that of the Romans and very similar to those founded by Spain in the Spanish borderlands.

The Tonkawas did not care to venture far from the fort except in company with military columns. Because of this they were judged cowards, a charge frequently made in the past. Whites failed to understand that the Tonkawas, like most Indians, believed it more sensible to live to fight another day than to sacrifice themselves heroically. The kind of bravery exemplified at the Alamo and by Pickett’s Charge appeared to them the height of insanity; they preferred to make their enemy die for his cause and to get out when the situation became unfavorable. The Tonkawas, in particular, could not afford attrition.

On one occasion in 1839, when some Texans and Tonkawas trapped a group of hostiles in a thicket, the Texans suggested that the Tonkawas enter the brush and flush out the enemy for the Texans to shoot. The Tonkawa chief replied that there were simply not enough Tonkawas to spare for him to follow such procedures. There were instances when a few of the Tonkawas, adorned with war-paint, feathers, and buffalo-horn head-dresses, charged the enemy with loud war-whoops—but they did so with the backing of their blue-coated comrades.

As it often happened when Indian-white relations were other than simple hostility, the whites’ perceptions and emotions about the Tonkawas were ambivalent. Trooper James McConnell described them as the “disgusting remnant” of their tribe, but added that they had one good quality—they had always been “true and loyal” to the whites. Lieutenant Robert Carter, who served with Colonel Ranald Mackenzie’s Fourth Cavalry and saw a lot of them, always described the Tonkawas in terms that made them appear amusing and rather contemptible (he saw all Indians in that light), even in recounting a Tonkawa charge that probably saved his life and the lives of several other troopers. But Carter’s detailed accounts of Mackenzie’s campaigns also made it clear just how indispensable the despised “Tonks” were, and this conclusion was supported by Mackenzie’s own correspondence and the post records of Fort Griffin.

Civilians were similarly ambivalent. They tended to see the Tonkawas as dirty and repulsive, and most failed to excuse their begging as a result of their poverty. D. A. Nance, a local settler, had known the tribe in his childhood and always considered them his friends, boys he had grown up with. His Louisiana-reared wife, however, never got over her fears that they would kidnap her children, in whom the Indians took an intense and no doubt friendly interest. Miner Kellogg, an artist traveling through the country in 1872, was also disgusted by their appearance and habits, yet he also thought that the government had not adequately repaid them for their loyalty and services. Most witnesses from the Fort Griffin years saw them as drunken and debauched, and realized they probably suffered various diseases from their contacts with whites.

The habits that disgusted whites apparently no longer included cannibalism; at any rate, there are no accounts of the practice after the
incident that supposedly led to the 1862 massacre. Witnesses reported that the Tonkawas wore Comanche finger-bones and ears as ornaments, in addition to scalps, but in this they were not unique among plains tribes. At the same time, they seem to have made dolls for their children that incorporated portions of Comanche scalps. On at least one occasion, after troops and scouts had returned from a successful foray, the Tonkawas held a scalp dance at their village that was attended by members of the garrison and local civilians, who thus tacitly joined in celebrating the defeat of the common enemy.18

In the late 1860s and early 1870s the Tonkawas participated in innumerable patrols, pursuits, and campaigns out of Fort Griffin and Fort Richardson, the next post north and east in the cordon that theoretically shielded the Texas frontier. They sometimes comprised as much as half of the smaller expeditions and necessarily participated in the fighting as well as the scouting duties. Indeed, since they were the advance portion of any column, they were likely to be the first in contact with the enemy. They realized this as well as anyone, and yet “civilian” Tonkawas as well as enlisted scouts were eager to accompany military columns. Even if the need to escape the boredom and forced confinement of the post supplied part of their motivation, it is hard to sustain the charge of cowardice. Their experience in such warfare often made them the best men for certain difficult tasks. When Mackenzie’s men in 1871 trapped two Comanches in rough country on the eastern edge of the Staked Plains, the colonel became impatient with the scouts’ slowness in disposing of them and tried to supervise their efforts personally. His reward was an arrow in the thigh. He then let the “Tonks” do it their own way, and by acrobatic maneuvering above the enemy, they soon finished off the two warriors who would not surrender.19

The climax of the Tonkawas’ service came in the “Red River War” of 1874. This campaign, which was supposed to begin with a Comanche revenge raid on the Tonkawas, was originated by the young war leader Quanah to avenge the death of a relative at the hands of Tonkawas and troops earlier in the year. When the army received advance warning and brought the Tonkawas in close to Fort Griffin, the senior Comanche chiefs diverted the enterprise into an attack on white buffalo hunters, who by this time were recognized as a far greater menace than the Tonkawas. In the army’s subsequent campaign to end the wars of the southern plains, five columns converged on the headwaters of the Red River along the eastern side of the Staked Plains in the Texas Panhandle. The columns, commanded by Ranald Mackenzie and Lieutenant Colonel George Buell, were guided by Tonkawas. Indian scouts (Tonkawas, Seminole Negroes, and Lipans) guided Mackenzie to the hostiles’ refuge in the Palo Duro Canyon. Mackenzie noted that his scouts engaged in hazardous reconnaissances as far as forty miles from the main column, and he thought it only proper to award the captured horses to them in compensation for the risk. Buell’s column had less spectacular success, but harassed the fugitive Indians and helped convince them that surrender was inevitable. Unquestionably this result was in large part due to the scouts’ ability to locate the hostiles. The Tonkawas also accompanied Lieutenant Colonel William Shafter’s movements that “mopped up” the last remaining fugitives on the Staked Plains.20

Their very success, however, destroyed the Tonkawas’ occupation. As the demand for their services dwindled, they confronted an enemy more deadly than the Comanches—starvation.

From the beginning of the tribe’s residence at Fort Griffin, the post commanders had issued rations to all. Since men who were not enrolled as scouts voluntarily joined expeditions, this was a reasonable recompense. In 1872, however, the adjutant general’s office in Washington issued a general order that army posts could no longer provide rations for Indians other than enlisted scouts. The post commander at Fort Griffin, Colonel W. H. Wood, evaded the order. He explained to
Headquarters, Department of Texas, that ration issues to the Tonkawas had been customary since the post was established, that their status was special since the men were scouts, and that he wanted to find out if the order applied in this case before carrying it out.

Wood's evasive maneuvers provided the Tonkawas with food for another two years, but in 1874 the prohibition was reiterated. Colonel George Buell, the current post commander, inquired about the matter in early 1875 and received the answer that the Tonkawas were not excepted.21

Buell, who was noted in the army for his care for those under his command, was distressed; the Tonkawas had served under him on various expeditions, and he was loath to watch them starve on his doorstep. It was true that in the past two years the Department of Interior had authorized the expenditure of $700 to purchase sheep and cattle for the tribe, but these herds had not reached the point where they could make the Indians self-sustaining. That summer it was necessary to issue beef rations to the tribe, even though there was no appropriation or authorization. Lieutenant Colonel John Davidson, who temporarily replaced Buell during the summer, commented on the good service the Tonkawas had rendered and suggested that they be given a reservation and supported in some way. In the fall Colonel Buell described the condition of the 119 Tonkawas and 26 Lipans at Griffin as “deplorable” and said that, if necessary, he wished to appeal directly to the President for some sort of action. Again citing their services, he said that while he disclaimed “any intention to reflect on any branch of the government” (a rather obvious reflection on the Bureau of Indian Affairs) he thought someone ought to care for these Indians. As various army officers pointed out to the Department of Interior, there was the possibility that the Tonkawas would turn to depredations on the settlers rather than starve, and the army did not want the responsibility to rest on its shoulders. General Philip Sheridan, not noted for his overflowing sympathy for Indians, endorsed these statements, calling the Tonkawas “a most deserving people, probably the most so of any Indians we have.”22

The juggling of responsibility continued for nearly a decade. The bureau would only assume responsibility for the Tonkawas if it could move them to Indian Territory or to the Mescalero Apache Reservation in New Mexico. An additional appropriation for livestock in 1875 saved the tribe from starvation. They did not become farmers, however, nor did they move to Indian Territory. They steadfastly opposed a return to the territory because they feared another massacre like that of 1862. As for becoming farmers (the official government policy for all Indians), they had no experience and perhaps were too psychologically battered to try. The myth of the wolves’ injunction to their ancestors explains their feelings about their way of life, and it was the basis of his reply when an army colonel asked Captain Charlie why the Tonkawas did not farm and build houses. Charlie responded by asking why the colonel did not do the same. When he replied that as an officer and a soldier he did not have to work, Charlie declared that he too was a fighting man and did not have to work. His answer helps explain why the military frequently achieved greater empathy with the Indians than did civilian missionaries and humanitarians.23

There are only a few such humanizing glimpses of the Tonkawas during this period. White witnesses were generally content to describe them as amusing or disgusting as a group. Miner Kellogg reported that Chief Campo was supposedly 117 years old in 1872 and a veteran of the Battle of New Orleans. William died of pneumonia while on detached service in 1873. When Chief Castile and other Tonkawas complained that the illness was due to brutal mistreatment by a white cavalry sergeant, Colonel Buell forwarded the complaints with a demand for action. The sergeant’s company commander backed his version of events, and apparently there was no further action.

Most of these Indians were known to the whites only by Spanish and English nicknames:
Placido and Campo, McCord, Job, Johnson, Old Henry, and Canteen. Indeed, they may have found these a convenience because of taboos relating to the use of names, particularly those of the dead. There are some indications of sardonic humor, like that of Captain Charlie—even of their playing on the whites' horror of their cannibalism for a joke. For the most part, however, they are not individualized as people who loved, feared, fought, and suffered. Most sources describe the Tonkawas as small and slim, as contrasted with the stocky Comanches—a description supported to some extent by photographs, generally taken some years after the Indian wars. Some of them certainly drank hard in those years, trying the patience of even the appreciative Colonel Buell. 24

The Tonkawas remained at Fort Griffin until 1884 with an army officer assigned as de facto agent, while the bureaucracy thrashed out an acceptable solution. In 1880 a delegation from the tribe inspected various locations in Indian Territory but were not pleased with any available area. They expressed fear of the Comanches and indicated a preference for their native homeland, Texas. Eventually they agreed to accept a reserve remote from the Comanches and near a military post. In 1884 the government installed the ninety-two remaining Tonkawas on the Iowa reservation in Indian Territory. The Iowas, however, protested that their rights were violated, and the following year the Tonkawas were transferred to a tract of land where the Nez Perces had been confined after their conflict with the United States in 1877. The settlement that became Tonkawa, Oklahoma, was founded and the Tonkawas at last ceased to obey the wolves' injunction to roam. 25

Whites often expressed the belief that the Tonkawas were doomed to extinction, and their steadily dwindling numbers seemed to bear this out. In the period immediately following their return to Texas during the Civil War, it was observed that there were no births among them. Some whites speculated that the women were "controverting the course of nature" by the use of herbs, rather than bearing children to be killed by their enemies. The presence of dolls among them a few years later, however, suggests that such a practice was not universal. By the early 1930s there were only six of some forty considered to be Tonkawas, all past middle age, who could speak the language. Since a number of Lipans were associated with them, the chances of preserving any pure Tonkawa line seemed dim. Nevertheless, forty years later there were fifty-seven people who called themselves Tonkawas. 26

The Tonkawas' relationship with the Anglo-Americans was peculiar, though not without parallel. Their difficult position in relation to other Texas tribes, as well as their declining strength, forced them into increasing dependence on the only group that could or would offer them any protection or hope of survival. Texas historian T. R. Fehrenbach condemns them for indulging their hatred of the Comanches by serving the whites, even when they knew "what sort of gratitude" they could expect. 27 This seems a harsh judgement on people caught in a truly desperate situation. If their cannibalism aroused the hatred of the neighboring tribes, the resulting persecution very likely aroused both the hatred and the need for supernatural reassurance that perpetuated the practice of cannibalism. If the Tonkawas' troubles were in some degree of their own making, the same could be said of most of us. Since both the Indians and the whites saw the Tonkawas through the haze of their own preconceptions, they continued to see just what they expected. Perhaps the universality of this human failing is the principal lesson to be learned from the story of the Tonkawas.

The Tonkawas illustrate that Indian-white conflict was not always as simple as we imagine. The Tonkawas, for good reason, did not perceive their interests to be the same as those of other Indians. The same was true of many other tribes who sought cooperation or alliance with the whites. Likewise not all whites, or even all frontiersmen, reacted alike to Indians. Some who were in closest contact with Indians realized that among them there were great differences.
For pragmatic reasons, and perhaps sometimes because of simple friendship and humanity, they found ways to cooperate with some Indians. Naturally they perceived their friends and allies as “good Indians,” regardless of what they thought of the others. For the Tonkawas the basic motive in the arrangement was survival. Without the alliance, as they saw it, there would have been no Tonkawas.

NOTES


13. Ibid., pp. 54-56; S. H. Starr to James Oakes, 20 April 1867; S. D. Sturgis to Acting Assistant Adjutant General, Department of Texas, 18 March 1868; Louis Casiare to L. B. Hayman, 8 February 1869; John Lee to AAAG 5th Military District, 12 March 1869, Post Records, Fort Griffin, NA, RG 393. NA, RG 393 also contains reenlistment records and muster rolls of the scouts.

21. Jones, Notes, p. 72; Friend, Kellogg’s Texas Journal, p. 127; U.S. Congress, House, Tonkawa Indians at Fort Griffin, Texas, 44th Cong., 1st sess., House Ex. Doc. No. 102, 1875, pp. 1–2; S. H. Starr to James Oakes, 20 April 1867, and endorsements; Headquarters, Fort Belknap, to AAAG Dept. Texas, 29 November 1870; W. H. Wood to AAAG Dept. Texas, 6 August 1873, Post Records, Fort Griffin, NA, RG 393. Muster rolls in the Fort Griffin Post Records show debits on pay for rations issued to the “squaw” of each man—probably another way of evading the order.

22. Orders No. 29, Fort Randall, Dakota Territory, 3 June 1883, ACP file on George P. Buell, NA, RG 94; Record of Engagements with Hostile Indians within the Military Division of the Missouri . . . (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1882), pp. 39, 40, 42; on one of these occasions Buell attacked with a force of only two officers, nine soldiers, and nine Tonkawas; E. P. Smith, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to Secretary of Interior, 13 June 1873, Post Records, Fort Griffin, NA, RG 393; Tonkawa Indians at Fort Griffin, pp. 1–4.


24. Friend, Kellogg’s Texas Journal, pp. 124–25; Sjoberg, “Culture of the Tonkawa,” p. 293; Pike, Scout and Ranger, pp. 95–96; Ford, Rip Ford’s Texas, pp. 236–37, and Carter, Old Sergeant’s Story, p. 90, give such instances, all without suspecting that the Tonkawas, who were surely aware of the whites’ reaction to their cannibalism, were having a little fun at their expense; Jenkins, Recollections of Early Texas, pp. 161–62; Gatschet, Karankawa Indians, p. 36, notes great variation in body size; Circular, Headquarters, Fort Griffin, 14 September 1873; C. H. Gorringe to Post Adjutant, Fort Griffin, 18 April 1875; G. P. Buell to AAAG Dept. Texas, 1 June 1873, and enclosure; E. M. Heyl to AAAG Dept. Texas, 24 June 1873, Post Records, Fort Griffin, NA, RG 393. Names of the scouts will be found in their enlistment papers, 1870–77, in the Fort Griffin Post Records; the spelling of Indian names when used suggests that the scouts may have preferred English names to having their own mispronounced by white men’s tongues.

25. Elias Chandler to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 18 January 1882, Letters Received, Bureau of Indian Affairs, NA, RG 75; Wright, Indian Tribes, pp. 251–52; Chapman, “Iowa Reservation,” pp. 313–17.
