

University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln

---

Political Science Department -- Theses,  
Dissertations, and Student Scholarship

Political Science, Department of

---

Spring 12-2012

## Understanding Africa's China Policy: A Test of Dependency Theory and a Study of African Motivations in Increasing Engagement with China

Nkemjika E. Kalu  
*University of Nebraska-Lincoln*

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscitheses>



Part of the [African Languages and Societies Commons](#), [Chinese Studies Commons](#), and the [International Relations Commons](#)

---

Kalu, Nkemjika E., "Understanding Africa's China Policy: A Test of Dependency Theory and a Study of African Motivations in Increasing Engagement with China" (2012). *Political Science Department -- Theses, Dissertations, and Student Scholarship*. 21.  
<https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscitheses/21>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Department -- Theses, Dissertations, and Student Scholarship by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

UNDERSTANDING AFRICA'S CHINA POLICY: A TEST OF DEPENDENCY  
THEORY AND A STUDY OF AFRICAN MOTIVATIONS IN INCREASING  
ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINA

by

Nkemjika E. Kalu

A DISSERTATION

Presented to the Faculty of  
The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska  
In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements  
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Major: Political Science

Under the Supervision of Professor Patrice McMahon

Lincoln, Nebraska

December, 2012

UNDERSTANDING AFRICA'S CHINA POLICY: A TEST OF DEPENDENCY  
THEORY AND A STUDY OF AFRICAN MOTIVATIONS IN INCREASING  
ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINA

Nkemjika Eke Kalu, Ph.D.

University of Nebraska, 2012

Adviser: Patrice McMahon

African states are increasingly engaging with China--politically, socially and economically--especially through the machinations of the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). This dissertation asserts that Africans are willing partners of the Chinese, motivated by their state-centric belief that engagement with China is in their national interest. This assertion contradicts the assumption of most literature to date that appears to borrow from the logic of dependency theory and presents African nations as pawns, subject to the demands of a dominant and exploitative China, who is benefiting at Africa's expense. Economic trends from the decade before the launch of the FOCAC and the 10 years following indicate that increasing engagement with China has not been detrimental to African economic development. Following the establishment of the FOCAC in 2002, Africa as a region is reporting significantly higher GDP growth rates, increased GNI, and GDP per capita. Additionally, African states and China have on the whole experienced a balanced trade flow with few exceptions of uneven balances not always in favor of China. Clearly African states are benefiting from their relationship with China. A case study of Nigeria in 2011 revealed that Nigerians are willing to experience a continued trade deficit with China in order to achieve other important objectives. Nigerians are looking to learn from China's industrialization process and the

economic policies that have resulted in higher growth rates and amelioration of poverty. Chinese investments in Nigerian and African infrastructure development are considered significant and relevant for economic and social development. The influx of affordable Chinese goods has increased the spending power of the average Nigerian and increased the profit margins for Nigerian retailers. Nigerians are engaging with China because it is in their best interest and as this relationship continues to grow, it will need to be managed in order to maximize the benefit to Nigeria.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my dissertation committee members - Patrice McMahon, Ross Miller, Alice Kang, E. Wesley Peterson and Andrew Wedeman – for their invaluable mentorship and assistance in the development of this dissertation. This dissertation also would not be possible without the support of my family and dear friends whose financial and moral support, as well as spare bedrooms made it possible for me to travel to Nigeria to conduct fieldwork. Along those lines, I must thank my parents, Okorie and Chi Kalu, especially my father who served as my driver, fixer, interpreter and bodyguard while I was conducting my research and a very important cheerleader during this doctorate program—I am privileged to have you. In particular, I would like to thank Will Norton and Mary Garbacz who encouraged me to return to Nebraska for a doctorate degree, and have been notable supporters of my post-graduate education. I would like also to thank Julie Nichols, who's proof-reading and editing skills helped retain my sanity and were invaluable in this process. I'd also like to thank scholars at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs in Lagos, who were willing to provide peer reviews for the findings of this study—I am very grateful for your time and contribution. I'd like to thank all the interview respondents, who saw the value in this project and were willing to spare time for me. This project has come to fruition as a result of the support and encouragement of many people, including the Swanson family and so many more. I am so very grateful to you all. Chi, you rock!

Ekele dili gĩ.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

---

	<u>Page</u>
Chapter 1: Introduction	1
Chapter 2: Chinese Capitalism in Africa	19
Chapter 3: Dependency Theory in Africa	43
Chapter 4: An Economic Win-Win	65
Chapter 5: Nigerian Agency	113
Chapter 6: Understanding Africa's China Policy	166
References	185
Appendices	220

## Chapter 1: Introduction

---

The recent growth of Chinese influence and enterprise across Africa has drawn world attention. As a result, both economic and political implications are emerging at the global level, raising concerns among actors in the world economy. Efforts to secure energy sources, among them oil, and to locate natural resources to meet increasing demands of China's domestic industry have spawned an abundance of publications on China's presence in Africa, attempting to address potential repercussions to the African populace, the estimated consequences to Western interests in Africa and overarching effects at the global level.

By all accounts, it would appear that Africa is allowing China free reign. In 2008, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows to Africa have increased from USD\$74.8 million in 2003 to \$5.5 billion a 7,239 percent increase (Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of China, 2009). Simultaneously, the percentage of China's outward FDI allocated to Africa rose from 2.6 to 9.8, a 277 percent increase. Obviously, Chinese FDI to Africa is rapidly accelerating, with more and bigger investments from Chinese enterprise. In 2007, FDI to Africa tripled from \$519 million in 2006 to \$1.6 billion, and then more than doubled in 2008 to \$5.5 billion (Ministry of Commerce, PRC, 2009).

However, this assumption has not been proven empirically and no substantive literature looks at Africa's "China policy." This research intends to understand and

explain African motivations in allowing and increasing Chinese engagement. Additionally, it investigates and challenges widely held assumptions about Chinese exploitation and goes on to explore African perceptions of China's involvement.

Clearly, China's investment in Africa may change the face of global economics.

As Richard Behar writes,

In just a few years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has become the most aggressive investor-nation in Africa. This commercial invasion is without question the most important development in the sub-Sahara since the end of the Cold War – an epic, almost primal propulsion that is redrawing the global economic map (2008).

China's foray into Africa is cause for alarm, primarily because of its potential consequences on the global stage. In particular how China's entry affects demand and supply of sub-Saharan African resources as well as regional political development. This concern has played out in the academic world, where scholars and political scientists are beginning to grapple with such questions as: 1) What, if anything, has been the impact of recent Chinese engagement in Africa? 2) What might be the long-term impacts of this Chinese "invasion?"

This project argues that, to interpret China's presence and impact, it is first necessary to understand what Africans are allowing China to do and why, and further posits that Chinese concerns have entered Africa because Africans *want* them there. In addition, this research argues that African countries are capable of acting strategically. This view is supported by Alden (2007) and Brautigam (2009), who both assert that Africans play a decisive role in Chinese engagement on the continent.



Using Nigeria as a case study, this project attempts to extrapolate the motivations and objectives of Africans who are increasingly engaging with the Chinese. The rationale behind the selection of Nigeria is discussed further in this chapter's methodology section. This research also contends that a more complex relationship is at work, distinct from Africa's previous pattern of international relations, and one that cannot be fully characterized through dependency theory. Although China is making a bid for African resources, its actions are being enacted on a different field, with different rules and thus different results. This view is supported by Ancharaz, who asserts that African agency, political motivations--and consequently, decision-making--are important factors in Africa's new connection with China (2009). Conducted primarily in 2011, this research examines Nigeria's current China policy to ascertain why Nigerians are engaging with China as well as reviewing policy over the last decade. However, the relevance of this study extends beyond Africa or China: it seeks to examine and reveal new relationships in international relations.

### **Theories on Africa-China Relations**

According to dependency theory, Africans are engaging with China because China wants to engage with Africa. However, noted African scholars continue to stress that, while the Chinese may be driven by their own domestic demands, their activity is defined by the African governments and institutions with whom they wish to interact

(Brautigam, 2009; Alden, 2007<sup>1</sup>). As such, African motivations matter because they are at the core of China-Africa relations. African states and their institutions are taking a more active role than current literature gives them credit for. The reasons Africans seek relations with China affects the nature and levels of Chinese engagement within states' borders. In addition, levels of monitoring and types of domestic policies play a key role in defining the character, impact and implications of China's presence in African states. Unfortunately, the literature lacks explanations of African perspectives and offers minimal discussion of African actors' roles in permitting and controlling China's engagement. The cases of Zimbabwe and Sudan are alluded to as representative of African agency in Chinese-African relations (Alden, 2007; Manji and Marks, 2007). Robert Kagan (2006) goes so far as to argue that China is buttressing authoritarian rule and creating an "informal league of dictators" in Africa. However, not only are the cases of Zimbabwe and Sudan atypical of the rest of the continent, Alden (2007) asserts that Chinese engagement in Sudan and Zimbabwe has not provided the levels of support to authoritarian regimes that many scholars claim. While Zimbabwe's autocratic President Mugabe has publicly attempted to woo China with proclamations of a "looking east" policy, China's response to his advances has actually been minimal.

Some studies claim that the impact of Chinese engagement in Africa, whether positive or negative, whether on a comprehensive scale or a small scale benefiting the elite, will be determined by African governments and their policies regarding China

---

<sup>1</sup> Their perspectives are also echoed by Askouri in Manji and Marks (2007) and Zhu (2010).

(Brautigam, 2009; Alden, 2007). While it is clear that African states have found a new partner for trade, aid and perhaps even political and diplomatic support to resist Western-initiated policies and interventions, it is also apparent that to accrue any sort of lasting benefit, African states must actively manage their relationship with China. Existing research has yet to adequately address the motivations of Africans who choose to engage with China and African perspectives on this growing relationship. This study will attempt to address these questions in part by exploring Nigeria's China policy.

### **The Argument**

This research argues that recent China-Nigeria relations display a form of state-centric realism that would be indicative of neo-classical economic theory and not dependency theory. Nigerian relations with the West (specifically the U.S. and the UK) are much like those of the rest of Africa and have often been depicted as and explained by dependency theory (Kalu, 2000; Ikejiaku, 2008; et al)<sup>2</sup>. Dependency is a condition that evolves over time, in which a relationship--generally between two states--develops to the advantage of a dominant state at the expense of another (Prebisch, 1950). Ajakaiye & Kaplinsky, noting the importance of African agency and the consequences of African decision-making, warn against returning to dependency theory as the way to understand this new relationship, because it assumes Africa as a "quivering victim of external forces" (2009: pp. 483). They further argue that Chinese engagement in Africa is increasingly

---

<sup>2</sup> See also Patrick Bond's *Looting Africa* (2006) and Walter Rodney's *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (1972).

attractive, due in part to the novelty of the relationship and the aspiration for a different nature of engagement.

Along the lines of Ajakaiye and Kaplinsky, I posit that, in a similar manner, Nigerians are attracted to the new opportunities China presents and assert that such a young relationship cannot be expected to exhibit reliable indicators of dependency. Chinese policy in Africa is driven by economic diplomacy and a businesslike relationship with minimal political interference, allowing the pursuit of arrangements aimed at producing mutual benefits (Alves in Alden et al, 2008; Moyo, 2009). Additionally, Chinese engagement in Africa has been marked by a significant investment in infrastructure in African states (Mutukwa, 1977; Alden, 2007). Increases in the amount and quality of infrastructure have been linked to positive economic growth and reduction in income inequality; Calderon and Serven go so far as to argue for the development of infrastructure as an effective method for ameliorating poverty (2004). With these factors in mind, it does not appear that a dependent relationship is developing between China and Nigeria.

Dependency theory emerged in the 1950s as a way of understanding relations between countries, in particular those between more developed and less developed countries (Ferraro, 1996).<sup>3</sup> Neoclassical economic theory, however, assumes that economic growth results in net benefit to all, though not always equal benefit, a condition

---

<sup>3</sup> Dependency theory was pushed forward through the work of Raul Prebisch, then-director of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America.

referred to as Pareto optimal.<sup>4</sup> History has shown that despite developed nations' recorded economic growth, developing (i.e. poorer, less wealthy) countries experienced lower levels of growth. In studying this phenomenon, Prebisch made the argument that economic growth in industrialized countries has negative impact on developing countries (1950)<sup>5</sup>. According to this logic, developing countries sell raw materials to developed countries that use those materials to create manufactured "value-added" products that are then sold back to the developing countries at a higher price. The finished goods cost more than the raw materials; thus, developing countries cannot accrue enough income to both pay for their exports and grow their economy. This unbalanced exchange creates a state of dependency for developing countries where "dependency can be defined as an explanation of the economic development of a state in terms of the external influences--political, economic, and cultural--on national development policies" (Sunkel, 1969: pp. 23).

Dependency theory provides an explanation of why developing countries stay poor while industrialized, developed countries become wealthier. However, dependency theory has since been discredited because it lacks cohesion and clarity (Harding, 1976; Chilcote, 1978; Snyder, 1980). More importantly, it fails to account for the influence of local elites' political policies in developing countries and the resulting impact on economic growth (Smith, 1979; Smith, 1981; Sandbrook, 1993). However, many of the

---

<sup>4</sup> Pareto Optimal resource distribution is that which betters at least one person and harms no one else.

<sup>5</sup> The same argument was also made by Andre Gunder Frank (1969; 1975).

arguments made on the nature of economic relations between China and African states still borrow heavily from the logic of dependency theory.

Relations between China and Africa require close examination, and this project seeks to address two major issues. First, it intends to test and investigate whether or not dependency theory explains the nature of Nigeria and China's relationship. Furthermore, it will address whether dependency theory can adequately describe this relationship. This research is supported by Dos Santos' assertion that dependency is a "historical condition... in which the economy of a certain group of countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which their own is subjected" (Fann and Hodges, 1971: pp. 226). I argue that China, like Nigeria, is a dependent-peripheral state<sup>6</sup>, with no dyadic history of dependence. At present, in its early stages, the relationship between China and Nigeria cannot definitively be characterized in terms of dominance and dependence, as dependency theory requires. In addition, if African states play a significant role in determining the nature and scope of their relationship with China to the extent that Brautigam and Alden allege, then dependency does not exist within this setting. Dependency theory dictates that peripheral, developing states (such as those in Africa) are pawns in a system enforced by powerful, dominant states that repress development (Smith, 1979). If in fact African agency is at work, exemplified by rational behavior and decision-making, then it seems that dependency theory offers an inadequate framework for understanding this new relationship between China and Nigeria.

---

<sup>6</sup> Ferraro argues that the dominant (non-dependent) states are the advanced industrial nations in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) of which neither China or Nigeria are members, according to the OECD's website:  
[[http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en\\_2649\\_201185\\_1889402\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html)].

This study also attempts to determine and define Nigeria's China policy and identify its specific objectives. Given this goal, this research fits within Van Evera's classifications as a theory testing dissertation, in this case, testing dependency theory to see if it provides a sufficient framework for understanding Nigeria-China relations (1997). The majority of this research contributes to understanding the motivations of Nigeria's engagement with China.

The argument for a state-centric realist relationship between China and Africa stems from the apparent inadequacy of dependency theory to describe this relationship. Subsequently, the following hypotheses were generated in contradiction of dependency theory. Thus, if dependency theory holds true, then the data will reflect support for the null hypothesis.

This study has one central hypothesis as follows:

*Nigerians are increasingly engaging with China because they believe it will result in a net benefit for themselves and for their country.*

This hypothesis is inductively generated from data collected from interviews, news articles, and published literature on Sino-African relations and Nigeria-China relations. Afrobarometer surveys on public opinion in Africa indicate that, despite the growing literature asserting that Chinese engagement in Africa is detrimental to Africans, most Africans and Nigerians view the Chinese with positive regard (Gadzala & Hanusch,

2010)<sup>7</sup>. This dissertation intends to take those findings a step further, demonstrating that not only do Nigerians have a positive outlook towards China's involvement, but also revealing the underlying rationale and motivations that drive the Nigerian side of Chinese engagement.

China-Africa trade and investment continues to grow at exponential rates. In the same pattern, China-Nigeria trade and investment is also growing. Chinese outward FDI stock to Nigeria has grown at an average rate of 101.7 percent<sup>8</sup> from 2003 to 2008 (Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of China). In fact, in 2010, the bilateral trade volume between Nigeria and China was recorded at over \$7.5 billion, according to the Chinese Consul-General in Nigeria (Okoh, 2011). This level of increasing cash flows can be expected to boost economic activity and increase economic growth rates in Nigeria, thereby making Chinese engagement more attractive to Nigerians. It is likely that this research will find that Nigerians are motivated to do business with China because it increases their revenue stream, leading to economic growth.

Economic growth and benefit in Nigeria may also benefit from Chinese investments in infrastructure and Chinese aid to Nigeria. As a result of China's tendency to attach aid agreements to larger business agreements, Nigerians can also be expected to show increasing interest in doing business with China (Brautigam, 2009). Regarding China's approach to aid, Sahr Johnny, the Sierra Leonean Ambassador to Beijing said,

---

<sup>7</sup> This is especially true when economic engagement increases in general, and when African exports to China increase relative to Chinese imports in Africa in specific (Gadzala & Hanusch, 2008).

<sup>8</sup> Author's calculations based on Chinese outward FDI stock statistics to Nigeria, as reported by the Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of China (2010).



“The Chinese are doing more than the G8 in making poverty history. If a G8 country had wanted to rebuild the stadium, we’d still be here holding meetings. The Chinese just come and do it.” (Gadzala and Hanusch, 2010: pp. 2). Many others share similar sentiments. Sautman and Hairong argue, “China, unlike Western states, is not obstructing development in the world’s poorer countries” (2007: pp. 93). They are supported by Ching who notes that Chinese aid is distributed with a particular focus on infrastructure and human capital development (2005). The argument has been made that investments in infrastructure are vital to economic and social development, and the alleviation of poverty (Calderon & Serven, 2004). The Chinese have been noted for taking on infrastructure development projects in Africa (Ching, 2005; Gadzala & Hanusch, 2008). Chinese aid in the form of large public works projects can be expected to improve development in Nigeria and in Africa. Although corruption may exist in such agreements, following the logic of Calderon and Serven (2004), I argue that investments in infrastructure remain significant because they create an environment conducive to increased economic growth and therefore potential amelioration of poverty.

China’s aid policy in Africa is interesting in its departures from the Western aid policies normally contingent on standards of governance and at times, human rights; recent Chinese aid has typically been supplementary to trade agreements and diplomatic endeavours rather than interfering with or limiting how governance occurs (Brautigam, 2009). Chinese aid in Africa also differs from Western aid in terms of dollar value; Chinese aid is lower. Brautigam, who has decried the popular notion of China as a “rogue donor”, asserts that the Chinese provide policy prescriptions with no apparent need to

understand policy problems in Africa. As such, China does not claim to know what African development might require.

Finally, information on Chinese aid to Africa is not comprehensively available, especially when aid is a part of a broader business arrangement; Brautigam points out that this lack of public information does not adhere to Western transparency standards (2009). In addition, China's previous attempts at aid programs were unsustainable, but making changes in the types of programs and how they are operated might bring about sustainable net benefit to Africa, a true "win-win" situation where Chinese aid and infrastructure investment might lead to improvements in standards of living and reduced poverty in Nigeria (Brautigam, 2009). However, the veiled nature of Chinese aid makes it difficult to determine its precise impact. To add to lack of transparency, aid sometimes takes the form of commercial credit, forming the financial base that allows promotion of Chinese exports in African countries. The building of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway, often cited as an example of Chinese aid to Africa, was "financed by selling Chinese consumer goods through Zambian and Tanzanian state trading organizations; a commodity credit agreement provided for the importation of Chinese goods during the period of construction of the rail link" (Yu, 1975: pp. 135). This raises the issue of credibility of Chinese aid based on the general understanding of what constitutes aid versus what doesn't.

If in fact the capacity of Chinese aid falls short of expectations, the question remains: does the actual investment in infrastructure outweigh the adverse impacts of the trade agreements that sometimes come packaged with Chinese aid? Following Calderon

and Serven's notion that investment in infrastructure leads to economic growth and reduced poverty, it is reasonable to assert that, while total benefits may be reduced due to corruption or mislabeled aid, it is rational for Nigerians to expect improvement in their economy and standard of living-- as long as investment in infrastructure continues (2004).

Chinese engagement with Africa follows the same parameters as Chinese aid to Africa; the Chinese have adopted a policy of non-interference, based on the recognition of the sovereignty of African states. This project argues that China's policy of non-interference allows African governments to deal with their own problems without undermining attempts at developing good governance. China's approach has permitted partnerships and allows African states to be active participants in the development process (Brautigam, 2009). Akin to Weiss et al., I argue that active participation can foster sustainable growth and exceed the benefits of structural adjustment programs and prescriptive policies forced upon African states as pre-conditions for Western aid and loans from international financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Weiss et al., 2009; Armstrong et al, 2007; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). While Chinese engagement in Africa may not be the saving grace of the continent, I contend that the more active African states and governmental actors become in their own development process, the greater success will be evident in addressing not only the symptoms of poverty and underdevelopment but also their root causes.

In support of the central hypothesis, this research reveals that Nigerians believe engagement with China is to their benefit. Interview respondents noted that China is an

increasingly significant global actor and that Nigerians at all levels of society are looking to learn from China's example in order to improve their present situation. Although the current trade relationship is heavily imbalanced in China's favor, Nigerians are purchasing more Chinese-manufactured products. This research examines this growing relationship to identify the drivers of increasing Nigerian engagement and expects to find evidence in support of the central hypothesis that Nigerians are engaging with China because they believe it will further Nigerian objectives and result in a net benefit.

### **An Overview of the Methodology**

This project has two main objectives: first, to examine economic trends to see if increasing economic engagement with China through trade has adversely affected African economic performance, as would be expected in a state of dependency. Second, it presents a case study of Nigeria with the goal of revealing the drivers behind increasing Nigerian engagement with China.

Dependency theory dictates that China would be the main and perhaps sole beneficiary of increasing economic engagement. Accordingly, much of the literature on Chinese engagement in Africa insinuates that a dominant China is engaging with African states in a manner that maximizes its own benefits while minimizing those of Africans, even causing some degree of harm. To test these assertions, this study looks at measures of economic performance, in particular, gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate, gross national income (GNI), and GDP per capita. Viewing Africa as a regional entity, this study examines twenty years of economic trends: the decade prior to the launch of the

Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and the decade immediately following. Borrowing from Kaufman, Chernotsky & Geller's propositions defining the indicators of high economic dependency, this study examines these economic trends to see if, as in a dependent relationship, aggregate Africa is exhibiting low rates of economic growth and an unfavorable trade balance with China (1975). This study asserts that African states should post higher economic growth rates after the launch of FOCAC and that the China/Africa trade balance between China and Africa should be even (or nearly even), lending credence to the view that dependency theory is an inadequate framework to understand or explain growing Sino-African relations. This study attempts to see if conditions of dependency as defined by literature exist, and does not attribute changes in African economic growth solely to the entry of China. Included in this economic trend analysis is an examination of Sino-Nigerian relations to see if economic trends would support the idea of a dependent relationship. This researcher posits that as Nigeria increasingly engages with China, economic performance indicators like GDP growth rate and GNI as well as GDP per capita will increase and fail to support the argument of a dependent relationship. However, this study expects to find--in support of a dependent relationship--a considerably unfavorable balance of trade to the benefit of China.

This study expects that examination of economic trends will provide an inconclusive picture of the nature of the relationship between Nigeria and China. In order to better understand Sino-African relations, an in-depth case study is required. This research uses a Nigerian case study in to better comprehend the nature of Sino-African relations. This study argues that, not only is dependency theory an inadequate framework,

but that identifying motivators for Africans who engage with China is crucial in understanding Sino-African relations. To this end, fieldwork was conducted in Nigeria, primarily during the months of July and August 2011<sup>9</sup> utilizing a strategic case-study approach that employed an open-ended interview format.<sup>10</sup> A case study was necessary to understand new phenomena that have not previously been addressed by scholarship. In sum, approximately 130 interviews (informal and formal) were conducted with Nigerian that engaged with China. Engagement with China was operationalized as any sort of interaction with China and Chinese people. There were 62 formal interviews conducted. To be considered formal, an interview required a signed informed consent form<sup>11</sup> and was usually voice-recorded. Interview respondents included government officials, politicians, lobbyists/policy specialists, business and industry representatives, market traders, and academics, as well as Chinese industry representatives and a Chinese diplomat. To get a better picture of Nigerian engagement with China, interviews were conducted in multiple geographic locations and strong efforts were made to speak with a varied selection of Nigerian ethnic groups. Data collected through these interviews were then coded to identify themes in responses to the questions posed, the most significant of which is: Why are Nigerians engaging with China? To validate the findings of this study, the researcher relied on interviews with and peer reviews by Nigerian academics and political

---

<sup>9</sup> Fieldwork on this project commenced in January, 2011, but the bulk of the data was amassed in July and August.

<sup>10</sup> The interview protocol is included in Appendix A.

<sup>11</sup> The informed consent form used for this research is included in Appendices C through E.

scientists. The methodology used for this case study and the ascertained themes are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.

## **Outline of Chapters**

The following is a breakdown of the chapters in this dissertation and a summary of their content. Chapter 2 presents an overview and critique of the literature on China-Africa relations since the 1980s, paying particular attention to the recent permutation of Chinese capitalism in Africa. Chapter 2 also outlines China's African policy – how it is being realized and perceived — and its proposed impact on African states.

Chapter 3 examines dependency theory in Africa, noting that its logic has been applied to much of the literature on Chinese engagement in Africa. The chapter begins with a discussion of dependency theory, its roots and development, followed by an interpretation of the current state of affairs in Africa and Nigeria, and a discussion of the relationship with China viewed through the lens of dependency theory. The chapter then presents state-centric realism as a more adequate framework through which to understand and evaluate China-Africa and China-Nigeria relations, in particular African and Nigerian aspect of engagement with China.

Chapter 4 tests dependency to see if increasing engagement with China has been detrimental to African economic development as dependency theory suggests. It examines economic trends in Africa from the ten years prior to the first FOCAC conference and the 10 years immediately after to see if increasing engagement with

China has an observable detrimental impact to African economies as measured by gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates, GDP per capita and gross national income (GNI) figures. It also explores balance of trade data to see who benefits the most from China-Africa trade. At a micro level, this chapter also investigates trends in Nigeria-China economic relations from 1995-2009, in view of broader Nigerian economic trends over the same period.

Chapter 5 examines Nigerian agency and tests the central hypothesis of this study. This chapter looks to see if Nigerians are indeed pursuing increased engagement with China because they believe it will result in a net benefit for themselves and for their country. It examines the motivations of Nigerians in their growing engagement with China, answering the questions of who in Nigeria is engaging with China and why.

The sixth and concluding chapter discusses the findings of this study and their potential implications, ending with a call for continued research in this increasingly relevant issue area.



## Chapter 2: Chinese Capitalism in Africa

---

The purpose of this literature review is to summarize the scholarship on Chinese engagement in Africa and to illustrate its apparent focus on the Chinese perspective and the absence of an African perspective in regard to China's engagement in Africa. Most of the literature examines Chinese objectives in Africa over the last 20 years. Much of the information on recent Chinese engagement in Africa is contained in journalistic accounts, some of which are in-depth book-length reports, and growing scholarship in this area relies heavily on these accounts. While these perspectives advise how African states should approach Chinese counterparts, the literature does not speak explicitly to whether or not an African policy on China exists, nor does scholarship define present African motivations. This chapter first critiques the scholarship on recent Chinese capitalism in Africa, looking at the noted drivers of Chinese engagement, and paying particular attention to allegations of an imperialist China in Africa. The next section examines the literature on Chinese aid in Africa, illustrating some of the ways in which China chooses to distinguish itself from the West. Finally, this chapter attempts to extrapolate the main arguments in the literature on Africans' motivations for engaging with China, noting the scarcity of scholarship in this area. In all, this literature review points to the need for systematic study into Africa's engagement with China, and in particular demands new research investigating the primary motives of Africa's new democracies as they continue to engage with China.

## **I. The New Imperialists**

Recent Chinese engagement in Africa builds on the foundation established by Sino-African relations during Africa's independence period in the 1960s (Ministry of Foreign Affairs PRC, 2006)<sup>12</sup>. China's recent effort to woo African leadership and the general populace has included making significantly larger investments in education and infrastructure (Shelton & Paruk, 2008). Some scholars suggest that the emergence of China in Africa insinuates a larger campaign for world dominance, and that China has entered Africa in the role of neo-colonialist (Kagan, 2006; Tull, 2006; 2008). Others argue that China's presence is no different than Western predecessors in misappropriating natural resources (Segal, 1992; Chan-Fishel, 2007). Kagan expresses concerns that China is striving to develop and support a global network of autocracies and like-minded dictators (2006). In support of Kagan's view, China's Beijing Consensus has been well received by African elites in light of the abject failure of the Washington Consensus. Yet many other scholars disagree, maintaining that China is only interested in Africa's abundant natural resources, most specifically oil (Pan, 2006; Taylor, 2006; Rocha, 2007; Taylor, 2007; Brookes, 2007; Alves, 2008). However, this relationship is more complex as well as more vulnerable to an array of intervening factors; thus, its implications for Western interests are perhaps less extreme than some of the assertions of the literature.

Some scholars, among them Snow and Thompson, depict Chinese engagement in Africa as a study in soft power (Snow, 1988; Thompson, 2004; Thompson, 2005).

Historically, China has sought to interact with Africa through diplomacy to establish its

---

<sup>12</sup> China's Africa Policy document issued by the People's Republic of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs is included in Appendix F.

own superiority as a kingdom of civilized and sophisticated people (Filesi, 1962). The earliest recognized mention of engagement with Africa was made in the T'ang Dynasty by Tuan Cheng-Shih who died in AD 863 (Filesi, 1962). According to Philip Snow, even in early relations, the Chinese took care to minimize their impact and interruption of African life in their quest (1988). Snow notes that the Chinese, unlike the Western colonialists that came after them, saw the exchange of goods between African coastal states and Chinese ambassadors as a tribute, indicating allegiance with China and a fitting obeisance to the superiority of the Chinese empire:

“The exchange of goods was laden in Chinese eyes with a symbolic significance far outweighing the value of the goods themselves. By trading with the fleet, the African coastal states were paying the Ming emperor the homage they owed him as the sovereign of the world (1988: pp. 27).

This diplomatic style of interaction carried on through the 1960s which saw a more active form of Chinese engagement in Africa. Taylor and Segal note that as China sought to liberate itself from Soviet influence, it found sympathetic partners in African states pursuing independence, which led to the development of China's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Segal, 1992; Taylor, 2006). Regarding foreign relations, the Five Principles defined the following directives: 1) reciprocal respect for territorial integrity; 2) non-aggression; 3) non-interference in one another's internal affairs; 4) equality and mutual benefit; and 5) peaceful co-existence (Taylor, 2006 pp. 940). Application of these principles has remained consistent even in the face of China's recent and more business-like approach in Africa.

Scholars such as Games and Marks claim that China's grab for African resources has led to both Western and African accusations of neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism

(Games, 2005; Marks, 2006). They argue that the industrial revolutions of China and the West led to an intensified presence of both on the African continent and China-African trade relations reflect familiar Western traits with African resources used to fuel technological advancements (Marks, 2007). As had previously occurred with the West, African raw materials are sold to China in exchange for processed, valued-added Chinese goods (World Trade Atlas, 2011; Manji and Marks, 2010). China's persistently low production costs have allowed access to luxury goods previously too costly for Africans (Liang, 2005; Taylor, 2008). However, Marks notes that this lower cost of luxury goods has devastated some sectors of African industry (Marks, 2006). The example cited by Alden and Liang, among others, is the closure of South African and Nigerian textile mills, resulting in job losses for thousands of Africans (Liang, 2005; Alden, 2005). This impact has raised concerns among African politicians and scholars that if this relationship remains unchanged, Africa will no more industrialize under China than it has under Western influence. Worse yet, African natural resources may be further depleted, snuffing any chances of African industrialization (Marks, 2006; 2007).

European colonialists and entrepreneurs set up shop in Africa, and established businesses that exploited their access to African resources and ties to foreign markets (Bristow, 2007). Bristow notes that, in a manner likened to former European settlers, an influx of Chinese migrants has impelled competition with African businesses (Bristow, 2007). The competitive advantages of these migrants, in particular their ties to other economies and other markets overwhelm would-be domestic competitors in Africa (Bristow, 2007). For instance, Africans and Chinese may import Chinese-manufactured products but the Chinese, with a cultural and language advantage as well as ties (often

familial) to manufacturers in mainland China, may be able to reduce their supply costs and thus market prices, thereby undercutting domestic competitors in the African marketplace (see also Brautigam, 2003). In other cases, Chinese manufactured imports sold by Chinese migrants may be less expensive than domestically produced versions of the same products, making it difficult for African businesses to compete with Chinese counterparts. From the open air African marketplace to manufacturing and industry, it is clear that Chinese presence in Nigeria and in the rest of Africa is growing (Bristow, 2007).

Alden and Marks suggest that, while some aspects of China-Africa relations may lead to neo-imperialist interaction, Chinese efforts may simultaneously lend equal voice to their African partners and has potential to establish a more equitable partnership. (Alden, 2007; Marks, 2007). Thompson asserts that Chinese relations are the result of persuasion rather than through the heavy-handed approach of Western colonialism and more recently Western-directed international financial institutions (Thompson, 2004). Certainly African states have their work laid out for them should they attempt to manage their relationship with China to maximize benefits to their constituents (Thompson, 2004).

Despite the claims of a neo-imperialist China in Africa, substantial differences exist in China's approach to Africa, noted by Snow and Marks, when compared to the West and these differences have been entrenched over time (Snow, 1988<sup>13</sup>; Marks, 2007).

---

<sup>13</sup> Snow makes the argument that when the Chinese (Ming Dynasty) first came to Africa in the Middle Ages they sought a "gesture of symbolic acquiescence in the Chinese view of the world" (pp. 29), different from the Europeans who came to conquer Africa.

Along these lines, according to Tull and Kagan this increased interaction between China and Africa appears to threaten Western interests on the continent (Tull, 2006; Kagan, 2008). However, Richard Behar points out that, while others paint China in Africa as a greater evil than its Western predecessors (namely the U.S. and British and French colonial powers), there may be little difference in terms of the end game for China and the West in Africa (2008). Ultimately, Behar states,

“the sub-Sahara is now the scene of one of the most bare-knuckled resource grabs the world has ever seen... In describing China’s exploits, it’s tempting to evoke the image of a benign, postcolonial West being outfoxed by a ruthless and unscrupulous neo-communist power... The American track record in modern Africa has been deplorable -- a half-century of backing strongmen, turning a blind eye, and taking what we can get with little or no regard for the health and welfare of the locals” (Behar, 2008).

Behar supports the view that “today’s global economy has an insatiable need for raw materials. That’s as true for China’s rise as it is true for the maintenance of America’s economy” (Behar, 2008). Carmody and Owusu agree, noting that as Chinese engagement has increased, so has the American presence in Africa, and China’s recent economic expansion appears to be a somewhat obvious aim to dilute the power and influence of U.S. hegemony in the region, as much as to acquire African resources (Carmody & Owusu, 2007). This upturn appears to corroborate Klare’s claim of the geopolitical revival in the rush to secure scarce resources (2005). No doubt, Africa presents a new and interesting battlefield for Western and Eastern global politics. Clapham puts forth the notion that trade is already shifting from a “Global North” to a “Global East” orientation. Not only is China flooding the African market with goods, it is also buying up oil, minerals and various other raw materials from African states (2005).

Carroll observes that, with the continued expansion of China's industry and economy, China's demand for industrial resources continues to climb, and resource-rich Africa has the potential to meet this need (Carroll, 2006).

While oil remains a central focus of the literature addressing China's African resource grab, Rocha points out that the Chinese have been just as diligent in their pursuit of base metals: aluminum, copper, iron ore, nickel and zinc to name a few (2007). Chinese demand for copper has driven up global prices from \$1,319/tonne in 2001 to \$8,800 in 2006 (Kaswende, 2005; *The Economist*, 2005, 2006). By 2005, Chinese firms had invested \$170 million into the copper mining industry in Zambia (Lyman, 2005). China also signed a US \$1.3bn agreement that for its investment in energy, it would gain access to Zimbabwean chrome (BBC News, 2006a). Additionally, Carmody and Owusu point out that 90 percent of the world's chrome reserves are found in Zimbabwe and South Africa (2007). In Gabon, a Chinese consortium won sole rights to exploit massive untapped iron ore reserves (Terradaily, 2006). The Chinese agreement with Gabon also included oil, two timber-processing plants and an industrial fisheries firm.

Beyond the industries mentioned, Chinese investments in Africa are increasingly dedicated to agricultural development not only to promote food security for African states, but also to ensure China's food sources (Carmody & Owusu, 2007). However, Cotuela and Vermeulen disagree, stating that Chinese agricultural interests in Africa aim to exploit business opportunities and "to secure access to non-food resources where Chinese demand outstrips domestic supply" (2009: pp. 1,236, 2011; see also Brautigam

& Xiaoyang, 2009). As China continues to urbanize and industrialize, the ability to support local demands has been threatened as land and resources are repurposed. Carmody and Owusu argue that China sees in Africa the potential to alleviate the increasing deficit from Chinese agricultural producers (2007).

Carmody and Owusu also highlight China's differing approach to Africa, noting that the U.S. treats Africa primarily as a "site of humanitarian intervention, resource extraction and security threat," while China views Africa as more a strategic economic space (2007: pp. 506). True to form, China has been engaging with African states in a largely business-focused manner (French 2004; Moyo, 2009). Specifically, in discussing China's approach, a Nigerian government official asserted, "China is engaging Nigeria seriously. They understand us. They know our problems."<sup>14</sup> This official is not alone in this view; several scholars agree that Chinese projects in Africa have been noted for their comparative suitability for African conditions (James, 2002; Liang, 2005; Carmody and Owusu, 2007). Another unique element of Chinese engagement has been the employment of payment-in-kind strategies to finance Chinese loans, reducing African states' financial burdens and encouraging African exports to China (Carmody and Owusu, 2007). For example, in Zimbabwe, tobacco exports are used to pay off the balance on Chinese loans to state agencies (Hilsum, 2006).

By entering into negotiations with African governments, some scholars claim, China affords them legitimacy and acknowledges both their sovereignty and ability to make independent decisions (Hongwei, 2005; Rocha, 2007; Alden 2007). In contrast,

---

<sup>14</sup> Interview with a Nigerian diplomat, Washington, DC, April 6, 2011.



Western influence and capital has often been used to force developing countries into accepting Western policy prescriptions (Ellis, 2005; Carmody and Owusu, 2007).

However, again the Chinese approach is noted as less domineering, with China even going so far as to agree to limit exports to protect the domestic industries of African trade and economic partners (Hall, 2006; Marks, 2007). This behavior supports the notion that China is in fact pursuing a long-term strategy in Africa.

Carmody and Owusu argue that Chinese behavior is indicative of objectives to dilute Western influence in the global economy; they identify the following as motives for Chinese engagement beyond access to critical natural resources: 1. investment of China's significant foreign exchange reserves; 2. continuing development of Chinese multinational corporations; 3. locating markets for Chinese products; 4. developing African agriculture to provide food and non-food products for Chinese consumption; and 5. establishing a cadre of African professionals and knowledge workers to support Chinese objectives of global economic transformation (2007). China has recently invested quite heavily in developing a skilled African workforce (FOCAC 2004k; Servant, 2005; FOCAC, 2006c; 2008; 2009e; 2009g). This workforce development, noted by many scholars, serves as an important component of China's African aid policy (King, 2007; Shelton & Paruk, 2008; Brautigam, 2009; Taylor, 2011). Thompson argues that these skilled workers are a part of China's plan to overhaul the current economic system (2004). By developing a skilled and intellectually prepared African workforce, China and Africa are equipped to offset the "unjust and inequitable world order" that has routinely marginalized the interests of non-Western states. This intellectual partnership provides a

means to draw focus to issues pertinent in developing countries to combat Western dominance of world politics (Efande, 2003; Muekalia, 2003).

The argument that China has routinely sought to establish a relationship and then partner with African states (or kingdoms and tribes) to promote its domestic political agenda has some merit--and a long history. In the Middle Ages, goods procured from African states indicated the excellence of the Emperor and the approval of the sovereigns (Filesi, 1972). Scholars agree in the 1960s, the People's Republic of China needed the support of African states to assert itself in the global community and thereby discredit the legitimacy of Taiwan, and to separate itself from the Soviet Union and earn recognition in the United Nations (Yu, 1988; Segal, 1992). As the Chinese economy grew in the 1990s, China again turned to Africa to find resources to satisfy its booming industry and to meet increasing domestic demands (Rotberg, 2008). Daniel Large asserts

...there is greater reason than ever before to suggest that more than an ephemeral phase, China's engagement with Africa will persist and deepen and that the present phase represents a departure from its past involvement. Observers considered that the PRC was in Africa to stay in the 1960s; some even dismissed its importance in Africa in the early 1990s. However, the context of relations has importantly altered. A progressively interdependent China, the future of whose Communist Party state is now more firmly linked to its performance at home, must continue to engage in order to guarantee essential supplies to maintain its development.

China needs, and will continue to need, African resources more than previously. (2007: pp. 157).

According to Smith and Larimer, rational choice theory dictates that states or at least state actors will always act in a manner that promotes their self-interests (2009). China's foreign policy in Africa can be viewed as a direct function of ruling elites' strategy to remain in power, and in the process guarantee control over domestic politics.

Five decades ago, African states had the votes necessary to seat the People's Republic of China at the United Nations (Segal, 1992). Today Africa still has the numbers necessary to protect Chinese interests on the world stage.

Some scholars, among them Pádraig Carmody and Francis Owusu, support the view that China is seeking to reset the global economy and the politics that surround it (2007). This is supported by a significant push by Nigeria and South Africa for African representation on the United Nations Security Council.<sup>15</sup> Not only does Africa possess the raw materials and resources to sustain China's economic climb, African states have the voting power to shift a currently Western focus to a more inclusive perspective undoubtedly more favorable to China (Kagan, 2006; Carmody and Owusu, 2007). Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the April 1990 Chinese publication *ChinaAfrica*, was quoted as stating, "[The] vast number of Third World countries [will] surely unite with and stand behind China like numerous 'ants' keeping the 'elephant' from harm's way" (Taylor, 1998: pp. 459). Clearly, China has intended to use a contingent of 'small' developing states as a shield. However, Chinese global objectives today transcend simple defense. It appears that Beijing intends to use this army of "ants" to gain additional leverage at the global level.

What the literature makes clear is that China is pursuing its own interests. Yet, an exhaustive empirical study has yet to be conducted, proving that China either is or is not exercising an imperialist agenda in Africa. A major shortcoming of the literature is that it

---

<sup>15</sup> According to multiple interviews with Nigerian government representatives during this research process and corroborated by an address by Mr. Olusegun Obasanjo, President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria at the 10th Plenary Meeting of the 54th Session of The United Nations General Assembly, Thursday, 23 September 1999 (included in Appendix L).

is a collection of points of view, and despite the diversity in arguments concerning Chinese motivations in Africa, the claims made by many of the scholars are simply that: claims that lack supporting evidence. These arguments, though logical and reasonable, have yet to be substantiated through rigorous empirical scholarship. Many of these scholars' assertions stem from journalistic and newspaper accounts of Chinese engagement with Africa. Despite the growing collection of literature on Chinese engagement in Africa, it is quite clear that there is room for research development. Much of the available literature is anecdotal and normative in language, with uncorroborated judgment on the positive or negative impact of engagement with China. Many studies also approach Chinese engagement in Africa as an isolated activity unaffected by international politics or external shocks. In addition, most of the literature on China/Africa relations originates from Western-based scholars and journalists, such as Alden, Behar, Brautigam, Large et al, Michel & Beuret, Tull, many of whom have adopted a zero-sum game mentality on China's increasing presence and its repercussions for Western interests .

## **II. Chinese aid to Africa**

A growing area of focus in the literature on Chinese engagement in Africa is aid, now attracting attention because it differs sharply from Western aid (Brautigam, 2003). Western aid with policy prescription seeks to shape African states within a certain framework; it affords a form of legitimacy but also constrains and limits states' behavior. In contrast, the Chinese express their interest in empowerment and emancipation of

African states (Carmody, 2007). Chinese aid pales in comparison to Western aid in terms of dollar amounts; Western aid to Africa is much larger (Brautigam, 2009). A profound difference in Chinese versus Western aid is its secrecy; China's aid is not subject to the transparency standards Western aid imposes (Brautigam, 2003). This shrouding of aid packages means that very little is truly known--and therefore understood--about the nature of Chinese aid to African states. As such, a number of unsubstantiated claims have been made. For example, Chinese aid has been characterized as "untied aid" because it is not subject to standards of governance and Western human rights principles, while Western aid is contingent upon certain conditions (Moyo, 2009). Additionally, Chinese aid is typically supplementary to trade agreements and political maneuverings, again free of Western contingencies, including transparency (Brautigam, 2009). This difference is likely due to Chinese political preferences. Aid and trade with African states is predicated on their recognition of the One China policy, which symbolizes respect for China's right to determine its own domestic policy, and China reciprocates with its policy of non-interference (Brautigam, 2009). Brautigam argues, with merit, that Chinese aid is a function of Chinese foreign political policy more than economic policy (2011).

China's policy of non-interference and absence of policy conditionalities has earned it the label of "rogue donor". However, Brautigam posits that Chinese aid's differences from Western aid does not equate it as rogue (2009). The Chinese do not claim to understand policy problems in Africa, nor do they claim to know what is necessary for African development; Chinese aid and policies reflect this. On the other hand, Western aid policy is notably prescriptive, with policy solutions that have a track

record of failure in Africa (Brautigam, 2009). Perhaps the most significant difference between Western and Eastern aid in Africa has been the demand-driven versus donor-driven dynamic. Western aid in Africa has been largely donor-driven (Brautigam, 2009). Western countries and policy makers outside of Africa decide to donate aid to African states, yet in many ways are out of touch with the circumstances Africans face. Still, Western donors persist in determining aid policy objectives and designate aid accordingly. A marked example of this disconnection is in the agricultural sector. The Western practice of agricultural dumping under the banner of aid and humanitarian principles has not always found a welcome mat (Easterly, 2006). Zambia drew great criticism from the global community from an executive decision in 2002 to ban genetically modified maize, a decision that kept U.S. food “aid” out of Zambia (BBC, 2002; Manda, 2003; Henriot, 2010). China, in contrast, has worked with African states to dispense aid in ways that African elites see fit, often investing in infrastructure development (Shelton & Paruk, 2008; Gadzala & Hanusch, 2010).

Chinese aid also differs from Western aid in scope. Western aid is often associated with grand, large-scale projects across Africa. The Chinese often engage in smaller projects: building a single hospital or clinic staffed by Chinese professionals, constructing a school or road, providing professionals to consult with African counterparts on specific issues (Brautigam, 2009). The argument can be made that these smaller-scale, community-specific projects are more likely to result in sustainable change. Sautman and Hairong assert that these characteristics of Chinese aid make its contributions less susceptible to exploitation and corruption (2007):

“Chinese aid is often dispensed in such a way that corrupt rulers cannot somehow use it to buy Mercedes Benzes.... [It] is often in the form of infrastructure, such as a railroad network in Nigeria or roads in Kenya and Rwanda. Or in the form of doctors and nurses to provide health care to people who otherwise would not have access. China provides scholarships for African students to study in its universities and, increasingly funds to encourage its businessmen to invest in Africa” (Ching, 2005; as quoted by Sautman and Hairong, 2007: pp. 87).

These arguments have done nothing to assuage concerns of China’s critics who note the secretive nature of Chinese aid and the inaccuracy of the “untied” label. Moreblessings Chidaushe cautions that, because the general public has no access to these aid agreements, the possibility of hidden conditionalities exists in Chinese aid, rather than the widely exhorted “no conditionalities” or “untied aid” (2007). In this Chidaushe is correct; it is erroneous to assume that compounding political conditionalities in Western aid therefore means that Chinese aid lacks conditionalities. While Chinese aid does veer away from political conditionalities, the fact that it is often attached to larger trade and economic agreements indicates that it is laden with economic conditionalities (Brautigam, 2009). These economic conditionalities mean that some Chinese aid tends to appear more often in the form of debt cancellation and loans as opposed to the Western system of grants (King, 2007; Brautigam, 2009). Farzad argues that loans are perhaps better suited for African needs (2007). Chinese loans are notably cheaper than Western loans and China offers Africans the opportunity for payment-in-kind arrangements, a ‘working off’ of their debt (BBC News, 2006a; Carmody and Owusu, 2007; Chidaushe, 2007). Logically, grants and donations can create a situation of dependency that undermines the capacity of Africans to develop the systems and programs necessary to

fend for themselves in the long run. Some of the blame for increased poverty in Africa has been cast on development aid and its ineffectiveness (Easterly, 2006; Chidaushe, 2007). The veiled nature of Chinese aid makes it difficult to assess or predict the full impact of aid agreements, but Shelton and Paruk argue that in general, Chinese engagement--perhaps due to its differences from Western activities in Africa--plays a positive role in Africa's development (2008).

A major shortcoming of the literature on Chinese aid in Africa is that only one major scholar has achieved specific expertise in this area: Deborah Brautigam. However there is emerging scholarship<sup>16</sup> on the issue of Chinese aid to Africa, especially viewed through the framework of the Forum on China-African Cooperation (FOCAC). FOCAC has become a platform for increased engagement between China and Africa and its conferences a place where Chinese aid commitments are increasingly publicized. An area of concern with FOCAC and scholarship thereon is that much of the information on the FOCAC conferences and ensuing policies are official statements released by the Chinese government. In the case of the FOCAC conferences, the agreements made public often appear to be Chinese promises of aid to African states, as well as vocalizations of political support in the call for UN reform (King, 2007).

However, like the details of other major agreements, economic or otherwise, aid agreements between China and African states are not fully publicized. The release of Chinese aid agreements can be construed as a continued ploy to curry African favor. What remains evident is that specific elements of Sino-African economic and political

---

<sup>16</sup> In particular King (2007), Shelton and Paruk (2008), and Taylor (2011).



relations, including administration of aid<sup>17</sup> continues to be inaccessible. The challenge of not only defining Chinese engagement, but ascertaining its unique impact, persists.

Without clear and complete information it is hard to assess the impact of Chinese aid in Africa. This deficit is further exacerbated by the fact that Chinese aid is offered in small amounts and aid agreements publicized through FOCAC are project based, with a continental focus: 50 schools in Africa, as opposed to 1 school per African state (Davies, 2007). Brautigam warns that, just as “sensationalism and rumors cloud our ability to understand China’s growing engagement in Africa” (2011: pp. 1), significant misinformation on Chinese aid in Africa lingers, noting that some of this misinformation stems from erroneous media reports, some is government-generated and inadequately measured and analyzed. What remains indisputable is that Chinese influence in Africa is growing. This condition then introduces the question: why are African states increasingly engaging with China?

### **III: Scholarship on African Engagement with China: *Why the draw for African states?***

Chris Alden and Deborah Brautigam contend that Africans play a central role in increasing Chinese engagement on the continent (2007; 2009). As such, the motivations of African actors in Chinese engagement matter, not only because these motivations drive the process, but because they determine the nature of the relationship between China and African states. Rocha puts it well when he asks, “What is the driving force behind

---

Africa's sudden economic interest in China? Is it part of a well-calculated approach to unlock the continent's true economic potential or is it merely a meek response to an unfolding development?" (Rocha in Manji and Marks, 2007: pp.31). Though posed by several scholars, these questions have yet to be adequately addressed by empirical research. It is unclear whether or not a 'win-win' relationship<sup>18</sup> is at play between China and Africa, as China's president, Hu Jintao claims (FOCAC, 2006b). Alden, Shelton and Paruk, among others, assert that Africa's governmental leadership needs to exploit the opportunities afforded by China and the West (Alden, 2007; Ajakaiye & Kaplinsky, 2008). To do so, government actors must have human and financial capital, as well as adequate project management and policy implementation protocols to apply the proffered resources to benefit citizens (Ajakaiye & Kaplinsky, 2008). In discussing China's relationship with Zimbabwe, Karumbidza asserts, "On the whole, it would not be fair to blame the Chinese for acting to further their interests. It is incumbent upon the government of Zimbabwe and its people (and any other African country for that matter) to put in place a programme and strategy for channelling [sic] funds and direct investment in a way that contributes to the growth of its own economy" (Karumbidza, 2007: pp. 87-88). However, published works to date have failed to sufficiently address the motivations of African states and measure either their intent or capacity to maximize on this win-win opportunity.

---

<sup>18</sup> Hu Jintao (President of the People's Republic of China) (2006) 'Work Together to Forge a New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership', address to the National Assembly of Nigeria. 27 April <<http://jm.chineseembassy.org/eng/xw/t259668.htm>>.

Some research exists on the benefits of engagement with China to Africa. Rocha observes that increasing economic engagement with China has raised market prices of certain African commodities, which in turn has led to additional revenue and economic growth for African states (Rocha, 2007). Furthermore, Chinese investment in African infrastructure development is increasingly noticeable across the continent (Michel & Beuret, 2009). Private Chinese firms are winning bids to develop public works, build roads and dams, and renovate airports and railways. In Sudan, a Chinese-built hydroelectric dam is expected to double the country's electricity output, which in turn should have a positive impact on oil exportation (Crilly, 2005). As a part of an agreement for sole rights to Gabonese iron ore reserves, the Chinese government committed to building a new railway from the mines to the seaport, and also pledged to build a new hydroelectric dam to provide power to the mines (TerraDaily, 2006). In deals signed with Nigeria in the early part of the 2000s, the Chinese government agreed to develop the country's oil refineries and power plants and to renovate the railway system (African Oil Policy Initiative Group, 2001; Lyman, 2005). Further south in Angola, the Chinese have done the same: renovated and developed the roads and railway systems and installed a fiber optic network (Mark, 2006). Many of these infrastructure development projects are part and parcel of larger Chinese trade agreements with African states. Some of these initiatives are the direct result of FOCAC ministerial conferences while others are the culmination of the Chinese government's efforts to encourage Chinese enterprise to embrace the African market. Chinese investments in infrastructure are to the benefit of African states and the African people.

Beyond the short literature on the advantage to Africa of engaging with China, there is a growing argument on Africa's attraction to China as the source of a different model for development. This section of literature is perhaps the best attempt at deducing African motivations. Stephen Marks makes the argument that China exemplifies and instructs on an alternative for African development (Marks, 2007). Seemingly independent of Western methods, the Chinese have expanded their economy and raised standards of living for the general population (Guerrero, 2006; Marks, 2007). This non-Western route has been termed the "Beijing Consensus," or, the anti-thesis of the Washington Consensus<sup>19</sup>. China ignored the principles of the Washington Consensus to stabilize, privatize and liberalize; as other developing states displayed economic demise, the Chinese economy rather shockingly expanded at an exponential rate (Sautmann & Hairong, 2007).

According to Thompson, the so-called Beijing Consensus as China's way to recent economic success is under consideration by African elites and policy-makers as a potential path to African development and economic growth (2005). There is no doubt that the Beijing Consensus has--on paper--improved the living conditions, economic, and social welfare of the Chinese people, in pure statistics. As of 2006, China was the "fourth largest economy in the world... [and] market reforms and China's opening to the global economy gave millions of people there an increased standard of living" (Guerrero, 2006).

---

<sup>19</sup> The Washington Consensus was the name given to an economic policy package designed to promote economic development and democracy in developing countries. The Washington Consensus contended that economic growth could and would be achieved when government intervention in economies and market systems was minimalized. Through privatization, liberalized trade and macro-economic stability (essentially "free markets") economic growth was theorized as achievable. Washington Consensus was ultimately considered a failure by scholars and policymakers (Stiglitz, 1998; Gore, 2000; Mkandawire, 2005; Adesina, 2006; Adesina, Graham & Olokushi, 2006; Rodrik, 2006; Easterly, 2009).

Weisbrot observes that over the last three decades, the Chinese economy has been the fastest growing in the world, especially during a period when other economies were in substantial decline (2011). Even after the global economic crisis of 2008, the Chinese economy has continued to post remarkable growth rates and is now ranked second in the world<sup>20</sup>, lending credibility to the potential of China to teach Africa a thing or two about development (Weisbrot, 2011). This Chinese model decries the importance of privatization and instead touts sophisticated but low-cost technology appropriate for African countries, focusing on alleviation of poverty as well as development of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (Liang, 2005).

According to Rocha, it is quite likely that neither the Beijing Consensus Model nor the Washington Consensus Model is the way forward for Africa. The uniqueness of the circumstances that face individual African states makes it hard to believe that a single policy package could adequately address such a range of problems. Rocha asserts,

“There is also a growing realisation that traditional relations and partnerships with the West have not helped Africa overcome the structural obstacles to eradicating poverty and reversing its economic marginalisation. Rather than develop, Africa is haemorrhaging while the rest of the world accumulates wealth at its expense through the unbalanced exploitation of its natural resources and the enforcement of a distorted international economic system. Logically, strengthened cooperation with China is seen as a way of addressing some of these structural imbalances” (John Rocha in Manji & Marks, 2007: pp. 17)

Perhaps Rocha has in this statement noted the most pressing issue: that the prevalence of China in Africa, has afforded African states new leverage in relations with the West. Not only does China provide a new market for African goods, driving up the

---

<sup>20</sup> April 2011 projections by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), has the Chinese economy surpassing that of the USA to be the world's largest economy by 2016.

prices of commodities, Chinese goods are also competing with Western goods, with Chinese goods reputedly more affordable (Taylor, 2008). In addition, increasing Chinese influence can be accurately seen as a threat to Western influence (Manji & Marks, 2007; Rotberg, 2008; Alden et al, 2008). The Chinese have made it obvious to the African elites that progress, whether economic growth, increased political influence or even sovereignty and autocracy can be achieved independently of Western protocols and policy recommendations (French, 2004). Based on this logic, there is no doubt that the growing influence of the Beijing Consensus could become worrisome for longstanding Western interests on the African continent (Campbell, 2007).

Still, the literature does very little to specifically address African motivations. Even though Brautigam, Rocha and Alden make valid arguments on the perceived benefits to African states, like much of the rest of the literature on Chinese engagement in Africa there is a dearth in empirical data supporting the arguments of the scholars and pundits. So while there are observable benefits to African states, there is no evidence to demonstrate that these benefits are the drivers for growing African engagement with China. A growing body of literature from the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) out of Nairobi, Kenya examines the economic impact of Chinese engagement in Africa, specifically the impact of trade, investment and aid. These studies present empirical data that display the potential of benefit to African states, but while they call for better management on the African side of engagement with China, they again do not speak specifically to African motivations (Ajakaiye, 2006; Ademola, Bankole & Adewuyi, 2009.). A glaring hole in the literature on African motivations to engage with China remains. If, as notable African scholars including Alden, Brautigam, Ajakaiye and

Kaplinsky allege, African motivations factor prominently in this new iteration of international relations, and this relationship has potential global consequences, there is a pressing need for research that addresses Africa's motivations.

## Conclusion

In sum, most existing literature fails to adequately address why Africans choose to engage with China. A growing body of work by the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) is beginning to address the African perspective on China-African relations<sup>21</sup> (Ajakaiye & Kaplinsky, 2009). Ajakaiye and Kaplinsky note that these economic analyses, including scoping studies and detailed case studies, have fallen short of revealing agency on the part of Africans (2009). Other research focuses on the Chinese perspective, speaking to China's possible motivations and policies in Africa (See Tull, 2006; Alden, 2007; Broadman, 2007; Large et al, 2008; Behar, 2008; Rotberg, 2008; Brautigam, 2009; Michel & Beuret, 2009). The running assumption among scholars and analysts seems to be that the Chinese are in Africa because they *can* be and want to be. These observations seem to allege that China's involvement in Africa is a modern iteration of dependency, in which China's economic growth and development as a result of engagement with Africa will have a retarding effect on Africa's own growth and development. Accordingly, most published literature appears to base assessments of

---

<sup>21</sup> There are a number of articles and studies published by AERC. AERC was established in 1988 and its publications on Chinese engagement in Africa have been published over the last few years, ranging from country-specific economic analyses to regional, industry and development analyses. These studies assess the scale and impact of increasing engagement with China.

Chinese engagement on the assertion that Africans have no choice and instead are pawns of China's foreign policy; Tull is perhaps the best example of this view (2006; 2008).

From early accounts of Chinese engagement in Africa during the Middle Ages, most existing literature has concerned itself primarily with the Chinese perspective of this relationship. However, noted scholars have reiterated the importance of African agency in the current permutation of Chinese engagement in Africa. Observations that the Chinese have had to curry African favor to promote their businesslike, non-interfering style of engagement indicate that the specific motivations of African actors matter. This view appears to directly contradict the arguments of other scholars and pundits who suggest that Africa is an unwitting pawn in Chinese foreign policy, with no influence or say in the relationship. Regardless of how well developed or logical any of these arguments may be, they remain unsubstantiated by rigorous empirical research. This researcher contends that to fully understand Chinese-African relations, the African aspect of the relationship must also be studied in greater detail. An exploration of Africa's China policy, especially in the case of non-authoritarian African states, is missing. China is engaging with Zimbabwe and Sudan, and also with many other African states, including Nigeria, a regional economic giant. The question remains: what benefits await African states that engage with China?



### Chapter 3: Dependency Theory in Africa

---

This chapter explains dependency theory and comments on its many forms. The discussion examines the applicability of dependency theory in explaining underdevelopment in poor countries. The chapter also addresses whether dependency theory can define the nature of Chinese relations with Africa and Nigeria, observes China's reliance on soft power to win over African states, and asks whether dependency theory relates to China's need to develop an international economic regime. Following the discussion of dependency theory, an alternative theoretical framework through which to understand and evaluate China-Africa and China-Nigeria relations is presented, with the assertion that China-Africa and China-Nigeria relations fall short of defined requirements for dependency and instead display an identifiable form of realist national self-interest.

Current literature on recent Chinese political and economic interaction with African states (either on individual or aggregate levels) has yet to adequately describe, let alone analyze, the inscrutable nature of relations between China and Africa. As the previous chapter described, most of the literature focuses on two disparate views: the anti-China in Africa delegation and the view that supports new opportunities/partnerships for Africa and China. The anti-China scholarship, with its own proponents<sup>22</sup>, notably

---

<sup>22</sup> The first voice of caution and warning of a negative outcome of Chinese influence on the African continent is probably Emmanuel John Hevi, who studied medicine in China for 18 months from 1960-1962, under a scholarship provided by the early communist Chinese government. Disillusioned by his experience, Hevi cautioned African elites to think for themselves and reason through circumstances to make decisions with Africa's best interests at heart; he encouraged Africans to learn from the foreigners

Kagan, Tull, and Behar, has exercised less restraint by broadcasting perceived impacts of increasing Chinese engagement in Africa and posing possible reasons for increased African collaboration (2006; 2006; 2008). The new opportunities perspective is best represented by the works of Alden and Brautigam, who offer rather conservative discussions of the potential impacts of Chinese engagement (2007; 2009). Most of the literature along this vein reports on Chinese activity in Africa—both positive and negative--and reiterates new opportunities afforded African state actors concerned with development and economic growth. But despite a somewhat positive outlook, dependency theory fails to critically and empirically assess the impact of China's activities in Africa.

In many ways, the analysis of China's impact in Africa reads like the literature on underdevelopment. The logic is laden with neo-imperialist concepts borrowed from dependency theory: the idea of a passive Africa, inconsequential except for its usefulness as an economic pawn for China's sole benefit. These assertions, however, are not clearly or always attributed to dependency theory.

## **Dependency Theory**

Dependency theory is an economics system theory that seeks to explain why rich countries become richer while poor countries become poorer. Dos Santos defined dependency as:

---

but to accept offers only after critical consideration. (Hevi, 1966). It is important to note that most of Hevi's disdain for the Chinese 1960 African policy was aimed specifically at China's radical push for an African revolution (Ya-chun, 1981; US Congressman Lawrence P. McDonald in Pearson, 1977)

“...an historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world economy such that it favors some countries to the detriment of others and limits the development possibilities of the subordinate economies...a situation in which the economy of a certain group of countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which their own is subjected” (Dos Santos, 1971: pp. 226)<sup>23</sup>.

Dependency theory also suggests that, despite increased trade with poorer countries, the international system is controlled by dominant (richer) states seeking to maximize their benefits at the expense of poorer states (Smith, 1979). Ultimately the poorer states are rendered powerless and subjected to economic policies that will always favor the interests of richer, dominant states.

Dependency theory, then, provides the framework for understanding why developing countries stay poor while the industrialized developed countries become wealthier. Dependency theorists made the argument that dominant developed countries had established a world economic system that they controlled and it was the machinations of this system that allowed wealthy countries to prosper and poor countries to suffer (Smith, 1979).

Initially, dependency theory emerged as a critique of neoclassical economic theory that assumes economic growth results in net benefits to all, though benefits are not always equal (Ferraro, 1996). In other words, neoclassical economists expected that trade would automatically have a positive effect on all participants. However, dependency theorists showed that although developed nations recorded economic growth, developing countries did not grow at similar rates (Prebisch, 1950; Ferraro, 1996).

---

<sup>2323</sup> See also (Dos Santos, 1973: pp. 76)

The primary and most oft-cited study establishing dependency theory is Raul Prebisch's examination of Latin America. In attempting to extrapolate the rationale behind the poor economic performance of Latin American countries, Prebisch, then executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), divided states into two sections of the world economy: states with established industrialized centers and less industrialized peripheral countries, the purveyors of raw materials and primary products. Prebisch argues that the industrial capabilities and technological advancements of the center states such as the United States and Western European countries provided a distinct advantage in the ability to amass greater proportions of net benefit of trade with peripheral states like Latin American nations (Prebisch, 1950). Thus, increased trade on the part of peripheral states was unlikely to result in growth in their local economies. In fact, according to this logic, "an increase in the traditional exports of a typical Latin American country might well produce *no* increase in national income" (Booth, 1975: pp. 55).

This explanation was without a doubt an alarming but plausible reason for the absence of economic growth in Latin American and by extension all developing countries including African countries that fit the same criteria. To even the playing field, protectionist policies were urged by dependency theorists to cushion domestic industry from damaging competition (Smith, 1979). Scholars argued that these policies only served to further exacerbate the inequitable situation, increasing peripheral countries' dependency on outside capital and external actors (Booth, 1975; Bernstein, 1979). The ECLA's idea of center-periphery relations and a structuralist approach to

underdevelopment served as the foundation for the emergence of various dependency and underdevelopment theories (Snyder, 1980).

The straightforward logic of dependency theory asserts that developing countries sell raw materials to developed countries who use those materials to create manufactured “value-added” products which are then sold back to the developing countries at a higher price (Ferraro, 1996). Finished goods cost more than raw materials; thus developing countries cannot accrue enough income from their exports to pay for their imports, resulting in debt and decrease of economic growth (Ferraro, 1996). This imbalance creates a state of dependency for developing countries where “dependency can be defined as an explanation of the economic development of a state in terms of the external influences--political, economic, and cultural--on national development policies” (Sunkel, 1969: pp. 23).

The economic North’s control of the world economy created a state of neo-colonialism for the southern states. Neo-colonialism refers to the Western domination of the world market and economic policies affecting non-Western states that have allowed unequal economic growth benefiting Western industrialized capitalists, at a significant cost to the non-industrialized world (Bosch, 1997). The North’s control of the global economic system was such that, even when industrialization emerged in developing states that manufactured finished goods, they remained under the influence of multi-national corporations in the developed North (Cardoso, 1972; Cardoso, 1973). The

*dependentistas*<sup>24</sup> central argument asserts that underdevelopment is a function of imperialism, which “changes in form but not in fact” (Smith, 1979: pp. 250)<sup>25</sup>.

Dependency theory emerged in the 1950s as a way of understanding relations between countries, in particular relations between more developed and less-developed countries (Ferraro, 1996). However, beyond this core argument, multiple versions of dependency theory have risen out of the intellectual and political tradition of Marxism, especially during the 1970s. Not all permutations can be characterized as Marxist (Snyder, 1980), primarily because dependency theory attempts to explain and understand variations in the economic performance of countries in capitalist systems within a capitalist world society. Despite booming success for developed countries during the same period, a group of disadvantaged countries—African states serve as obvious examples--saw little or negative economic growth: the rich got richer and the poor got poorer in a system that advertised success for all.

Snyder (1980) argues that most of the underdevelopment and dependency theorists did not subscribe to an empirical approach to social science. Instead they followed the logic of Marxian political economy, employing the notion of successive approximations, which “consists in moving from the more abstract to the more concrete in a step-by-step fashion, removing simplifying assumptions at successive stages of the investigation so that they may take account of and explain an ever wide range of phenomena” (Sweezy, 1968: pp. 11). Consequently, the importance of context rather than

---

<sup>24</sup> Borrowed from Tony Smith’s classification of dependency theorists.

<sup>25</sup> See also Theotonio Dos Santos’ “The Structure of Dependence.”

statistical rigor is particularly heightened because it allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomena under study. For dependency and underdevelopment theorists, the significance of context is evident in the value and emphasis placed on history and socio-economic elements that define social reality, asserting that historical context determines varied interpretations of reality (Thomas, 1974). Thus, when applying dependency theory it is important to employ a holistic approach, reinforcing the stance that a better understanding at the macro level allows for a better understanding at the micro level (Frank, 1969; 1975).

Dependency theorists have attempted to answer the question, “dependency for whom?” understanding that pursuing dependency theory’s logic may result in very real political conclusions—i.e., the lessons and conclusions of dependency theorists influenced the policy process, and did not always have a positive outcome (Smith, 1979; Ferraro, 1996). In addition, dependency theory is by nature normative; the key terms of development and underdevelopment are largely subjective. Quite naturally, a moral rhetoric has become a part of dependency theory because it seeks to discern circumstances leading to underdevelopment in order to improve the status quo (Snyder, 1980; Bosch, 1997). “Dependency theories articulate the interests of particular groups or classes and simultaneously embody preconceptions, raise questions and propose explanations” (Snyder, 1980: pp.744). The normative and subjective nature of dependency theory has led to multiple permutations of dependency concepts.

Despite a body of published work categorized as dependency theory and the consistency of language addressing unequal development and economic growth, dependency theory essentially lacks theoretical coherence and has resulted in notable

political inefficacy (Snyder, 1980). “There is no such thing as a single unified body of thought called dependency theory,” Harding states. (Harding, 1976: p.3). Chilcote puts it more bluntly, “no unified theory of dependency yet exists” (1978: pp.55; see also Fagen, 1977). Chilcote argues that dependency theory was at its best a heuristic model, not a formal theory of modernization (1978). Since a heuristic model is largely an explanatory tool which describes use and action, dependency theory has been applied to explain the discrepancies in economic growth between nations; to this end dependency theory has shown itself a heuristic. But a theory attempts to do more than a heuristic, not only by explaining a current state of affairs but by predicting and analyzing the conditions leading to one action or another. Following this logic, dependency theory can hardly be characterized as a theory. Not only is there no comprehensive dependency *theory*, Smith argues that the concepts readily claimed by dependency theory lack explicit and concrete definitions and their interpretation differs from one scholar to the next (1981). Even among dependency theory scholars, discord persists concerning its purpose. Regardless of increased attention from academia, dependency theory has remained “ambiguous” and “fragmentary” (Snyder, 1980). As such, dependency theory is perhaps at its best an approach or even a framework and, despite its name, not a theory (Duvall, 1978; Snyder; 1980).

This research is not intended to discredit dependency theory. The dearth of recent publications in this review of dependency theory serves to illustrate the fact that dependency theory as a means of understanding international political economy, world systems and the effects of the relationships between industrialized and less-industrialized countries has fallen into disrepute. Further examination reveals that dependency theory



inaccurately overemphasizes the impact of economic processes<sup>26</sup> and does not account for other influences in assessing development. Thus, it fails to note that chronic underdevelopment is not simply a function of unequal exchange and external decision-making but a direct consequence of the political decision-making patterns of local elites (Smith, 1979; Smith, 1981). According to Gabriel Almond “One cannot escape the conclusion that the dependency movement ...may have been intellectually counterproductive” (1990: pp. 253). James Caporaso disagrees, asserting that “Dependency theory died out more from neglect than frontal criticism” (1993: 470). Regardless, dependency theory as a means of interpreting international relations or explaining economic relationships has lost traction in academia, and has for the most part been abandoned.

While dependency theory has been phased out of scholarship on international/political economy, its influence remains. The argument can be made that the most important contributions of dependency theory are its normative stance on global economic influence on politics and the constant call to action. These influences are clear in the literature on Chinese engagement in Africa. It is quite easy to see how the expected impact of Chinese engagement in Africa can be framed using the language and logic of dependency theory. Moeletsi Mbeki, deputy chairman of the South African Institute of International Affairs, referring to trade relations between China and South Africa, states, “We sell them raw materials and they sell us manufactured goods with a predictable

---

<sup>26</sup> “[Dependency Theory] holds that economic processes are the basic structural force of history, and that over the last several centuries it has been northern capitalism (first in its mercantile, then in its free-trade, later in its financial and today in its multinational guises) that has been history’s locomotive” (Smith, 1981: pp. 756).

result--an unfavorable trade balance against South Africa" (as quoted in Mooney, 2005).

This resonates with Cox and Jacobson, who assert that, in a state of dependence,

“Economic growth is skewed so as to induce and perpetuate balance of payments deficits, to distribute income and wealth in a highly unequal manner, and to increase marginality in society. The relationship of dependency is created and maintained by a coalition of individuals in both the dominant and subordinate states who benefit from it and who act to insure that their states pursue appropriate policies. The overall system, however, provides greater benefits for the dominant states than for those in subordinate positions (1974: pp.1)”

If, as implied by Mr. Mbeki and supported by Cox and Jacobson, dependency exists in Sino-African relations, then we can expect the following:

1. *Increased economic engagement with China should result in little, no or reverse economic growth for African states.* Cox and Jacobson argue that in a dependent system dominant states benefit most (1974) because they control the world economic system (Smith, 1979). It is important to note that Cox and Jacobson fail to clarify the nature of this benefit, whether it is economic or political.
2. *China is the main and arguably the only driver in Sino-African relations.* *Dependency theory is inherently a systems theory.* A major critique leveled against *dependentistas*, is their inability to account for the actions of the parts (individual actors) in their drive to explain the whole. The actions and motivations (agency) of Africans are not a significant influencing factor in this relationship.

However, existing evidence cannot evaluate whether these expectations are borne out. To begin with, characterizing Sino-African relations as dependent seems inaccurate. A

significant element of the explanatory power of dependency theory is built on the basis of a shared history (Dos Santos, 1971). Historical context is a necessary standpoint to determine if dependent relationships are imposed upon peripheral, resource-rich states. Dos Santos argues that conditions of dependency are not immediately impressed upon peripheral states but are instead developed over long periods of time (1971). While they have persisted through centuries, Sino-African relations have largely consisted of diplomatic interactions devoid of the political and economic characteristics that dependency theorists argue influence the emergence of dependent conditions. Sino-African relations have only recently begun to develop significant political and economic traits that may over time culminate in conditions resembling dependency. The last 15 years have marked this new relationship with the FOCAC conferences commencing in 2000, which have catalyzed increasing relations. China and Africa's shared history is really only now being written. In light of this more visible relationship, it is problematic to contend that present relations show Africa's dependency even though the possibility exists that a dependent relationship may develop over time.

However, quoting Samir Amin, who states "the starting point, as always, is imperialism," Peter Evans suggests, "imperialism remains the frame for the analysis of dependent development" (Evans, 1979: pp. 16; Evans, 1979, pp. 50). As with the general claim of dependency, as yet no empirical research or evidence has adequately depicted the recent Chinese foray into Africa as imperialistic or colonialist. Even though some insist that China is pursuing a neo-colonialist agenda in Africa, these claims have not been rigorously examined. Furthermore, what is known of Chinese engagement in Africa does not fit Kwame Nkrumah's definition of neocolonialism, where "the state which is

subject to it [neocolonialism] is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside” (1966: pp. ix). Without a historical foundation rooted in imperialism, as asserted by proponents of dependency theory, it appears that the present permutation of Sino-African relationship is not a dependent one

In addition, characteristics of dependency theory are typically defined as vulnerability to external forces, lack of autonomy, trade imbalance (Smith, 1979). Chinese trade with Africa is at the aggregate level fairly balanced; at the individual level, some of the dyadic relations are imbalanced in favor of China and others are imbalanced in favor of the African country, e.g. Angola or Sudan. Chinese policy in Africa has been labeled “economic diplomacy” (Alves in Alden et al, 2008), and Moyo points out that Chinese policy in Africa adopts a decidedly business-like tone (2009), without political interference<sup>27</sup>, which allows for the pursuit of arrangements that, if properly executed, have the potential for positive results. African states *do* have autonomy in their engagement with China; they are active participants that choose this relationship. While the literature has not fully addressed the motivations of African elites and the African role in increasing engagement with China, there is little question that African approval and agency is necessary for this relationship (Alden, 2007; Brautigam, 2009). It can also be argued that engagement with China has reduced African vulnerability to external forces as the Chinese option has afforded African elites new leverage in their dealings with other states and external actors. In addition, the Chinese have shared technology with

---

<sup>27</sup> Askouri argues that Chinese support of and work with ruling elites in African states is a form of indirect political interference (2007).

African states and are increasingly recognized for their efforts in the development of infrastructure (Mutukwa, 1977; Alden, 2007). Theoretically speaking, these activities could result in economic growth, increased standards of living, and poverty amelioration, which run counter to expected indicators of underdevelopment or dependency (Calderon and Serven, 2004). It does not appear that Chinese-African relations can be appropriately characterized by dependency theory.

Today, international politics faces new conditions, and the changing global puzzle requires new theories, ideas and frameworks to provide adequate understanding of international relations and political economics. While Africa's history with the West fit quite well with the story and explanation presented by dependency theory, this logic can no longer be automatically superimposed on Africa's relations with China. Chinese forays into Africa have introduced and shared new capital and technology that has diluted and diminished Western control of those resources. According to Evans, this control of capital and technology plays a significant role in the development of dependency relationships (1979). If China is not developing a dependent relationship with African elites, it is logical to infer that China is developing a new international economic relationship to address the changes in the global political economy.

### **State-centric Realism**

Dependency theory was developed around and during the period of the Cold War; the influences of realism and idealism are apparent in the literature. Realism refers to the individual's quest for self-interest. Gilpin notes that following the end of the Cold War there has been a shift from Marxist economic doctrines like dependency theory and an increasing adoption of liberalism (2001). The influence of neo-liberalism in the

structural adjustment policies of the Washington Consensus is evident. Neo-liberalism argues that economies grow best when the market is free of limiting state interventionist policies (Gilpin, 2001). However, the reduction of the state in the market, and the promotion of free market economies in the manner proposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, have failed to attain sustainable economic growth for African states. Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo also contends that “after the end of the Cold War, it has become intellectually and philosophically more difficult, using the dominant paradigms in international relations, namely realism and idealism, to predict the behavior of actors and structures of actions in international relations” (1999: pp. 1). Gilpin presents a different perspective for analyzing international political economy, state-centric realism. State-centric realism identifies the state as the principal actor in international affairs motivated by national interests, and not a system of states influenced by the distribution of power as Waltz's neo-realism argued (Waltz, 1979; Gilpin, 2001). Gilpin therefore suggests "the interests and policies of states are determined by the governing political elite, the pressures of powerful groups within a national society, and the nature of the 'national system of political economy'" (2001: pp. 18). In part, Gilpin's idea of state-centric realism marries the constructivist perspective and the realist perspective, acknowledging that social constructs, ideas, and human volition--like nationalism--allow for agency, and play an important role in state behavior and international affairs (Gilpin, 2001). The analytic perspective of state-centric realism accounts for African agency in Chinese engagement in Africa; it supports the arguments made by key African scholars that the motivations of African state actors matter.

This study asserts that, just as dependency theory inadequately describes underdevelopment in Africa and the role of the West therein, it is even more unsuitable for explaining current Sino-African relations. It argues instead that growing Sino-African relations can be viewed as African states' self-interests, exercised in the pursuit of political and economic objectives as much as China's interests, a realist pursuit of national interest. This research is most concerned with African agency and asserts that Africans are increasingly engaging with China not because of a systems theory of dependency that paints Africans as "powerless" pawns. Ajakaiye and Kaplinsky warn,

"A reincarnation of dependency theory, in which Africa was seen as a quivering victim of external forces, must be abandoned, both in order to understand better what is happening and why it is happening, and in helping Africa to make the best of the opportunities opened up by the rapid emergence of the Asian Driver economies and the consequent restructuring of the global order in the twenty-first Century" (2009; pp. 482).

The argument this author promotes is that the phenomena at hand more closely resemble Gilpin's state-centric realism. In other words, African states are trading with China in a way that resembles inter-state relations.

As demonstrated in earlier chapters, scholars of African politics are adamant that Africans are significant actors in their engagement with China but they stop short of discussing the precise role of African states and the drivers behind growing engagement with China. This project argues that, contrary to dependency theory that assumes African states are passive players, African states choose to engage and in particular to trade with China for the same reasons that all states trade with each other: because as liberal economic theory and a state-centric realist perspective support, international trade is in their national interest. Stephen Krasner argues that the four basic state interests are

economic growth, aggregate national income, political power and social stability (1976). Growing African engagement with China can be argued as a means to attain all four of these objectives. That is, African states chose to engage with China because it is a path to increasing economic growth, accruing aggregate national income, improving social stability and leveraging political power in the global arena.

African states are increasingly engaging with China because they believe it is in their national interest and will result in increased aggregate national income and economic growth. Trade has perhaps been the most noticeable demonstration of Africans' increasing engagement with China. This research argues that the presence of China as a new market for African exports, even more significant because China buys African products at market prices, has the potential to add to aggregate national income. Consequently, an increase in national income is positive economic growth. This is because China is a new trade partner for African states, in *addition to* and not in *lieu of* prior trading partners. Thus, trade with China provides marginal income, an additional revenue source for African economies. African states can earn more because they can sell more. As a result they will accrue more income and this will in turn lead to economic growth, thereby meeting two of Krasner's basic state interests. In addition, Chinese foreign direct investments in African economies have provided important capital that has the potential to contribute to sustainable economic growth.

This study contends that the ability of the Chinese to fill some of the needs of African society is an important motivating factor for Africa's increasing engagement with China. Chinese manufactured products are cheap and affordable; thus, trade with China has made luxury goods more accessible and increased the spending power of the average



African<sup>28</sup>. Combined with Chinese investments in infrastructure development, this higher spending power has the potential to make significant improvements to living standards and the amelioration of poverty and under-development in Africa. The previous chapter highlighted the proclivity of Chinese aid towards the construction or rehabilitation of public service works, large scale projects like the construction of roads, hydro-electric power stations, telecommunication systems and lesser projects like schools, hospitals and skills training, all necessary for economic growth and the reduction of poverty (Calderon & Serven, 2004). The argument can be made that improvement in living standards can in turn lead to a happier and less volatile society. A more satisfied society, therefore, can be expected to be a more stable one.

In addition to trade and aid, the previous chapters also noted increasing political collaboration between African states and China. With the end of the Cold War and current U.S. involvement in two expensive wars, China's influence is growing as the Chinese economy flourishes; Lumumba-Kasongo claims that as China's influence increases so does uncertainty at the global level. Theories applied to international relations fall short of addressing current events in general, and in particular, Africa's demand for global change (1999).

With increasing globalization, the nature of state interaction is shifting, influenced by advances in communications and information technology that has the power to change the face of international relations. Gilpin asserts that there are three types of change: systems change, systemic change and interaction change (1981). The argument that this

---

<sup>28</sup> Based on interviews with Nigerian respondents and observations of the researcher.

study advances is that Africans are engaging China to effect change, in particular interaction change. African engagement with China has been noted as markedly different from typical African foreign relations, in particular with Western states; it is a relationship with a distinctly business-like tone, laden with negotiation aimed at the realization of mutual objectives and mutual benefit. The Chinese government has implemented incentives that encourage Chinese businesses to engage in Africa<sup>29 30</sup>.

Through the machinations of international organizations, Chinese support and South-South solidarity can also draw attention to issues that concern Africans. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is an international organization with a framework that has allowed consideration of African concerns. Additionally, with its policy of non-interference and adherence to the recognition and respect for state sovereignty, China allows African states to play a role in their own policy process. This was demonstrated in the address then-President of Egypt Hosni Mubarak made at the fourth FOCAC Ministerial Conference, November 8, 2009 that presented African ideals and principles in increasing Africa-China engagement (FOCAC, 2009d)<sup>31</sup>.

This study argues that the nature of engagement between African states and the Chinese, through strategic partnerships and negotiated agreements, creates an environment that compels Africa states to become determinants and decision-makers in

---

<sup>29</sup> Informal interview with a Chinese diplomat in the Commerce sector of the Chinese consulate, July 15, 2011, Abuja.

<sup>30</sup> In addition, a major part of FOCAC conferences (held every 3 years) is trade meetings and agreements between Chinese and African entities.

<sup>31</sup> President Mubarak's Ten Principles of Africa-China Cooperation is included in Appendix G.

their own development process. By playing an active role in its own policy and development process, a greater possibility exists for Africa to realize sustainable change and growth, especially when the outside policies of international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have blatantly failed to improve African economies (Weiss et al., 2009; Armstrong et al, 2007; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). Engagement with China positions Africans as important players that form a prominent part of the solution and policy process. This new role indicates a significant shift in African international relations, and one that fits Gilpin's concept of interaction change. This shift has the potential to culminate in global change, an overall shift in the way African states interact with all other states, a transformation that, Lumumba-Kasongo posits, Africans demand (1999). This study therefore asserts that African states are engaging with China because they believe a different method of interaction, one with increased African participation will lead to an increase in political power, with the capability to change the way African states interact with others.

There is sufficient reason to believe that state-centric realist African states are choosing to engage with China because it allows them to realize their interests in increased aggregate national income, greater economic development, improved social stability and expansion of political power, internally and on the world stage. To test the argument that Africans are choosing to engage with China because it is in their national interest, a case study of Nigeria was conducted. The following are the hypothesis to be tested in this study:

*Nigerians are increasingly engaging with China because they believe it will result in a net benefit for themselves and for their country.*

This hypothesis first examines Gilpin's argument for state-centric realism by investigating the notion that Nigerians who engage with China are motivated by national, cultural or societal ideals. It aims to determine if Nigerian governmental actors identify national interest (or ideals that would fall under the purview of national interest) as motivating factors in Nigeria's increasing engagement with China. These interests include: Nigerian belief that Chinese investments in infrastructure and Chinese aid will lead to improvements in standards of living and a reduction in poverty; and, Nigerian belief, especially by governmental actors, that engagement with China reinforces their sovereignty and affords them new international legitimacy.

This study further examines Krasner's specific areas of national interest, in particular aggregate national income and economic growth, as well as Krasner's national interest of social stability, examining the argument that Nigerians believe that increased engagement with China will improve the lives of the Nigerian people. This argument suggests that the improvement of standards of living will in turn lead to happier citizens, resulting in a comparatively more stable society. This hypothesis tests whether or not Nigerians believe that political power or some new form of leverage in the international political arena will accrue as a result of increased engagement with China. The argument that this hypothesis explores is that Nigerians believe the presence of China as a strategic partner and potential alternative to Western states creates a condition in which these countries (Western states) must change the way they interact with Nigeria or at least indicate an interest in addressing international issues of concern to Nigeria. This study tests whether Nigerians believe they can realize these objectives through increased engagement with China.

The next chapters test the central hypothesis of this study to see if, as argued, dependency theory is an inadequate descriptor of growing Sino-African relations and if Africans, in particular Nigerians are choosing to increasingly engage with China because they believe that it is in their best interests and in-line with national interests.

## **Conclusion**

Dependency theory emerged as a way to understand the phenomenon of rich states getting richer and poor states getting poorer at a time when liberal economic theory purported that increased trade would lead to economic benefit for all. Presently, political economists have abandoned dependency theory. Although it has explanatory power, dependency theory fails to account for other factors that influence economic growth, in particular the effects of elite decision-making. However, the influence of dependency theory has persisted in underdevelopment literature, and more recently in the literature on Sino-African relations, especially from those who accuse China of neo-colonialist behavior in Africa. These claims have yet to be rigorously examined through empirical research. Furthermore, evidence of economic growth in African states due to China's increased demands for African products, as well as increasing agency on the part of African actors, indicates that a relationship unlike that described by dependency theory is at work.

This study argues that state-centric realism is the phenomenon at work in growing engagement between China and African states. In a context of state-centric realism, all actors are driven by their own interests and act in pursuit of them. The motivations of both sides are important determinants of the nature of the relationship. As most literature

on Chinese engagement in Africa has explored the issue from the Chinese perspective, this project is concerned with understanding the African side of this relationship. This study argues that African states matter because their behavior in this iteration of international relations is motivated by a belief that engagement in China will result in the realization of national interests. These national interests, as identified by Krasner, include aggregate national income, economic growth, political power and social stability (1976). The next chapters explore the argument that dependency theory is not an adequate descriptor of growing Sino-African relations and test the hypotheses that state-centric realist African states are engaging with China because they believe that it is in their national interest, with primary focus on Nigeria as a case study.

## Chapter 4: An Economic Win-win?

---

### Introduction

If applied to current Sino-African engagement, dependency theory asserts that, despite increasing trade, African states will not benefit and are instead insignificant pawns subject to the demands of Chinese objectives. However, demonstrable economic benefits to African states support this project's central argument that dependency does not adequately describe the relationship between China and African states. This chapter explores the idea that African dependency results in adverse economic conditions in Africa and in Nigeria, particularly in the areas of economic growth and trade balance<sup>32</sup>. To investigate these indicators, the following chapter seeks to determine any evidence of mutual economic growth as trade increases between African states and China, and assesses levels of benefit from trade. To accomplish this, economic growth and trade balance are measured at two levels: the aggregate level (all of Africa as a single entity) and the individual state level (Nigeria case study). This chapter does not assert that positive economic trends are due to increasing engagement with China, but instead asserts that the economic trends do not indicate a state of dependency for African states.

The first half of this chapter focuses on Africa and is split into two sub-sections. The first subsection looks at Africa's aggregate economic growth, noting trends in gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate, gross national income (GNI), and gross domestic

---

<sup>32</sup> See previous chapter for all indicators of a dependent relationship.

product per capita during the ten years preceding the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and the ten years following (1990-2009). The second subsection concentrates in particular on the balance of trade between China and Africa from 1995-2009 to reveal any indicators of dependency. The second section of this chapter examines economic trends between Nigeria and China from 1995 to 2009 to see if dependency theory is a fitting framework for understanding growing China-Nigeria relations.

Testing dependency theory is a challenging undertaking. As Vengroff asserts, this difficulty results from the numerous and diverse approaches by scholars to empirically examine dependency theory (1977; 1977b). Kaufmann, Chernotsky and Geller allege that many of these studies intended “to build and illustrate dependency theory, rather than subject it to the possibility of disproof” (1975: pp. 303). Just as scholarship on the ideology behind dependency theory lacked cohesion, so do empirical analyses of dependency theory as a subset of underdevelopment literature. Although dependency theory is viewed as an economics systems theory, scholars hold that there are different kinds of dependency: economic, political and military. Further still, each scholar operationalizes dependency differently (Kaufman, Chernotsky & Geller, 1975; Vengroff, 1977b). For example, Kaufman et al. operationalized economic performance within dependent conditions in the following manner:

- “1: Countries with high levels of economic dependency are likely to have low rates of economic growth.
- 2: Countries with high levels of economic dependency are likely to have an unfavorable balance of trade.
- 3: Countries with high levels of dependency are likely to have unstable, fluctuating growth patterns” (1975: pp.308).”



Such attempts at empirical analysis of dependency theory have generated mixed results, including Vengroff's, which examined dependency in Africa (1975; 1977b). Vengroff's analysis of newly independent African states failed to demonstrate a negative relationship between dependency and economic performance, which the author attributed to methodology problems as opposed to "fundamental inadequacy of the theory," asserting that the "analysis has provided at least a partial confirmation of dependency theory" (1977b: pp. 630). Kaufman and others were more blunt, leveling critiques against dependency theory later echoed by Tony Smith, noting "the concept of dependency... requires refinement and redefinition" and further still, declaring that dependency theory needs to account for the influence of political, social and cultural factors that can influence economic performance (1975: pp. 329). As illustrated in the previous chapter, dependency theory fell out of favor amongst scholars; therefore this chapter does not look to test dependency.

The argument for state-centric realism posed by this study suggests that dependency is *not* at work between China and Africa, but instead that state leaders and individuals are engaging with China because it is in their best interest. Though a lot of the literature and research reveals the benefit for China of African trade<sup>33</sup>; this section focuses instead on whether or not African states are demonstrating growth despite China's more obvious profit.

---

<sup>33</sup> See Gu & Humphrey (2006) and Alden, Large, and Soares de Oliveira (2008b).

### **Sino-African Relations— Mutual Economic Benefit**

In 2000, the first FOCAC conference in Beijing formally marked the start of burgeoning trade between China and Africa. Over the next 10 years, the FOCAC conferences have served as an engine for growing Chinese engagement in Africa, thus indicating the significance of FOCAC as a chronological marker of Chinese engagement in Africa (Shelton & Paruk, 2008). This study relies upon the start of the FOCAC conferences as the indicator of the Chinese economic partnership with African states. Trends prior to 2000 the year of the first FOCAC conference show African economic activity without Chinese interaction and trends after indicate the perceived influence of the Chinese. A 20-year period will be examined, first exploring limited Chinese interaction (1990-1999), and then increasing Chinese interaction (2000-2009). Economic trends for China are indicated on the same graphs to illustrate China's positive economic performance over the same 20-year period, although discussion dwells on African economic performance.

If indeed economic engagement between China and Africa is producing favorable outcomes for both sides, borrowing from the framework provided by Kaufman et al., the following propositions will be tested:

- 1: Africa should exhibit higher economic growth rates in the decade *after* the first FOCAC conference (2000-2009) than the preceding decade (1990-1999).
- 2: Africa should have an even or nearly even balance of trade with China.

These propositions challenge Kaufmann's first two assertions regarding the relationship between dependency and economic performance, and unfavorable trade

balance in countries with high rates of dependency. This chapter's research posits positive trends due to the *absence* of a dependent state. Examining economic trends to test these propositions can reveal empirical results to support or discredit the argument of a dependent relationship between China and Africa. If the evidence supports these propositions, no dependent relationship is at work; if the evidence shows no support for these propositions, then it would appear there is some merit to the claim of a neo-imperialistic China promoting a dependent economic relationship with African states. This chapter does not attribute African economic growth to increased engagement with China, noting that there are a number of other factors including African's continuing engagement with the West, in particular the USA<sup>34</sup> that influenced economic development in the region. The purpose of this chapter is to determine if a state of dependency exists for African states.

### *Mutual Economic Growth*

The first indicator of economic performance is growth in gross domestic product. According to Fig 4-1, aggregate African GDP growth rates prior to the 2000 launch of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation stayed close to global growth rates. After 2000, however, African growth rates maintain an approximate 2 percentage point lead over world growth rates for the following decade with the exception of 2004, which demonstrated a 4 percentage point difference. The following graph illustrates that, after


---

<sup>34</sup> In 2000, the US government also introduced the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) which "offers tangible incentives for African countries to continue their efforts to open their economies and build free markets" (see [www.agoa.gov](http://www.agoa.gov) for more information). Though not maximally exploited by African states, it has increased the US trade deficit with African states over the same time that FOCAC has been in operation.

the launch of the recent iteration of Sino-African relations as defined by the FOCAC Summit of 2000, African economies on average fared well as China's economy grew at higher rates than the rest of the world. This is likely due to the increase in the price of commodities over the 10 year period, partly driven up by increased Chinese demand.


This distinct separation between the African growth rate and that of the world after the launch of FOCAC may lend credibility to the notion that a mutually beneficial relationship driven by state-centric realism is displayed. This following graph indicates that all engaging African states and China experience mutual benefit and economic growth as reflected in GDP rates.

**Figure 4-1. Real Gross Domestic Product Growth Rates of Africa, China and the World, 1990-2009 (percentages)**




For the purposes of this study, gross national income (GNI) serves as another indicator of mutual economic benefit. China's gross national income and aggregate Africa's GNI is depicted in the following graph (Figure 4.2). China's willingness to purchase African raw materials at market prices has provided a new market for exports and given African countries an additional revenue stream. This added income can then be invested as Africans see fit, for example, into economic stimulus to bolster growth of local economies or to develop infrastructure. From 1990 to 1999, Africa posted an average GNI of USD\$515,491.81 million dollars. As the figure below (4-2) illustrates, this amount nearly doubled over the next decade, when the average GNI reached USD\$954,692.79 million. Figure 4-2 displays this significant change in the growth rate of GNI following China's formal entry into Africa.

**Figure 4-2. Gross National Income of Africa (Aggregate) and China, 1990-2009**  
(Millions of US Dollars)



Examining mutual economic benefit at the per capita level, GDP per capita in Africa appears to mirror the same trends displayed by GNI over the 20-year period. As shown in Figure 4-3 below, in the ten years preceding the first FOCAC conference and in the five years that followed, the African GDP per capita fell below \$1,000. However, after 2004, per capita income experienced steady growth, topping \$1,610 by 2008 and falling only slightly to \$1,489 by 2009. Notably, per capita GDP almost doubled that of the previous decade (1990-1999) when it hovered at an average of \$751.44.

**Figure 4-3. Gross Domestic Product Per Capita of Africa and China, 1990-2009 (US Dollars)**



Asserting that these significant gains in indicators of African economic growth have directly resulted from increasing Sino-African political and economic relations would be incorrect. Such a conclusion makes the brazen assumption that China-Africa relations exist in a vacuum, and Sino-African trade is the major variable in African economic growth, immune to other external variables. Though China is quickly becoming Africa's top trading partner, Africa is also trading with others, including the United States, the EU, and to a lesser degree other African states. However, the figures represented in these graphs clearly display that within the first decade of active engagement with China, African states do not appear to have suffered the economic setbacks anticipated within a dependent relationship.

#### *China-Africa Balance of Trade*


Figure 4-4. below illustrates the rapid and steady growth of trade between China and Africa over time. The blue bars show the value of goods from Africa purchased by China and the pink bars show the value of Chinese products purchased by Africans, demonstrating benefits accrued by aggregate African states compared to China's. As depicted here, trade volume does not significantly lean in favor of one side over the other.

Figure 4-4 also illustrates changes in trade volume between China and Africa during the two decades (1995 to 2009). At its onset, trade between China and Africa appears imbalanced; Chinese exports are nearly double African imports. However, as the total trade volume climbed, Chinese imports from Africa have for the most part kept pace with Chinese exports to Africa, with the significant exception of 2009. During this year,

the overall trade volume retracted as a result of global financial crises; Chinese exports to Africa measured approximately \$5.5 billion over imports from Africa.

According to WorldTrade Atlas, during this 15-year period, aggregate imports from Africa to China totaled US\$233.3 billion, while Chinese exports to Africa totaled \$239.8 billion, a difference of US\$6.5 billion, or approximately 1.4 percent of total trade activity over the same period (2011).


**Figure 4-4. Volume of Trade between China and Africa, 1995-2009 (Billions of US Dollars)**





This means that trade between China and Africa at the aggregate level cannot be construed as being significantly imbalanced if at all; trade volume between China and Africa measured in terms of monetary value is fairly balanced and even. Although aggregate trade might indicate a more even trade balance between China and African states, it would be erroneous to assume that this equity is characteristic of trade at the individual state level. In certain cases, for example, some countries (among them Sudan, Congo and Angola) have shown significant positive trade balance with China (see Table 4-1). Most of these states are notably resource-rich, and their exports to China consist almost exclusively of crude oil (WorldTrade Atlas, 2011). Others, like Nigeria (as discussed later), have a trade balance tipped in favor of China, despite Nigeria's large oil supply base, and the fact that crude oil accounts for approximately 75 percent of Nigeria's exports to China (WorldTrade Atlas, 2011). On the individual [African] state level, significant trade imbalances exist, that do not favor African states but also do not favor China. This means that analyses of Sino-African economic relations that address Africa as a single entity do not accurately depict the relationship that individual African states have with China, and so, overarching claims on the impact of China in Africa, may not be supported by the evidence. As Figure 4-5 and Table 4-1 illustrate, both China and Africa are winners and losers in terms of trade balance in their increasing economic engagement.

**Figure 4-5. Trade Balance between China and African states, 1995-2009 (Millions of US Dollars)**



According to the data presented by Figure 4-5 and Table 4-1, it appears that trade between China and Africa does in fact result in mutual economic benefit. As illustrated in Figure 4-5, the trade balance between China and most African states hovers fairly consistently around zero from 1995 to 2009. This consistency is supported by Table 4-1, which shows trade balances by African country over the same period. Figures in red show years when the balance favored an African state. Balance of trade data has often been relied upon by scholars to indicate and empirically demonstrate economic dependency.

Table 4-1. China's Trade with Africa 1995-2009: Trade Balance (Exports to China minus Imports from China)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
	<i>Millions of US Dollars</i>														
Angola	115.75	215.22	574.47	117.15	339.27	1,808.96	676.11	1,025.75	2,059.18	4,524.31	6,207.82	10,036.51	11,644.08	19,439.28	12,275.50
AFRICA	1,066.25	1,101.86	744.55	2,576.04	1,734.95	483.31	1,215.06	1,535.51	1,834.65	1,825.72	2,427.36	2,062.75	1,084.12	5,014.04	5,442.48
Nigeria	93.02	164.03	305.83	329.91	213.51	270.95	689.72	925.78	1,715.81	1,256.70	1,778.21	2,577.92	3,262.70	6,248.21	4,577.49
Egypt	426.59	401.03	407.55	542.23	681.81	703.26	792.92	761.09	786.09	1,201.20	1,724.11	2,759.51	4,195.34	5,394.69	4,352.97
Algeria	35.47	54.49	112.87	116.39	97.75	147.33	152.69	270.03	547.11	721.46	1,042.79	1,811.38	1,584.71	2,843.28	3,233.34
Sudan	32.89	9.77	87.75	348.13	176.29	573.33	718.22	765.06	964.76	889.75	1,320.94	524.55	2,577.47	4,451.29	2,954.76
Liberia	35.43	113.60	73.36	27.77	12.37	90.71	83.94	25.48	15.76	166.10	135.58	527.89	802.44	1,130.84	1,876.00
Benin	60.40	67.93	100.88	150.09	156.83	369.20	520.51	403.94	403.15	467.50	812.96	1,362.96	1,858.54	2,193.30	1,858.77
Morocco	72.57	57.37	75.44	79.48	198.34	219.51	215.58	329.33	534.80	730.32	928.62	1,210.14	1,739.79	1,867.12	1,758.37
Ghana	66.51	79.92	83.55	102.88	104.70	90.99	109.32	152.12	287.72	430.85	577.23	723.01	1,171.12	1,639.99	1,454.50
Congo	2.49	9.39	139.90	15.43	49.14	305.38	143.57	211.61	755.60	1,475.90	2,133.29	2,542.91	2,408.17	3,112.67	1,369.31
Kenya	102.72	91.36	131.13	116.67	95.75	129.11	133.03	174.84	233.03	331.80	439.39	597.25	904.06	1,181.89	1,247.90
Libya	38.64	1.24	63.46	50.01	47.88	27.25	13.22	110.32	144.01	161.61	581.28	990.52	684.07	953.81	1,158.37
Togo	119.20	76.75	61.40	55.96	70.24	80.30	108.52	133.11	240.60	352.04	505.37	682.44	1,347.67	1,179.06	1,093.12
Zambia	17.83	3.98	15.82	15.91	9.23	36.53	3.15	8.87	12.66	120.04	203.26	166.57	195.42	283.24	1,088.83
Ethiopia	30.67	40.99	54.30	67.76	52.65	52.83	77.03	92.74	148.02	179.73	198.97	299.88	687.71	1,144.69	1,036.65
Congo, Dem. Rep.	39.58	40.97	27.58	48.73	17.43	17.46	5.85	6.51	1.55	62.61	125.97	299.69	367.29	1,346.82	797.79
Tanzania	64.52	44.73	66.88	60.29	58.06	80.99	86.88	114.86	164.24	145.58	132.88	231.20	396.39	808.60	717.96
Equatorial Guinea	10.30	9.63	74.15	65.97	164.60	258.53	505.23	379.48	406.82	985.16	1,467.27	2,496.56	1,604.39	1,990.02	693.16
Tunisia	0.67	28.33	52.13	38.13	68.98	94.53	103.02	105.82	166.91	211.43	231.41	307.21	451.59	593.59	604.89
Mauritania	31.56	13.02	11.02	8.34	12.94	19.73	25.50	42.23	48.78	13.96	70.25	292.81	430.17	849.66	599.61
Gabon	120.42	180.61	307.21	139.18	272.59	332.76	253.49	227.22	292.28	387.24	306.68	752.95	989.78	1,646.80	558.07
Cote d'Ivoire	50.51	42.21	60.73	127.98	189.87	215.51	249.97	205.59	191.56	15.03	51.93	101.08	371.69	457.79	442.13
South Africa	54.90	18.76	4.62	175.64	0.06	23.58	123.68	42.55	187.93	3.46	382.24	1,673.49	820.83	610.31	409.07
Senegal	35.97	35.74	33.30	42.96	38.78	49.76	52.18	56.61	66.71	104.34	125.56	178.05	310.78	391.71	357.46
Madagascar	6.67	11.10	23.54	30.92	35.69	64.78	64.02	28.95	105.10	137.77	169.37	198.19	302.80	533.76	341.11
Djibouti	9.73	9.81	13.44	30.91	38.34	54.09	47.10	49.79	66.02	71.73	110.89	154.66	162.30	245.84	295.18
Mauritius	23.08	43.57	47.90	65.22	48.71	54.51	78.19	85.35	104.34	144.26	168.97	190.30	279.31	323.86	286.19
Niger	7.92	1.45	1.54	7.41	14.59	7.02	6.48	14.74	19.64	24.98	33.91	70.83	30.69	166.67	283.85
Guinea	25.44	25.96	1.24	36.23	38.42	23.45	44.02	31.84	62.87	78.16	141.26	163.32	170.67	308.49	274.37

Red figures indicate years when the trade balance was in favor of the African country.



Table 4-1 cont'd. China's Trade with Africa 1995-2009: Trade Balance (Exports to China minus Imports from China)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
	<i>Millions of US Dollars</i>														
Uganda	12.83	6.71	8.17	10.65	10.48	13.57	15.00	22.46	47.88	64.75	59.48	120.15	182.59	212.83	208.92
Mozambique	10.43	11.04	15.22	12.90	15.64	15.95	10.85	3.31	18.23	30.81	17.83	48.29	36.51	153.93	161.39
Gambia	57.83	46.26	41.85	50.69	57.21	61.68	72.51	81.88	114.53	124.08	124.75	162.26	176.39	172.08	161.38
Mali	<b>11.25</b>	1.61	<b>13.59</b>	19.51	17.18	34.44	21.91	19.89	6.81	<b>48.03</b>	<b>13.59</b>	<b>39.27</b>	89.38	104.56	131.33
Botswana	0.21	<b>2.60</b>	2.07	11.24	8.16	11.46	14.23	18.97	20.63	46.65	54.51	53.56	91.45	<b>19.82</b>	100.56
Chad	1.19	0.67	<b>0.57</b>	0.15	0.24	0.50	0.27	0.18	<b>1.16</b>	<b>216.65</b>	<b>184.79</b>	<b>246.14</b>	<b>18.59</b>	38.39	88.64
Reunion	3.62	3.70	4.50	4.48	5.58	5.77	7.71	8.69	13.87	23.63	31.18	42.67	89.29	113.24	83.69
Burkina Faso	1.58	0.77	1.39	0.88	<b>0.62</b>	2.96	4.06	5.12	<b>20.63</b>	<b>112.54</b>	<b>147.16</b>	<b>173.87</b>	<b>111.59</b>	<b>16.29</b>	<b>73.49</b>
Somalia	<b>1.00</b>	<b>0.15</b>	0.19	0.13	0.43	0.93	0.60	0.27	<b>2.72</b>	1.71	13.30	24.51	24.91	39.95	66.79
Lesotho	1.39	1.16	4.94	8.58	3.73	10.37	15.64	24.57	24.88	47.45	55.49	63.16	57.39	78.05	48.71
Malawi	0.74	0.83	1.59	2.51	5.00	6.91	4.09	5.91	10.78	18.72	14.26	29.76	41.31	72.00	48.10
Namibia	1.10	<b>1.53</b>	2.81	1.45	4.16	4.69	9.95	<b>8.80</b>	0.68	6.13	<b>15.32</b>	11.39	87.98	<b>50.80</b>	<b>47.34</b>
Sierra Leone	4.27	6.40	4.09	4.45	4.35	8.64	11.99	14.25	16.61	26.63	29.27	38.00	52.79	73.15	44.41
Eritrea	2.16	0.61	3.13	2.56	0.72	1.28	2.83	6.02	5.47	7.00	7.60	37.24	24.11	26.44	39.05
Cape Verde	0.38	0.27	0.41	1.96	3.15	5.18	2.21	1.84	2.60	2.75	5.19	10.11	14.70	13.47	35.57
Burundi	2.12	0.91	0.39	2.09	1.46	2.51	1.15	1.74	1.71	4.50	11.56	8.43	12.36	17.99	32.95
Rwanda	1.13	3.66	1.67	0.21	0.01	0.80	<b>3.48</b>	<b>1.33</b>	<b>3.47</b>	<b>11.13</b>	0.78	<b>9.57</b>	11.15	34.95	32.27
Guinea-Bissau	1.09	0.46	<b>0.32</b>	1.45	2.99	4.49	8.30	4.55	12.35	5.97	5.79	5.68	6.70	4.89	21.58
Cameroon	<b>17.45</b>	<b>24.13</b>	<b>85.82</b>	<b>29.97</b>	<b>56.11</b>	<b>115.41</b>	<b>154.34</b>	<b>70.67</b>	<b>50.42</b>	<b>49.00</b>	63.10	<b>8.64</b>	136.95	<b>98.88</b>	17.92
Seychelles	0.63	0.43	1.05	1.32	2.01	1.42	1.06	1.45	1.75	1.75	3.39	4.16	2.93	9.54	15.16
Zimbabwe	<b>21.62</b>	<b>49.61</b>	<b>46.42</b>	75.05	<b>17.10</b>	<b>70.82</b>	<b>81.63</b>	<b>127.43</b>	<b>136.81</b>	<b>28.05</b>	<b>32.54</b>	<b>2.65</b>	<b>55.18</b>	<b>16.07</b>	12.48
Comoros	1.37	0.26	0.22	0.12	0.64	0.29	0.41	0.76	0.69	1.30	1.84	6.19	7.65	25.34	11.17
Canary Islands	18.94	24.82	16.91	17.65	21.07	24.45	33.98	30.31	37.53	52.60	39.04	52.55	53.94	19.40	5.91
Swaziland	0.08	0.36	0.66	2.34	2.44	2.91	<b>4.02</b>	<b>6.36</b>	<b>8.09</b>	<b>3.14</b>	<b>12.25</b>	<b>17.60</b>	<b>6.13</b>	8.73	2.97
Sao Tome & Principe	0.21	0.26	0.11	0.06	0.06	0.12	1.26	0.16	0.17	<b>1.11</b>	0.55	1.22	1.78	1.86	2.19
Malilla	3.69	2.26	2.39	1.72	2.19	1.17	0.99	0.84	2.15	2.79	3.24	3.77	4.13	2.74	2.16
Central African Republic	0.82	<b>0.57</b>	<b>0.24</b>	1.05	1.01	0.04	<b>0.82</b>	<b>0.57</b>	<b>0.19</b>	<b>2.92</b>	<b>1.90</b>	<b>6.92</b>	2.25	<b>10.19</b>	<b>1.90</b>
Oth. Africa, N.E.S.	0.23	2.78	<b>1.40</b>	0.36	1.70	0.95	0.78	0.77	1.53	0.77	1.02	0.93	5.66	4.35	1.65
Ceuta	3.25	0.92	0.97	1.34	1.96	2.10	0.55	1.69	0.90	1.44	1.59	0.21	0.65	0.61	0.18
Western Sahara	0.61	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.04	0.89	0.37	0.56	0.58	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.07

Red figures indicate years when the trade balance was in favor of the African country.

*Italicized Countries: NOT members of Forum for China-Africa Cooperation*

Source: World Trade Atlas

However, this table (4-1) brings to light an interesting trend: as trade between China and African states increases, more African states are experiencing a positive balance of trade. In other words, for some African countries, increasing trade with China may actually bear greater benefit for the African state than for China. An example is Angola (represented by the brown dot in Figure 4-5), which over the 15-year period posted a positive trade balance every year.

As evidenced in Table 4-1, it is important to note that the countries are ranked by the absolute value of their 2009 trade balance rather than total trade volume with China, i.e., the figures in the table are the result of subtracting the value of goods procured from China from the value of goods sold to China. They are then ranked by their absolute value, which is the magnitude of value whether positive or negative. This means that the states are ranked by the degree of trade imbalance in 2009, from highest to low, and states with more even trade balances place closer to the bottom of the table. As a result, the figures in this table do not reflect the actual volume of trade between China and African states. For instance, South Africa falls lower in Table 4-1, although it is one of China's biggest African trading partners (WorldTrade Atlas, 2011). The lower ranking of South Africa would indicate that trade between South Africa and China is close to even but the magnitude of Chinese trade with South Africa cannot be ascertained from Table 4-1. However Table 4-2 presents China's top trading partners in Africa in 2009 and their volume of trade.

**Table 4-2. China's Top 10 African Trading Partners, 2009**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Total Trade</b> (Imports + Exports, Millions of USD\$)	<b>Share of Africa Total Trade</b>
Africa	\$ 90,006.64	-
Angola*	\$ 17,045.77	18.94%
South Africa*	\$ 15,138.88	16.82%
Nigeria	\$ 6,373.94	7.08%
Sudan*	\$ 6,363.80	7.07%
Egypt	\$ 5,858.06	6.51%
Libya*	\$ 5,163.30	5.74%
Algeria	\$ 5,126.20	5.70%
Morocco	\$ 2,500.95	2.78%
Congo*	\$ 2,105.46	2.34%
Benin	\$ 2,046.34	2.27%

Source: World Trade Data

\*Countries with a positive trade balance in 2009


The previous table presents trade data on China's top ten African trading partners in 2009. Together these ten states account for 75.24 percent of total trade between China and Africa. Half of the top ten partners posted positive trade balances with China in 2009. These data lend support to the claim that a mutually beneficial relationship driven by state-centric self-interest is developing between China and Africa. These findings challenge the notion of Africa's dependency on China. The evidence presented here does

not support dependency as defined by various scholars, including Kaufman et al (1975).

If Africa is benefiting from bilateral trade as much as China--and in some cases more--an argument for state-centric realism, not dependency, perhaps has merit.

A major argument put forward by dependency theorists is that economic dependency creates a condition in which, even with increased trade volume, dependent states do not record significant (if any) economic growth. Booth asserts, “an increase in the traditional exports...might well produce no increase in national income” (1975: pp. 55). These traditional exports are raw materials and natural unprocessed resources, notably Africa’s primary exports to China. As the following graph (Figure 4-6) illustrates, this trend is increasingly corroborated over time.

**Figure 4-6. Chinese Imports from Africa by Category, 1995-2009 (Millions of US Dollars)**



Clearly, exports of raw materials are the main driver for a balanced trade relationship between China and African states at the state level. The reason for this is two-fold: China is paying high market prices for African commodities and Africans are paying low prices for cheap Chinese products.

Contrary to dependency theory, where profit margins from value-added products increase economic benefit to dominant states while impeding benefit to dependent states, China-Africa trade appears to follow a different trajectory. China pays more for African exports and Africans pay less for Chinese exports (Alden, 2004). China purchases raw materials from African countries at *current* market prices, which has boosted the economies of African states; profit margins of Chinese manufactured goods are rather minimal. Without a doubt, current economic conditions are quite different from the conditions that provided the foundation for the development of dependency theory. Part of the logic of dependency theory is that developed countries as sole providers of finished goods could sell at premiums over market value.

However, China's entrance as an additional supplier has not only drawn market prices down as a result of increased supply: Chinese methods of under pricing goods meant that profit margins and net gains to China have been minimal (Carmody and Owusu, 2007). In the case of Chinese-produced goods, the impact of "value-added" on net returns and subsequent trade benefit is not adequately explained by the dependency theory framework, despite continued focus on Chinese finished goods as initiating lopsided economic development. It is also important to note that some caution is required when dealing with raw trade data, because a percentage of the total value of a finished



good comes from imported inputs, including raw materials acquired from African states. Xing and Detert assert, “conventional trade statistics greatly inflate bilateral trade deficits between a country used as export-platform by multinational firms [China] and its destination countries” (2010: pp. 9). Domestic value-added for Chinese manufactured products vary by product from as little as 10% of the wholesale value of the imported good to 65% (Dean et al, 2007; Xing and Detert, 2010). This means that although trade data may show significant benefit of trade to China, not all of that benefit is actually accrued to China.

Over the last decade of increased engagement with China, African states have posted observable increases in economic growth. While the research presented here has noted that this growth has occurred parallel to increased engagement with China (in particular exponential growth in bilateral trade) it does not allege that these changes in economic trends are directly attributable to the China/Africa relationship. African states do not trade solely with China; their economic activity is influenced by other factors, including trade with other nations, shocks to the world economy and policy decisions of domestic state actors. A growing body of literature by African scholars from the African Economic Research Consortium attempts to examine the impact of Chinese engagement in Africa. Researchers note the dearth of empirical research, as well as data to promote further research (Ajakaiye & Kaplinsky, 2009; Oyeranti et al., 2010). However, current data indicates that Chinese engagement in Africa offers opportunities, expanding infrastructure and service provision, which ultimately improves the welfare of the African people (Oyeranti et al., 2010). Empirical studies of Chinese engagement in Africa

contradict the popular rhetoric of a disadvantageous relationship with a dependent Africa. By most measures, Africa is gaining observable economic benefits by engaging with China, pointing to a nondependent relationship.

### **Case Study: Nigeria**

Nigeria is heavily populated compared to other African countries, making up 20 percent of the total African population. It is also a consumer nation, in which domestic industry, with appropriate management, might successfully compete with Chinese imports. Recent news articles cite Nigeria as having the highest population of Chinese in an African country which lends credence to the assumption that a comparatively higher level of engagement and trade can be expected between China and Nigeria as compared to other African states (Yisa, 2011). With Nigeria's significant political influence on the continent, the argument can also be made that Nigeria's engagement with China might have a ripple effect on other African countries subject to China's exploitation. A key purpose of this project is to determine the nature of China-Nigeria relations and to ascertain Nigerian motivations in this engagement.

Oil influences Nigeria's characterization as a resource-rich country, and it would be easy to assume that China is interested in Nigeria because of its oil. While that assumption may be accurate, it does not tell the full story of China's interest. Nigeria does provide oil for China and factors significantly into China's resource grab in Africa. In 2005, Nigeria and China signed an \$800 million crude oil sale agreement (Onyebuchi, 2005). However, while Nigeria is a leading producer of crude oil in Africa, Nigeria is not

a leading supplier of African oil to China (Rocha, 2007). Figures from WorldTrade Atlas indicate that Nigeria was China's 7<sup>th</sup> ranked supplier of African crude oil<sup>35</sup>, supplying only 2 percent of the African crude oil purchased by Chinese entities<sup>36</sup> from 1995 to 2009 (2011). China's relationship with Nigeria differs from most other African states, as engagement with Nigeria was marked early on by the exchange of information and technology, where Chinese know-how contributed to the development of local industry (Brautigam, 2003). Alden notes that Nigerian traders still say that they learn and adopt Chinese practices and methods in industry and manufacturing (2007).

Nigeria is also in many ways a political anomaly in Africa, a regional and continental self-determined powerhouse that has, since independence, adopted and maintained a policy of political neutrality in foreign relations. Because of its influence, Nigerian significance in Africa is arguably necessary for any actors looking to make a strategic power play, economic and otherwise, on the continent. Nigeria's influence in West Africa, active role in peacekeeping efforts, as well as in development and governance make Nigeria a key player in African politics. Chinese efforts to collaborate politically with African states on the global level can no doubt be bolstered with Nigeria's support. Where one in every five black Africans is a Nigerian, the Chinese cannot afford to overlook Nigeria if they aim to be players in Africa.

---

<sup>35</sup> China's leading supplier of African crude oil is Angola which accounted for 52% of the African crude sold to China from 1995 to 2009. Sudan (16%), Congo (9%), Equatorial Guinea (7%), Libya (7%) and Algeria (2%), account for another 42% of the total crude purchase over the same time period.

<sup>36</sup> The US Department of State notes that the United States is the leading trade partner for Nigeria, bolstered by American purchase of Nigeria crude oil. The Department of State estimates that approximately half of Nigeria's daily production of crude oil is acquired by American firms.

The selection of Nigeria as a case study is based on both political and economic contexts. The influx of Chinese goods into Africa, particularly inexpensive textiles, has hurt domestic industries in Nigeria, leading to the loss of several thousand jobs and diminishing the added value associated with the sale of finished goods (Alden, 2007). Nigerian policies regarding China have shown the influence of local business, which has been active in provoking the government to adopt or at least promote the protection of domestic industry (Alden, 2007). They have also shown the influence of public opinion. A case in point: consumers rallied the government to reopen Chinatown in Lagos for access to cheap Chinese goods after it was closed down due to quality concerns raised by local business regarding counterfeit and subpar products (Alden, 2007). The Nigerian government's responsiveness to concerns with Chinese engagement, though not perfect, has yet to be adequately addressed by literature on growing Chinese engagement in Africa.

## **Trade**

Trade between Africa and China has grown at a rate of nearly 44 percent each year since 2000 (Moore, 2011). Chinese manufactured products are ubiquitous--from the USD\$1 plastic sandals and chintzy-looking fabric flowers to steel security doors and generators of all sizes. In 2010, trade volume between the two nations reached US\$7.5 billion (Okoh, 2011; Williams, 2011). As of 2011, the Chinese completed 117 projects in Nigeria, worth \$2.1 billion; Chinese contract investments had already reached \$13.3

billion by November of 2010 (Williams, 2011). According to the president of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Nigeria is China's fourth African trade partner and the second largest African export market. Though largely focused on oil reserves, Chinese investments also targeted natural gas, agriculture and steel processing (Moore, 2011; Daily Champion, 2011). At present, the Chinese are building an economic free trade zone in Lagos as a part of recent trade agreements with the Nigerian government. Chinese investment can be seen across the country in infrastructure development: communications technology, road development and construction, to name a few.

Though Chinese trade with Nigeria is booming, a glance at export and import values shows that the trade balance heavily favours China (see Figure 4-7 and Table 4-3 below). The apparent imbalance, for all intents and purposes looks like textbook dependency theory in action. However, based on calculations using World Trade Atlas and UNCTAD data, Chinese exports to Nigeria from 2000 to 2009 grew 871.08 percent, an approximate average annual growth rate of 40 percent, with the exception of 2009 when the value of Chinese exports fell below that of 2008 (WorldTrade Atlas, 2011; UNCTAD, 2012). On the other hand, Nigerian exports to China grew by 206.64 percent during the same period, at an average annual growth rate of 62.71 percent. This growth rate statistic does a poor job of demonstrating that Nigerian exports to China fluctuated tremendously during this period, with extreme rates ranging from -47.3 percent to +545.35 percent. While this may give the appearance of a dependent relationship uncontrolled by Nigeria, this author argues instead that this volatility demonstrates the

novelty of the trade relationship and exists because China was not yet a major buyer of Nigerian exports.

**Table 4-3. China's Trade with Nigeria, Imports and Exports and Percentage Change, 2000-2009**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Imports from Nigeria (Millions of US\$)</b>	<b>Percentage Change</b>	<b>Exports to Nigeria (Millions of US\$)</b>	<b>Percentage Change</b>
2000	292.93	60.52%	563.88	42.40%
2001	227.44	-22.36%	917.15	62.65%
2002	121.31	-46.66%	1,047.09	14.17%
2003	71.68	-40.91%	1,787.49	70.71%
2004	462.58	545.35%	1,719.27	-3.82%
2005	527.06	13.94%	2,305.28	34.08%
2006	277.75	-47.30%	2,855.67	23.88%
2007	537.49	93.51%	3,800.19	33.08%
2008	509.92	-5.13%	6,758.13	77.84%
2009	898.23	76.15%	5,475.71	-18.98%


Source: World Trade Data

As the bar graph below indicates, Chinese exports to Nigeria grew at a faster rate than Nigerian exports to China. In speaking of Nigeria-China economic relations, a government official remarked, "Our engagement with China...has not been as fruitful as it should be. We have not exploited; instead it's [trade balance] tilted towards China. The

only thing is, we sell them oil.”<sup>37</sup> Even with the increasing sales of oil to China, as Figure 4-7 shows, there remains a somewhat significant imbalance in favor of China.

Undoubtedly, the trade data do not present a full picture of the economic and political relations that exist between China and Nigeria, and do an even poorer job of displaying the impact of Chinese engagement with Nigeria.

**Figure 4-7. Chinese Trade with Nigeria, 1995-2009 (Millions of US Dollars)**




Further still, this graph does not adequately demonstrate the degree of China’s significance and magnitude in Nigeria’s overall trade. Examining this data from another perspective by including Nigeria’s overall trade balance over the same period, it appears that, overall, increased imbalance of trade with China may not have had an adverse an

<sup>37</sup> Interview with Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bilateral Relations officer, August 11, 2011, Abuja.

effect on Nigeria, at least in the short term, because China's trade with Nigeria is substantially overshadowed by Nigeria's overall trade balance much less Nigeria's total trade (See Figure 4-9 below). Trade with China still only accounts for a small portion of Nigeria's total trade activity. Aggregate Nigerian trade balance has continued to show positive growth with a few exceptions, the most notable in 2009 when a global recession affected the performance of many countries.

**Figure 4-9. China's Trade with Nigeria, and Nigerian Aggregate Trade Balance, 1995-2009**



A closer look shows that the trade between China and Nigeria pales in comparison to Nigeria's overall trade balance which would indicate that trade with China may not yet have a significant impact on Nigerian economic development. Furthermore, the recent positive economic trends may not directly relate to engagement with China.



According to the Washington-based Emerging Capital Partners (ECP), Nigeria has been noted as having economic growth prospects, as a result of growth in new technologies and sectors such as television over internet, insurance and real estate (Abiodun, 2011).

Nigerian government officials have done their part to attract foreign investors, including the Chinese to Nigeria. In 2011, then Nigerian Minister of State for Commerce and Industry, Josephine Tapgun encouraged Chinese businesses to invest in Nigerian industry, in particular agricultural development (Bello, 2011). In Calabar State, the Calabar Free Trade Zone and Tinapa resort have been recently developed, and local and federal governments are seeking outside investors. The governor of Calabar State, Liyel Imoke, has hosted Chinese delegations and in a meeting with the General-Consul of China, extolled the economic potential and opportunities that the Free Trade Zone has to offer Chinese investors (Inyang, 2011). In Lagos State, a new free trade zone is under development. The Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry organizes an annual international trade fair where investors and entrepreneurs are recruited through efforts of the LCCI, as well as the other investment promotion agencies and foreign embassies and networking organizations. In all, these efforts have been successful, as evidenced by growing Chinese enterprise and population in Nigeria. More and more Chinese are making big money in Nigeria, but Nigerians are also pursuing trade with the Chinese.

It is important to recognize that true economic impact is made in the long-term. Because China's presence on the continent and in Nigeria has increased so recently, the argument can be made that it may be too soon to guess--much less gauge--what the real, far-reaching economic impact of Nigeria-China trade will be. Chinese exports to Nigeria

(and many of the other countries on the continent) are not just mass quantities of cheap little manufactured plastic products and textiles but also expensive equipment used to construct roads, railways, and factories. In other words, a significant amount of Chinese exports to Nigeria includes the necessary components for successful infrastructure development in the country. Such equipment is helping build power generation facilities like dams, refineries, telecommunications towers, satellites, etc. Still, the argument has been made that, despite investments in infrastructure development, the influx of cheap Chinese products is leading to the de-industrialization of Nigeria's indigenous enterprises especially textile manufacturing (Akinrade and Ogen, 2008). While the view presented by Akinrade and Ogen is valid, increased efforts by the Nigerian government to improve monitoring of imports into Nigeria, as well as investing more heavily in domestic economic development may offset the anticipated negative impact of trade with China. Although Nigeria is presently running a substantial trade deficit, there is no evidence that the Sino-Nigerian dynamic will remain this way, particularly given China's movements to increase oil imports from Nigeria. Increased oil importation from Nigeria to China, coupled with increased sourcing of other raw materials by Chinese corporations, including but not limited to natural gas, solid minerals, gold and other metals. Conversely, while most of Nigerian imports have been spread across many categories<sup>38</sup>, the top three products are telecommunications equipment, motorcycles and generators. In fact, approximately 80 percent of the top 20 product categories in 2009 can be construed as capacity-building imports, not comprised entirely of finished goods;

---

<sup>38</sup> According to the WorldTrade Atlas, Nigeria's biggest import category from China is telecommunications equipment and that accounts for 5.2% of Nigeria's total trade with China

approximately half of these categories were identified as ‘parts’<sup>39</sup> (WorldTrade Atlas, 2011). It can be argued that continued investment and trade between China and Nigeria, under appropriate management, can and should promote industrialization in Nigeria. While this may not be the picture of industrialization as emblazoned by the West some time ago, China presents an opportunity for economic development in Nigeria and forward social progress.

## **OIL**

Although oil may comprise a significant portion of Chinese imports from Nigeria, the Chinese purchase of Nigerian oil exports is significantly overshadowed by other international players, in particular the United States, which occupies the number one spot as the primary trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa. The U.S. buys about 50 percent of Nigeria’s daily production, which account for nearly 10 percent of the total U.S. supply<sup>40</sup>. The US Energy Information Administration reports Nigeria as the US’s 4<sup>th</sup> largest oil supplier in 2010<sup>41</sup>. According to the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of African Affairs, the U.S. trade deficit with Nigeria in 2010 was \$26 billion, largely due to crude oil; Nigeria’s imports from the U.S. were valued at just over \$4 billion in the same year (U.S. Department of State, 2012).

---

<sup>39</sup> These range from automobile parts, non-identified engine parts, construction equipment etc.

<sup>40</sup> Source: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm>,

<sup>41</sup> Source: <http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=3050>

Notably, while China is a growing partner for Nigeria, (economically, politically and otherwise), it is not the only international player in Nigeria. Calculations of the International Trade Centre (ITC), based on UN COMTRADE statistics, rank China as Nigeria's second highest (by U.S dollar value of imported wares) supplying market in 2010, constituting 16.56 percent of total Nigerian imports and as the fourteenth largest import market for Nigerian exports, or 1.66 percent of Nigerian total exports (2012). The ITC also ranked the United States as the leading importer and exporter to Nigeria. Although this information differs from that provided by the U.S. Department of State's rankings above, they both serve to illustrate the point that the effects of trade with China on Nigeria will be challenging to isolate for a number of reasons (2012).

China and Nigeria do not interact within a vacuum; Sino-Nigerian relations and economic activity are vulnerable to outside influences and the behaviors of other players and other markets. Additionally, there are so many other players and factors in Nigerian economic activity that may or may not fall under the direct influence of China. Supporters of the position heralding China's neo-imperialist agenda in Nigeria must then also address the issue of China's diluted impact. If China is pursuing the same objectives as other actors in Africa as Behar argues, how then can specific impacts and outcomes be attributed to China (2008)? While the Chinese are increasingly significant trade partners, it is important to assess Chinese engagement and impact in context, acknowledging that they make up a part and not the whole, of a much greater picture.

China/Nigerian trade's rapid growth, especially in the informal sector, is largely due to Nigerian traders' recognition that business with Chinese suppliers and enterprises

provides higher profit margins. The U.S. State Department's Bureau of African Affairs, in its review of Nigeria and Nigerian-American engagement, also notes that the Nigerian economy's informal sector--which is grossly unmeasured--is increasingly significant in propelling the entire Nigerian economy forward. The Bureau states specifically, "the economy continues to witness massive growth of 'informal sector' economic activities, estimated by some to be as high as 75% of the total economy." Having spent a considerable amount of time in Nigeria, I would venture that the 75 percent may be too low an estimate. In every office space I entered, formally employed individuals with what would be considered good jobs also engaged in informal business ventures. Examples: a cultural attaché renting out living space, a fully promoted<sup>42</sup> government employee selling laptops and electronics from business trips and raising chickens and catfish in the backyard. Outside the Chinese embassy, I came across a trader, Mary, waiting to pick up her travel documents and approved visa<sup>43</sup>. As a market trader, Mary's income is self-reported and her income tax derived from the figures she provides the government. While Mary's integrity is not relevant here, it is important to note that self-employed individuals have the opportunity to under-report earnings, and when enterprises are not registered businesses, they can choose not to report those earnings at all. Mary travels to China six times a year, for her business also stopping in Thailand and Indonesia, to buy mother and baby care products. After every trip to Asia, she nets ₦ 4 million (or approximately

---

<sup>42</sup> At the highest pay-grade of government employees.

<sup>43</sup> Interview with market trader Mary, outside the Chinese embassy, waiting on travel documents, July 18, 2011, Abuja.

USD\$26,666.00)<sup>44</sup> in profit after all expenses. With six trips a year, Mary pulls in a total of ₦ 24 million (or USD\$160,000) annually by doing business with the Chinese. These figures do not take into account the additional profits from her biannual trips to the U.S. and the United Kingdom, also for her business. Her husband is formally employed for the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) and brings in a steady paycheck of approximately USD\$30,000 per year as senior management. His paycheck is likely the only accurately measured household income for their family and is tracked statistically by the government and other interested agencies, and factored into income per capita figures used to assess the economy. Such figures present a false picture of Nigeria's economic situation, and lead to inaccurate results, including assertions that most Nigerians live on less than USD\$2 a day. While this story seems to portray an atypical face of the informal sector at work in the Nigerian economy, it really is not unique. A different market trader noted that if he spent ₦3 million purchasing goods in China, after expenses were accounted for, he was sure of about ₦1.6 million in profit. Clearly, the degrees of profitability and earnings from the informal sector differ from person to person. Nonetheless, huge sums of untracked cash are flowing through the market system and the informal sector, and a growing population of unmeasured nouveau riche individuals in Nigeria has recognized the opportunities presented by China and are working hard to exploit them to maximize personal gains.

---

<sup>44</sup> Nigerian Naira to US \$ exchange rate has wavered around ₦150 to \$1. Bloomberg Business Week reports the Naira to Dollar exchange rate at ₦150.01 to \$1 on October 24, 2011 (<http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-10-24/nigeria-naira-weakens-as-bank-fails-to-meet-demand.html>).

## **Nigeria-China's State-Interest Driven Engagement**

At the onset it might appear that Nigeria's engagement with China is indicative of a dependent relationship with a dominant country. However, limiting China's engagement with Nigeria to an "unequal relationship" is to belittle and dismiss the greater objectives that drive this relationship. The rest of this chapter is therefore focused on discussing aspects of the Nigeria-China relationship that demonstrate that what is at play in this dyad is a state-centric realist relationship driven by national interest.

### *Value-Added Chinese Goods*

Chinese finished goods are noted as affordable and sold at very low prices, so low that the value added and profit made on the Chinese produced finished goods is minimal, and in some cases likely negative. A Nigerian interview respondent asks, "How do you import shoes from China to come and sell it for N150 in Nigeria? [...] It's about USD\$1. So what kind of material is that? And I have not talked about shipping. So was the shoe produced for 50¢?"<sup>45</sup> This question describes many Chinese goods in the Nigerian markets. Market traders assert that since China has become a major source of manufactured products in Nigeria, prices of consumer goods have for the most part halved and remain at half of what they were years ago. Similarly an interview with an industrial engineer from an investment bank<sup>46</sup> revealed a case where Chinese

---

<sup>45</sup> Phone interview with Nigerian US Consulate Officer, April 6, 2011, Washington DC.

<sup>46</sup> Interview conducted January 6, 2011, Kaduna.

manufacturers sold industrial equipment for a fifth of the cost charged by a German supplier<sup>47</sup>.

Inexplicably low Chinese price points beg the question: what is the actual value-added ultimately accrued to the Chinese? Pricing levels made possible through undervaluation of the Yuan would imply that Chinese value-added on the manufacturing process is somewhat limited. That the Chinese purchase raw materials from Africa, including Nigeria, at market or close to market price has been noted in the general rise in income for most African countries as a result of engagement with China. With the end product of Chinese-manufactured goods sold at low prices, it stands to reason that the domestic Chinese value-added on a Chinese manufactured product may actually be less significant in monetary worth than the domestic value-added of African raw materials. Note also that the Chinese value-added to the manufacturing process is of a lower monetary value for two major reasons. First, it is measured in Yuan, and as previously mentioned, Yuan is strategically undervalued in global currency markets. Second, Chinese labor is readily available and cheap, so the overall cost of production in China is comparatively less than cost of production elsewhere. Therefore, with most Chinese manufactured products, the highest domestic value-added is most likely from the raw materials used in the manufacturing process.

In accordance with this reasoning, if the African value-added is more significant than the Chinese value-added, then this hardly looks like a situation of dependency. In a

---

<sup>47</sup> This particular Chinese firm previously supplied the German firm with the same equipment but was locked into a contract that did not permit sales to other parties. Once the contract was up, the firm was free to sell the equipment on their own.



dependent relationship, the dominant state has more at stake because the accrued benefit is greater than it is to the dependent state. In this situation, because raw materials have the highest value-added, Africans stand to benefit even more from trade with China than the Chinese do, comparatively speaking, assuming that Africans are producing the raw materials, or are at least managing the production of the raw materials. As such, in the context of value-added, it would appear that this economic relationship is not heavily imbalanced in favor of the Chinese.

This argument only stands, however, if Africans are producing raw materials. Unfortunately, in many cases of Chinese engagement in Africa, this is not the case. The Chinese have been noted, by scholars as well as journalists, for controlling the major part and in some cases the entire process of production, often because the Chinese secure African government contracts to extract raw materials. Where labor management and employment laws are lax, the Chinese bring in their own workers, and with Chinese equipment and resources, extract the resources that they need, then export the materials to China to produce finished goods. As long as the Chinese control the production of raw material for manufacturing, they stand to benefit the most from relationships with African states. If the Chinese win contracts from African governments and as such pay only market price for the raw materials, deducting their costs of extraction, it is highly possible that in these circumstances a dependent relationship could emerge.

In their efforts to support African attempts towards development and industrialization<sup>48</sup>, the Chinese have stressed education and training as a significant part of their non-economic relationship with Africa. The Chinese are in many ways living up to their promise to assist Africans, especially Nigerians. In northern Nigeria, a mining company's sign proudly proclaims "Technical Assistance from China Minerals and Metal Cooperation and Yunnan Copper Group"; the bold letters say "Nigeria-China" in English and Chinese characters. Though this is actually a Nigerian firm, they are just a few miles away from another mining company that clearly has some significant Chinese ties: Zhonghao Ziyuan Development Ltd, Minerals Exploration and Exploitation. The Chinese foreman at the Nigerian mining firm has been in Africa for over ten years working in mining and raw materials industries in many countries, including Côte d'Ivoire, Zambia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, South Africa and now, Nigeria. He states<sup>49</sup> that this mining company, a joint venture with the state (provincial) government, is incorporated with a Chinese firm tasked with developing the company until it is able to conduct all aspects of the production process: prospecting, exploration, exploitation, processing and export. Once its local employees have mastered these procedures, the company will be left in the hands of Nigerians to continue and increase production. The company currently employs 11 Chinese workers, a number that will grow to 30 once construction of the new plant is completed. Presently, the company employs 30-50

---

<sup>48</sup> A look at any of the speeches as well as any of the action plans of any of the four Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) conferences, as well as China's African Policy document published in 2006, supports this assertion.

<sup>49</sup> Phone interview with Chinese manager of a Nigerian-Chinese mining company, August 10, 2011, Zamfara.

Nigerian workers dependent on workload; two are managers. This number is expected to increase to 300 once the enterprise is fully realized. The company is currently operating, but due to limited facilities and lack of skilled employees--as well as equipment and technology--the company is focused on the second stage of mining, exploration, producing gold concentrates and crystals. These products are sold to a Chinese company that processes the material into gold bars. Eventually, the company in Zamfara intends to produce and export fully processed, 99.999 percent pure gold bars.

Unfortunately, the training of Nigerian employees has been stalled by the challenge of the language barrier. Chinese managers do not speak English; their Nigerian employees have just as poor a grasp of English. To get around this, the Chinese foreman is having his translator tutored in Hausa, the local language, a step that is bound to help improve communications with his Nigerian workforce, but does little to help workers read the controls on equipment they operate that are labeled with directions in Chinese.<sup>50</sup> Although Zamfara state is significantly mineral-wealthy, as is evidenced by the sight of multiple mining companies along the major highways that cut through the state, very little has been done to develop this industry. As with most of the states in the Nigerian Federation, the state's economy was left dependent on allotment from oil revenues.

---

<sup>50</sup> Michel & Beuret (2009), in *China Safari: On the Trail of Beijing's Expansion in Africa* also mention the challenge of Chinese equipment and technology, for African employees who do not recognize or read Chinese characters. Clearly equipment manufacturers can switch to English labels to get around this problem, or individual companies can re-label their equipment or train some of their employees in basic Chinese. However Chinese equipment and technology has been noted as being comparatively simpler and more accessible to Africans and so the language issue may not pose a significant problem to African machine drivers and/or engineers.

Though interview respondents note the intent of the government to invest in developing other aspects of the Nigerian economy, continued governmental focus on oil, has created much opportunity for exploitation and unchecked corruption in the exploration and production of raw materials, especially in the sparsely populated but resource-rich north.<sup>51</sup> The entry of the Chinese provides chances to increase the productivity and economic output and growth in this underdeveloped region. Interview respondents in this study demonstrated a great belief in Nigerian ability to produce but also an understanding of some of Nigeria's latent issues, (for example, corruption), that have limited innovation and development. Nigerian businessmen, lobbyists and academics as well as informed government officials all agree that Nigeria has the capacity to produce and meet some of the demands of the local market, but in light of challenges to industrial development, Nigeria needs to focus on improving its technological base by borrowing and learning technology from China.

Chinese training has not been limited to technical skills and expertise or even higher education. There is a select cadre of businessmen who are making their money by bringing the successful Chinese business model, Tianshi, to Nigeria. Tianshi is a Chinese version of a pyramid selling (also known as network marketing, and referral marketing) agency that employs a multi-level marketing strategy, where salesmen are independent self-employed contractors earning on a commission basis. Through selling products (health products, in this instance), their income increases with every unit they sell, and

---

<sup>51</sup> Interview with executive at The Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission, a parastatal agency, August 12, 2011, Abuja.

when contractors recruit new salespersons, they earn an additional commission from the recruited individuals' sales. This particular Chinese-run company is primarily based out of Kaduna, in northern Nigeria, although it is expanding to new cities around the country. Salesmen are recruited through current Nigerian employees as well as through classified ads in newspapers. Nigerian employees stated that all management positions at this company are held by Chinese nationals; however, as the company is still young they are hopeful for promotion. In interviews with a number of Nigerians employed by this company, all noted that the most significant draw with this business was the autonomy it allows. With such flexibility, employees are able to determine how much they want to work and therefore their take-home income, and they also receive bonuses on a regular basis. An employee of just a few weeks stated that he had made approximately \$200 in his first month, roughly enough to cover his initial cost of joining the agency; a more established employee noted that he had developed his sales program to the point that he was taking home USD\$800-\$1000 every month, and could now afford to quit his formal employment. These employees indicated that not only through this new business model, but on the whole, the entrance of the Chinese into the Nigerian marketplace has created competition which is forcing Nigerian counterparts to improve their operations processes and increase efficiency.

Even though cultural differences exist and interpersonal relations between the Nigerians and the Chinese are not ideal<sup>52</sup> and, may not exist beyond the financial aspect,

---

<sup>52</sup> According to interviews with Nigerians employed by Chinese and the Chinese manager at a mining company and corroborated by interviews with government officials as well as academics at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.

engagement with the Chinese has afforded new opportunities for employment. A government official in the Federal Ministry of Information and Communications assigned to the bilateral relations desk, and specifically China, states, “China has opened doors in Nigeria for Nigerians.”<sup>53</sup> Nigerians are learning how to be just as shrewd as the Chinese, if not more; they are by nature entrepreneurial and are known to exploit any opportunity to improve their circumstances. According to data gathered through this research, the influx of low-quality Chinese goods into Nigeria has a greater Nigerian dynamic than is known. Some Nigerian entities actually go to China to source the lower quality goods, thereby reducing the expenses to the manufacturers and also themselves, ultimately increasing their profit margin.

It is possible that some are likely to persist in asserting that the Nigeria-China relationship fits within the parameters of a dependent relationship. However, the level of probable dependability comes into question. Over the course of history, the West has typically had a monopoly in Africa, especially as the marketplace for African commodities and raw materials. The arguments surrounding dependency theory and underdevelopment assert that dependency is a condition that is developed over a long period of time (Dos Santos, 1973; Ferraro, 1996). The West’s relationship with Africa has arguably followed the dynamic, with both sides in the same roles since the colonialization of Africa, which intensified particularly in the 19th and early 20th century. The West has remained “master” and “commander” and Africa “servant” and

---

<sup>53</sup> Interview with high level government official in the Federal Ministry of Information and Communications, July 19, 2011, Abuja.

“purveyor” of raw materials and vast riches providing support and growth to western economies. The Sino-African relationship differs greatly because China<sup>54</sup> needs African political support, which arguably was the impetus for the initial development of significant Sino-African relations during the 1960s. Distinct effort was made to develop relationships of partnership between developing (Third World) China and developing Africa. Despite the fact that China’s recent industrial revolution has vaulted it past Africa in terms of development and measures of a developed state and economy, China’s return to Africa following its emergence from isolationism was built on the foundations of 1960s Sino-African relations, partnership and mutual benefit. As such, the Chinese government has had to go to additional, cost-inducing lengths to make sure that there were clear indicators of the benefits of this budding relationship on both sides. Towards that end the Chinese are building schools, hospitals, roads and hydro-electric plants which undoubtedly will assist African states on the road to development and help assuage some of the poverty and poor living standards. Even then, China, much like the West, makes efforts to retain some of the value of aid contributions. A Nigerian foreign service officer shares,

“The effect of Chinese engagement in Nigeria can be measured in so many ways. In the educational sector, the Chinese came and they were building us model primary schools, granting us aid here and there, small aid. They are going to build another edifice in Nigeria, the Nigeria-China Friendship Association Building. It’s a cultural building. [...] during our fifth bilateral joint commission for bilateral cooperation, they amassed \$25 million for that. That \$25 million, more than half of it will go back to China because the design of the building will be done by Chinese

---

<sup>54</sup> In this particular situation, the People’s Republic of China as opposed to the Republic of China.

architects, some of the workers and the consultants will have to be Chinese.<sup>55</sup>”

The argument here asserts that at the aggregate level, Chinese infrastructure built across Africa is an essential part of the required foundation if sustainable development and industrialization are to be realized across the continent. However, concerns have been voiced--not in regard to the benefit of Chinese development of infrastructure but instead on the reliability and dependability of Chinese construction. For many years news reports have highlighted problems with quality control that have plagued Chinese manufacturers and contractors following industrialization. These domestic issues have spilt on to the world stage and have affected the reputation and perceived value of the “Made in China” label. Nigerian regulators and government agencies, primarily the Standards Organization of Nigeria (SON) and the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) have had to impress upon their Chinese counterparts the need to be more diligent in monitoring the quality of products that leave China for foreign markets. Market traders and businessmen with extensive ties to China assert that, while there are products for every price with quality diminishing as the price declines, good quality products can be had from the Chinese. In multiple interviews, Nigerian traders and businessmen noted that higher quality products manufactured in China were typically reserved for European and North American markets. Therefore, if the Chinese habitually reserve higher quality products for other markets, how much stock should then be placed in the actual and long-term value of their investments into African infrastructure?

---

<sup>55</sup> Phone interview with Nigerian US Consulate Officer, April 6, 2011, Washington DC.



An economist at the African Development Bank<sup>56</sup> notes that the Chinese are winning a lot of contracts in Africa (especially in construction) because they are almost always the lowest bidder. However, when the Chinese win bids, they employ imported Chinese labor, which does nothing to improve conditions for indigenous workers, inducing a negative impact on the Nigerian (and African) labor sector. In addition, recent reports and articles have begun to call into question the efficiency and efficacy of Chinese construction in Africa, with growing concerns for quality and the observation of standards. Chinese projects nearing completion are exhibiting tendencies toward delays and questions are rising on whether or not they will be completed properly and punctually. These allegations call into question the value of Chinese investments in infrastructure in Africa and whether they will have a true positive impact. It is important to note that these concerns have yet to either be corroborated or dismissed by evidence. In truth, as stated by this research, little empirical research has been published with regards to Chinese engagement in Africa (including Nigeria) and its resultant impact. The relationship is still young and as yet it remains difficult to attribute specific developments in Africa solely to the influence of the Chinese. Concurrently, most of the literature on

---

<sup>56</sup> The African Development Bank Group is made up of three constituent Institutions, namely, the African Development Bank (ADB), the African Development Fund (ADF) and the Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF) and is one of a few African-driven continental-wide development initiatives, with a membership of 53 African countries and 24 non-African countries as of October 2011.

According to their website ([www.afdb.org](http://www.afdb.org)), "The African Development Bank (AfDB) Group's mission is to help reduce poverty, improve living conditions for Africans and mobilize resources for the continent's economic and social development. With this objective in mind, the institution aims at assisting African countries – individually and collectively - in their efforts to achieve sustainable economic development and social progress. Combating poverty is at the heart of the continent's efforts to attain sustainable economic growth. To this end, the Bank seeks to stimulate and mobilize internal and external resources to promote investments as well as provide its regional member countries with technical and financial assistance."

Chinese engagement in Africa has been limited to largely normative arguments- clearly more research is needed. Only time will tell whether or not Chinese investments in infrastructure in Africa will play a decisive role in African development--or lack thereof.

The AfDB economist continues, asserting, “If you're going to really unlock the potential within Africa, then infrastructure should be a top priority. Infrastructure development. And for that reason, we have what we call core priority areas for interventions. Infrastructure is number one. Private sector development, agriculture, health, in basically the social sector. But if we're really going to unlock the potential in the whole continent for economic development, infrastructure is key, there's no question about it. And in Nigeria it is even more critical.”<sup>57</sup> Nigeria’s underdeveloped infrastructure, in particular the unreliable power supply, insufficient water, bad roads, and poor transportation systems (such as the decaying rail network), have proved to be catastrophically limiting to the development of Nigerian industry. It is not that there are no Nigeria manufacturers but instead that Nigerian manufacturers are under a lot of strain and often fail under the burden of very high overhead (expensive generators to power factories and fuel costs to keep generators running) and no easy way to get their products into the hands of consumers domestic and foreign. Although not all Nigerian manufacturers have floundered, the high costs of operations create a situation in which Nigerian-made products, though of good quality, are significantly more expensive than imported alternatives. This means that consumers who would rather buy locally made

---

<sup>57</sup> Interview with AfDB economist A, July 27, 2011, Abuja.

Two different AfDB economists were interviewed on the same day for this study, both of whom declined to be personally identified and mention of their position would violate IRB regulations and reveal their identity.

more durable, better-quality products than the Chinese imports, find that these Nigerian products are too expensive.

Assessing Africa's development in the light of the recent entry of the Chinese into Africa, but solely under the lens of the dyadic relationship between African states and China, does give weight to claims of exploitation and the development of a dependent relationship between China and Africa. However, this perspective also quickly dismisses the significant overt and covert influence of the West in African affairs. Despite the Nigerian government's continued efforts to stress its policy of nonalignment, adopted and upheld since Nigerian independence in 1960, a government official stresses that Africans are not that easily separated from the West. During the research process for this study, a conscious decision was made to remove reference to Western engagement with Africa in the official questions posed to interview respondents. However, comparisons of the West versus China would organically materialize; in many ways Chinese engagement in Nigeria has differed from that of the West. Taylor notes that Chinese engagement in Nigeria is largely in fixed assets, providing examples like refineries and factories; these sorts of investments are not characteristic of Western enterprise in Nigeria (2007).

The draw of the Chinese has stemmed from the differences in the ways they have chosen to relate to African states, especially when compared to their western counterparts. The Chinese are actively pursuing engagement with African states, while Nigerian government officials note that on the whole the U.S. and European states do not seem to be reaching out to African states in the same manner. The West has presumed upon Africa and made policy prescriptions on African development that by and large

have had disastrous effects across the continent. The Chinese are diplomatically non-imperial and, best of all, appear willing to share their technology to assist African states in catching up to the rest of the world. Also, the Chinese economy has very quickly gone from relatively non-significance to very high significance in the global arena. The extreme growth rate of the Chinese economy especially in the light of the recent global recession has many African states (Nigeria included) taking notice, hoping to learn a trick or two from the Chinese.

The Nigerian government recently made a rather bold decision in choosing to convert 10 percent of its \$33-billion in foreign reserves into Chinese currency, the Yuan (Nyagah, 2011). This strategic move was intended to boost growing trade relations between both countries but also to safeguard the Nigerian economy and foreign reserves from the economic downturn in Europe and the United States. The ingenuity of this decision by the Nigerian government speaks not only to the intentionality of Nigerian decision-makers in engagement with China, but the timing of it also shows a side of African international politics not often showcased in the media or even in scholarship on international relations and comparative politics. China's economic explosion has been largely due to the decision of its centralist government to under-value the Chinese currency system, the Renminbi. Undervaluing their currency has meant that Chinese exports to the rest of the world continue to undercut market prices and remain inexpensive. On the domestic front, an undervalued currency system has led to expensive imports for Chinese consumers and manufacturers and this has led to a need for creativity to meet and support burgeoning demand. While this economic policy was arguably

necessary to extricate Chinese economy and industry from the deplorable conditions that launched the Cultural Revolution and produced the economic powerhouse that it is today, it is not a policy that can be maintained indefinitely. The actual value of the Chinese currency is much higher than the present government controlled rates. Government control of currency exchange rates is not sustainable and when the Renmibi's Yuan soars up to its true market value, 10 percent of the Nigerian government foreign exchange reserves will soar with it. These policy moves by the Nigerian government indicate an element of intentionality in the Nigerian aspect of Chinese engagement in Nigeria. They demonstrate a relationship motivated by national self-interest rather than dependency because of the very active role that Nigerians across all spheres of society are taking in this relationship and also because of the levels of learning and mutual benefit that are inherent in this relationship.

## **Conclusion**

Dependency theory as a means of understanding international (economic and political) relations between developed and developing countries, and the underdevelopment of the latter, lacked cohesion conceptually and this made evident in the operationalization of dependency theory. Scholars differed in their tests of dependency, and critics noted that tests of dependency theory were used to bolster the arguments of dependency theorists and not to test the soundness of the dependency logic as a theory. Most studies centered on the argument that indicators of dependency, in particular economic dependency, were related to poor economic performance. An examination of economic trends in Africa in the 10 years preceding the FOCAC

conferences and the ten years following the first conference would dispel the notion of an economically dependent Africa. This chapter looked at real growth domestic product (GDP) growth rates, gross national income (GNI), and GDP per capita. In all of the measures examined, there appeared to be no detrimental effect to African economic trends following the establishment of the FOCAC. In fact it appears that following the FOCAC, African states have experienced better economic performance. Balance of trade data between China and African states from 1995 to 2009 also show that African states and China have a fairly even balance of trade at the aggregate level. This is in direct contradiction to dependency theorists who hypothesized that dependent countries would exhibit unfavorable balances of trade (Kaufman et al, 1975).

A look at Nigeria as a case study presents a different picture. Chinese trade with Nigeria is heavily imbalanced in favor of China but Chinese proportion of total Nigerian trade dilutes the impact of trade imbalance. Nigeria's overall positive trade balance overshadows its imbalance with China. So despite an unbalanced trade relationship, Chinese trade with Nigeria is not significant enough to create a situation of economic dependency.

The data presented in this chapter supports the argument put forward by Chapter 3, that dependency theory is not an adequate framework for understanding growing Sino-African relations. African states are benefiting from increased engagement with China.

## Introduction

Following the launch of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which is the most visible manifestation of growing Sino-African relations, African states appear to have benefited from engagement with China, as demonstrated in Chapter 4. Shelton and Paruk argue, “FOCAC forms the central pillar in advancing China–Africa relations and is the arena for constructive diplomatic interaction. It provides the foundation for building a long-term ‘win-win’ China–Africa relationship” (2008: pp.2). The framework of the FOCAC has been adamant in its claims of a “win-win” relationship at play between China and African states (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2006; FOCAC, 2006b; Shelton and Paruk, 2008). Like other scholars in this area, Shelton and Paruk note that the literature has largely focused on Chinese objectives and activities in Africa, and perceived impacts on African economic and social as well as western interests on the continent (2008; see also Alden, 2007; Brautigam, 2009). The literature focuses extensively on the benefits to China but very little research empirically examines the benefit to African states. Further still, the literature has yet to acknowledge what might be the interests and motivations of African states in relation to China. This chapter attempts to fill this gap in the literature by presenting a case study of Nigerian motivations for increasing engagement with China. This chapter first explains the methodology used to gather and analyze the primary data for this study, and presents

the overarching themes in response to the question: why is Nigeria engaging with China?

The chapter then discusses the three main motivators and objectives behind Nigerian agency in this relationship, as identified by this study: first, how Chinese courtship and respectful attitude attracts Nigerian counterparts; second, Nigerian intent to learn from China's recent economic and technological advancements; and finally, Nigerian goals to maximize and exploit the economic opportunities afforded by engagement with China.

### **Case Study Methodology**

To begin to understand African agency and find answers to the questions posed, I conducted a case study of Nigeria. A case study is a tradition of qualitative inquiry and research usually reserved for unknown and unfamiliar phenomena, to provide in-depth understanding of an event, process or individual(s) (Cresswell, 2007). The methodology employed to answer these questions was qualitative data gathering through interviews, and analysis of government policies and trade data. The major contribution of this study is examination of the issue from an African perspective, going beyond the jargon of "South-South solidarity," the "supremacy (or legitimacy) of sovereignty," "non-interference" or an "alternative to the failed Western model" as put forward by China's African Policy document issued in 2006 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2006) and by others (Behar, 2008; Manji and Marks, 2007). Since this study is interested in what Africans think and want, the logical data would be public opinion surveys. However, while surveys like Afrobarometer point to Africans' attitudes regarding the Chinese, they are not suited for identifying the factors that motivate African agency and



African objectives in increasing engagement with China. This study seeks to understand the active engagement of Africans with Chinese representatives.

The majority of this research required fieldwork in Nigeria, and methodology applied a strategic case-study approach relying heavily on extensive interviews performed during the months of July and August of 2011. Approximately 130 interviews (formal and informal) were conducted during this period. (Respondent demographics are discussed in greater detail in the section on sampling selection). I conducted formal interviews of a semi-structured nature using guiding questions open to follow-up, and in-depth probing was employed during the interview process (Hatch, 2002). A portion of the methodology incorporated secondary sources as well as primary resources, including China-related policy documents issued by Nigerian government agencies. These data were used to establish context and corroborate facts provided by interview respondents.

The scarcity of data and the novelty of the issue area made a case study approach the best option for this project (Stake, 2010). Qualitative research allows for inquiry into what is not known (Stake, 2010). It also provides a framework for understanding a usually single phenomenon at a deeper and more detailed level. In addition, the exploratory nature of this study makes both a qualitative approach and case study methodology appropriate. Creswell defines a case study approach as a process wherein “the investigator explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information, and reports a case description and case-based themes” (2007: pp. 73). Regarding the research, what is particularly salient about Creswell’s definition is the key

phrase “in-depth”, as this study is tasked with acquiring an understanding of Nigeria’s China policy, which calls for an in-depth look at the relationship between China and Nigeria. The added benefit of a case study methodology is its holistic approach to data gathering; it allows the investigator to incorporate various techniques and sources of information to understand the phenomena under investigation and, for the purposes of this study, to interpret Nigerian motivations (Merriam, 2009).

### Why Nigeria?

The selection of Nigeria as the research site relates to both the political and economic nature of the country. Nigeria’s oil resources influence its characterization as a resource-rich country (Brautigam, 2009). China is in Africa to acquire resources to fuel its economy and thus is engaging with resource-rich countries, including Nigeria. Nigeria is a source of oil for China, which factors significantly into China’s resource grab (Brookes, 2007; World Trade Atlas, 2011). China’s relationship with Nigeria differs somewhat from its associations with most African states; in its early stages, China’s engagement with Nigeria was marked by the exchange of information and technology; Chinese know-how contributed to local industrial development (Brautigam, 2003). Alden notes that Nigerian traders and manufacturers still claim they adopt Chinese practices in manufacturing (2007). Additionally, the influx of Chinese goods into Africa, particularly inexpensive textiles, have hurt Nigeria’s textile industries eliminating several thousand jobs and also resulting in added-value impacts associated with the sale of finished goods (Akinrade & Ogen, 2008). Local businesses have been active in urging the government to adopt--or at least promote--the protection of domestic industry (Alden, 2007). So while

this relationship shows some of the expected outcomes of Sino-African relations, it also makes evident the significance of the role that Africans play in this relationship.

Nigeria's story of Chinese engagement is different than the rest of Africa. Its large population base, projected by the United Nations Population Fund to reach 162.5 million by 2011, can theoretically support domestic industry while at the same time consuming large quantities of Chinese goods (UNFPA, 2011). Nigeria also has significant political influence in Africa that if appropriately managed, can be exploited by China in other African countries. In some ways, Nigeria presents a challenging case because of its cultural complexities as well as its complicated political history, but this argument can likely extend to include some other African states. Nigeria is, however, distinctive in its relatively stronger and more independent government, and thus more likely to resist a situation of dependency on trade with China. Nigeria's particular differences in relation to other African nations might have a bearing on the findings of this case study and may limit its applicability to Africa as a whole. However, I argue that the findings of this study can speak to and acknowledge agency on the part of other African states in choosing to engage with China, and hopefully spur discourse and further scholarship along these lines.

### Sampling Method

In determining interviews in Nigeria, I followed Cresswell's logic of purposeful sampling to identify "information-rich" individuals (2002). As such, I made specific efforts to locate individuals who directly engaged with China, particularly in business or

government forums. Chinese foreign policy in Africa has been characterized as “economic diplomacy,” as Chinese engagement has been led by business initiatives backed by the Chinese government (Alves in Alden et al, 2008). The Nigerian recipients of this diplomacy are business representatives and government officials. I chose government officials and business representatives because they are the driving force behind Nigerian policies that are either adopted or abandoned. These individuals have the most expertise and the greatest interaction with the Chinese who are engaging with Africa.

For the purposes of this study “engagement with China” is generally defined as any sort of interaction with China and Chinese people. For business people and entrepreneurs, the term "engagement" will generally refer to import and export partnerships. For instance, Nigerians who sell Chinese goods and services in Nigeria, or Nigerians who sell African goods to the Chinese. For government officials, "engagement" refers to any and all actions that are carried out between Chinese and Nigerian personnel, institutions and agencies, among others.

In addition to interviews with various officials, efforts were made to interview attendees of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) ministerial conferences and other FOCAC events to determine the objectives for Nigerian delegates and if and how they are being realized. FOCAC, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, is “a platform established by China and friendly African countries for collective consultation and dialogue and a cooperation mechanism between the developing countries” (FOCAC, 2004a). Since its inception in Beijing in August of

2000, the policies and agreements resulting from FOCAC have centered around four significant ministerial conferences. Since 2000, four major FOCAC ministerial conferences have been held. The first conference was held in 2000 in Beijing, the second in 2003 in Addis Ababa, the third, also known as the Beijing Summit, convened in 2006 and celebrated of the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the PRC and African countries. The fourth and most recent conference was held in Egypt in 2009. At these conferences, government and business representatives from China and Africa, as well as other interested international actors, convene to deliberate on trade agreements, business contracts, and aid contributions.

At the start of the data collection process, critical-case sampling was used to identify individuals who can best illustrate Nigerian agency in Chinese. Government officials were selected based on the offices in which they work. Chinese engagement in Nigeria has been particularly evident in infrastructure development, information technology, petroleum and commerce. Federal ministries with responsibilities in these sectors as well as government agencies and parastatals were identified from a government-issued registry. Wherever possible, interviews were conducted with officials from relevant government agencies and various areas of Chinese engagement (identified by the PRC's Africa policy document<sup>58</sup>, accessed Joint Press Communiques between PRC and Nigeria<sup>59</sup> and the Programme for China-Africa Co-operation in Economic and

---

<sup>58</sup> Available in Appendix G.

<sup>59</sup> These Joint Communiques are attached in Appendix I and Appendix J.

Social Development following the launch of FOCAC<sup>60</sup>). A variety of other individuals were identified and interviewed, including department directors, bilateral relations officers, and information officers responsible for managing relations with China.

To identify interview respondents, I arrived at government agencies and requested to speak with information and public relations personnel or bilateral relations and China specialists, preferably directors. This helped limit but not eliminate the predictable administration run-around. Often a series of unofficial interviews took place before I was able to locate a government employee able to provide me with an official interview. Many offices required an official request for information and access that was sent to the office of the federal minister for approval before any sort of audience would be granted even from those on the lowest rung of the ladder. In every case, the requests were formally approved. Sometimes the approval did very little to improve the demeanor and assistance offered by certain government officials. At other agencies, access was outright denied despite the fact that the Nigerian government had just recently passed a Freedom of Information Bill that on its own merit should have granted access to government employees and information. In stark contrast, in other agencies and departments, the letter of approval went a long way, opening doors and making information and data typically withheld from the public available to my research. Contracts, agreements, reports and data figures were shared.

---

<sup>60</sup> Programme for China-Africa Co-operation in Economic and Social Development included in Appendix K.

Similarly, I walked into the local markets and asked around for traders that travelled to China to acquire the goods and with persistence was able to locate a number of traders who then recommended me to other traders. I made visits to the Chinese embassy in Abuja and talked to the Nigerians who were waiting to collect their approved visas and interviewed some traders and contractors. I also stopped by Chinatown in Lagos, the commercial capital of Nigeria and spoke with Nigerian traders who had set-up shop within this predominantly Asian setting. In Lagos, I made a stop at the Nigerian Institute for International Affairs (NIIA) and spent some time with Nigerian political scientists and academics who influence the policy-making process in Nigeria.<sup>61</sup> Through the NIIA, I was able to locate and speak with a Nigerian scholar recently returned from China, where his doctorate program had been sponsored by the Chinese government. On the drive to Niger and Burkina Faso, I came across a gold mine in Zamfara State that receives technical aid from China and spoke with a Nigerian employee as well as the Chinese national who ran the mine and had worked in Africa for about 10 years. On a flight from Lagos to Kaduna State, I met a Chinese national who had just arrived in Nigeria (and in Africa for the first time) to work as a mid-level for a Tianshi group based out of Kaduna, whose Nigerian independent contractors I had interviewed a week earlier. I had a chance to meet and speak with his Chinese boss on the same flight. In many ways locating and identifying subjects to interview, in such a short frame of time was pure luck but it was also the result of a dogged drive to get the necessary data and maximize my use of very limited time. Sometimes I was able to grow my subject pool using snowball

---

<sup>61</sup> Collected books and secondary data on Chinese engagement in Nigeria from NIIA's library, including old newspaper articles from their archives.

sampling to identify more individuals to interview, but often because I lacked the necessary cushion time-wise to rely on snowball sampling, it was necessary that I kept visiting new offices, new government agencies, talking to contractors, businessmen and asking almost everyone I met about Nigeria's relationship with China.

Of the nearly 130 formal and informal interviews conducted for this project, 62 were formal; the approved interview protocol was employed and respondents signed informed consent documents. A listing of the official interview respondents is available in Appendix F. Government representatives made up about 35 percent (22 respondents) of the formal interviews. Among those interviewed were directors and bilateral relations officers from the Federal Ministry of Tourism, Culture and National Orientation, the National Planning Commission, the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Federal Ministry of Trade and Investment. The list of interview respondents also included five prominent politicians: a current federal minister in the Nigerian Cabinet, a senator in the Nigerian National Assembly, a former Nigerian ambassador to China, a former Nigerian presidential advisor who had also previously served as a Federal Minister in the Cabinet and a former presidential candidate.

Business and industry representatives accounted for approximately 47 percent (30 respondents) of the formal interviews, varying from small to mid-size traders who import Chinese manufactured goods to bankers (and bank managers) from the Nigerian Export-Import Bank, the Bank of Industry and the Central Bank of Nigeria. Academics and non-governmental policy specialists comprised the remaining 19 percent (12 respondents). These respondents included economists from the African Development Bank, political



scientists from the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, and directors from business and investment promotion agencies with ties to the Nigerian government. Examples include the Nigeria-China Friendship Association, the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission and the Nigeria-China Business Council.

This study attempted to collect ethnographically representative data, to account for differences in socio-economic, geographic and cultural variables. Varying levels of business representatives, as mentioned earlier allowed for socio-economic diversity in the data collected. Interviews were primarily conducted in three major Nigerian cities: Zaria, Abuja and Lagos. This means that respondents geographically represented north, central and southern Nigeria. In addition, some effort was made to ensure cultural diversity among the interview respondents, and included representation from the three major people groups of Nigeria: Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo.

### Interview Protocol

Interviews were formal interviews of a semi-structured nature. The interview protocol made use of guiding questions open to follow-up and in-depth probing into issues raised during the interview process. The interviews were scheduled at 30-45 minutes, but duration varied, based on the amount of information provided by the participants. The official interview protocol (see Appendix B) was split into two separate categories, (1) government officials and (2) business and industry representatives. Interviewees who did not fall into government official or business and industry

representative categories were interviewed with the questions from the latter categories' protocol.

### Data Analysis

After the interviews, transcripts of interviews provided the data. When, at the respondents' request, interviews were not voice recorded, research notes were coded for themes. Codes are labels, or characteristics affixed to the collected data, and used to organize and catalogue the data to allow analysis. All of the data were coded by hand using descriptive and analytic coding strategies. Descriptive coding provides for storage of the interview information in a manner that allows investigators to determine patterns and explanations and to identify theories (Morse and Richards, 2002). Analytic coding allows for the generation of themes and categories from the collected data. According to Morse and Richards, analytic coding can reveal thematic content, exploration of new concepts and provide opportunities for comparisons or development of new themes (2003). As such, both descriptive and analytic codes were identified. These codes were then further scrutinized and categorized into *three* analytical groupings: intent, relationship and effects. Using the identified groupings and codes, themes were generated to describe the phenomena being studied.

### Verification procedures

Determining validity in qualitative studies differs from quantitative studies. Issues of reliability and generalizability, central to the issue of validity for quantitative studies, play a lesser role in qualitative studies. Here validity is instead a reflection of "accuracy,"

"trustworthiness," "authenticity," and "credibility" (Creswell, 2007). Some studies are able to use multiple investigators to cross check reliability of themes generated from the listing of codes. This particular study, however, has only one investigator and as such needed to make a conscious effort to validate the accuracy of its findings.

This research relied heavily on triangulation, rich and thick descriptions, presentation of discrepant information and peer debriefing to assure the validity of the findings. Triangulation of the information provided by the different data sources is the most significant way to prove validity. Information and references that were strongly repeated across every interview prove the validity of a given theme. In addition, the findings have been triangulated against other (secondary) sources including newspaper articles, journal articles and other studies on China in Africa, a process necessary to corroborate the information revealed by the research, in particular to verify specific events or figures. Rich and thick descriptions of the themes, corroborated by extensive use of quotes from interviews also serve to further assure of the validity of the findings and the themes generated in this study. Discrepant or outlying information has also been presented with descriptions of the context surrounding it to further enhance understanding of the phenomena under study. Finally, this project made use of peer debriefers to ensure that the published findings "resonate" with others beyond the primary researcher. These peer de-briefers included academics and political scientists at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.

#### Ethical considerations

Addressing ethical considerations, especially when dealing with interview subjects is necessary. This study would be not be categorized as a harmful study; no damage of any kind came to respondents as a direct result of participation in this study. In addition, participants were provided with the option for self-identification in the reporting of findings in this study. Most participants chose not to be personally identified; therefore, reference is made to representative groups in lieu of using names. Government officials, although approved by their ministries to participate, spoke in their official capacity and not as private citizens; to that end, these respondents preferred to speak anonymously. These requests were respected and identities withheld. Approximately 20 percent of the official interview respondents consented to being identified in this study. Even then, respondents were only identified when deemed necessary by the researcher. Most respondents were identified in an occupational capacity as opposed to being identified by name.

### **Research Findings**

The major findings of this study were encapsulated in an early interview with Nigerian businessman and entrepreneur Lawal, who also invests in telecommunications equipment<sup>62</sup>. Mr. Lawal noted that it was necessary to do business with the Chinese in order to survive in today's economy and to remain competitive. To date, however, his business arrangements with the Chinese have not been as profitable as hoped, partly because he was still learning how to best engage with Chinese counterparts. He noted that

---

<sup>62</sup>Phone interview with Lawal, Businessman, April 5, 2011, Kaduna.

the Chinese provided goods at varying quality levels to match the purses of Nigerian purchasers, and he had paid for cheap goods but not quality goods. Though he had previously lost money, he stated that he would continue to engage with the Chinese--and on a greater scale--because he feels it is necessary for future success. His experience and words resonated across different facets of Nigerian life. Nigerians, at all levels and in varied capacities, both publicly and privately, echoed these sentiments. Even though net benefits may not be visible presently, Nigerians are choosing to engage with China because they see engagement as the way forward for individuals and for the country. Despite missteps, learning allows for adjustments to be made, and with the involvement of China, quicker steps in the direction of progress. In the words of Mr. Lawal, “sometimes, China is the only option.”<sup>63</sup> Chinese engagement with Nigeria is creating opportunities for Nigerians in Nigeria.

This section presents a discussion of the themes laden in the data collected as they pertain to motivations and objectives of Nigerians in increasing engagement with China. This study unearthed three major themes. They are:

- 1) Nigerians are engaging with China because of China’s courtship and respectful attitude towards Nigeria.
- 2) Nigerians want to learn from China.
- 3) Nigerians want to maximize their economic benefit.

---

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

The rest of this chapter describes these themes in greater detail, and discusses how they manifest in specific groups, in particular the Nigerian government, the private sector (business and industry) and where relevant, the consumer sector and academia. It is important to note that this chapter is most concerned with the *perceptions* of Nigerians and so quotes that best represent the expressed views of the respondents were incorporated into the write-up. These perceptions whether or not they are couched in fact or stem from misinformation and rumored fabrications, influence Nigerians' understanding of their relationship with China and what they believe Nigeria stands to gain.

The following sections first identify the role that the Chinese play and how the differences in the nature of Chinese engagement attract Nigerians, and then explore Nigerian objectives to learn from China to develop the Nigerian economy.

### ***Chinese Courtship and Respect***

The first and most dominant theme in the findings is Nigerians' motivation to engage with China because of mutual respect, in contrast to engagement with the West.

Nigerians note that China has presented a respectful alternative, although scholars at the Nigerian Institute for International Affairs<sup>64</sup> warn that it is perhaps misleading to portray China as an alternative to the West, arguing instead that what China provides Nigeria (and Africa at-large) is a strategic opportunity. However, how this strategic opportunity has been promoted and presented by the Chinese, and its stark differences from how

---

<sup>64</sup> Round table discussion with 6 political scientists and academics at the NIIA, August 16, 2011, Lagos.

Western counterparts (the U.S., Great Britain, France and Germany) engage with Nigerians was a strong theme that emerged in almost every interview. What makes this theme all the more fascinating is that the interview questions contained no reference to the West--the comparison between China and the West was a natural development initiated by interview respondents. Although this section does not directly discuss Nigerian objectives, it identifies factors that make the Chinese attractive to Nigerians, which this study would argue are just as important as Nigerian objectives, as they pertain to the Nigerian government, business and industry representatives.

It falls to Nigeria's federal government to provide and pursue opportunities that will foster growth and development. Engagement with China--while originally a government-driven phenomenon<sup>65</sup>--has since transformed into a consumer and business-driven relationship. However, government's role remains important to Nigeria-China relations; in many ways, the government is the quintessential facilitator of the dyadic relationship between entities from both sides. As such, it is important to identify the motivators that compel Nigerian foreign relations with China. When asked why Nigeria is seeking engagement, the first answer from most government officials was that Nigeria *must* engage with China; everybody must engage with China because of its growing economic and political significance on the global stage<sup>66</sup>. As the world disengages from the bipolar power system that characterized the Cold War, the ensuing collapse of the

---

<sup>65</sup> This point was raised by 2 officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 1 in the Ministry of Tourism, Culture and National Orientation and corroborated by a panel of academics at NIIA.

<sup>66</sup> Interview with Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials E, August 11, 2011. Abuja. There were 4 formal interviews with individual MFA officers on August 11 (noted as MFA official A - D), and 1 informal interview with a panel of MFA officers (noted as MFA officials E).

Soviet Union, and since U.S. participation in two costly foreign wars, it appears that the world is moving towards a multi-polar system. China's economic prominence and firm political position make it a new contender for power and influence in global politics. In light of these factors, it is important to understand the leading motivator of Nigeria's diplomatic engagement with China.

*The role of Chinese courtship in Nigerian Agency*

As noted in Chapter 2, most of the literature on Chinese engagement in Africa, Nigeria included, approaches the issue from the Chinese perspective and is quite correct in its inherent position that China is a major driver in the development of new relationships. A major finding of this study is the relevance of the Chinese factor in driving Nigeria-China relations and subsequently Nigeria's China policy. The Chinese have made it clear that they want to engage with Nigeria; their active pursuit and courtship of increased interaction with Nigeria has advanced development of relations. According to a government official, "China is engaging Nigeria seriously. They understand us. They know our problems. They know we have the market. ...If you consider all the potentials of Nigeria as a nation, as a giant in the making, there is no country that can just brush us aside without looking for our friendship, without looking for our market and without looking for our collaboration at the multilateral level." He further explains, "China is interested in engaging with virtually every country. But it has singled out Nigeria because of our own peculiarities. We share a lot of things in common. China is the biggest country in Asia. Nigeria is the biggest country in Africa. Now it [China] has emerged as the second largest economy in the world. What it requires to



grow industrially in terms of fuel and energy, keeps on expanding every day. Nigeria produces one of the best oils in the world. The peculiarities of Nigeria, the endowments of Nigeria, what we have, our market, we are a bride to any country - any developed country - because we have the market. We are strategically located. We are a regional power in the West Africa sub-region. We are very influential. We've done a lot of things that would attract any developing or developed country. Let me emphasize this, especially our market. I tell you one thing, sad enough, we are not a productive country, I'm not sorry to say this. We are a consumer nation."<sup>67</sup> All these factors and more have made Nigeria a necessary strategic partner for China and there is little question as to Chinese intents to have this relationship grow over the long-term.

China's Africa policy document talks about the need for collaboration amongst developing countries like China and Nigeria (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2006). According to the findings of this research there is little question that the Chinese have actively pursued a relationship with Nigeria. In describing the relationship between China and Nigeria, interviewees ranging from marketplace traders to high-level government officials and political pundits all described engagement between Nigeria and China as a "cordial relationship." This relationship has developed through channels such as FOCAC, (the Forum of China Africa Cooperation), which has successfully resulted in additional partnerships between Chinese and Nigerians, in tandem with the Nigeria-China Joint Commission for Cooperation. The Nigeria-China

---

<sup>67</sup> Phone interview with Nigerian US Consulate officer, April 6, 2011, Washington DC.

Note: these exact points were raised by many government officials and recurrent points throughout interviews with government officials, but best stated by this officer.

Joint Commission for Cooperation is perhaps the best policy document the Nigerian government has created describing any explicit policy on Chinese foreign relations. Signed in 1976, this document served to mark the formal agreement of recognition of each state and helped define the parameters of engagement between them. Following the guidelines set in the Joint Commission, large delegations of Nigerian and Chinese governmental representatives, typically from every federal ministry and their Chinese equivalents, meet frequently for “joint commissions” that fall under the purview of the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). In league with the Nigerian National Planning Commission and the Federal Ministry of Finance, the MFA compiles, organizes and collates Nigerian objectives and goals to cultivate better and more fruitful negotiations with the Chinese. The joint commissions have recently met more frequently, alternating locations between China and Nigeria. In these meetings all aspects of engagement are discussed, from the service agreements on which airlines will operate routes from Nigeria to China, to desired levels of cooperation in agriculture and food security, to cooperation in health, education, science and technology. The Nigerian government is not alone in its efforts to coordinate increased engagement. Agencies such as the Nigerian-China Friendship Association, NICAFA, and the Nigeria-China Business Council (NCBC) are playing a more active role in the development of Nigeria-China relations. NICAFA was founded by former Nigerian Ambassador, Victor Nwaozichi Chibundu, who has previously served in China. NCBC is a business-driven private-sector partnership with the Nigerian government that organizes trade missions to China and hosts Chinese missions to Nigeria<sup>68</sup>. Spearheaded by the efforts of the government as

---

<sup>68</sup> Interview with former Nigerian Ambassador now-founder of Nigerian-China Friendship Association,

well as these agencies, Sino-Nigerian trade is expanding (Okoh, 2011), as well as assuring economic and political ties. A news report illustrates,

“Speaking in Abuja when they visited Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC), the CICIR<sup>69</sup> President said that the trade volume between Nigeria and China reached \$7.5 billion last year.

He said that Nigeria is the fourth trade partner of China in Africa and the second exporter market in the continent. He said that by November 2010, the total contract investment by China to Nigeria reached \$13.3 billion, adding that some of the investments are concentrated in the oil & gas sector” (Williams, 2011).

Expanding trade and political relations between China and Nigeria are predicated on Nigeria’s acceptance of the One China Policy, which has always been a pre-requisite for Chinese engagement with other countries. This requirement was clearly stated in China’s Africa policy document (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2006) as well as by representatives of the Nigerian government as a policy to which Nigeria is committed. However, China recognizes Nigeria's sovereignty and even though it demands recognition of the People's Republic of China<sup>70</sup>, it has not constrained Nigerian economic interests in Taiwan, also a trading partner of the PRC. In recognition of the One China Policy, the Nigerian government has no official political dealings with Taiwan; instead, Nigerian engagement with Taiwan is limited to economic and business

---

Victor Nwaozichi Chibundu, August 18, 2011, Lagos.

<sup>69</sup> China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) is according to their website [www.cicir.ac.cn], "a comprehensive research institution for international studies" located in Beijing.

<sup>70</sup> In lieu of the Republic of China (Taiwan).

arrangements that are the prerogative of a sovereign Nigerian state and do not technically renege on commitment to the One China Policy.

China's recognition and respect for Nigeria's sovereignty and the right of government to make decisions and carry out policy that is not necessarily in tandem with China's own policies has made China an attractive partner, despite a number of ideological differences between China and Nigeria. For instance, China is communist while Nigeria is capitalist; China's communism does not permit religion, while Nigeria is a deeply religious country. Such fundamental differences mean that the Nigerian government does not always share the same views as the Chinese government and therefore does not always agree with China. In spite of the occurrence of incongruence and incompatibility on policy objectives (sometimes economic and other times political) the Chinese have continued to relate with Nigeria in a manner that shows respect for Nigeria's sovereignty. The visibility of this respect, even in the face of disagreement, sets China apart and improves the state of relations between both countries and their levels of engagement. China's overt acceptance of Nigerian sovereignty and non-bullish attitude plays a strong role in attracting Nigerians to pursue relations with China.

One of the more prominent political motivators for increasing Nigerian engagement with China is China's expressed support for UN reforms. In particular, great discourse has been devoted to allotting a seat on the UN's Security Council to an African state, and Nigeria is strongly vying for that position. Although no concrete development towards this end has materialized, especially within the UN, Nigerian government representatives are hopeful for this outcome and avow China's support for an African

seat on the UN's Security Council. The issue at stake is the frequent omission of Africa and African states' interests in strategic decisions made by the Security Council<sup>71</sup>.

Change is necessary, especially in light of the fact that African countries are sovereign states, like the states that comprise the Security Council. As the source of a variety of raw materials with increasing significance in the global market, it is important that African interests are protected in the global arena. Concerns of under-development and dependency only begin to shed light on the need for a more leveraged effort to protect and pursue African interests; a seat on the UN Security Council would provide this opportunity.

Nigerian motivations for engaging with China differ as one begins to look at specific federal ministries and agencies that pursue objectives specific to their fields. For instance, the Ministry of Tourism and Culture looks to promote Nigerian culture in China and Chinese culture in Nigeria to increase cultural exposure and exchange<sup>72</sup>. Increased personal engagement and interaction between Nigerians and Chinese can only serve to further entrench the growing relationship between the two. Every three years, representatives from China and Nigeria meet to discuss what specific actions will be undertaken over the next three-year period with regards to cultural and tourist interaction between China and Nigeria<sup>73</sup>. The Ministry of Science and Technology is engaging

---

<sup>71</sup> According to an address by Mr. Olusegun Obasanjo, President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria at the 10th Plenary Meeting of the 54th Session of The United Nations General Assembly, Thursday, 23 September 1999 (included in Appendix L).

<sup>72</sup> Interview with an External Affairs officer in the Federal Ministry of Tourism, Culture and National Orientation, July 27, 2011, Abuja.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

Chinese assistance in their bid to promote technological advancement in Nigeria<sup>74</sup>. The Raw Materials Research and Development Council (RMRDC)<sup>75</sup>, and the Nigerian Institute of International Relations (NIIA) both note that they are seeking engagement with China because it provides training and higher education opportunities for their staff and affiliates<sup>76</sup>. The Ministry of Trade<sup>77</sup>, Standards Organization of Nigeria<sup>78</sup> and National Agency for Food & Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC)<sup>79</sup> are seeking China's collaboration in improving the process of monitoring of goods that enter Nigeria from China and upgrading the system of product regulation. These entities are not alone: Chinese Embassy reports<sup>80</sup> (as well as news articles, FOCAC reports and interviews) indicate that many agencies, professional journalists, members of the judiciary and others have established partnerships with the Chinese. Through the exchange of information, techniques and technology, they are working towards improving service offerings to Nigerian citizens. In a variety of ways, China exemplifies a different model, and Nigerian agencies are taking action to learn from it and apply it to the benefit of Nigerians.

### Business Representatives

---

<sup>74</sup> Interview with government official in Federal Ministry of Science and Technology, July 15, 2011, Abuja.

<sup>75</sup> Interview with Raw Materials Research and Development Council (RMRDC) officer, August 10, 2011, Abuja.

<sup>76</sup> Interview with Nigerian Institute of International Relations director-general, August 15, 2011, Lagos.

<sup>77</sup> Interview with Federal Ministry of Trade and Investment official, July 29, 2011.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Interview with National Agency for Food & Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) executive, July 12, 2011, Abuja.

<sup>80</sup> Available on the Chinese Embassy website at <http://ng.china-embassy.org/eng/zngx/>

Nigerian government agencies note that they are able to pursue their own agenda and objectives in this growing relationship, because of Chinese courtship and the nature of their engagement with the Chinese. Similarly, Nigerian businessmen and market traders note that they too have been sought by Chinese entities. Chinese Trade expos and trade promotion agencies working with the Chinese government<sup>81</sup> send official invitations to Nigerian traders that make the process of sourcing goods in China quick and easy.<sup>82</sup> These expos feature many different kinds of manufacturers, enough to meet the needs of most traders, and participants could attend the expo, meet suppliers, place orders and return to Nigeria to receive them. The Chinese had more than streamlined the business process, it was quick, easy and efficient, and they were inviting Nigerians to be a part of it. Similarly, Nigerians are inviting and encouraging the Chinese to trade with them. The Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry organizes an annual international trade fair, and working with the Chinese embassy they are increasing trade relations with China.<sup>83</sup>

It is a logical progression to see that China's courtship of Nigeria as well as the development of a partnership promoting mutual respect and mutual benefit has played out into more favorable business conditions between Nigerian and Chinese business entities. This view is also supported by Alves' (2008) claim that Chinese foreign policy in Africa (and thereby Nigeria) is perhaps best described as a form of "economic diplomacy."

---

<sup>81</sup> Interview with Chinese diplomat with responsibilities in promoting business between Nigeria and China, Chinese Consulate, July 18, 2011, Abuja.

<sup>82</sup> Interview with Nigerian trader in Wuse Market, July 26, 2011, Abuja.

<sup>83</sup> Interview with public relations officer at the Lagos Chamber of Commerce, August 16, 2011, Lagos.

Dambisa Moyo (2009) made a similar observation when she noted that Chinese engagement in Africa is significantly more businesslike in nature than that of the West. The literature review, as well as the results of this research, supports the position that Chinese engagement in Nigeria and in Africa is spearheaded by enterprise and industry. Through promoting these economic values to Nigerians (and Africans), the Chinese have quite clearly gone to great lengths to improve the conditions of conducting business in Africa, and have made the business environment at the very least more attractive than the customary Western one. This is evidenced in Chinese contractors' bids away from Western competitors. It is also evidenced in statements by Nigerian business and government representatives, expressing their views that the Chinese believe in the Nigerian economy, markets, and Nigerian businessmen. Chinese faith and confidence in the Nigerian businessmen has welcomed and motivated Nigerian businessmen to increasingly engage with China.

#### The Role of the West in Increasing Sino-Nigerian Engagement

The attractiveness of the Chinese to their Nigerian counterparts is not entirely of China's making. While the Chinese have done a lot to entice Nigerians, the case can be made that a history of bad business practices and exploitation at the hands of Western partners have also served to push Nigerians towards China. Though not specifically addressed in the interview questions, the idea that China could provide an alternative to Western options was recurrent in most of the interviews and a natural development in discussions regarding the draw of the Chinese.



Popular culture has made Nigeria synonymous with the negative labels corruption and scams. A noteworthy example is the recent and continued fallout from the indictment of high level Halliburton executives and U.S. politicians on charges of corruption and bribery stemming from a Nigerian-led investigation into Halliburton's conduct in Nigeria. The subject of the Halliburton case was introduced by several interviewees for this study who noted Nigerian corruption with equally culpable western counterparts has earned Nigeria and Nigerian businesses stigma and detrimentally impacted the ability of Nigerian business representatives to engage with western counterparts, with very limited impact to their western counterparts.

The data collected by this study show that dishonest behavior has seeped into Nigeria's business practices with the West, and corruption has become habitual and unavoidable. In addition, corruption is not only a Nigerian practice, but it exists on both sides of the table—in other words, how can one be corrupt if there is no one else to engage in corrupt behavior? Clearly, the years of rampant corruption made easy in Nigeria by government instability and persistent military rule has created a business relationship between Nigeria and the West where corruption has become customary and inherent. These conditions are not conducive to true and sustainable business and economic growth and development. The repercussions of such detrimental practices are the aversion and reluctance to trade with Nigerians—not only to Nigerians but also to western counterparts. It is quite likely the habit of corrupt business practices between the West and Nigeria has been the motivation for the business standards and calls for increasing transparency in trade and economic agreements.

According to the respondents in this study, the opportunity to engage with China seems a chance for a fresh start. This is not to say that no corruption takes place between China and Nigeria. Chinese tendencies towards a lack of transparency in business deals and agreements provide the right conditions for corruption. However, what this study brings to light is that, in spite of the negative environment, engagement with China affords Nigerian businessmen and entrepreneurs the chance to conduct legitimate, honest, corruption-free business should they choose. Despite the past, China can serve as a clean slate. While corruption may still exist, it is avoidable and unnecessary for business.

This finding appears to contradict a good portion of the literature which makes reference to the Chinese penchant for corruption, and the relative ease for corruption brought about by secretive, non-transparent Chinese trade arrangements. This issue of corruption accusations leveled against the Chinese in Africa, especially from the West,<sup>84</sup> was noted by an interview respondent who said, “...this is the thing that the westerners are accusing China of...that the Chinese don’t do business ethically, but they [westerners] have demonstrated over and over again themselves that they are not doing business in Africa and in Nigeria particularly ethically. [...]No, they (the West) can’t accuse China 100% and get away with it. Honestly, Chinese, they can do business

---

<sup>84</sup> There are a number of publications that speak to this. Some of the more prominent ones are:

Tull, D. M. (2006). *China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences*;  
 Tull, D. M. (2008). *The Political Consequences of China’s Return to Africa*; and,  
 Behar, R. (2008, June 1). *China Storms Africa*.

ethically. It depends on how you approach them.”<sup>85</sup> So while corruption is quite feasible in Nigeria/China relations, the opposite is also a readily accessible option.

In addition, the Chinese were noted by respondents to behave more professionally than Westerners and this difference is a draw for Nigerians seeking to engage with China. P. Ter, a supplier of Chinese-produced educational software and computer systems remarks, “You write emails, they [Chinese] reply [to] you. You know, this issue of advance fee fraud that is prominent in Nigeria has made European and American companies so apprehensive, such that when you see a profile of a U.S. company or an American company and it meets your requirement and you make inquiries, they don’t respond for fear of being defrauded. But the Chinese companies don’t keep silent. You make an inquiry, they will respond to you. And of course, I’m not holding forth for fraudsters but I believe that in business if somebody makes an inquiry you respond but you have to be careful. So one big advantage or one issue that draws some of us close to them [the Chinese] is the ease with which they respond to our inquiry. You don’t need to go begging them, it’s like they also want you. With the Europeans and American companies it’s like you have to go begging them.”<sup>86</sup>

Another attractive component to Chinese trade is the affordability of Chinese products versus Western goods. (This point is discussed to a greater extent in upcoming sections of this chapter.) A major difference between the Chinese and the West is that the Chinese sell technology and the West does not. A government official put it best, “We

---

<sup>85</sup> Interview with L. Yerima, entrepreneur, January 6, 2011, Kaduna.

<sup>86</sup> Interview with Peter Ter, entrepreneur, conducted January 10, 2011, Abuja.

are engaging with China because it could be cheaper for us. Chinese engineering is cheaper than western engineering. They have made giant strides in agriculture. They have made giant strides in trade expansion. They have taken giant strides in industrialization. We are engaging with them because we see them as an alternative to western technology for which they will attach certain conditionalities before you can access. China is willing to share. Yeah, China is willing to share with Africans, especially Nigerians.”<sup>87</sup> A Nigerian businessman points out the same advantage, “Chinese willingness to sell technology, which is very, very difficult to get from Europe or Western world. So as long as you are ready to pay, the Chinese are easily willing to sell their technology. In fact I have procured technologies more than once, more than twice I would say. Just purely the technology. Right now I am even discussing with my partners on behalf of someone, a company. They just wanted technical men to come over, rehabilitate the plant and run it. That is sale of technology. In Europe, it was always difficult. They always tied it to their supply of the equipment and the personnel, unlike China. In fact, I think I would not be very wrong to say that their [the Chinese] willingness to sell that technology openly contributed to my interest in China a great deal.”<sup>88</sup> By selling technology to Nigerians, the Chinese are succeeding in outperforming, out-supplying, and upending their Western competition.

A recurrent comment in research interviews was that the Chinese path to development and industrialization was significantly shorter than the Western path to

---

<sup>87</sup> Phone interview with Nigerian US Consulate Officer, April 6, 2011, Washington DC.

<sup>88</sup> Interview with L. Yerima, entrepreneur, January 6, 2011, Kaduna.

development. This shorter option is attractive to Nigeria as it seeks to quicken its rate of development. China's recent rapid development has provided a new way of addressing development, and it makes sense that other countries like Nigeria would be interested in learning from China and following in a similar path. According to respondents, part of the rationale for looking to China as a model of development is the Nigerian belief that Western states have made distinct efforts to curb African and Nigerian development. The same cannot be said of China, which is visibly investing in infrastructure development in Nigeria. There is little question that the history of relations between Western countries and Nigeria has left a bad taste and has also adversely affected current and potentially future Nigeria-Western relations. This confining situation has pushed Nigerians to pursue other opportunities, other partnerships that may actually give Nigeria room to grow, to move forward and progress as a nation. China presents itself as one such opportunity and its marked departure from Western patterns of engagement is attracting Nigerian counterparts. This section has illustrated the importance of Chinese courtship of Nigerians and how that has influenced increasing engagement between both states.

### ***Learning and Development***

A major objective, which this study posits as the most significant objective driving Nigeria's engagement with China at governmental, public and private levels, is learning. China presents a novel picture of a state that has rapidly industrialized and has alleviated and successfully addressed issues of poverty amongst constituents. Nigerians are looking to learn from the Chinese model, not to duplicate it, but to borrow from the ideas and logic behind China's recent rapid economic and social development. According

to academics at NIIA, “Nigeria is willing to pay the price if we get what we need and want,”<sup>89</sup> and economic growth and progress akin to that of China is a central goal for the Nigerian government and people. A representative for the Nigeria China Business Council (NCBC) notes that there is a strong belief that learning from China will improve Nigeria. When discussing the effects of the increasing engagement with the Chinese on Nigerians, he had the following to say,

“Well I’ll say it’s been positive; in the sense that the goods that are being made in China are affordable to Nigerians. Secondly, Nigerians don’t receive the kind of discrimination and racism they receive from western nations. Thirdly, Nigeria recognizes the fact that China is an emerging market economy, just as Nigeria is, and we share a lot of similarities, in terms of culture, behavior and understanding. We believe that learning from China from the same background, Nigeria can improve. They are very strong in small scale enterprises, Nigeria is learning from that. With a population of over 1.5 billion, they have food security; we believe with our teeming population we should borrow relief from the Chinese. We also believe we can learn from their humility, the Chinese are very humble.

[...]Nigeria is a nation that is growing; that wants genuine partners, that is desirous of countries that will share their aspirations through understanding, dialogue and commitment. That we’ve seen with the Chinese. We’ve had cases where people condemn their products for low standards, but those issues are being dealt with. We also are noticing that apart from the little problems with standard, that their heavy industries coming to Nigeria and they are doing very well.”<sup>90</sup>

Many of the interview respondents noted their belief that Nigeria is very resource-rich even beyond its oil reserves but much needs to be done to increase chances to exploit these other opportunities in towards development. Borrowing technology from China,

---

<sup>89</sup> Round table discussion with 6 political scientists and academics at the NIIA, August 16, 2011, Lagos.

<sup>90</sup> Interview with the Nigerian director of Nigeria-China Business Council, July 29, 2011, Abuja.

taking cues from China's humble approach to international relations and engagement, and ruthlessly pursuing business opportunities, are some of the practices that Nigerians want to adopt.

Nigerians are seeking knowledge from the Chinese in many areas: economic development, agriculture, healthcare, education, and capacity building through technology transfer, and adaptation and infrastructure development<sup>91</sup>. With regards to economic development and growth, the particular area of interest for Nigerian businessmen and policymakers is small and medium enterprise (SME) development. A banker at the Nigeria Export Import Bank (NEXIM) notes that Nigerian SMEs likely have the most to gain from increasing engagement with China<sup>92</sup>. Western capitalist models of development for the most part were built on economies and industries of scale, which are the products of specialization. Such large-scale projects have been predominately unsuccessful in Africa and Nigeria. Reasons for persistent underdevelopment throughout Africa have been pursued by many scholars and policy specialists. Theories with a rationale similar to dependency theory have been introduced, but lasting and sustainable solutions have yet to be discovered. This chapter is not concerned with contributing to the debate on addressing and solving the issues of underdevelopment in Nigeria and in Africa, but what remains indisputable is that continued attempts for industries of scale have mostly failed. A number of factors

---

<sup>91</sup> List compiled from interviews with African Development Bank (AfDB) economists (7/27/11) and Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) political scientists and scholars (8/16/11), and corroborated by interviews with government officials and business and industry representatives.

<sup>92</sup> Interview with Nigeria Export Import Bank (NEXIM) Banker, July 13, 2011, Abuja.

including, but not limited to, external pressure, lack of dependable logistical support, and unreliable infrastructure have contributed to these failures. This has led to the “need to look to Asia for new blueprints on development.”<sup>93</sup>

Accordingly, engagement with China provides a paradigm shift in the approach to economic development, one that may be better suited for Nigeria’s economic culture and many budding entrepreneurs. Almost every person is somehow self-employed in the informal sector, whether or not they have a regular 9 to 5 occupation<sup>94</sup>. Not only do small and medium enterprises thrive, they are more successful in an environment and economic culture that does not appear to be conducive to industries of scale<sup>95</sup>. This is a significant similarity shared by China and Nigeria; although China is presently known as the manufacturing capital of the world, it has built aspects of its economic progress on the foundation of small and medium enterprises. China’s significant advantage and key factor in its path to development has not been greater resources but the ability to better organize and harness their resources, and herein lies the lessons Nigerians are so eager for.

A major area of concern for Nigerian development as discovered by this research was food production and agricultural production. Based on my travels and research on Nigeria, food security is not a problem. From the coastal fishing of southern Nigeria to

---

<sup>93</sup> Interview with National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) officer, July 14, 2011, Abuja.

<sup>94</sup> Based on researchers observations and experiences in Nigeria.

<sup>95</sup> This point was raised by a number of interview respondents and was further emphasized by observations by the researcher in multiple regions of Nigeria where large-scale endeavors including farming and manufacturing lay in varying degrees of disarray and abandonment.



the rice paddies and millet fields of the north, adjacent to the semi-arid Sahel region, food is readily available. Yet as I observed in my extensive travels, all the fresh food came from what would be typically categorized as subsistence farmers or small-scale commercial farmers, small to medium size producers. Although food supply in Nigeria is not problematic for domestic consumers, production is highly inefficient, which limits gains and potential income in agriculture that could be accrued by the country. The Nigerian government is noted in Nigerian newspapers and news articles for its food aid, especially to other African countries; however, food production as a major source of national income has yet to be adequately developed and for Nigeria, opportunities abound. Issues of global food security are making Africa's vast arable land a hot commodity. Nigeria has a unique opportunity to capitalize on this resource. For example, the Chinese requested cassava chips from Nigeria to be used as biofuels in China. Cassava is widely grown in Nigeria in excess of domestic market demands, and the hardy crop grows everywhere, lining highways throughout the country. Yet according to Nigerian officials in the federal ministries of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Investment, Chinese demands have yet to be fulfilled.

China is not the only market eager for Nigerian agricultural products. North of Nigeria is Niger, a dry and dusty country consisting mainly of a southern section of the Sahara Desert. Northern Nigeria has been described as semi-arid and when compared to the lush jungles of the south and the delta regions of the country, it has a much dryer climate. However, in the Nigerian state of Sokoto, one of the northernmost states, there is some water and surprisingly quite a bit of agriculture, enough to even grow rice. Crossing

the border into Niger is a shocking experience. In the few short miles it takes to leave Nigeria and enter into Birn'nkoni, gone are the farms and the green and the motor vehicles. In the much poorer Niger, donkeys drawing carts blink away the dust and the sand that coats everything. Here the petty Nigerian traders are the big men about town and products from Nigeria bear high costs.

Nigerian farmers have an exceptional opportunity to provide fresh produce, not only to Niger but to other countries in West Africa, taking advantage of the simplicity of travel and inter-country trade put in place by ECOWAS. However, Nigerian agriculture is not developed enough to capitalize on these opportunities. With continued challenges in transportation logistics due to a suffering infrastructure system, potential additional income is unremittingly lost. Nigerians interviewed noted the need to invest in the development of the agricultural sector and Chinese technical training in agriculture and agricultural research is expected to play a decisive role towards this end. Chinese experts are travelling to Nigeria to train and Nigerians are going to China to learn and exchange knowledge.

Perhaps the greatest element of learning as the core motivator in Nigerian agency in China-Nigeria relations is in its implications for capacity building. As previously argued, the Chinese option provides African states and Nigeria a new opportunity to make a selection, to play an active and decisive role in the pursuit of their best interests and the determination of their future. Through domestic and external efforts, Nigerians are hoping they will finally be able to identify successful policy solutions that can propel the country towards sustainable development. Nigeria's decision-making power, now

asserted through increased and strategic relations with China has, politically speaking, afforded greater recognition and respect not only in Nigeria but also on the global stage. The Chinese have found a different means to address the issues of extreme poverty. Nigeria (as well as the rest of Africa), in the light of the blatant failure of aid to deal with the poverty problem in the developing world, is taking note, not to emulate but to learn from China, employing simpler technologies that address the seminal causes of poverty rather than complex policy prescription drawn up from perceived symptoms of global poverty. Nigeria's increased sense of self-determination allows for Nigerian-generated solutions to Nigerian problems. Nigerians by nature have a better understanding of domestic problems and thereby a better foundation from which to decipher solutions that can produce both short and long term benefits for all Nigerians. The necessary human development for such a solution is coming with some assistance from the Chinese. Chinese training and education is equipping Nigerians to better manage their own economy, while Chinese competition is spurring domestic (Nigerian) competitors towards higher productivity and better business models. Nigerians are learning how to be successful and self-supporting--or at least, self-promoting--from the Chinese.

### ***Economic Benefit***

The last theme uncovered by this research is that Nigerians increasingly engage with China because of the economic benefit it brings to them, specifically profitability and affordability. This last portion examines the relevance of engagement with the Chinese especially as increasing trade with China has become arguably the most visible indicator of growing ties between China and Nigeria.

### Federal Government

The previous section discussed Nigerian intent to learn from the Chinese experience in order to grow and develop the Nigerian economy. In order to make significant progress it is important that the Nigerian government pay special attention to revitalizing infrastructure. As a result, the government is looking to China to play a role in the development of Nigerian infrastructure<sup>96</sup>. Corporate Nigeria 2010/2011<sup>97</sup> notes “Nigeria is tackling the problem of transforming transport infrastructure that does not meet the needs of a modern economy. Although the sector is under-developed, significant progress is being made by the Federal and State Governments in building and rehabilitating infrastructure, with the help of funding from international organizations, private sector input and new policy initiatives” (pp. 168). The article goes on to state, “...construction is ongoing across the major state roads in many of Nigeria’s 36 states. With the help of the World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB), major connecting roads that link Nigeria to its neighboring countries are being reconstructed” (Corporate Nigeria, 2010: pp. 169). Many of the contracts for rebuilding roads are going to Chinese companies<sup>98</sup>. The Chinese are very successful in winning contracts because they are almost always the lowest bidder and also more adept at putting together contracts

---

<sup>96</sup> Interview with AfDB economist A, July 27, 2011, Abuja and corroborated by government officials, as well as NIIA academics.

<sup>97</sup> A business trade and investment guide (magazine) published by Corporate Guides International and Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC).

<sup>98</sup> Interview with AfDB economist A, July 27, 2011, Abuja.

that appeal to decision-makers<sup>99</sup>. Consequently, the Chinese can be seen all across Nigeria funding and building, roads, stadiums, dams, power plants, sky scrapers, and more. They are building roads, expressways, and bridges everywhere in Abuja, the capital city of Nigeria. Abuja is a young city that is growing rapidly, with the help of Chinese construction companies, the most visible of which is probably the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC). One of the CCECC's most prominent projects is the construction of a light rail network to improve public transportation options for people that work and live in Abuja. The project began in May of 2009 and is expected completion is December of 2014. Just as the Chinese are crucial to construction and infrastructure development in Abuja, they are also important in the rest of the country, in particular in key trading towns such as but not limited to Kano, Jos, and Kaduna. Current infrastructure development and consequently economic and social development in Nigeria is heavily dependent on the efforts of Chinese entities.

The government is also pursuing engagement with China to improve the communication infrastructure, noting that the Chinese provided Nigeria with their first communication satellite NigComSat-1. When the satellite developed problems, China was again the source for a replacement (NigComSat-1R) and an additional satellite.<sup>100</sup> These satellites have helped improve communication infrastructure in the country, although the mobile networks in Nigeria remain over-burdened by heavy demand and

---

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> Interview with government official in the Federal Ministry of Science and Technology. The respondent noted that while these satellites primarily serve Nigeria, they also serve Central Africa.

constant traffic. By further developing the infrastructure in Nigeria, the Nigerian government hopes to foster conditions that will promote sustainable economic growth.

### Business Representatives & Entrepreneurs

Chinese-manufactured products have flooded the Nigerian marketplace throughout the country, and Nigerians are the engine behind the mass dispersal of Chinese goods. Purchases are made by crate loads from ports or from Chinatown, broken down into smaller units, then sold by a third party to yet another party in even smaller units, until shoppers make contact with the actual traders that finally sell the goods.<sup>101</sup>

Businessmen note that they prefer doing business with China because China provides them with exactly what they need and want in terms of levels of quality; they note it is easier to acquire low quality goods but upon request higher quality goods are made available. In addition, the flexibility of Chinese suppliers allows Nigerians to purchase within their means. The affordability of Chinese products for Nigerian consumers has also resulted in increased comparative profitability and net income of Nigerians engaged in the purchase and sale of Chinese products. Nigerian entrepreneurs, businessmen and industrialists--just like consumers--are doing business with China because it is an economically viable endeavor that has netted exponential returns despite the fact that Chinese products are typically considered inferior to Western products, or are cheaply-made copies. A part of this study's research found that Chinese products were just as reliable and sometimes even of equal quality as Western-branded products.

---

<sup>101</sup> According to 4 official interviews with Nigerian traders in Wuse market, interviews conducted on July 18 and July 26, 2011 and echoed by 2 interviews with traders in Chinatown, Lagos August 14, 2011.

Interestingly, according to Nigerian market traders, Nigerian manufactured products were more durable and of better quality; however, logistical and infrastructural limitations have kept locally produced goods from reaching Nigerian markets in adequate quantities and affordable prices. This point was echoed by government officials in the Federal Ministry of Trade and Investment, as well as Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and corroborated by executives in the Nigeria-China Business Council and academics at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.

Chinese technology has proven itself a good fit for the Nigerian market in terms of viability and price, and Nigerian businessmen are taking advantage of this opportunity to shore up their earnings. Profitability is clearly a major reason for doing business with China but it is not the only reason. A number of factors in the characteristics of business arrangements with China have combined to attract and nurture business relations, even in cases where other (non-Chinese) suppliers might offer better products to the Nigerian market.

A noted motivator for Nigeria's China policy is the relative ease of business in engaging with China. This theme was prominent in every single interview. Clearly the Chinese have seen that “Nigeria is a consumer nation<sup>102</sup>,” and are packaging their goods and services to meet the demands of this consumer base. A Nigerian entrepreneur put it well, stating, “In all cases, when you engage in business with somebody there are benefits accruing to you, okay. But I think most especially in the case of Nigeria, two factors I

---

<sup>102</sup> An observation made by many interview respondents over the course of the research process.

consider quite important. Number one, the *ease* of doing business with them. Ease in the sense that probably until recently, the Chinese tended to believe more of us than the Europeans. By the way, all of my working life, we've dealt a lot with, in all our dealings we've dealt a lot with the Europeans or the western world rather, let me put it that way. But towards the tail end of my working career, we have had cause to deal with China and the ease with which that business was conducted I think attracted me personally and even encouraged me to be on my own." This sentiment is echoed by another entrepreneur who said, "For our company, we are more interested, rather we are interested in doing business with this Chinese firm because of the ease we got in doing business with them."

In tandem with the response of ease of business as a major appeal factor for Chinese firms, interviewees reported that Chinese products were affordable and made accessible to Nigerians. Nigerian businessmen noted that with the Chinese, they were able to earn value for money. Granted it wasn't always a positive outcome, just as good quality was available for purchase, so also was bad value. Traders could purchase goods in qualities and quantities that matched their spending thresholds. Mr. Lawal explained, "I mean as a businessman I have interests in dealing with China because they have good products. Good cost, low-cost prices that improves my competitive position in the market. So it's not for the country, it's for my business and myself. They have good products. They have good cheap products. Well, not cheap, good affordable products."<sup>103</sup> When asked to elaborate, he goes on to state, "Because their products are good, are well priced. Which means if you want to compete, as against the European products, you need

---

<sup>103</sup> Phone interview conducted April 5, 2011, Kaduna.



good prices. European products are very expensive, you know that. And, but Chinese products are relatively cheaper. So your margin and your competitiveness is enhanced if you procure from Chinese firms. High turnover and high profit margins, that's our objectives as the business is concerned. And the Chinese facilitate that, as I said. They have the goods and they have the good prices. So it makes us competitive. So we can achieve our volume and we can achieve our profit margin."<sup>104</sup>

Another recurring motivator was that business with the Chinese employed simpler business processes and Chinese counterparts were considerate and accommodating of their Nigerian colleagues and business partners. Mr. Ter shared his experience as an exclusive supplier for some Chinese agencies, "About a year ago, we wanted to represent some companies in sole agency capacity. We market their products, which they manufacture and of course at a good price. That we got from the Chinese firms. They were very willing to make us their sole agents without any pre-condition. Of course we had a target to meet, but beyond that there were no preconditions... As a starting company that was quite good for us."<sup>105</sup> When asked about the progress of this business venture, Ter added, "Of course it has been hectic. Particularly in our own field, we are introducing new products. It's been quite hectic. There have been a lot of demands from them too, to meet up our target. We have not met our target as a matter of fact, basically because we were introducing new products in the Nigerian market. But they were always very understanding, always telling me 'yeah we will support you, we will support you; we

---

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> Interview with Peter Ter, entrepreneur, January 10, 2011, Abuja.

know it's not easy, it's not easy.' In fact, one of the products, the laboratory equipment, the manufacturers told us that it took them 6-10 years to break into the Chinese market themselves. So they are not expecting magic from us. They also know that it will take us quite some time. So far, so good."<sup>106</sup>

This ease of business for Nigerians is not only arising from enterprise business. The Chinese government has also implemented policies (immigration, economic and the like) that facilitate Chinese and Nigerian to engagement and partnership. This support from the Chinese government in streamlining the business process is evident and has become a strong attraction for Nigerians. In interviews and informal conversations regarding Nigeria's engagement with China, it was reiterated that the process of making travel arrangements to go to China is simpler and more successful than making travel arrangements to visit the West. Once Chinese consular visa requirements are met, then visas to travel to China are issued. There are fewer hoops for Nigerians to jump through. For example, according to the interviews, a visa to the United States for business purposes requires those seeking to travel to have certain levels of education. This makes the U.S., by and large, inaccessible--regardless of the business skill or capital of the applicant. The business-savvy market trader who may possess little formal education is essentially denied admittance. China's visa requirements do not call for higher education, a good grasp of English or Chinese. The alternative of procuring visas to travel to the West, even when formal and informal requirements are met, visa applications can be denied for any reason, and reasons do not have to be disclosed to the applicant. In short,

---

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

travelling to the West is a hassle. A businessman explains, “Once you have the requirement for visa to go to China, you are given the visa no excuse. As long as you meet their requirements. It’s not the same with American companies; it’s not the same with European companies. You fill the visa form, you’ve met all the requirements and you’re still denied visa. Reasons of course they are not obligated to disclose. We are not querying that. But, sometimes some of us wonder why you have a requirement, somebody meets the requirement and you do not, you will not give him what you made the requirements for.” Recently, however, reports indicate that as a result of abuses of the system by criminally-motivated Nigerians, the Chinese government has been more restrictive with the issuance of visas, especially to Nigerians who have never visited China, until in league with Nigerian counterparts they are able to more directly address the issue of system abuse<sup>107</sup>.

Nigerian businessmen note that Chinese manufacturers and suppliers offer attractive conditions and in certain situations have been the only option, let alone the only viable one. Mr. Lawal illustrates, “And of course there are times you can only deal with them. I tell you one example I have now. I want to buy promotional items, pens and biros [...] customized as gift items. Only Chinese can do that. I mean, they are good at things like that. So where I go for things like consumables, promotional items, the Chinese are good at it.” Nigerian traders go to China because of the vast options for business and extensive catalogs and offerings presented by the Chinese. The region of Guanzhou is

---

<sup>107</sup> According to interviews with market traders, and a Chinese Consulate Business and Investment representative.

home to most of the China-based, China/Nigeria business arrangements. Trade expos there often serve as a one-stop shop even for the businessmen looking to diversify their business offerings.

The Chinese are noted as very responsive to their Nigerian counterparts, quick to communicate, flexible and considerate of special circumstances in their negotiations. They are seen as reliable as well as good communicators. A lot of these factors of attraction were brought up in contrast to Western business practices and discussed in an earlier section of this chapter. Based on interviews, it is quite clear that the difficulty of doing business with the U.S. and Europe, and the comparative ease of doing business with China is pushing Nigerians to choose China.

### Consumers

A short stroll into a Nigerian marketplace makes obvious rather quickly the motivations of Nigerian consumers in increasing Nigerian engagement with China. The affordability of Chinese imports ordinarily classified as luxury goods has considerably increased the relative spending power of the average Nigerian. Thanks to the Chinese, it doesn't matter that the power company, the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) has frequent outages because now even the hairdresser at the corner market has her own generator to provide consistent service to patrons. Thanks to the Chinese, most Nigerians own at least one mobile phone, many have multiple phones, or pricier multiple SIM card carrying phones so that they can take advantage of offers from various mobile service carriers. Whether or not Nigerians make a conscious decision to buy Chinese products,

the influx of Chinese-made goods is driving down market prices<sup>108</sup>. Not only are traditional goods flying off the shelves, even non-traditional Asian and Chinese-oriented goods, like Malaysian manufactured ginseng-infused instant coffee and portable electronic acupuncture machines are gaining traction in the Nigerian marketplace<sup>109</sup>. In many ways the consumer society in Nigeria looks a lot like the U.S., where quite a bit of spending goes to the latest toys and gadgets. High definition plasma and LCD televisions are all the rage, even though most television stations and service providers have yet to provide high definition service<sup>110</sup>.

It is important to note, however, that the entry of the Chinese into the Nigerian marketplace was not and is not an isolated event. As the BRIC economies (Brazil, Russia, India and China) grew and developed industrially and economically, it became necessary to find new markets in which to sell goods and increase income generation. Accordingly, with its remarkably large market, Nigeria has been a key African destination for some of these countries' products<sup>111</sup>.

Chinese manufactured goods in particular have made an impression on the lives of Nigerian consumers. The affordability of Chinese products has dropped market prices

---

<sup>108</sup> Interview with government official in the Federal Ministry of Trade and Investment, July 29, 2011, Abuja.

<sup>109</sup> Phone interview with a Nigerian independent distributor for a Chinese Tianshi company that specializes in health equipment and acupuncture machine, August 11, 2011, Kaduna.

<sup>110</sup> Based on personal observation at the time fieldwork for this study was conducted, July-August 2011.

<sup>111</sup> Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs Official C, August 11, 2011, Abuja.

of most goods to a fraction of what they were just years ago<sup>112</sup>. Nigerians are noting that Chinese-manufactured products have increased standards of living without increasing the cost of living. With non-essential goods accessible to every Nigerian and in spite of quality concerns, Nigerians are keen to embrace the opportunity Chinese imports provide to live a better life. Scholars at NIIA note that the Nigerian disposition is to accept beneficial economic relations from everyone including China<sup>113</sup>. Even concerns that Chinese products are undercutting and destroying domestic Nigerian industry are not keeping Nigerians from spending money on goods bearing the “Made in China” label. Clearly, Nigerian consumers are the big winners. A Nigerian notes that, across the board, “cheap Chinese [products] have been good for the African consumer.” Especially members of the lower socio-economic classes can only afford things made in China and in an interesting turn, “China becomes the saving grace of so many,” as noted by an interview respondent. It is important to note that Nigerian culture and society tends towards immediate satisfaction and a ‘keeping up with the Jones’s’ mentality; these demands are best met by cheap Chinese products that do not require long-term planning or saving. Nigerians in the marketplace talked about the days when the only option available was to buy second-hand goods, but today cheap Chinese imports allow them to purchase and own brand new products. This adds a level of prestige and self-respect that hasn’t been lost on Nigerian consumers; as such, the demand for Chinese products continues to grow at an exponential rate.

---

<sup>112</sup> Interview with small business owner in Wuse Market, July 18, 2011, Abuja.

<sup>113</sup> Round table discussion with 6 political scientists and academics at the NIIA, August 16, 2011, Lagos.

## Conclusion

Although a significant amount of information came out of the interviews that were conducted, it is quite clear that this study is only scratching the surface of China-Nigeria relations and subsequently Nigeria's China policy. The central research question posed by this study is: Why do Nigerians choose to engage with China? The underlying current through all the identified themes is that engagement with China offers Nigeria and Nigerians a new opportunity for progress, and that is why Nigerians choose to engage with China. The significance of these themes is their demonstration of intent and agency on the part of Nigerians engaging with China. Further still, they lend support to the central argument of this study: that Africans are willing and active participants in their engagement with China, and that Nigerians are making state-centric realist decisions in search of their perceived best interests. Afrobarometer surveys on public opinion in Africa indicate that, despite the growing literature asserting that Chinese engagement in Africa is detrimental to Africans, most Africans hold the Chinese in positive regard (Gadzala & Hanusch, 2010). Approximately 58 percent of Nigerian Afrobarometer respondents indicated that to some degree they believe that China is helping Nigeria. Only 10 percent of respondents reported that China was no help; 33 percent noted that they did not know (Afrobarometer, 2008).

Nigeria is also engaging China in part because of the level of competition that China has created in the world economy. In addition, China's disposition towards Nigeria makes Nigerian pursuit of engagement an almost natural development. Although China is using Nigeria to pursue its own national interests, Nigerian government officials note that

Nigeria is doing the very same with China and continues to do so, in part due to China's assistance in capacity-building and the financing of key projects in Nigeria. The Nigerian government sees China as an alternative source to the West for technological advancement. This view is sound; the Chinese government is more generous with technology than its Western counterparts (Alden, 2007; Brautigam, 2009). Important questions have arisen concerning the shelf-life of these technologies, since rapid advancement makes even today's technologies obsolete. Because of this process of obsolescence, the continued viability of the technology that China brings into Nigeria is under scrutiny by Nigerian regulatory agencies and consumers. In addition, Chinese hardware and equipment presents a compatibility problem because of language barriers; this research has discovered that the equipment coming from China is sometimes labeled in Chinese with Chinese language manuals that are not accessible to even the average educated Nigerian. However, regardless of these challenges, what matters is that China's offer of technology starkly differs from the West's. As a result, Nigerians are logically going to China to obtain what the West has withheld.

The continued development of business relationships makes the PRC even more lucrative for Nigeria because of the relative freedom of access to what Nigerian people need and demand. Although the relationship is government and business driven, Nigerian leadership looks to China to source its needs: military, technological, economic and otherwise. It is relatively easy for Nigerians to trade and have access to China because of the comparative freedom of entry and competitive affordability of China. This is not to say no concerns exist; there are significant concerns regarding the quality and safety of



Chinese products. But in spite of these concerns, the opportunities that China presently provides outweigh the costs of engagement with China. Nigerians and Africans alike are also motivated by the easy disbursement of Chinese funding, loans and investments. The Chinese have made use of barter techniques in many agreements, where services or access to raw materials is traded, and thus not all transactions require exchange of money, especially money from Nigerians. Nigerians are undaunted in their approach to China for funding for ambitious projects. China's non-interference policy has meant that, typically, contracts focus on the heart of the business deal and are not contingent on governance conditions or the implementation of outside-generated policy prescriptions. The point remains that the Chinese are not concerned with African governance or perceived standards of humanitarianism or democracy, but instead China's steadfast belief in sovereignty means that it falls to Nigerians to determine for themselves what standards are appropriate and apply them accordingly.

Chinese engagement with African states, especially as facilitated by FOCAC, has allowed African states, public and private actors and business representatives to meet and interact whereas they might not otherwise do so. While this may not be an obvious motive for engaging with China, it is actually of great consequence to Africa and Nigeria's growth. China has perhaps unwittingly presented African states with an opportunity to collaborate and coordinate their efforts. The potential for collaboration is astounding, especially if appropriately exploited by African actors. A number of Nigerian lower-level government officials have noted this opportunity and though it wasn't brought up in interviews with higher level officers or politicians, the fact that some

officials feel Nigeria can act on these opportunities, portends the possibility for corresponding action.

The Chinese element in Nigerian lives is increasingly significant, and while China presents some very real opportunities to the Nigerian populace, it also presents some very real threats. However as this chapter has focused mainly on the perceptions that inform Nigerian motivations and agency in increasing engagement with China, it has not addressed current Chinese engagement in Nigeria, and areas of concern with regards to growing engagement with China have also not been addressed. These include the influx of counterfeit products in China, reports that Nigerian minerals such gold and wolframite are being illegally mined and exported by Chinese entities without appropriate permissions or remuneration to the federal government as required by law. Interview respondents agree, China's engagement in Nigeria must be appropriately managed. It falls then to the Nigerian government to maximize opportunities and minimize threats. Ultimately, the drivers of Nigerian governmental agency in engagement with China can be categorized under opportunities and threats.

Offering this chapter as the final word on the motivations of Nigerians in their increasing engagement with China would be naive. This chapter presents some of the major discoveries of a study that was conducted in a short span of time. It is quite likely that further research might find greater weight for other motivating factors not mentioned in this study. In addition, while broad, this study is hardly comprehensive; the motivations for other specific categories of Nigerians are not discussed. Regardless, as a nation, Nigerians have embraced the Chinese option, not just as an alternative to the West

but also as ancillary to engagement with the West and other nations. To pursue Nigeria's own self-interest and objectives, Nigerian actors are hoping to learn from China, taking advantage of the relative affordability of Chinese products and technology, the assistance training and education readily offered by the Chinese government, the ease of engaging the Chinese, the short-term successes of current Nigeria-China relations and the additional leverage and that a strategic partnership with China has afforded the Nigerian government in the international arena.

## Chapter 6: Understanding Africa's China Policy

---

This chapter discusses the findings of this study and its implications to Sino-Nigerian relations as well as Sino-African relations, and concludes with recommendations for future research. China is gaining headway into Africa and fast becoming an important trading partner for many African states. This new economic development has resulted in increased competition for African resources and attention in the economic and political spheres from Chinese and Western interests. This competition requires that Africa become an active participant in the determination of her future that potentially could bring a new era of successful development for African states, and a new environment in which to pursue their own best interests. Nigerian leaders express their intent to do just that. Although much information was discovered through this research, it is quite clear that this study is only scratches the surface of China-Nigeria relations and subsequently Nigeria's China policy. The central research question posed by this study is: Why do Nigerians choose to engage with China? The easiest answer is because China chooses to engage with Nigeria. However, an answer that simple fails to paint an accurate picture of the dynamics that influence Nigerians' decision to engage with China. The underlying theme in this dynamic is that engagement with China offers Nigeria and Nigerians a new opportunity for progress. Nigerians choose to engage with China because it is in their best interests.

The Nigerian government does not have an explicit policy document on China that outlines objectives in engaging with China. There is no doubt that this is a major shortcoming and a potential hindrance to maximizing the accrued benefits to Nigeria of engaging with China. This author contends that the absence of a policy document makes it difficult to analyze and evaluate the outputs of this relationship because no explicit objectives exist. However, Nigeria and China have signed an agreement, the Nigeria-China Joint Commission for Cooperation, which details the nature of relations between the two countries. While such documents might speak to the nature and characteristics of Nigeria-China relations, it cannot be said definitively that these documents address Nigeria's objectives in engaging with China, in the same ways that an explicit policy document might. An explicit foreign policy document issued by the Nigerian government would speak directly to the central concerns of this study: what is Nigeria's foreign policy is toward China? What the objectives are of state leaders and governmental administrations that choose to engage with China over other actors? What does Nigeria stand to gain? Creating a foreign policy document detailing Nigeria's policy goals and objectives serves a few strategic purposes. First, Chinese engagement in Africa has been implied as being detrimental to African governance and policy-making (Tull, 2006; Tull, 2008; Kagan, 2006). However, the presence of explicit Nigerian policies on China would instead demonstrate deliberate governance and policy-making, and, the level of detail in such policies would indicate increased Nigerian intent. Second, the articulation of a policy would require at least a strategic SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis of the opportunities that engagement with China provides. Such analyses require attention to fine details and could pave the way for making calculated decisions

on policy-based objectives and aims. Fieldwork and research have made it clear that Nigeria has plenty of brilliant minds that are capable of conducting and have already conducted such analyses and come up with policy recommendations to move the country forward. Unfortunately the final decision is in the hands of politicians whose primary aims may not be nation-centric because of overwhelming pressure to use their position to increase personal gains. Finally, understanding policy goals and objectives provides a foundation for future evaluation and analysis of the outcomes of Nigerian-Chinese policy initiatives in Nigeria. The relevance of policy documents as primary source documents lies in their ability to serve as indicators of Nigerian participation and intent in Chinese engagement in Nigeria. Policy documents such as foreign policy missives on China, official reports and statements on China and Chinese enterprises in Nigeria will be helpful as a launching pad in the articulation of Nigeria's China policy. Future research can begin to assess the impact of Chinese engagement in Nigeria with these documents as a foundation.

Nigerian traders and businesses choose to create partnerships with China primarily because the Chinese are more likely to treat them as partners. This receptivity has been missing in Nigeria's relations with the West. After many years of ill-treatment and disrespect by the Western countries, who were seen as exploiting Nigeria's wealth while sullyng its international reputation and stifling significant attempts at economic growth, Nigerians are attracted by a new-found respect and legitimacy in dealing with China. Chinese engagement with Nigerians is distinctive because the Chinese have made a point of displaying vested interest in the development of Nigeria. Discussions of mutual

benefit are more than political propaganda, the Chinese are not seen as presenting challenges and setting up roadblocks to Nigeria's progress. In addition, the Chinese are making quality products affordable and accessible to the consumer culture prevalent in Nigeria. The Chinese have made business simple and more profitable for the Nigerian traders and businesses, leading to partnerships with Chinese suppliers and manufacturers. This is not to say that trade with China has not created areas of concern. While it is true that there has been mutual benefit to Nigeria and China as a result of bilateral trade, it is also true balance of trade data would present China as clearly the big winner in Nigeria, although the benefits of cheap Chinese products to the spending power of the average Nigerian may overshadow the trade imbalance.

China is largely importing raw materials from Nigeria while subsequently selling finished goods and products to Nigerians. This sort of scenario has been described in political science as indicative of dependency, a situation in which developed countries grow economically through manufacture of finished goods while the economies of the developing countries that export raw materials are dependent on the exports from developed countries because of their inability to produce finished goods. Additionally, as indicated in Chapter 4, which tested dependency theory, it does not appear that what is at play in China-Nigeria relations is dependency but rather state-centric realism, a pursuit of self-interest by both China and Nigeria, both developing states. China stands to benefit from Nigerian raw materials as well as political influence in Africa; while Nigeria welcomes Chinese products, it is not dependent on them. China presents Nigeria with options and opportunities but is not Nigeria's only option or opportunity. Chinese

engagement is a portion of a larger picture of the Nigerian economy and Nigerian foreign relations and while the Chinese are likely Nigeria's largest trading partner in terms of volume, it does not hold the spot monetarily—that spot is occupied by the United States. This iteration of the relationship between Nigeria and China is still quite new, and labels like 'dependency' may be premature, especially in such a dynamic relationship. However, it is important to remain critical about the state of China-Nigeria relations and to continue research into the nature and characteristics of Chinese engagement beyond this study. A situation of dependency may yet develop and the Nigerian government needs to play an active role in managing its relationship with China.

While the Chinese are going to great lengths to promote the development of Nigeria-China relations, it is hard to say definitively that one nation is driving relations more than the other. On one hand the Chinese are courting the Nigerians, accommodating them and providing them with lucrative deals and options. At the same time, however, it is clear that Nigerians are leaping at the chance to conduct business and it is logical to make the claim that Nigerians' receptiveness to the new opportunities afforded them through engagement with China is also in its own way perhaps a retroactive driver of Chinese-Nigerian relations. Nigerians and Chinese are increasingly collaborating in many different areas. This research has pointed out cultural, economic and political collaboration. However, collaboration extends beyond those areas and is increasingly specific. Nigerian and Chinese government are working together on establishing and monitoring manufacturing standards. This is important as counterfeit products, especially goods like food stuffs and medication put the rest of society in danger.



This research has attempted to determine just what Nigeria wants from China. Based on the findings of this study, Nigerians are keen to learn from China and borrow from China's example to improve their present situation and develop economically and socially. Systematic problems with the Nigerian government and political system still keep Nigeria from taking full advantage of the new opportunities made available by Chinese engagement. Issues of inadequate leadership, corruption, lack of infrastructure, undependable energy supply; these are persistent barriers to faster rates of sustainable development and progress in Nigeria. These are issues that the Nigerian government needs to address expediently. It is clear that China-Nigeria relations are not always beneficial, or always fruitful interaction, but Nigerians are well aware of China's increasing global importance and the need not only to actively engage China but to take advantage of the opportunities presented by China.

### **Nigeria (and Africa) not easily moved from the West**

Although Chinese engagement in Nigeria is growing, the West continues to hold a marginal advantage in Nigeria especially with regards to sustainable opportunities. To begin with, there is a fundamental ideological contradiction between Nigeria and the People's Republic of China. Nigeria is a growing democracy patterned after the democratic system employed by the United States of America. This has allowed the Nigerian government to adopt a Bill of Rights, to promote and protect the recognized rights of the Nigerian citizen. This Bill of Rights afforded to every Nigerian citizen is not accommodated in the communist PRC system and this contradicts the Nigerian policy of

citizen diplomacy that is becoming a major component of Nigerian foreign relations.<sup>114</sup>

Secondly, engagement with China is noted as a tedious affair because there is a lot of “unnecessary activity.” Relations between parties in both states are plagued with ancillary tasks and a significant amount of red tape because the systems of both countries are incompatible and supplementary action must be taken to allow activities to take place. For instance Nigerians in China are being harassed by the Chinese authorities for practicing their religion. In response to the causalities this has caused Nigerians, the government has to make specific efforts to request that the Chinese government recognize and respect Nigerians right to practice their religion<sup>115</sup>.

Although there are some cultural and social similarities between China and Africa at the general levels, these commonalities do not applicably extend to Nigeria. Nigeria is culturally capitalist and individualist, the second portion of that descriptive is arguably not applied to most African culture. Chinese investments are heavily government-controlled, Chinese investments both at home and abroad are mostly tailored by government. The Nigerian counterparts are usually private individuals with private enterprises, not necessarily controlled by the Nigerian government. There are fundamental differences therefore in the way that both governments approach business and investment. The role of the Nigerian government in the business dealings of Nigerians is limited especially when compared to the role that the central Chinese

---

<sup>114</sup> According to an interview with a government representative, July 14, 2011, Abuja. Interview respondent noted that Chinese police raids on illegal Nigerian Christian gatherings in China had resulted in the deaths of a few Nigerians and was a point of concern for Nigerian government. This point was corroborated by academics at the NIIA panel discussion.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

government plays in Chinese enterprise. The Chinese need for government intervention in business relations, is not characteristic of Nigerian or Western dealings. Government intervention to create harmony and orchestrate business agreements and contracts on the scale of the Chinese would be considered unnecessary and superfluous by Nigerians. These additional steps and additional players increases the cost of the business relationship, the number of necessary approvals for projects or contracts can make the business process wasteful, in terms of time and money.

Nigerians are increasing engaging with the Chinese because of the availability of opportunities, but under the right conditions, arguably business with Western companies can and should be simpler. The following excerpt from an interview helps illustrate this point.

Respondent 1: Nigeria was compelled to move towards the east out of impatience and disappointment, but cost-effectiveness [sic], if we have a sincere approach from the West that's where we'll move far.

Interviewer: What will it take to develop a sincere approach from the West?

Respondent 1: The West has to shift from seeing Africa as a colony. We are an independent people. It is only then that it [The West] will understand in real perspective, what Africa needs now.

Respondent 2: In the light of hundreds of years of a Master-servant relationship-

Respondent 1: In this era of a global village, era of communications, the windows are open. It is just the political will that is needed.<sup>116</sup>

Irrefutably, Africa and Nigeria are not easily parted from the West; there is a shared history and a deeper understanding and knowledge of the other that will always remain a competitive advantage for western interests in Africa. However, for the West to make use of this advantage it needs to change its approach to African countries and to Nigeria. Interestingly, following the establishment of a formal strategic partnership between China and Nigeria, recent tours to Nigeria of high level Western government officials have sought to do the same. Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States have sent high profile representatives to underpin the importance of their relationships with Nigeria. While the U.S. sent Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Germany sent Chancellor Angela Merkel, and the UK, Prime Minister David Cameron. Perhaps generating the political will is underway to change the dynamics of the relationship between Nigeria and the West, as well as Africa and the West.

### **China in Nigeria: good or bad?**

A question posed by most of the literature on recent Chinese engagement in Africa, including Nigeria, is whether Chinese engagement in Africa is good or bad. The argument can be made that the wrong question is being asked. After all in the words of an interview respondent, “there is no sincerity in international politics.” This echoes Waltz’s

---

<sup>116</sup> Interview with government official in the Federal Ministry of Science and Technology, July 15, 2011.

(1979) argument that the fundamental aim of states is self-interest and survival. China is in Africa and in Nigeria in pursuit of its own best interests and it is up to African state actors to pursue the best interests of their respective countries in their engagement with China. The argument has been raised that there is no significant difference in Chinese engagement in Nigeria as compared to that of the West. The difference of Chinese engagement is that it provides Nigeria and African states with additional options and opportunities. A Nigerian political scientist warns against portraying China as an *alternative* to the West in Africa, noting that the right perspective is to view China as an *opportunity* and accordingly to make the best of it<sup>117</sup>. At the end of the day, the future of African development lies in the psychological liberalization of the African, an objective not attained by government policies or well-written action plans.

### ***Managing China***

*“People are not very comfortable with China but China is a force and must be managed appropriately!”* –Nigerian government employee.<sup>118</sup>

In order to maximize its benefits from China, the Nigerian government and other African states need to manage their relations with China, paying particular attention to protecting and promoting their national interests. It would however, be unwise to characterize China as a big bad monster. China is rapidly growing economically and in political power and influence, everybody is engaging with China in order to pursue their

---

<sup>117</sup> Round table discussion with 6 political scientists and academics at the NIIA, August 16, 2011, Lagos.

<sup>118</sup> Interview with National Agency for Food & Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) executive, July 12, 2011, Abuja.

own interests and it would behoove African actors to do the same. The key for Africa is to take a different approach to its foreign policy. African countries have been noted as being receptive and rather passive in their foreign relations, and if they are to really benefit from the opportunities presented by China, they need to be at the table determining the nature of their relations with China.

### **Limitations and Recommendations**

This study is tasked with understanding the motivations of Africans, in particular Nigerians, that choose to engage with China. However, the findings of a case study of Nigeria can hardly be construed as indicative of the situation in Africa. Since Nigeria is part of Africa, there is some logic to the validity of Nigerian motivations being construed as African motivations. Yet the uniqueness of Nigeria in Africa, and the interesting details which make for a fascinating study represent both the strengths and weaknesses of this research. To speak to Africa's China policy, further research and interviews will need to be conducted with information-rich individuals who can speak to conditions across the continent. Examples of such individuals would include policy-makers and economists at regional and continental agencies, such as the African Development Bank, the Africa Investment Bank, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), to name a few. The expertise of the individuals working at these larger-scale agencies might help shed light on Africa's China policy beyond Nigeria's China policy. In the same vein, if there are some regional and continental policies that pertain to Africa that may be brought to light by any of these agencies, it is important to note that they may not be applicable to

a particular African state—Africa is not an inanimate object, nor is it ever a solitary actor. In the light of all this, it is important to denote that the findings of this study are valid only to Nigeria and not to Africa. Should any future research look at regional and continental organizations, it must also concede that findings may not be directly applicable or representative of any given African country.

The findings of this qualitative case study are not necessarily novel or ground-breaking but there is little doubt that the findings of this research are somewhat relevant, not only to the expansion of information and knowledge but to the study of political science and the manner in which states and governments interact. As mentioned earlier the manner in which China has engaged Africa is new and more business-like and this study corroborates that claim. The findings of this study have validated some of the claims published by scholars and journalists on China and Africa (Nigeria specifically) relations. This is valid because it moves general understanding and critique of this relationship beyond conjecture but offers up some hard evidence to support and bolster what is known and said about China and Nigeria. This study also has implications that extend beyond academia. Any governments and groups interested or affected by Chinese engagement in Nigeria have a vested interest in the findings of this study. For instance Western governmental agencies or businesses that are interested in engaging with Nigeria, or are looking to be more successful and lose fewer contracts to the Chinese, can through this study identify the characteristics that make the Chinese attractive to the Nigerians and adapt accordingly. This study has also highlighted the need for a

coordinated Nigerian effort to maximize benefit and better exploit the opportunities that engagement with China has made available.

This qualitative case study portion of this project has focused rather significantly on the perceptions regarding Nigerian objectives and motivations in increasing engagement with China. By focusing on motivations and objectives, the responses provided for the most part have the expectation of a positive outcome. This is because people, expectably, when discussing intent in decision-making, focus on self-benefit and what they expect to gain and not costs or expected losses. This tendency gives the impression that this study paints China in a good light. To be clear, it is not the intent of this study or this researcher to do so. The data unearthed by this study shows that the very same respondents who hope for an eventual positive outcome for Nigeria from engagement with China are also aware and outspoken about the negative aspects of engagement with China and its current and potential threats. Future scholarship into the details of China's current engagement with Nigeria, with the data collected will demonstrate that as with all economic relationships there are gains and losses and China in Nigeria is no different.

Concerns might also be raised about being able to tell when interviewees were telling the truth as opposed to when they were feeding lines to the researcher. Especially in the case of government officials, common sense would dictate that when asked why Nigeria engages with China, they would respond that it was because it was good for Nigeria to engage with China. Such a response would be politically appropriate and can be considered self-preserving because it is a response that wouldn't jeopardize their jobs



and offices. In addition, when considering the issue of inherent and systematic corruption in the government, it is logical to assume that corrupt government officials would immediately resort to feeding political spin, soft non-specific responses to the questions posed. While there were some instances when government officials were not informative or accommodating, they usually made it obvious by rushing through or denying interviews outright, but such situations were rare. By and large, over the course of this particular study, the government officials were forthcoming and provided in-depth answers, offering anecdotes and special examples to illustrate their arguments. Responses to questions were thoughtful, earnest and specific enough to be controversial. In many instances respondents gave in to their convictions, speaking passionately, at times seemingly with no concern for political or diplomatic finesse or tact. Interviewing many government officials across different ministries, and at varying levels, from the policy experts on the lower end of the power structure to the department directors and then political figureheads (politicians), as well as laypeople helped limit the influence of bias and propaganda in the findings of this study. Incorporating views across different spheres of Nigerian society and triangulating their responses helped preserve the accuracy of this study.

It is also necessary to note that most of the participants interviewed for this study were male. It is difficult to say definitively what sort of an influence that would have on the findings of this study but it is important to admit that this is an area where there is limited perspective being offered. General political science beliefs in the feminist tradition hold the view that a female perspective might afford a different lens for

examining an issue and may bring to light other phenomena that might not have been identified by a male perspective (Ring, 1987). Future research would need to take particular care to identify and interview women who engage with China, either in the capacity of government or business and perhaps otherwise. This supports the general argument of verification process and quality control efforts that the triangulation of information received, would result in the development of the most accurate codes and findings that tell the true story of the phenomena being studied and provide a reliable picture of Chinese and Nigerian relations and Nigerian intentions in this interaction.

Other un-represented or inadequately represented groups include state level government officials, Nigerian consumers, non-governmental organizations (such as human rights activists), young professionals<sup>119</sup> and rural Nigerians. Although this research did make a conscious effort to interview many different people across different socio-economic profiles and industries to get a better grasp of China-Nigeria relations and to understand Nigeria's current China policy, future studies into Nigeria China relations can benefit from expanding the diversity of perspectives. This study is a step in the right direction but there is still more that needs to be done. Future scholarship in this area needs to conduct case studies of other African countries to understand better China-Africa relations and to establish organized information that can be used in comparing Chinese engagement across African countries to compile a more accurate composite and comprehensive picture of China in Africa that is supported by empirical evidence.

---

<sup>119</sup> Most people interviewed fit an older age demographic, very few if any were less than 30 years old. The research protocol did not request biological information, like age.

## **Future Research**

A perspective not adequately addressed by current literature is the position that growing Sino-African relations can be viewed as political and economic interdependency as a result of China's push to establish a new international economic regime that dilutes the influence of the West (particularly the U.S.) in the world market. The Chinese have taken strategic steps to attract African states and have been successful in persuading them to collude not only in dyadic arrangements but at the international institutional level. China's currying the favor of African states has afforded it some additional maneuverability at the United Nations. Africans have expressed a desire to emulate China's quick road to development; Western industrialization has taken longer to implement, and time is not something that most African states can afford to squander, especially in the light of the dire state of current conditions in Africa. Mugabe's reference to a "Look East Policy" is perhaps the most popular of many explicit examples of African state actors' intentions to imitate the Chinese. Undoubtedly, increasing use of terms like 'South-South Solidarity', 'mutual development and cooperation', and the identifiable relations of China and African states has fostered affinity between the two sides.

It is possible that China is attempting to create a new international economic regime on the foundations of an interdependent relationship, as opposed to the dependent relationship traditionally formed with African states. This argument builds upon the initial arguments presented by Carmody and Owusu, who maintained that China and the U.S. have engaged in geopolitical competition over Africa and its resources with different end games in sight (2007). While making comparatively limited references to U.S. objectives in Africa, the authors propose that China is endeavoring to use African states

to reset the processes of the global economic system. They argue that Chinese short-term stratagem intends to meet the needs of the growing domestic industry as well as the demands of an increasingly materialistic (daresay capitalist) Chinese consumer base. Simultaneously, Chinese long-term stratagem is to advance the industrial capacity of African states to secure a secondary, comprehensive supply for leaner times when Chinese industry fails to meet domestic consumer demands. This evidence of this strategy is apparent in China's significant investment in infrastructure in African states (Mutukwa, 1977; Alden, 2007).

With the end of the Cold War and current U.S. involvement in two expensive wars, China's influence is growing as the Chinese economy flourishes. Lumumba-Kasongo claims that uncertainty is growing at the global level, and theories applied to international relations fall short of addressing current events in general, and in particular, Africa's demand for global change (1999). With increasing globalization, the nature of relations between states is shifting. Advances in communications and information technology are changing the face of international relations. Chinese efforts to establish a new economic and geo-political regime clearly indicate a need to diminish uncertainty. International regimes are useful for reducing uncertainty, minimizing transaction costs and preventing market failures (Keohane, 1984).

Future research can explore the position that Chinese-African relations are developing as a result of mutual vulnerability and a growing interdependence. As defined by Waltz, "interdependence" describes a condition in which anything that happens anywhere in the world may affect somebody, or everybody, elsewhere" (Waltz 1979, 139). Additionally, Chinese development of an interdependent relationship with Africa

fits the neoliberal institutionalism literature on interdependence. According to Keohane and Nye (1977), interdependence poses a situation in world politics where reciprocal effects occur among actors from different countries. Growing Sino-African relations can be examined using Keohane and Nye's characterization of a complex interdependent relationship.

Special attention needs to be paid to the role of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Forum as the platform for multi-level, multi-focus China-African relations. FOCAC is taking on the appearance of an international institution; it is more than a formal organization. Institutions affect state behavior and international institutions and regimes facilitate cooperation between sovereign power-seeking states (Keohane, 1984). FOCAC has and continues to serve as a facilitator of Sino-Africa relations. The amalgamation of individual and collective interests has allowed for the development of an international institution in FOCAC and an international regime made up of China and African states. The platforms FOCAC establishes and the role it plays in promoting partnerships between African and Chinese entities occur at all levels--from individual market traders to government representatives and agencies. As African and Chinese interests continue to converge and complement each other, collaboration in an international regime can help promote and protect these interests in the global arena.

China, through FOCAC and its African foreign relations, may be attempting to develop a new international economic regime. Collusion between African elites and China through the development of an international regime affords all parties the opportunity to achieve objectives that would be out of reach without the cooperation of other states in an international regime. As Chinese ideology is not always in tune with

that of the U.S., the current hegemon and general Western ideologies, it makes sense that China would seek out the support of African states and other developing countries to establish an international political economy well suited to its particular interests and accommodating of Chinese ideologies (Keohane, 1964; Carmody and Owusu, 2007). Just as there is significant focus on the Chinese perspective of this relationship it is also important that future studies continue to examine in great detail the role of African states in order to more accurately identify the global implications of this growing engagement.

Current literature on Sino-African relations, as well as this study has demonstrated the need to pursue further systematic research into this iteration of international relations. This study has only begun to scratch the surface of Nigeria-China relations. There remain another 51 countries in Africa, most of whom have relations with China that have yet to thoroughly investigated. Undoubtedly China is Africa to stay and African states are not only permissive but are also actively engaging the Chinese. It remains to be seen whether African states will adequately manage this new relationship to maximize on the benefits that the Chinese opportunity presents.

## References

- 
- Abdul, Mimiatsu. 2011. "Ajaokuta by Popular Demand." *Daily Trust Newspaper*. November 21. Accessed on-line January 20, 2012  
[<http://allafrica.com/stories/201111210926.html>]
- Abiodun, Eromosele. 2011. "Nigeria, Others Identified As Having Growth Prospects". *This Day Newspaper*. March 9.
- Ademola, Oyejide Titiloye, Abiodun S Bankole & Adeolu O Adewuyi. 2009. "China—Africa Trade Relations: Insights from AERC Scoping Studies." *European Journal of Development Research*. 21 (4): pp. 485-505.
- African Oil Policy Initiative Group. 2001. *African oil: a Priority for U.S. National Security and African Development*. Institute for Advanced Strategic and Policy Studies.
- Afrobarometer. 2008. Round 4-- dataset
- Agba, George and Hamzat Baba. 2011. "We've Not Given up on Industrialisation - Jonathan." *Leadership Newspaper*. November 29. Accessed on-line January 20, 2012 [<http://allafrica.com/stories/201111290646.html>]
- Ajakaiye, Olusanya. 2006. "China and Africa - Opportunities and Challenges." Presented at the African Union Task Force on Strategic Partnership Between Africa and the Emerging Countries of the South.

- Ajakaiye, Olusanya and Raphael Kaplinsky. 2009. "China in Africa: A Relationship in Transition." *European Journal of Development Research*. 21 (4): pp.479-484.
- Akinrade, Sola and Olukoya Ogen. 2008. "Globalization and De-Industrialization: South-South Neo-Liberalism and the Collapse of the Nigerian Textile Industry." *The Global South*. 2 (2): pp. 159-170.
- Alden, Chris. 2005. "China in Africa". *Survival*. 47(3): pp. 147–64.
- Alden, Chris. 2007. *China in Africa*. Zed Books: London
- Alden, Chris, Daniel Large, and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira. 2008. *China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace*. Columbia University Press: New York.
- Alden, Chris, Daniel Large, and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira. 2008b. "China Returns to Africa: Anatomy of an Expansive Engagement." Real Instituto Elcano, Working Paper 51/2008.
- Alike, Ejiofor. 2011. "Oil Revenue - Nation Joins EITI Compliant Countries". *This Day Newspaper*. March 8.
- Almond, Gabriel A. 1990. *A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Alves, Ana Cristina. 2008. "Chinese Economic Diplomacy in Africa: the Lusophone Strategy." In *China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace*, ed. Chris Alden, Daniel Large, and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, 69-82. Columbia University Press: New York.



Amanze-Nwachuku, Chika. 2011. "FG Begins Online Monitoring of Crude Production".  
*This Day Newspaper*. March 8.

Amin, Samir. 1974. "Accumulation and Development: A Theoretical Model." Review of  
 African Political Economy. 1(1): pp. 9-26.

Ancharaz, Vinaye. 2009. "David V. Goliath: Mauritius Facing Up to China." *European  
 Journal of Development Research*. 21 (4): pp.622-643.

Ash, Lucy. 2007. "China in Africa: Taking Jobs." BBC News.  
 <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7047127.stm>> accessed 06/21/11.

Askouri, Ali. 2007. "China's investment in Sudan: displacing villages and destroying  
 communities." In *African Perspectives on China in Africa*, ed. Firoze Manji and  
 Stephen Marks, 71-86. Fahamu: Nairobi and Oxford.

Baker, Kathleen and Richard Edmonds. 2004. "Transfer of Taiwanese Ideas and  
 Technology to The Gambia, West Africa: A Viable Approach to Rural  
 Development?" *The Geographical Journal*. 170(3): pp. 189-211.

Bate, Roger and Tom Woods. 2010. "'Made in India,' Faked in China." *The American  
 On-line Magazine*. December 4. Accessed On-line November 20, 2011  
 from[[http://www.american.com/archive/2010/december/made-in-india-faked-in-  
 china](http://www.american.com/archive/2010/december/made-in-india-faked-in-china)].

BBC News. 2002. "Zambia 'Ignored Science' over GM." BBC News. October 31.  
 <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2376505.stm>> Accessed 06/21/11.

- BBC News. 2006a. "Zimbabwe signs China energy deal." BBC News. June 12.  
<<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5071824.stm>> Accessed 06/20/11.
- BBC News. 2006b. "Mbeki warns on China-Africa ties." BBC News. December 14.  
<<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6178897.stm>> Accessed 06/21/11.
- BBC News. 2008. "China Steps Up African Investment." BBC News.  
<<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7362435.stm>> Accessed 06/21/11.
- Behar, Barry. 2010. "Zambia Uneasily Balances Chinese Investment and Workers' Resentment." *New York Times*. November 20.
- Becker, Antoaneta. 2011. "China Begins to Look Away from Africa." *Financial Nigeria*. 3(7): pp. 36-37.
- Behar, Richard. 2008. "China Storms Africa." *Fast Company*. June 1. Accessed On-Line at [<http://www.fastcompany.com/chinastormsafrica>].
- Bello, Usman A. 2011. "Minister Tasks Chinese Investors in Agriculture Sector". *Daily Trust Newspaper*. February 24.
- Bernstein, Henry. 1971. "Modernization Theory and the Sociological Study of Development." *Journal of Development Studies*. 7(2): pp. 141-160.
- Blenford, Adam. 2007. "China in Africa: Friend or Foe." BBC News.  
<<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7086777.stm>> Accessed 06/21/2011.
- Bond, Patrick. 2006. *Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation*. Zed Books: London.

- Booth, David. 1975. "Andre Gunder Frank: An Introduction and Appreciation." In *Beyond the Sociology of Development: Economy and Society in Latin America and Africa*, eds. I. Oxaal, T. Barnett and D. Booth. London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Bosch, Gerald R., Jr. 1997. "Eric Williams and the Moral Rhetoric of Dependency Theory." *Callaloo* 20 (4): pp. 817-827.
- Bräutigam, Deborah. 2003. "Close Encounters: Chinese Business networks as Industrial catalysts in Sub-Saharan Africa." *African Affairs*. 102: pp. 477-467.
- Bräutigam, Deborah. 2009. *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa*. Oxford University Press: New York.
- Bräutigam, Deborah. 2011. "China in Africa: Seven Myths." *Analysis of the Real Elcano Institute*. ARI 23/2011: pp. 1-7.
- Bräutigam, Deborah & Tang Xiaoyang. 2009. "China's Agricultural Engagement in Africa: 'Going Down to the Countryside'." *China Quarterly*. 199: pp. 686-706.
- Bristow, Michael. 2007. "Chinese migrants are following in the footsteps of European settlers, by seeking their fortunes in Africa." BBC News.  
<<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7118941.stm>> Accessed 06/21/11.
- Broadman, Harry G. 2007. *Africa's Silk Road: China and India's New Economic Frontier*. Washington DC: The World Bank.

Brookes, Peter. 2007. "Into Africa: China's Grab for Influence and Oil." *Heritage*

*Lectures*. No. 1006. Accessed On-Line at

[[www.heritage.org/research/Africa/hl1006.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/research/Africa/hl1006.cfm)], June 21, 2011.

Brown and Sriram. 2008. "China's Role in Humans Rights Abuses in Africa." In *China*

*into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence*, ed. Robert Rotberg. Brookings Institution

Press: Washington, DC, pp. 250-271.

Buckley, Peter J., L. Jeremy Clegg, Adam R. Cross, Xin Liu, Hinrich Voss and Ping

Zheng. 2007. "The Deterinants of Chinese Outwards Foreign Direct Investment."

*Journal of International Business Studies*. 38: pp. 499-518.

Calderon, Cesar & Serven, Luis, 2004. "The effects of infrastructure development on

growth and income distribution." Policy Research Working Paper Series 3400.

The World Bank. [http://www-](http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSCContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/09/21/000012009_20040921105044/Rendered/PDF/WPS3400.pdf)

[wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSCContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/09/21/000012009](http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSCContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/09/21/000012009_20040921105044/Rendered/PDF/WPS3400.pdf)

[\\_20040921105044/Rendered/PDF/WPS3400.pdf](http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSCContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/09/21/000012009_20040921105044/Rendered/PDF/WPS3400.pdf) (accessed March 18, 2011).

Campbell, Horace. 2007. "China in Africa: Challenging US Global Hegemony." In

*African Perspectives on China in Africa*, ed. Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks,

119-138. Fahamu: Nairobi and Oxford.

Caporaso, James. 1993. "Global Political Economy." In *Political Science: The State of*

*the Discipline II*, ed. Ada W. Finifter. APSA pp. 451-481.

- Cardoso, Fernando Henrique. 1973. "Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications." In Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future*. Yale University Press: New Haven.
- Cardoso, Fenrnando Henrique. 1972. "Dependent Capitalist Development in Latin America," *New Left Review*. Vol. 74.
- Carmody, Pádraig. 2007. *Neoliberalism, Civil Society and Security in Africa*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Carmody, Pádraig, and Francis Owusu. 2007. "Competing Hegemons? Chinese versus American Geo-Economic Strategies in Africa". *Political Geography*. 26: pp. 504-524.
- Carroll, Rory. 2006. China's goldmine. *The Guardian*. <<http://www.guardian.co.uk>> Accessed 06-20-11. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2006/mar/28/china.g2>
- Chabal, Patrick and Jean-Pascal Daloz. 1999. *Africa Works: Disorder As Political Instrument*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Chama, Brian. 2010. "Economic Development at the Cost of Human Rights: China Nonferrous Metal Industry in Zambia." *Human Rights Brief*. 17(2): pp. 2-7
- Chan-Fishel, Michelle. 2007. "Environmental Impact: More of the Same?" In *African Perspectives on China in Africa*, ed. Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks, 139-152. Fahamu: Nairobi and Oxford.

Channels TV. 2012. "CBN Reveals 2011 Subsidy Payments Increased to N1.7 Trillion."

Channels Television. January 24. Accessed online

([http://www.channelstv.com/global/news\\_details.php?nid=31182&cat=Local](http://www.channelstv.com/global/news_details.php?nid=31182&cat=Local))

Chauvet, Lisa and Paul Collier. 2006. "Helping Hand? Aid to Failing States." Working Papers DT/2006/14, DIAL (Développement, Institutions & Analyses de Long terme).

Chen, Shirong. 2010. "China defends Africa economic and trade role." BBC News.

<<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12069624>> Accessed 06/21/11.

Chidaushe, Moreblessings. 2007. "China's grand re-entrance into Africa – mirage or oasis?" In *African Perspectives on China in Africa*, ed. Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks, 107-118. Fahamu: Nairobi and Oxford.

Chilcote, Ronald H. 1978. "A Question of Dependency." *Latin American Research Review*. 13 (2) : pp. 55-68.

Ching, Frank. 2005. "Cosy Ties, but China Needs to Do More for Africa." *Business Times*. July 13.

Chittick, Neville. 1975. "Reviewed work(s): China and Africa in the Middle Ages by Teobaldo Files; David L Morison". *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*. Vol. 8 (Supplements A &): pp. 1-3.

Chittick, Neville and Robert Rotberg. 1975. *East Africa and the Orient*. Holmes and Meier Publishers: New York.

- Christopher, A.J. 1985. "Patterns of British Overseas Investment in Land, 1885-1913." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*. 10(4): pp. 452-466.
- Chua, Amy. 2003. *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability*. Doubleday: New York.
- Clapham, Christopher. 2005. Introduction. *International Affairs*. 81(2): pp.275-279.
- Collier, Paul. 2007. "Poverty Reduction in Africa." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*. 104(43): pp. 16763-16768.
- Cooley, John K. 1965. *East Wind Over Africa: Red China's African Offensive*. Walker and Company: New York.
- Cossou, Egon. 2011. "China-Africa trade set to keep on booming in 2011." BBC News. <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12098204>> Accessed 06/21/11.
- Cotula, Lorenzo & Sonja Vermeulen. 2009. "Deal or no deal: the outlook for agricultural land investment in Africa." *International Affairs*. 85 (6): pp. 1233-1247
- Cox, Robert W. and H. K. Jacobson. 1974. "IGOs and World Economic Policy in the Perspective of Dependency Relationships." Paper prepared for delivery at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science association, Palmer House, Chicago, Illinois, August 19-September 2.
- Creswell, John W. 2007. *Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

- Creswell, John W. 2002. *Educational research: Planning, conducting, and evaluating quantitative and qualitative approaches to research*. Upper Saddle River: Merrill/Pearson Education.
- Crilly, Rob. 2005. What are the politics behind China's race to develop Sudan? *Irish Times*. November 24.  
<<http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2005/1124/1132330246339.html>>  
Accessed 06/20/11.
- Cuervo-Cazurra, Alvaro. 2006. "Who cares About Corruption?" *Journal of International Business Studies*. 37(6): pp. 807-822.
- Datta, Jyothi. 2010. "Chinese-origin "Made in India" Fake Medicines Seized in Nigeria." *The Hindu Business Line Newspaper*. July 23. Accessed on-line 11/20/11 from [<http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/todays-paper/article999248.ece>].
- Daily Champion. 2011. "China to Benefit from Gov't LNG". *Daily Champion Newspaper*. March 2.
- Davies, Penny. 2007. *China and the End of Poverty in Africa— Towards Mutual Benefit?*. Diakonia: Sweden.
- Dean, Judith, K.C. Fung, and Zhi Wang. 2007. "Measuring the Vertical Specialization in Chinese Trade." U.S. International Trade Commission, Office of Economics Working Paper No. 2007-01-A. January. Accessed on-line 12/11/12 from [[http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/working\\_papers/ec200701a.pdf](http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/working_papers/ec200701a.pdf)].



- Dingwerth, Klaus. 2008. "Private Transnational Governance and the Developing World: A Comparative Perspective." *International Studies Quarterly*. 52: 607-634.
- Dixon, Robyn. 2006. Africans lash out at Chinese employers. *Los Angeles Times*. <  
<http://articles.latimes.com/2006/oct/06/world/fg-chizambia6>>. October 6.  
 Accessed 06/20/11.
- Dos Santos, Theotonio. 1970. "The Structure of Dependence." *The American Economic Review*. 60 (2): pp. 231-236.
- Dos Santos, Theotonio. "The Structure of Dependence." In *Readings in U.S. Imperialism*, eds. K.T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges. Boston: Porter Sargent, 1971, p. 226)
- Dos Santos, Theotonio. 1973. "The Crisis of Dependency Theory and the Problem of Dependence in Latin America." In *Underdevelopment and Development: The Third World Today*, ed. Henry Bernstein. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin.
- Duvall, Raymond D. 1978. "Dependence and Dependencia Theory: Notes Toward Precision of Concept and Argument." *International Organization*. 32 (1): pp. 51-78.
- Duyvendak, J.J.L. 1949. *China's Discovery of Africa*. Probsthain: London.
- Easterly, William. 2009. "Can the West Save Africa?" *Journal of Economic Literature*. 47(2): pp.373-447.
- Easterly, William. 2006. *The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good*. New York: The Penguin Press.

- Efande, Peter. 2003. China cancels Africa's debts. *The Tribune*. December 17  
 <[www.afrika.no/Detailed/4541.html](http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/4541.html)> Accessed 06/20/11.
- Ellis, R. Evan. 2005. *U.S. National security implications of Chinese involvement in Latin America*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.
- Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 2011.  
 "Chinese, Nigerian Leaders Exchange Congratulatory Messages on the 40th  
 Anniversary of Diplomatic Ties." February 10. Accessed On-Line 12-15-11  
 [<http://ng.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t793673.htm>]
- Evans, Peter. 1979. *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local Capital in Brazil*. Princeton University press; Princeton.
- Ezigbo, Onyebuchi. 2005. "Nigeria-China Sign \$800 million Crude Oil Sale  
 Agreement." *This Day*. July 11.  
 <<http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200507111391.html>>.
- Fagen, Richard R. 1977. "Studying Latin American Politics: Some Implications of a  
 Dependencia Approach." *Latin American Research Review*. 12(2): pp. 3-26.
- Fann, K.T. and Donald Hodges. 1971. *Readings in U.S. Imperialism*. Porter Sargent:  
 Boston.
- Farzad, Roben. 2007. "Can Greed Save Africa?" *Business Week*. December 10, (4062):  
 46-54.

- Ferraro, Vincent. 1996. "Dependency Theory: An Introduction." Paper presented at Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, MA. July 1996. Accessed On-Line at [http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/depend.htm]
- Filesi, Teobaldo. 1972. *China and Africa in the Middle Ages*. Translated (from the Italian) by David L. Morrison. Frank Cass: London.
- FOCAC. 2004a. "Characteristics of FOCAC." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at [http://www.focac.org/eng/lttda/ltjj/t157576.htm]
- FOCAC. 2004b. "The Creation of FOCAC." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at [http://www.focac.org/eng/lttda/ltjj/t157569.htm]
- FOCAC. 2004c. "The First Ministerial Conference of FOCAC." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at [http://www.focac.org/eng/lttda/dyjbzjhy/CI12009/t157577.htm]
- FOCAC. 2004d. "Two Major Agenda Items of the Conference." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at [http://www.focac.org/eng/lttda/dyjbzjhy/CI12009/t157578.htm]
- FOCAC. 2004e. "Workshops of the First Ministerial Conference." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at [http://www.focac.org/eng/lttda/dyjbzjhy/CI12009/t157579.htm]
- FOCAC. 2004f. "The Implementation of the Follow-up Actions of the First Ministerial Conference of FOCAC." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at [http://www.focac.org/eng/lttda/dejbzjhy/FA22009/t157587.htm]

FOCAC. 2004g. "Theme of the Second Ministerial Conference." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at

[<http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dejbzjhy/CI22009/t157582.htm>]

FOCAC. 2004h. "China-Africa Business Conference." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at

[<http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dejbzjhy/CI22009/t157586.htm>]

FOCAC. 2004i. "Remarks by Honorable Haile~Kiros Gessesse Special Envoy of Ethiopia on China~Africa Cooperation Forum at the Opening Ceremony of the 4th Senior." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at

[<http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dejbzjhy/FA22009/t207966.htm>]

FOCAC. 2004j. "Follow-up Actions of the Second Ministerial Conference." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at

[<http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dejbzjhy/FA22009/t157588.htm>]

FOCAC. 2004k. "Forum on China-Africa Cooperation-Addis Ababa Action Plan." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at

[<http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dejbzjhy/DOC22009/t606801.htm>]

FOCAC. 2005a. "China Granting Tariff-free Treatment to Some Goods Exported to China by the Least Developed Countries." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at

[<http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dejbzjhy/FA22009/t181106.htm>]

- FOCAC. 2006a. "Declaration of the Beijing Summit Of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at [<http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dscbjhy/DOC32009/t606841.htm>]
- FOCAC. 2006b. "Address by Hu Jintao President of the People's Republic of China at the Opening Ceremony of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at [<http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dscbjhy/SP32009/t606840.htm>]
- FOCAC. 2006c. "Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009)." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at [<http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dscbjhy/DOC32009/t280369.htm>]
- FOCAC. 2008. "Implementation of Follow-up Actions of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at [<http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dscbjhy/FA32009/t459449.htm>]
- FOCAC. 2009a. "Promoting African-Chinese Cooperation Essential For Both Sides: Egyptian PM." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at [<http://www.focac.org/eng/dsfbzjhy/t625621.htm>]
- FOCAC. 2009b. "The Fourth Ministerial Conference of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC) Opens." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at [<http://www.focac.org/eng/dsfbzjhy/t625618.htm>]

- FOCAC. 2009c. "New Measures Stress More On Improving Africans' Living Standard: Chinese Premier." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at [<http://www.focac.org/eng/dsjbjhy/t625627.htm>]
- FOCAC. 2009d. "Egyptian President Mubarak put forward ten principles of Africa-China cooperation." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at [<http://www.focac.org/eng/dsjbjhy/t633221.htm>]
- FOCAC. 2009e. "Forum On China-Africa Cooperation Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012)." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at [<http://www.focac.org/eng/dsjbjhy/hywj/t626387.htm>]
- FOCAC. 2009f. "China has cancelled 150 mature debts of 32 African countries." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at [<http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dscbjhy/FA32009/t623384.htm>]
- FOCAC. 2009g. "Implementation of the Follow-up Actions of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at [<http://www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dscbjhy/FA32009/t627504.htm>]
- Frank, Andre Gunder. 1969. *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution? Essays on the Development of Underdevelopment and the Immediate Enemy*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Frank, Andre Gunder. 1975. *On Capitalist Underdevelopment*. Bombay: Oxford University Press.

- French, Howard. 2004. "China in Africa: All Trade and No Political Baggage." *New York Times*. August 8  
 <<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/08/international/asia/08china.html>> accessed 06/20/11.
- Gadzala, Aleksandra and Marek Hanusch. 2010. "African Perspectives on China-Africa: Gauging Popular Perceptions and Their Economic and Political Determinants." *Afrobarometer*.
- Games, Dianna. 2005. "Chinese the New Imperialists in Africa." *Business Day*. February 21, 2005. <<http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200502210104.html>>
- Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Giovannetti, Giorgia and Marco Sanfilippo. 2009. "Do Chinese Exports Crowd-out African Goods? An Econometric Analysis by Country and Sector." *European Journal of Development Research*. 21 (4): pp. 506-530.
- Gleave, M. B. and W. B. Morgan. 2001. "Economic Development in Tropical Africa from a Geographical Perspective: A Comparative Study of African Economies." *The Geographical Journal*. 167(2): pp.139-162.
- Goldstein, A., N. Pinaud, H. Reisen and X. Chen. 2006. *China and India : what's in it for Africa?*. Paris :OECD Development Centre Studies.
- Gore, Charles. 2000. "The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries." *World Development*. 28(5): pp.789-804.

- Guerrero, Dorothy. 2006. "China: beyond the growth figures". *The Globalist*. 21 February. Accessed On-Line at:  
[<http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=5095>].
- Gu, Jing. 2009. "China's Private Enterprises in Africa and the Implications for African Development." *European Journal of Development Research*. 21 (4): pp.570-587.
- Gu, Jing and John Humphrey. 2006. The Impact of Africa on China. AERC Working Paper. Accessed on-line, 3/14/2012.  
<http://www.aercafrica.org/publications/item.asp?itemid=335>
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2005. "Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression." *International Organization*. 59(3): pp.593-629.
- Hall, Wendy. 2006. "South Africa: China's cutting exports to SA lauded." *Business Day Newspaper*. January 23.
- Hamisu, Muhammed. 2011. "NCDMB, Chinese Firm Seal Pact On Pipe Mill". *Daily Trust Newspaper*. February 11.
- Harding, Timothy. 1976. "Dependency, Nationalism and the State in Latin America." *Latin American Perspectives*. 3(4): pp.3-11.
- Hawksley, Humphrey. 2010. "UK seeks China aid partnership in Africa." BBC News.  
<<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11444441>>. Accessed 06/21/11.
- Hearn, J. 2000. "Aiding democracy? Donors and civil society in South Africa." *Third World Quarterly*. 21(5):pp. 815-830.



Henriot, Peter. 2010. "Should Zambia Accept GMO." *The Post Newspaper*. May 18.

<[http://www.postzambia.com/post-read\\_article.php?articleId=9313](http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=9313)> Accessed 06/21/11.

Hevi, Emmanuel J. 1963. *An African Student in China*. Praeger Publishers: New York.

Hevi, Emmanuel J. 1966. *The Dragon's Embrace: The Chinese Communists and Africa*.

Praeger Publishers: New York.

Hilsum, Lindsey. 2006. "We love China." *Granta*. 92.

<<http://www.granta.com/Magazine/92/We-Love-China>> Accessed 06/20/11.

Hongwei, Zhang. 2010. "China not Neocolonilist." *China Daily*. November 16: pp. 8

<<http://www.chinese-embassy.org.za/eng/zfgx/zgyfzgx/t775025.htm>> Accessed 06/21/2011

Hope, Kempe Ronald. 2002. "From Crisis to Renewal: Towards a Successful

Implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development." *African Affairs*. 101 (404): pp.387-402.

Hutchison, Alan. 1975. *China's African Revolution*. Hutchinson & Co.: London

Ikejiaku, Brian-Vincent. 2008. "Africa Debt Crisis and the IMF with a Case of Nigeria:

towards Theoretical Explanations." *Journal of Politics and Law*. 1(4): pp. 2-8.

International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA).

2004. "Counterfeit Drugs: A Global Health Risk." *Geneva Pharma Forum*.

February 4.

International Trade Centre. 2012. <http://www.intracen.org/country/nigeria/#>

Inyang, Bassey. 2011. "Imoke Woos Chinese Investors". *Daily Independent Newspaper*.  
February 28.

Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2009. *Emerging States: The Wellspring of a New World Order*.  
Translated (from the French) by Cynthia Schoch. Columbia University Press:  
New York.

James, Jeffrey. 2002. *Technology, globalization and poverty*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Jamieson, Dale. 2005. "Duties to the Distant: Aid, Assistance and Intervention in the  
Developing World." *The Journal of Ethics*. 9(1/2): pp. 151-170.

Jenkins, R. & C. Edwards. 2004. *How does China's Growth Affect Poverty Reduction in  
Asia, Africa, and Latin America?* Norwich: University of East Anglia.

Kagan, Robert. 2006. "League of Dictators? Why China and Russia will Continue to  
Support Autocracies. *Washington Post*. 30 April.

Kalu, Kelechi-Amihe. 2000. *Economic Development and Nigerian Foreign Policy*.  
Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.

Kapoor, K. 1995. "Africa's Experience with Structural Adjustment. Proceedings of the  
Harare Seminar, May 23-24, 1994." *World Bank - Discussion Papers* 288. World  
Bank.

Kaswende, Kingsley. 2005 "Copper Prices Continue to Rise." *The Post* . June 8, 2005.  
<<http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200506080487.html>> Accessed 06/19/11.

Kaufman, Robert, Harry Chernotsky, and Daniel Geller. 1975. "A Preliminary Test of the  
Theory of Dependency Theory." *Comparative Politics*. 7(3): pp. 303-330.

- Keenan, Patrick. 2009. "Curse or Cure? China, Africa and the Effects of Unconditioned Wealth." *Berkeley Journal of International Law*. 27(1): pp. 83-125.
- Keohane, Robert. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye. 1977. *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- Kim, Samuel S. 1992. "International Organizations in Chinese Foreign Policy." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. 519: pp. 140-157.
- King, Kenneth. 2007. "The Beijing China-Africa Summit of 2006: The New Pledges of Aid to Education in Africa." *China Report*. 43(3): pp. 337-347.
- Large, Daniel. 2008. "China & the Contradictions of 'Non-interference' in Sudan." *Review of African Political Economy*. 35(115): pp. 93-106.
- Larkin, Bruce D. 1971. *China and Africa 1949-1970*. University of California Press: Berkeley.
- Legum, Colin. 1976. "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa." *Foreign Affairs*. 54(4): pp. 745-762.
- Leigh, David. 2005. UK backs oil firm despite bribery inquiry: Halliburton arm gets \$10m DTI loan guarantee. *The Guardian*. June 21  
 <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/jun/21/uk.oil?INTCMP=SRCH>>  
 Accessed 06/20/11.

- Liang, Guixan. 2005. "Perspectives on China-Africa trade and economic cooperation'' presentation by Minister Counsellor Liang Liang at the 4th Tswalu Dialogue, May 9. <<http://www.chinese-embassy.org.za/eng/zfgx/zgyfzgx/t194633.htm>> Accessed 06/20/11.
- Lumumba-Kasongo, Tukumbi. 1999. *The Dynamics of Economic and Political Relations Between Africa and Foreign Powers: A study in International Relations*. Praeger Publishers: Westport, Connecticut.
- Lyman, Princeton. 2005. China's rising role in Africa. Presentation to the US-China commission. <<http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-rising-role-africa/p8436>> Accessed 06/20/11.
- Mabogunje, Akin L. 2007. "Tackling the African 'Poverty Trap': The Ijebu-Ode Experiment." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*. 104(43): pp. 16781-16786.
- Manda, Olga. 2003. "Controversy rages over 'GM' food aid: Zambia, citing health concerns, bars genetically modified grain." *Africa Renewal*. 16(4): pp. 5.
- Manji, Firoze and Stephen Marks. 2007. *African Perspectives on China in Africa*. Fahamu: Nairobi and Oxford.
- Marks, Stephen. 2006. "China in Africa - the new imperialism." Pambuzuka News. 244. <<http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/32432>> Accessed 06/20/11.
- Marks, Stephen. 2007. "Introduction." In *African Perspectives on China in Africa*, ed. Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks, 1-14. Fahamu: Nairobi and Oxford.

- Mengistae, Taye and Catherine Patillo. 2004. "Export Orientation and Productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa." *IMF Staff Papers*. 51(2): pp. 327-353.
- Michel, Serge and Michel Beuret. 2009. *China Safari: On the Trail of Beijing's Expansion in Africa*. Nation Books: New York.
- Ministry of Commerce. 2010. *2008 Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment*. Department of Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation, People's Republic of China.  
<http://hzs2.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/statistic/200909/20090906535723.html#>  
 (accessed November 12, 2010).
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2006. *China's African Policy*. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).  
<http://www.focac.org/eng/zfgx/dfzc/> (Accessed May 18, 2010).
- Mkandawire, Thandika. 2005. The global economic context. In B. Wisner, C. Toulmin, & R. Chitiga (Eds.), *Towards a new map of Africa*. London: Earthscan.
- Mkandawire, Thandika and Charles C. Soludo. 1999. *Our Continent, Our Future: African Perspectives on Structural Adjustment*. Africa World Press Inc.: Trenton, New Jersey.
- Mooney, Paul. 2005. "China's African Safari." *YaleGlobal*. 3 January  
<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/chinas-african-safari> accessed 06/20/11.
- Moore, Malcolm. 2011. "China in Africa at a glance". *The Daily Telegraph* (UK).  
 February 10.v

Morgenthau, Hans. 1948. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*.

New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.

Morris, Julian and Philip Stevens. 2006. *Counterfeit Medicines in Less Developed*

*Countries: Problems and Solutions*. London: International Policy Network.

Accessed on-line November 20, 2011 available at

[<http://www.policynetwork.net/health/publication/counterfeit-medicines-less-developed-countries>]].

Moyo, Dambisa. 2009. *Dead Aid: Why aid is not working and how there is a better way*

*for Africa*. New York: Farrar, Staus and Giroux.

Muekalia, Domingos Jardo. 2004. ' Africa and China's Strategic Partnership', *African*

*Security Review*. 13(1) : pp. 5–11.

Mutukwa, Kasuka S. 1977. *Politics of the Tanzania – Zambia Railproject: A Study of*

*Tanzania – China – Zambia Relations*. University Press of America: Washington DC.

Nagarajan, Rama. 2009. "Chinese Passing off Fake Drugs as 'Made in India.'" *The Times*

*of India*. June 9. Accessed online November 20, 2011 at

[<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/China-passing-off-fake-drugs-as-Made-in-India/articleshow/4633377.cms>]

Nigeria First. 2011. "FG Still Committed to Establishing Viable Steel Industry - President

Jonathan." Nigeria First: Official Website of the State House, Abuja. November

29. Accessed on-line January 20, 2012

[<http://allafrica.com/stories/201111300696.html>]

Nkrumah, Kwame. 1965. *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*. International Publishers: New York.

No Author. 2006. *China's African Policy*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China.

Nyagah, Nelly. 2011. "Nation's Big Bet On Chinese Yuan." *TradeInvest Africa*.  
Retrieved On-Line at [<http://allafrica.com/stories/201109211408.html>].

Nye, Joseph S. 2002. *The paradox of American power: Why the world's only superpower can't go it alone*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Ochigbo, Franca. 2011. "Nigeria's fourth fast growing economy, says World Bank." *The Nation*. December 12. Accessed on-line December 18, 2011[<http://www.thenationonline.net/2011/index.php/business/29453-nigeria%E2%80%99s-fourth-fast-growing-economy,-says-world-bank.html>].

Ogunsanwo, Alaba. 1974. *China's Policy in Africa 1958-71*. Cambridge University Press: London.

Okafor, Chineme. 2011. "Transparency International: NNPC, Seven Others Most Corrupt Oil Companies". *This Day Newspaper*. March 2.

Okoh, Charles. 2011. "Nigeria, China Trade Relations Hit U.S.\$7.5 Billion." *Daily Champion Newspaper*. February 11.

Oyeranti, Olugboyega, Adetunji Babatunde, Olawale Ogunkola, Abiodun Bankole. 2010.

*China-Africa Investment Relations: A Case Study of Nigeria*. African Economic Research Consortium Report. February 2010.

Pan, Esther. 2006. China, Africa and oil. *Council on Foreign Relations*.

<<http://www.cfr.org/china/china-africa-oil/p10586>> Accessed 06/20/11.

PBS News Hour. 2005. "China's big investment." Public Broadcasting Service News Hour with Jim Lehrer. July 5 Newscast.

<[http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/july-dec05/china\\_7-05.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/july-dec05/china_7-05.html)> Accessed 06/20/11.

Pearson, Roger. 1977. *Sino-Soviet Intervention in Africa*. Council on American Affairs: Washington, DC.

People's Daily. 2006. "'Neo-colonialism' fallacy aims to sow discord in Sino-Africa cooperation." *People's Daily Online (China)*. October 20

<[http://english.people.com.cn/200610/30/eng20061030\\_316577.html](http://english.people.com.cn/200610/30/eng20061030_316577.html)> Accessed 06/21/11.

People's Daily. 2011. "Ajaokuta Steel Company Still in the Woods." *People's Daily Newspaper (Nigeria)*. Oct. 31. Accessed On-Line December 19, 2011.

[<http://www.peoplesdaily-online.com/news/special-report/23318-ajaokuta-steel-company-still-in-the-woods>]

Pickles, John and Jeff Woods. 1989. "Taiwanese Investment in South Africa." *African Affairs*. 88(353): pp. 507-528.



- Pieterse, Jan Nederveen. 1996. "The Development of Development Theory: Towards Critical Globalism." *Review of International Political Economy*. 3(4): pp. 541-564.
- Prebisch, Raúl. 1950. *The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems*. New York: United Nations.
- Ran, Dan. 2011. "China, Africa Strengthening Cooperation in Global Affairs: Chinese envoy." *Xinhua News*. Jan 29. Accessed On-line 09/21/10 at [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-01/29/c\_13712711.htm].
- Reynolds, James. 2007. "China in Africa: Developing Ties." BBC News. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6264476.stm> Accessed 06/21/11.
- ROAPE. 1974. "Editorial." *Review of African Political Economy*. 1(1): pp. 1-8.
- Rodrik, Dani. 2006. "'Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank's Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform.'" *Journal of Economic Literature*. 44(4): pp. 973-987.
- Rotberg, Robert. 2008. *China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence*. Brookings Institution Press: Washington, DC.
- Saasa, Oliver and Jerker Carlsson. 1996. *The Aid Relationship in Zambia: A Conflict Scenario*. The Institute for African Studies & The Nordic Africa Institute, Gotab: Stockholm, Sweden.
- Sandbrook, Richard. 1993. *The Politics of Africa's Economic Recovery*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Sautman, Barry and Yan Hairong. 2007. "Friends and Interests: China's Distinctive Links with Africa." *African Studies Review*. 50 (3): pp. 75-114.
- Schwarz, E. H. L. 1938. "The Chinese Connections with Africa," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal*. IV.
- Segal, Gerald. 1992. "China and Africa." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. 519: pp. 115-126.
- Servant, Jean-Christophe. 2005. "China's trade safari in Africa". *Le Monde Diplomatique*. <<http://mondediplo.com/2005/05/11chinafrica>> Accessed 06/20/11.
- Shakoor, O., Taylor, R., and Behrens, R. 1997. "Assessment of the incidence of substandard drugs in developing countries." *Tropical Medicine & International Health*. 2(9): pp. 839–845.
- Shehu, Mohammed S. and Usman Bello. 2011. "Jonathan Renews FG's Commitment to Revamp Steel Industry." *Daily Trust Newspaper*. November 29. Accessed on-line January 20, 2012 [<http://allafrica.com/stories/201111290803.html>]
- Shelton, Garth and Farhana Paruk. 2008. *The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation: A Strategic Opportunity*. Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Monograph 156.
- Shen, Chung-Hua and Chien-Chiang Lee. 2006. "Same Financial Development yet Different Economic Growth – Why?" *Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking*. 38(7): pp.1907-1944.

- Shosanya, Mohammed. 2012. "Ajaokuta Steel Complex Can Generate Over 2.5 Million Jobs." *Daily Trust Newspaper*. January 5. Accessed on-line January 20, 2012  
[<http://allafrica.com/stories/201201050467.html>]
- Singer, Peter. 1972. "Famine Affluence and Morality." *Philosophy and Public Affairs*. 1 (3): pp. 229-243.
- Sklar, Richard L. 1983. "Democracy in Africa." *African Studies Review*. 26(3/4): pp. 11-24.
- Sklar, Richard. 1979. "The Nature of Class Domination in Africa." *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. 17 (4): pp. 531-552.
- Smith, Tony. 1981. "The Logic of Dependency Theory Revisited." *International Organization*. 35 (4): pp. 755-761.
- Smith, Tony. 1979. "The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory." *World Politics*. 31(2): pp. 247-288.
- Smith, Kevin and Christopher Larimer. 2009. *The Public Policy Theory Primer*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Snow, Philip. 1989. *The Star Raft : China's encounter with Africa*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Snyder, Francis G. 1980. "Law and Development in the Light of Dependency Theory." *Law & Society Review*. 14 (3): pp. 723-804.
- Stiglitz, Joseph. 1998. "More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving towards the Post-Washington Consensus." WIDER Annual Lectures 2. United Nations University

World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, Finland.

Processed.

Sumner, Andrew. 2005. "Is Foreign Direct Investment Good for the Poor? A Review and Stocktake." *Development in Practice*. 15(3/4): pp. 269-285.

Sunkel, Osvaldo. 1969. "National Development Policy and External Dependence in Latin America." *The Journal of Development Studies*. 6(1): pp. 23-48.

Sweezy, Paul. 1968. *The Theory of Capitalist Development: Principles of Marxian Political Economy*. New York and London: Monthly Review Press.

Taylor, Ian. 1998. "China's foreign policy towards Africa in the 1990s". *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 36(3): pp. 443-60.

Taylor, Ian. 2003. "Globalization and Regionalization in Africa: Reactions to Attempts at Neo-Liberal Regionalism." *Review of International Political Economy*. 10(2): pp. 310-330.

Taylor, Ian. 2004. "The "All-Weather Friend"? Sino-African Interaction in The Twenty-First Century", in Taylor & Williams, eds. *Africa in International Politics*: pp. 83-101.

Taylor, Ian. 2005. *NEPAD: Towards Africa's Development or Another False Start?* Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, Colorado.

Taylor, Ian. 2006. "China's Oil Diplomacy in Africa." *International Affairs*. 82(5): pp. 937-959.

Taylor, Ian. 2007. "Sino-Nigerian Relations: FTZs, Textiles and Oil". *China Brief* -

Jamestown Foundation. 7 (11). Accessed On-Line 2011-12-22.

[[http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=4197&tx\\_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=197&no\\_cache=1](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4197&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=197&no_cache=1)]

Taylor, Ian. 2008. *China's New Role in Africa*. Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, Colorado.

Taylor, Ian. 2011. *The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation*. Routledge: New York, New York.

TerraDaily. 2006. "China given monopoly to work Gabon's untapped iron ore resources." Terradaily.com.

<[http://www.terradaily.com/reports/China\\_given\\_monopoly\\_to\\_work\\_Gabons\\_untapped\\_iron\\_ore\\_resources.html](http://www.terradaily.com/reports/China_given_monopoly_to_work_Gabons_untapped_iron_ore_resources.html)> Accessed 06/21/11.

The Economist. 2005. From accelerator to brake. *The Economist*.

<<http://www.economist.com/node/4488944>> Accessed 06/20/11.

The Economist. 2006. Mining in Zambia: the copper phoenix. *The Economist*.

<<http://www.economist.com/node/6956150>> Accessed 06/20/11.

Thomas, Clive Y. 1974. *Dependence and Transformation: The Economics of the Transition to Socialism*. New York and London: Monthly Review Press.

Thompson, Drew. 2004. "Economic growth and soft power: China's Africa strategy." *China Brief*. 4(2).

<[http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\\_cache=1&tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=3699](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3699)> Accessed 06/20/11.

Thompson, Drew. 2005. "China's soft power in Africa: from the "Beijing Consensus" to health diplomacy". *China Brief*. 5(21): pp. 1-4.

Tull, Denis M. 2006. "China's Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences." *Journal of Modern African Studies*. 44(3): pp. 459-479.

Tull, Denis M. 2008. "The Political Consequences of China's Return to Africa." In *China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace*, ed. Chris Alden, Daniel Large, and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, 112. London: Hurst & Company.

UNFPA. 2011. *State of World Population 2011*. New York: United Nations Population Fund.

United States' Department of State. 2012. "Country profile: Nigeria."

<<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm>> Accessed 5/5/12.

Vengroff, Richard. 1977. "Dependency, Development and Inequality in Black Africa." *African Studies Review*. 20(2): pp. 17-26.

Vengroff, Richard. 1977b. "Dependency and Underdevelopment in Black Africa: an Empirical Test." *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. 15(4): pp. 613-630.

Wang, Mark Yaolin. 2002. "The Motivations behind China's Government-Initiated Industrial Investments Overseas." *Pacific Affairs*. 75 (2): pp. 187-206.

Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. *Theory of International Relations*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

- Wei, Liang-Tsai. 1982. *Peking Versus Taipei in Africa 1960-1978*. The Asia and World Institute: Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China.
- Weinstein, Warren and Thomas H. Henriksen. 1980. *Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations*. Praeger Publishers: New York.
- Weisbrot, Mark. 2011. "2016: when China overtakes the US." *The Guardian Newspaper*. April 27. Accessed On-Line 3/20/12 at [http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/apr/27/china-imf-economy-2016],
- Wheatley, Paul. 1975. "Analecta Sino-Africana Recensa." In *East Africa and the Orient*, Ed. N. Chittick and R. Rotberg. Holmes and Meier Publishers: New York.
- Williams, Sunday. 2011. "Chinese Execute 117 Projects Worth \$2.1 Billion in Nation". *Daily Trust Newspaper*. Feb 24.
- Wong, Gillian. 2012. "Hu: Hostile Forces Seek to Westernize, Split China." *Associated Press*. Jan 3. Accessed On-line 01/03/12 at [http://news.yahoo.com/hu-hostile-forces-seek-westernize-split-china-074248258.html].
- World Trade Atlas. 2011. China-Africa Trade 1995-2009 Dataset.
- Xing, Yuqing and Neal Detert. 2010. "How the iPhone Widens the United States Trade Deficit with the People's Republic of China." Asian Development Bank Institute Working Paper 257. Accessed On-Line 12-11-12 at [http://www.adbi.org/working-paper/2010/12/14/4236.iphone.widens.us.trade.deficit.prc/].

- Xinhua. 2005. "China, Nigeria to Build Strategic Partnership." *Xinhua News Agency*.  
April 15. Retrieved online 12-15-11  
[<http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/125893.htm>]
- Xinhua. 2010. "China unveils proposals for agricultural cooperation with Africa". *Xinhua News Agency*. August 12. Accessed On-Line at  
[[http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-08/12/c\\_13441725.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-08/12/c_13441725.htm)].
- Ya-chun, Chang. 1981. *Chinese Communist Activities in Africa- Policies and Challenges*.
- Yisa, Jamiu. 2011. "China Town Now Ghost Town." *PM News*. June 17. Accessed online  
12/11/11 [<http://pmnewsnigeria.com/2011/06/17/china-town-now-ghost-town/>].
- Yu, George T. 1970. *China and Tanzania: A Study in Cooperative Interaction*. University  
of California Press: Berkeley.
- Yu, George T. 1975. *China's African Policy - A study of Tanzania*. Praeger Publishers:  
New York.
- Yu, George T. 1988. "Africa in Chinese Foreign Policy." *Asian Survey*. 28(8): pp. 849-  
862.
- Zartman, I. William, 1976. "Europe and Africa: Decolonialization or Dependency."  
*Foreign Affairs*. January 1976
- Zhu, Jin. 2010. "China, Africa Forge Farming Ties." *People's Daily Online* (China  
Daily). August 12. Accessed On-Line at  
[<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7101891.html#>]



Zweig, David and Bi Jianhai. 2005. "China's Global Hunt for Energy." *Foreign Affairs*.  
84(5): pp. 25-38.

## APPENDICES

---

		<u>Page</u>
Appendix A	Abbreviations & Acronyms	221
Appendix B	Interview Protocol	223
Appendix C	Informed Consent Form 1	225
Appendix D	Informed Consent Form 2	226
Appendix E	Informed Consent Form 3	227
Appendix F	List of Official Interview Respondents	228
Appendix G	China's Africa Policy Document	235
Appendix H	Egyptian President Mubarak's Ten Principles of Africa-China Cooperation (11/10/2009)	246
Appendix I	Joint Communiqué Between the People's Republic of China and the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Abuja, 15 April 2002)	248
Appendix J	Joint Press Communiqué between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Beijing, 28 February 2008)	251
Appendix K	Programme for China-Africa Co-operation in Economic and Social Development from 1st FOCAC conference 2000/11/17	253
Appendix L	Address by Mr. Olusegun Obasanjo, President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria at the 10th Plenary Meeting of the 54th Session of The United Nations General Assembly, Thursday, 23 September 1999	263

## Appendix A: Abbreviations & Acronyms

---

AERC	African Economic Research Consortium
AfDB	African Development Bank
AU	African Union
BOI	Bank of Industry
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India and China (identified as newly industrialized economies)
CCECC	China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation
CICIR	China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
ECLA	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECP	Emerging Capital Partners
EFCC	Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organization
ITC	International Trade Centre
LCCI	Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals

MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
₦	Naira, Nigerian currency
NAFDAC	National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control
NCBC	Nigeria-China Business Council
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NEXIM	Nigerian Export-Import Bank
NICAF	Nigerian-China Friendship Association
NIIA	Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
NIPC	Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PHCN	Power Holding Company of Nigeria
PRC	People's Republic of China
RMRDC	Raw Materials Research and Development Council
SME	Small and Medium Enterprise
SON	Standards Organization of Nigeria
UN	United Nations
UN	
COMTRADE	United Nations Commodity Trade
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
USD	US Dollars
WTO	World Trade Organization

## Appendix B: Interview Protocol

---

### **Interview Questions for Government Officials**

1. How would you characterize the nature of the relationship between your government and China?
2. Why do you think that China is interested in engaging with your country?
3. In your own words, what have been the effects of Chinese engagement in your country?
4. Why do you think your country is engaging with China?
5. Is there a foreign policy document issued by your government on their interaction with China?
6. What do you think are the objectives being sought by the government and how do you think they can be realized?
7. What has been the result so far? Do you think these objectives been met? Please provide examples.

**Interview Questions for Business and Industry Representatives**

1. As a business and industry representative, why do you think your country is interested in engaging with China?
2. How would you characterize the nature of the relationship between your organization and China? Do you have any trade agreements with Chinese firms?
3. Why is your organization engaging with China?
4. What are the objectives being sought by your organization and how do you plan on realizing them?
5. What has been the result so far? Have these objectives been met? Please provide examples.

**Follow-up Questions added during Fieldwork Period:**

6. What are the unique advantages that engagement with China presents?
7. What are the unique disadvantages of engagement with China?

## Appendix C: Informed Consent Form 1



IRB# 20110111450 EX  
Date Approved: 01/03/2011  
Valid Until: 05/01/2011

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

# INFORMED CONSENT FORM

## Understanding Africa's China Policy

This is a research project that will address the role of African government actors and business leaders in China's recent engagement in Africa. It compares the role, importance and effects of these actors in several case studies. You will be asked questions related to the role played by African governmental institutions and African business leaders in this process. An interview was requested with you because you are an official working for a governmental organization or business firm involved or affected by Chinese engagement in Africa. Participation in this study will require approximately 45-60 minutes of your time and will take place in the participant's office.

There are no known risks or discomforts associated with this research. There are no direct benefits for participation in this research. However, the public (society) may benefit from knowing what directs governmental organizations and business leaders that choose to engage with China. Any information obtained during this study which could identify you will be kept strictly confidential, if you are not willing to release your name. The data will be stored in a locked cabinet in the investigator's office and will only be seen by the investigator during the study and for five years after the study is complete. The information obtained in this study may be published in scientific journals or presented at scientific meetings. You may ask any questions concerning this research and have those questions answered before agreeing to participate in or during the study. Or you may call the investigator at any time, mobile phone, (402) 310-6909. If you have questions concerning your rights as a research subject that have not been answered by the investigator or to report any concerns about the study, you may contact the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Institutional Review Board, telephone (402) 472-6965.

You are free to decide not to participate in this study or to withdraw at any time without adversely affecting adversely affecting your relationship with the investigators, the University of Nebraska, or your employer. Your decision will not result in any loss of benefit to which you are otherwise entitled. You are voluntarily making a decision whether or not to participate in this research study. Your signature certifies that you have decided to participate having read and understood the information presented. Your responses will be treated confidentially unless you waive the right by checking the box below. In that case you will be giving me permission to use your name in reports and publications. You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep.

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Signature of Research Participant*

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Date*

☐ Please check this box if you agree to personal identification within any publication as a result of this research.

**Name and Phone number of investigator(s)**  
*Nkemjika E. Kalu, PhD Student, Principal Investigator*  
*Patrice McMahon, PhD, Secondary Principal Investigator*

*Mobile: +1 (402) 310-6909*  
*Office: (402) 472-3235*

511 Oldfather Hall / P.O. Box 880328 / Lincoln, NE 68588-0328 / USA  
(402) 472-2341 or (402) 472-2343 / FAX (402) 472-8192 / <http://www.unl.edu/polisci/home.html>

## Appendix D: Informed Consent Form 2



IRB# 20110111450 EX  
Date Approved: 02/15/2011  
Valid Until: 05/01/2011

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

# INFORMED CONSENT FORM

## Understanding Africa's China Policy

This is a research project that will address the role of African government actors and business leaders in China's recent engagement in Africa. It compares the role, importance and effects of these actors in several case studies. You will be asked questions related to the role played by African governmental institutions and African business leaders in this process. An interview was requested with you because you are an official working for a governmental organization or business firm involved or affected by Chinese engagement in Africa. Participation in this study will require approximately 45-60 minutes of your time and will take place in the participant's office or by teleconference.

There are no known risks or discomforts associated with this research. There are no direct benefits for participation in this research. However, the public (society) may benefit from knowing what directs governmental organizations and business leaders that choose to engage with China. Any information obtained during this study which could identify you will be kept strictly confidential, if you are not willing to release your name. The data will be stored in a locked cabinet in the investigator's office and will only be seen by the investigator during the study and for five years after the study is complete. The information obtained in this study may be published in scientific journals or presented at scientific meetings. You may ask any questions concerning this research and have those questions answered before agreeing to participate in or during the study. Or you may call the investigator at any time, mobile phone, (402) 310-6909. If you have questions concerning your rights as a research subject that have not been answered by the investigator or to report any concerns about the study, you may contact the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Institutional Review Board, telephone (402) 472-6965.

You are free to decide not to participate in this study or to withdraw at any time without adversely affecting adversely affecting your relationship with the investigator, the University of Nebraska, or your employer. Your decision will not result in any loss of benefit to which you are otherwise entitled. You are voluntarily making a decision whether or not to participate in this research study. Your signature certifies that you have decided to participate having read and understood the information presented. Your responses will be treated confidentially unless you waive the right by checking the box below. In that case you will be giving me permission to use your name in reports and publications. You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep.

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Signature of Research Participant*

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Date*

☐ Please check this box if you agree to personal identification within any publication as a result of this research.

### Name and Phone number of investigator(s)

*Nkemjika E. Kalu, PhD Student, Principal Investigator*  
*Patrice McMahon, PhD, Secondary Principal Investigator*

*Mobile: +1 (402) 310-6909*  
*Office: (402) 472-3235*

511 Oldfather Hall / P.O. Box 880328 / Lincoln, NE 68588-0328 / USA  
(402) 472-2341 or (402) 472-2343 / FAX (402) 472-8192 / <http://www.unl.edu/polisci/home.html>



## Appendix E: Informed Consent Form 3



IRB# 2011011450 EX  
Date Approved: 02/15/2011  
Valid Until: 09/12/2011

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

# INFORMED CONSENT FORM

## Understanding Africa's China Policy

This is a research project that will address the role of African government actors and business leaders in China's recent engagement in Africa. It compares the role, importance and effects of these actors in several case studies. You will be asked questions related to the role played by African governmental institutions and African business leaders in this process. An interview was requested with you because you are an official working for a governmental organization or business firm involved or affected by Chinese engagement in Africa. Participation in this study will require approximately 45-60 minutes of your time and will take place in the participant's office or by teleconference.

There are no known risks or discomforts associated with this research. There are no direct benefits for participation in this research. However, the public (society) may benefit from knowing what directs governmental organizations and business leaders that choose to engage with China. Any information obtained during this study which could identify you will be kept strictly confidential, if you are not willing to release your name. The data will be stored in a locked cabinet in the investigator's office and will only be seen by the investigator during the study and for five years after the study is complete. The information obtained in this study may be published in scientific journals or presented at scientific meetings. You may ask any questions concerning this research and have those questions answered before agreeing to participate in or during the study. Or you may call the investigator at any time, mobile phone, (402) 310-6909. If you have questions concerning your rights as a research subject that have not been answered by the investigator or to report any concerns about the study, you may contact the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Institutional Review Board, telephone (402) 472-6965.

You are free to decide not to participate in this study or to withdraw at any time without adversely affecting adversely affecting your relationship with the investigators, the University of Nebraska, or your employer. Your decision will not result in any loss of benefit to which you are otherwise entitled. You are voluntarily making a decision whether or not to participate in this research study. Your signature certifies that you have decided to participate having read and understood the information presented. Your responses will be treated confidentially unless you waive the right by checking the box below. In that case you will be giving me permission to use your name in reports and publications. You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep.

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Signature of Research Participant*

\_\_\_\_\_  
*Date*

☐ Please check this box if you agree to personal identification within any publication as a result of this research.

### Name and Phone number of investigator(s)

*Nkemjika E. Kalu, PhD Student, Principal Investigator*  
*Patrice McMahon, PhD, Secondary Principal Investigator*

*Mobile: +1 (402) 310-6909*  
*Office: (402) 472-3235*

511 Oldfather Hall / P.O. Box 880328 / Lincoln, NE 68588-0328 / USA  
(402) 472-2341 or (402) 472-2343 / FAX (402) 472-8192 / <http://www.unl.edu/polisci/home.html>

Appendix F: List of Official Interview Respondents

#	Name*	Occupation	Category	Date**
1	Lazarus Yerima	Industrial Engineer & Entrepreneur that works with Chinese manufacturers and suppliers, and also sells Nigerian semi-processed minerals and other products to Chinese purchasers. Also attended a FOCAC conference.	Business	01/06/11
2	Peter Ter	Small Business Owner, IT software and hardware supplier	Business	01/10/11
3	B.D. Lawal	Medium-Large Business owner/Telecommunications Investor	Business	04/05/11
4	Foreign Service Officer	Political Division, Nigerian Embassy Washington DC, (previously assigned to the Nigerian Foreign Service Pacific Division which includes China)	Government	04/06/11
5	Civil Servant	Deputy Director in National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC)	Government	07/12/11
6	Banker	NEXIM (Nigeria Export-Import Bank)	Business	07/13/11
7	Banker	NEXIM (Nigeria Export-Import Bank)	Business	07/13/11
8	Civil Servant	Bilateral Relations & Public Relations officer in National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC)	Government	07/14/11
9	Civil Servant	Policy Specialist, Planning and Policy Analysis division of the Federal Ministry of Science and Technology	Government	07/14/11
10	Civil Servant	Department director in the Federal Ministry of Science and Technology	Government	07/14/11
11	Civil Servant	Associate Director, Policy & Planning Analysis division, Federal Ministry of Science and Technology	Government	07/15/11

#	Name*	Occupation	Category	Date**
12	Civil Servant	Recently retired, prior responsibility in construction and policy-making in housing and urban development	Government	07/16/11
13	Market Trader	Owns 3 shops (down from 10) and employs 8 workers in the open market, and makes 6 trips each year to China, Thailand and Indonesia to buy "mother care" products, and 2 trips per year to USA and United Kingdom. Respondent was approached and interviewed outside the Chinese consulate in Abuja.	Business	07/18/11
14	Chibueze Okereke	Businessman/Contractor interviewed outside the Chinese consulate in Abuja.	Business	07/18/11
15	Market Trader	Textile trader in Wuse Market who buys drapes/curtains from China	Business	07/18/11
16	Market Trader	Kitchen appliance trader in Wuse Market, products sourced from China	Business	07/18/11
17	Civil Servant	Director in Directorate of Technical Co-operation in Africa (DTCA), the Technical Aids Corps (TAC) which sends Nigerian professionals, teachers, doctors, judges, executives etc to volunteer in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries (very similar to the US' Peace Corps).	Government	07/19/11
18	Civil Servant	Bilateral Relations officer in Nigeria Information Service	Government	07/19/11
19	Civil Servant	Bilateral Relations officer in Federal Ministry of Information and Communications	Government	07/19/11
20	Banker	Central Bank of Nigeria (at time of interview was 2 weeks retired from this job)	Business	07/25/11
21	Civil Servant	Bilateral relations desk at the National Planning Commission	Government	07/26/11
22	Market Trader	Men's apparel trader in Wuse Market, travels to China 3 times a year	Business	07/26/11

#	Name*	Occupation	Category	Date**
23	Market Trader	Women's shoes and bags and wares trader in Wuse Market, travels to China 4 times a year. Showed an official invitation to China Import-Export Fair ( <a href="http://www.cantonfair.org.cn">www.cantonfair.org.cn</a> ). Has attended the fair 3 times, and meets Chinese suppliers there.	Business	07/26/11
24	Civil Servant	Director of External Affairs, Federal Ministry of Tourism, Culture and National Orientation	Government	07/27/11
25	Civil Servant	UNESCO office in the Federal Ministry of Tourism, Culture and National Orientation	Government	07/27/11
26	Economist	Former Resident Representative, African Development Bank	Other	07/27/11
27	Economist	Current Resident Representative, African Development Bank	Other	07/27/11
28	Market Trader	Furniture and Office equipment trader in Wuse Market, travelled to China twice, first time in 2010.	Business	07/28/11
29	Market Trader	Travelled once to China, buys instead from Chinatown in Lagos due to recent visa issues	Business	07/28/11
30	Market Trader	Home appliances trader, travels to China 3-4 times a year depending on demand. Has been travelling to China since 2003	Business	07/28/11
31	Business Owner	Medium-Large Business owner of Door Supply Company	Business	07/28/11
32	Civil Servant	Bilateral Relations desk at the Federal Ministry of Trade and Investment	Government	07/29/11
33	Trade Promoter/ Lobbyist	Director of the Nigeria-China Business Council (NCBC), a private sector organization that partners with the Nigerian government to organize trademissions to China and receive trade missions from China	Other	07/29/11
34	Civil Servant	Department of Investor Relations at the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission, a para-statal agency.	Government	08/10/11

#	Name*	Occupation	Category	Date**
35	Foreign Service Officer	Regional relations director at the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Government	08/11/11
36	Chinese national	Manager of a mining operation in Zamfara State. Chinese national that has worked in Africa for over 10 years, working in many African countries including Cote D'Ivoire, Zambia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe and South Africa, as well as Nigeria (list of countries is not conclusive).	Business	08/10/11
37	Foreign Service Officer	Foreign service officer in the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Government	08/11/11
38	Civil Servant	Executive in the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission	Government	08/12/11
39	Foreign Service Officer	Foreign service officer in the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Government	08/12/11
40	Senator	Senator in the Nigerian cabinet who serves on the Health committee and travelled with a delegation to China to address issues of counterfeit medicines from China entering Nigerian marketplaces.	Government	08/12/11
41	Financial Investor	Nigerian financial investor with some business dealings with the Chinese as well as some exposure to Chinese investments in the Nigerian economy.	Business	08/13/11
42	Jerry Gana	Previously served as the Federal Minister for multiple ministries including the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Federal Ministry of Information and Communications. Now works in the private sector.	Government/ Business	08/13/11

#	Name*	Occupation	Category	Date**
43	Business Consultant	Nigerian national that attended university in China and studied Chinese, works as a liason for Nigerian and Chinese companies, offering translation services among others. An independent contractor that works on a short-term contract basis, often travelling to China for work projects.	Business	08/14/11
44	Academic	Academic at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA). Interviewed in a panel discussion format with other academics.	Academic	08/16/11
45	Salesperson	Independent contractor for a Chinese supplier of acupuncture equipment that uses a tianshi format similar to a pyramid scheme where the salespersons are paid by commission with bonuses for milestones reached as well as for new salepeople brought to the company.	Business	08/11/11
46	Salesperson	Independent contractor for a Chinese supplier of acupuncture equipment that uses a tianshi format similar to a pyramid scheme where the salespersons are paid by commission with bonuses for milestones reached as well as for new salepeople brought to the company.	Business	08/12/11
47	Salesperson	Independent contractor for a Chinese supplier of acupuncture equipment that uses a tianshi format similar to a pyramid scheme where the salespersons are paid by commission with bonuses for milestones reached as well as for new salepeople brought to the company.	Business	08/12/11

#	Name*	Occupation	Category	Date**
48	Salesperson	Independent contractor for a Chinese supplier of acupuncture equipment that uses a tianshi format similar to a pyramid scheme where the salespersons are paid by commission with bonuses for milestones reached as well as for new salepeople brought to the company.	Business	08/12/11
49	Salesperson	Independent contractor for a Chinese supplier of acupuncture equipment that uses a tianshi format similar to a pyramid scheme where the salespersons are paid by commission with bonuses for milestones reached as well as for new salepeople brought to the company.	Business	08/12/11
50	Academic	Academic at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA). Interviewed in a panel discussion format with other academics.	Academic	08/16/11
51	Academic	Academic at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA). Recently returned from completing a doctorate degree in China.	Academic	08/16/11
52	Trade Promoter/ Lobbyist	Executive at the Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture (NACCIMA) in Lagos.	Business	08/17/11
53	Academic	Academic at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA). Interviewed in a panel discussion format with other academics.	Academic	08/16/11
54	Salesman	Nigerian employed by Chinese company that sells automated banking machinery.	Business	08/13/11
55	Academic	Academic at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA). Interviewed in a panel discussion format with other academics.	Academic	08/16/11

#	Name*	Occupation	Category	Date**
56	Academic	Academic at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA). Interviewed in a panel discussion format with other academics.	Academic	08/16/11
57	Academic	Academic at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA). Interviewed in a panel discussion format with other academics.	Academic	08/16/11
58	Pat Utomi	Published Nigerian scholar and politician with a backgrounds in economics and development and business owner with dealings with China.	Academic/ Business	08/17/11
59	Ambassador Victor Chibundu	Founder and chief executive of the Nigeria-China Friendship Association (NICAF). Respondent was a former Nigerian ambassador to China and established organization to help promote private non-government relationships between Chinese and Nigerian entities.	Other	08/18/11
60	Banker	Bank of Industry (Nigeria).	Business	08/18/11
61	Chinese national	Chinese national just arrived in Nigeria to work as a manager for a Tianshi project that contracts with independent Nigerian salespersons to sell acupuncture machines. First time out of China and first time in Africa.	Business	08/19/11
62	Chief Ojo Maduekwe	Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, current Nigerian Ambassador to Canada	Government	08/20/11

\* Names are provided where permitted by interview respondents according to IRB regulations and informed consent form.

\*\* \*Interview dates do not follow chronological order as the interviews are listed in numerical fashion based on order of informed consent forms signatures.



## Appendix G: China's Africa Policy Document

**China's African Policy**

2006/09/20

**China's African Policy**

January 2006

**Foreword**

The first few years of the new century witness a continuation of complex and profound changes in the international situation and further advance of globalization. Peace and development remain the main themes of our times. Safeguarding peace, promoting development and enhancing cooperation, which is the common desire of all peoples, represents the irresistible historical trend. On the other hand, destabilizing factors and uncertainties in the international situation are on the rise. Security issues of various kinds are interwoven. Peace remains evasive and development more pressing.

China, the largest developing country in the world, follows the path of peaceful development and pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. China stands ready to develop friendly relations and cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence so as to contribute to peace, stability and common prosperity around the world.

The African continent, which encompasses the largest number of developing countries, is an important force for world peace and development. China-Africa traditional friendly relations face fresh opportunities under the new circumstances. By this African Policy Paper, the Chinese Government wishes to present to the world the objectives of China's policy towards Africa and the measures to achieve them, and its proposals for cooperation in various fields in the coming years, with a view to promoting the steady growth of China-Africa relations in the long term and bringing the mutually-beneficial cooperation to a new stage.

### **Part I:**

#### Africa's Position and Role

Africa has a long history, vast expanse of land, rich natural resources and huge potential for development. After long years of struggle, the African people freed themselves from colonial rule, wiped out apartheid, won independence and emancipation, thus making significant contribution to the progress of civilization.

Following their independence, countries in Africa have been conscientiously exploring a road to development suited to their national conditions and seeking peace, stability and development by joint efforts. Thanks to the concerted efforts of African countries and the Organization of African Unity (OAU)/the African Union (AU), the political situation in Africa has been stable on the whole, regional conflicts are being gradually resolved and economy has been growing for years. The NEPAD has drawn up an encouraging picture of African rejuvenation and development. African countries have actively participated in the South-South cooperation and worked for the North-South dialogue. They are playing an increasingly important role in international affairs.

Africa still faces many challenges on its road of development. However, with the persistent efforts of African countries and the continuous support of the international community, Africa will surely surmount difficulties and achieve rejuvenation in the new century.

### **Part II:**

#### China's Relations with Africa

China-Africa friendship is embedded in the long history of interchange. Sharing similar historical experience, China and Africa have all along sympathized with and supported each other in the struggle for national liberation and forged a profound friendship.

The founding of the People's Republic of China and the independence of African countries ushered in a new era in China-Africa relations. For over half a century, the two sides have enjoyed close political ties and frequent exchange of high-level visits and people-to-people contacts. Our bilateral trade and economic cooperation have grown rapidly; cooperation in other fields has yielded good results; and consultation and coordination in international affairs have been intensified. China has provided assistance to the best of its ability to African countries, while African countries have also rendered strong support to China on many occasions.

Sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common development-these are the principles guiding China-Africa exchange and cooperation and the driving force to lasting China-Africa relations.

### **Part III:**

#### **China's African Policy**

Enhancing solidarity and cooperation with African countries has always been an important component of China's independent foreign policy of peace. China will unswervingly carry forward the tradition of China-Africa friendship, and, proceeding from the fundamental interests of both the Chinese and African peoples, establish and develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa, featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange. The general principles and objectives of China's African policy are as follows:

- Sincerity, friendship and equality. China adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, respects African countries' independent choice of the road of development and supports African countries' efforts to grow stronger through unity.
- Mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity. China supports African countries' endeavor for economic development and nation building, carries out cooperation in various forms in the economic and social development, and promotes common prosperity of China and Africa.
- Mutual support and close coordination. China will strengthen cooperation with Africa in the UN and other multilateral systems by supporting each other's just demand and reasonable propositions and continue to appeal to the international community to give more attention to questions concerning peace and development in Africa.

- Learning from each other and seeking common development. China and Africa will learn from and draw upon each other's experience in governance and development, strengthen exchange and cooperation in education, science, culture and health. Supporting African countries' efforts to enhance capacity building, China will work together with Africa in the exploration of the road of sustainable development.

The one China principle is the political foundation for the establishment and development of China's relations with African countries and regional organizations. The Chinese Government appreciates the fact that the overwhelming majority of African countries abide by the one China principle, refuse to have official relations and contacts with Taiwan and support China's great cause of reunification. China stands ready to establish and develop state-to-state relations with countries that have not yet established diplomatic ties with China on the basis of the one China principle.

## **Part IV**

### **Enhancing All-round Cooperation Between China and Africa**

#### **1. The political field**

##### **(1) High-level visits**

China will maintain the momentum of mutual visits and dialogues between Chinese and African leaders, with a view to facilitating communication, deepening friendship and promoting mutual understanding and trust.

##### **(2) Exchanges between legislative bodies**

China favors increased multi-level and multi-channel friendly exchanges on the basis of mutual respect between China's National People's Congress (NPC) on the one hand and parliaments of African countries and the Pan-African Parliament of the AU on the other, for the purpose of deepening understanding and cooperation.

##### **(3) Exchanges between political parties**

The Communist Party of China (CPC) develops exchanges of various forms with friendly political parties and organizations of African countries on the basis of the principles of independence, equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. The purpose of such exchanges is to increase understanding and friendship and seek trust and cooperation.

##### **(4) Consultation mechanisms**

Mechanisms such as national bilateral committees between China and African countries, political consultation between foreign ministries, joint(mixed) committees on trade and economic cooperation and mixed committees on science and technology should be established and improved, so as to institutionalize dialogue and consultation in a flexible and pragmatic manner.

#### (5) Cooperation in international affairs

China will continue to strengthen solidarity and cooperation with African countries on the international arena, conduct regular exchange of views, coordinate positions on major international and regional issues and stand for mutual support on major issues concerning state sovereignty, territorial integrity, national dignity and human rights. China supports African nations' desire to be an equal partner in international affairs. China is devoted, as are African nations, to making the UN play a greater role, defending the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, establishing a new international political and economic order featuring justice, rationality, equality and mutual benefit, promoting more democratic international relationship and rule of law in international affairs and safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries.

#### (6) Exchanges between local governments

China's Central Government attaches importance to the exchanges between local governments of China and African countries, vigorously supports twin province/state and twin city relationship aimed at facilitating bilateral exchanges and cooperation in local development and administration.

### 2. The economic field

#### (1) Trade

The Chinese Government will adopt more effective measures to facilitate African commodities' access to Chinese market and fulfill its promise to grant duty-free treatment to some goods from the least developed African countries, with a view to expanding and balancing bilateral trade and optimizing trade structure. It intends to settle trade disputes and frictions properly through bilateral or multilateral friendly consultation, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. Efforts will be made to encourage business communities on both sides to set up China-Africa Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry. When conditions are ripe, China is willing to negotiate Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with African countries and African regional organizations.

#### (2) Investment

The Chinese Government encourages and supports Chinese enterprises' investment and business in Africa, and will continue to provide preferential loans and buyer credits to this end. The Chinese Government is

ready to explore new channels and new ways for promoting investment cooperation with African countries, and will continue to formulate and improve relevant policies, provide guidance and service and offer convenience. African countries are welcome to make investment in China. The Chinese Government will continue to negotiate, conclude and implement the Agreement on Bilateral Facilitation and Protection of Investment and the Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation with African Countries. The two sides should work together to create a favorable environment for investment and cooperation and protect the legitimate rights and interests of investors from both sides.

### (3) Financial cooperation

To further develop China-Africa cooperation in the area of finance, the Chinese Government will support the effort of Chinese financial institutions to increase exchanges and cooperation with their counterparts in African countries as well as regional financial institutions in Africa.

### (4) Agricultural cooperation

China intends to further promote its agricultural cooperation and exchanges with African nations at various levels, through multiple channels and in various forms. Focus will be laid on the cooperation in land development, agricultural plantation, breeding technologies, food security, agricultural machinery and the processing of agricultural and side-line products. China will intensify cooperation in agricultural technology, organize training courses of practical agricultural technologies, carry out experimental and demonstrative agricultural technology projects in Africa and speed up the formulation of China-Africa Agricultural Cooperation Program.

### (5) Infrastructure

The Chinese Government will step up China-Africa cooperation in transportation, communication, water conservancy, electricity and other infrastructures. It will vigorously encourage Chinese enterprises to participate in the building of infrastructure in African countries, scale up their contracts, and gradually establish multilateral and bilateral mechanisms on contractual projects. Efforts will be made to strengthen technology and management cooperation, focusing on the capacity-building of African nations.

### (6) Resources cooperation

The Chinese Government facilitates information sharing and cooperation with Africa in resources areas. It encourages and supports competent Chinese enterprises to cooperate with African nations in various ways on the basis of the principle of mutual benefit and common development, to develop and exploit rationally their resources, with a view to helping African countries to translate their advantages in resources to

competitive strength, and realize sustainable development in their own countries and the continent as a whole.

#### (7) Tourism cooperation

China will implement the program of Chinese citizens' group tour to some African nations and, grant more African countries, as they wish and as far as feasible, Approved Destination Status for out-bound Chinese tourist groups. China welcomes citizens from African nations for a tour of the country.

#### (8) Debt reduction and relief

China is ready to continue friendly consultation with some African countries with a view to seek solution to, or reduction of, the debts they owe to China. It will urge the international community, developed countries in particular, to take more substantial action on the issue of debt reduction and relief for African nations.

#### (9) Economic assistance

In light of its own financial capacity and economic situation, China will do its best to provide and gradually increase assistance to African nations with no political strings attached.

#### (10) Multilateral cooperation

China is ready to enhance consultation and coordination with Africa within multilateral trade systems and financial institutions and work together to urge the UN and other international organizations to pay more attention to the question of economic development, promote South-South cooperation, push forward the establishment of a just and rational multilateral trade system and make the voices of developing countries heard in the decision-making of international financial affairs. It will step up cooperation with other countries and international organizations to support the development of Africa and help realize Millennium Development Goals in Africa.

### 3. Education, science, culture, health and social aspects

#### (1) Cooperation in human resources development and education

The Chinese Government will give full play to the role of its "African Human Resources Development Foundation" in training African personnel. It will identify priority areas, expand areas of cooperation and provide more input according to the needs of African countries so as to achieve greater results.

Exchange of students between China and Africa will continue. China will increase the number of government scholarships as it sees fit, continue to send teachers to help African countries in Chinese language teaching and carry out educational assistance project to help develop Africa's weak disciplines. It intends to strengthen cooperation in such fields as vocational education and distance learning while encouraging exchanges and cooperation between educational and academic institutions of both sides.

#### (2) Science and technology cooperation

Following the principles of mutual respect, complementarity and sharing benefits, China will promote its cooperation with Africa in the fields of applied research, technological development and transfer, speed up scientific and technological cooperation in the fields of common interest, such as bio-agriculture, solar energy utilization, geological survey, mining and R&D of new medicines. It will continue its training programs in applied technologies for African countries, carry out demonstration programs of technical assistance, and actively help disseminate and utilize Chinese scientific and technological achievements and advanced technologies applicable in Africa.

#### (3) Cultural exchanges

China will implement agreements of cultural cooperation and relevant implementation plans reached with African countries, maintain regular contacts with their cultural departments and increase exchanges of artists and athletes. It will guide and promote cultural exchanges in diverse forms between people's organizations and institutions in line with bilateral cultural exchange programs and market demand.

#### (4) Medical and health cooperation

China is ready to enhance medical personnel and information exchange with Africa. It will continue to send medical teams and provide medicines and medical materials to African countries, and help them establish and improve medical facilities and train medical personnel. China will increase its exchanges and cooperation with African countries in the prevention and treatment of infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS and malaria and other diseases, research and application of traditional medicine and experience concerning mechanism for public health emergencies.

#### (5) Media cooperation

China wishes to encourage multi-tiered and multi-formed exchange and cooperation between the media on both sides, so as to enhance mutual understanding and enable objective and balanced media coverage of each other. It will facilitate the communication and contacts between relevant government departments for the purpose of sharing experiences on ways to handle the relations with media both domestic and foreign, and guiding and facilitating media exchanges.



#### (6) Administrative cooperation

China will carry out exchange and cooperation with African countries in civil service system building, public administration reform and training of government personnel. The two sides may study the feasibility of setting up a mechanism for personnel and administrative cooperation.

#### (7) Consular cooperation

China will hold regular/irregular consular consultations with African countries during which the two sides may have amicable discussions on urgent problems or questions of common interest in bilateral or multilateral consular relations in order to improve understanding and expand cooperation. The Chinese side will work with Africa to facilitate personnel flow and ensure the safety of their nationals.

#### (8) People-to-people exchange

China will encourage and facilitate the exchanges between people's organizations of China and Africa, especially the youth and women, with a view to increasing the understanding, trust and cooperation of people on both sides. It will encourage and guide Chinese volunteers to serve in African countries.

#### (9) Environmental cooperation

China will actively promote China-Africa cooperation in climate change, water resources conservation, anti-desertification, bio-diversity and other areas of environmental protection by facilitating technological exchange.

#### (10) Disaster reduction, relief and humanitarian assistance

China will actively carry out personnel exchange, training and technological cooperation in the fields of disaster reduction and relief. It will respond quickly to African countries' request for urgent humanitarian aid, encourage and support exchange and cooperation between the Red Cross Society of China and other NGOs on the one side and their African counterparts on the other side.

### 4. Peace and security

#### (1) Military cooperation

China will promote high-level military exchanges between the two sides and actively carry out military-related technological exchanges and cooperation. It will continue to help train African military personnel and support defense and army building of African countries for their own security.

## (2) Conflict settlement and peacekeeping operations

China supports the positive efforts by the AU and other African regional organizations and African countries concerned to settle regional conflicts and will provide assistance within our own capacity. It will urge the UN Security Council to pay attention to and help resolve regional conflicts in Africa. It will continue its support to and participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.

## (3) Judicial and police cooperation

China is prepared to promote exchange and cooperation between Chinese and African judicial and law enforcement departments. The two sides may learn from each other in legal system building and judicial reform so as to be better able to prevent, investigate and crack down on crimes. China will work together with African countries to combat transnational organized crimes and corruption, and intensify cooperation on matters concerning judicial assistance, extradition and repatriation of criminal suspects.

China will cooperate closely with immigration departments of African countries in tackling the problem of illegal migration, improve exchange of immigration control information and set up an unimpeded and efficient channel for intelligence and information exchange.

## (4) Non-traditional security areas

In order to enhance the ability of both sides to address non-traditional security threats, it is necessary to increase intelligence exchange, explore more effective ways and means for closer cooperation in combating terrorism, small arms smuggling, drug trafficking, transnational economic crimes, etc.

# Part V:

## Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and Its Follow-up Actions

Launched in 2000, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation has become an effective mechanism for the collective dialogue and multilateral cooperation between China and Africa and put in place an important framework and platform for a new type of China-Africa partnership featuring long-term stability, equality and mutual benefit.

China attaches importance to the positive role of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in strengthening political consultation and pragmatic cooperation between China and Africa, and stands ready to work with African countries to conscientiously implement the Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation-Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006) and its follow-up action plans.

China will work with African countries within the framework of the Forum to explore new ways to enhance mutual political trust, promote the comprehensive development of pragmatic cooperation, further improve the mechanism of the forum, and try to find the best way for furthering cooperation between the Forum and the NEPAD.

## **Part VI:**

### China's Relations with African Regional Organizations

China appreciates the significant role of the AU in safeguarding peace and stability in the region and promoting African solidarity and development. China values its friendly cooperation with the AU in all fields, supports its positive role in regional and international affairs and stands ready to provide the AU assistance to the best of its capacity.

China appreciates and supports the positive role of Africa's sub-regional organizations in promoting political stability, economic development and integration in their own regions and stands ready to enhance its amicable cooperation with those organizations.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China Copyright@2004



Contact Us Address: No. 2, Chaoyangmen Nandajie, Chaoyang District, Beijing, 100701 Tel: 86-10-65961114

Appendix H: Egyptian President Mubarak's Ten Principles of Africa-China Cooperation  
(11/10/2009)

---

The Egyptian president Mubarak addressed the Fourth FOCAC Ministerial Conference on November 8. He put forward the ten principles of deepening the Africa-China cooperation and realizing the sustainable development.

- I. Reiterate the principle of sticking to the equal treatment, sincere cooperation, mutual benefit and win-win progress, which was established when the FOCAC was just founded;
- II. Go on to promote the dialogue and consultation on Africa-China cooperation, strengthen the coordination of the both sides' stands and protect the mutual benefits of African and Chinese peoples;
- III. Strengthen the bilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation, support the efforts of realizing peace and stabilization in the African continent, which is the foundation of realizing the all-around development of African countries;
- IV. Africa and China make joint efforts to consolidate the consciousness of democracy in the international relations, and combat the double standard practiced in the political and economic field;
- V. Change the marginalization of Africa and the developing countries in the current international policy making system, demand more rights to participate in the world economic and financial organizations and groups, especially in Group of Eight (G8) and Group of Twenty (G20), so as to guarantee the effective participation of Africa and the developing countries in instituting new economic and trade systems.
- VI. The developed countries should bear the responsibility of the current economic and financial crisis so it is necessary for them to keep the promise to eliminate the effect of the crisis on African countries, strengthen the capability of realizing development, eliminating poverty, and especially guaranteeing grain security;
- VII. Call for common efforts to end the Doha Round negotiation at the earliest time, develop along the direction of bringing beneficial to African countries and ending the trade protection policies taken by the developed countries, especially those of targeting the merchandise and agricultural products exported from African countries.

- VIII. Stress that the development partners must realize their promises to reduce the debt of African countries and increase official aids or direct investment in Africa. These are all the promises made by the developed countries many years ago, which still remain to be performed to help with the implementation of Africa development programs and realize the United Nations Millennium Development Goals;
- IX. Insist that Africa is eligible to get the necessary aid in technology and funding to fight the effect caused by the climate changes. African countries have been mostly affected, though they are not the principal contributors to the climate changes. He stresses that the advanced industrial countries should follow the promise of reducing emission of green house gases and wishes that a fair and balanced initiative be concluded at the Copenhagen Climate Conference which will be held in the next month to support the capability of African countries to fight the effect of climate change and solve the problems of desertification, draught [sic] and flood hazard that some African countries are facing.

The Fourth FOCAC Ministerial Conference was held in the coastal city Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt on November 8-9, with nearly a hundred ministerial-level officials from 49 African countries including China attending the conference.

## Appendix I: Joint Communiqué Between the People's Republic of China and the Federal

### Republic of Nigeria

Abuja, 15 April 2002)

---

At the invitation of President Olusegun Obasanjo of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, President Jiang Zemin of the People's Republic of China paid a state visit to Nigeria from 14 to 16 April, 2002.

During the visit the two leaders discussed a wide range of issues, including the furtherance of bilateral relations as well as regional and international issues of common interest. Both sides expressed satisfaction with the results of the visit.

1. The two sides expressed satisfaction with the progress achieved so far in their friendly relations and cooperation which are anchored on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence over the past 31 years since their establishment of diplomatic ties. The two sides reaffirmed as the basic principle guiding China-Nigeria relations in the 21st Century, the four-point agreement reached by the two Presidents during President Obasanjo's visit to China in August 2001. These include sincere friendship and mutual trust, mutual benefit and common development, enhanced consultation and mutual support, and commitment to a long-term perspective and a future-oriented relationship. The two sides also reaffirmed their determination to build on past achievements while working together to push the existing friendly relations to greater heights.
2. The two sides share the view that China-Nigeria bilateral cooperation in trade and economic activities with its huge potentials, remains a powerful driving force behind the development of China-Nigeria relations. They resolved to work together to further develop the cooperation in these areas. While implementing conscientiously the economic cooperation and trade agreements already signed, the two governments pledged to continue to encourage their companies and enterprises to step up exchanges and cooperation and create conditions to facilitate trade and investment between them. The two sides stressed the significance of mutual cooperation in oil and natural gas ventures and their readiness to encourage and support active participation of Chinese enterprises in Nigeria's energy development projects.

3. Both sides expressed their readiness to encourage their enterprises to carry out cooperation in the areas of infrastructural development including the railways.
4. Both sides expressed their willingness to facilitate China-Nigeria cooperation in defence science, technology and industry.
5. On agriculture, the Chinese side reiterated its readiness to assist Nigeria develop its massive agricultural potentials, especially in the area of production of rice and other grains.
6. On international issues, the two sides agreed that China and Nigeria share extensive interests in maintaining world peace, facilitating the establishment of a just and equitable new international political and economic order, strengthening South-South cooperation and promoting the cause of universal prosperity, and that they have an important role to play in these endeavors. They expressed their readiness for continuous and enhanced consultation and cooperation in international affairs.
7. Both sides expressed unflinching support for each other's efforts to safeguard national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. While the Chinese side values and appreciates the role of Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, in regional and continental matters, the Nigerian side reiterates the one-China policy that there is but one China in the world, the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory, and that Nigeria will only enter into private sector led trade and economic relations with Taiwan.
8. Both sides expressed concern over the new challenges to developing countries brought about by globalization and urge the international community to adopt positive measures to ensure the economic security of developing countries by enhancing their developmental capacity.
9. The two sides emphasized the important role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security and promoting global economic and social progress, a role no other international organisations could replace. Both sides are however in favour of reforms of the United Nations in such a way that the demand by its member states for democratisation of international relations would be met and that the organisation would more effectively fulfill its mandate under the UN Charter. In this connection, China supports greater representation of African States in the Security Council.

10. Both sides condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and firmly support the international community in using every lawful means to fight the scourge. Both sides maintain that in combating terrorism, efforts should be made to address both its root cause and symptoms, and while international cooperation should be strengthened, the leading role of the UN and its Security Council should be further reinforced.
11. The two sides viewed the pursuit of peace, stability and development, as well as the settlement of regional conflicts and eradication of poverty, as pressing problems facing African countries. The Chinese Government supports the African Union and other sub-regional organisations in Africa and believes they can be utilised to achieve peace and stability and promote the integration in Africa. The Chinese side supports the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), and expressed the willingness to work together with the international community to assist Africa in more concrete and effective ways to achieve sustainable economic development.
12. On the cooperation between China and Africa generally, and particularly the China-Africa Cooperation Forum and Mechanism, the two sides also expressed their readiness to implement the follow-up actions of the Forum through enhanced consultation and coordination, so as to contribute to the new partnership between China and Africa featuring long-term stability, equality and mutual benefit.



Appendix J: Joint Press Communiqué between the Government of the People's Republic  
of China and the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

(Beijing, 28 February 2008)

---

At the invitation of President Hu Jintao of the People's Republic of China, President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua of the Federal Republic of Nigeria paid a state visit to the People's Republic of China from 27 February to 1 March 2008. President Yar'Adua and his entourage were warmly received by the government and people of China.

During the visit, the two Presidents reviewed the sound growth of China-Nigeria relations since the establishment of diplomatic relations. They expressed satisfaction at the evolving strategic partnership and the momentum of the ties between their two countries in recent years, and decided to step up consultation between the two governments by launching a strategic dialogue in due course to promote the in-depth growth of bilateral relations.

The two leaders acknowledged the steady rise in the volume of trade, economic and technical cooperation between the two countries and pledged to further deepen and expand their mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation. They agreed to promptly hold meetings of the joint commission between the two countries to take stock of achievements in bilateral trade and economic cooperation and plan future cooperation.

President Hu Jintao pledged China's support for President Yar'Adua's programme of economic and social transformation of Nigeria as reflected in the Seven Point Agenda. On his part, President Yar'Adua applauded the remarkable achievements China has made in economic and social development and reaffirmed Nigeria's commitment to the one-China policy.

The two Presidents reviewed developments in Africa and stressed the vital importance of enduring peace and stability to the progress and prosperity of the continent. The Chinese side hailed Nigeria's long-standing role in the cause of peace in Africa and the Nigerian side applauded the contribution made by China in support of the efforts of the African Union in the peaceful resolution of conflict situations in Africa. In this regard, the two leaders called for greater support of the international community to

facilitate the early deployment of the African Union-United Nations hybrid peacekeeping force in Darfur.

The Presidents underscored the essential nature of Africa-China cooperation. They reiterated that the two sides will continue to work to advance the new type of China-Africa strategic partnership featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges and mutual learning, and expressed the view that the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the policy measures the Chinese Government adopted to strengthen pragmatic cooperation with Africa have provided a viable framework and strong support for promoting the mutually beneficial cooperation between China and Africa.

President Hu Jintao and President Yar'Adua agreed to maintain regular contacts between Nigeria and China. The two leaders affirmed that such consultations and dialogue at the highest level were imperative at this time when the two countries seek to continue to play a positive role in regional and global affairs.

At the conclusion of the discussions, President Yar'Adua extended an invitation to President Hu Jintao to undertake a state visit to Nigeria. President Hu expressed thanks to President Yar'Adua for the invitation.

Appendix K: Programme for China-Africa Co-operation in Economic and Social  
Development from 1st FOCAC conference

2000/11/17

---

The Forum on China-Africa Co-operation - Ministerial Conference 2000 was held in Beijing, China from 10 to 12 October 2000. Ministers from China and 44 African countries exchanged views and are convinced of the imperatives for a dynamic, new strategic partnership between Africa and the PRC. The Ministers commit themselves to co-operating in all fields, especially social and economic development, on the basis of equality and mutual respect with a view to renewing, developing and expanding China-Africa co-operation in the 21st century.

1. Foreword

1.1 The Ministers reviewed with satisfaction the results of the co-operation between China and African countries over the past 50 years. The Ministers believe that such co-operation, not only directly benefits their peoples, but also enhances friendship and mutual understanding. The Ministers note that China and African countries have made great efforts in recent years to explore new forms of co-operation, particularly between enterprises. They, however, note that both Africa and China still have great potential, which should be properly managed and strategically directed for their mutual benefit.

1.2 The Ministers also agree that, in view of the present unjust and inequitable world order. China and African countries should position themselves to influence the establishment of a new world order which will reflect their needs and interests. To this end, they agree to adopt a workable programme towards the creation of a new strategic partnership for sustainable development in the 21st century.

1.3 The Ministers further observe that globalization currently presents more challenges and risks than opportunities to the vast number of developing countries and therefore express their determination to strengthen the existing co-operation between China and African countries in all fields. They also agree to earnestly explore new ideas and strategies to develop their respective economics and enhance their capabilities to participate in globalization.

1.4 In pursuit of the foregoing objectives the Ministers reiterate that China and African countries will honor the following principles of co-operation for their future development:

1.4.1 equality and mutual benefit

1.4.2 diversity in form and content

1.4.3 emphasis on practical results

1.4.4 pursuit of common progress

1.4.5 amicable settlement of differences

## 2. Inter-governmental Co-operation

2.1 The Ministers maintain that the two sides should use and improve the existing bilateral consultation mechanisms to strengthen inter-governmental links, explore new areas of co-operation, closely monitor the progress in their existing co-operation and share experiences in order to enhance their mutually beneficial partnership. In light of the development and changes in their bilateral economic and trade relations, the two sides agree to continue to review and conclude agreements as necessary, with a view to encouraging preferential market access for products from African countries into China.

2.2 The Ministers agree to promote the exchange of high-level visits and conduct regular inter-governmental dialogue and co-operation, so as to create a favorable climate for business contacts and trade between China and Africa. In addition, they undertake to promote positive interaction with relevant trade and commercial organizations and assist in the establishment of effective communication links between such organizations in China and Africa, in order to ensure that they play an active role in the development of our economies.

2.3 The Chinese government undertakes to continue to co-operate with and provide development assistance to African countries, focusing on the promotion of local industries, sourcing of local materials and the creation of employment. Such development assistance should support national policies of African countries and be awarded in consultation with national governments. Projects will be aimed at the utilization of local expertise and materials, the creation of local employment and the development of human resources of African countries.

2.4 To support African countries in their economic and social development, the Chinese side undertakes to continue providing assistance to African countries, within its capacity, in light of specific economic conditions of the recipient countries and within the

framework of South-South co-operation. This support will mainly take the form of aid grants, concessional loans and interest-free loans to be mainly used in areas determined by both sides.

### 3. Trade and Investment

3.1 The Ministers acknowledge progress in the area of trade and investment promotion and express their readiness to develop a strategy by creating an enabling legal and business environment, so that such co-operation will gradually play a leading role in the China-Africa economic partnership.

3.2 The Ministers agree to conclude an appropriate legal framework on:

3.2.1 trade promotion and capacity building;

3.2.2 encouragement, protection and guarantee of investments;

3.2.3 avoidance of double taxation;

3.2.4 enhancement of co-operation in marine shipping and air transportation

3.3 The Ministers agree to undertake joint efforts to improve trade and investment environment through such measures as granting each other preferential treatment in conformity with existing national laws, equitable treatment to all investors together with investment guarantees and just settlement of eventual disputes, in accordance with internationally accepted rules and practices.

### 4. Trade

4.1 The Ministers note the necessity to move towards balanced and enhanced trade and acknowledge the need to assist in improving the production capacity in Africa and in diversifying the composition of African exports. They pledge to collaborate and share experience in overcoming Africa's export dependence on primary commodities, single products and raw materials.

4.2 The Ministers stress the need to harmonize their trade policies and to participate actively in trade negotiations, including within the framework of the WTO, in order to ensure that the multilateral trading system contributes to enhanced competitiveness, economic growth and sustainable development of their countries.

4.3 The Ministers express the readiness of their business communities to vigorously explore and benefit from all opportunities offered by their respective markets, in an

enterprising spirit, while complying with internationally accepted norms and quality standards in their exported products.

4.4 Noting with concern the imbalance in the two-way trade and the need to address it as soon as possible, the Chinese side undertakes to:

4.4.1 encourage its enterprises to give preference to the import of African products in the light of market demand and conditions;

4.4.2 strive to make its investment and trade centers in Africa a success, and to facilitate the establishment of similar centers of African countries in China, so that these centers will play an effective bridging role in facilitating exchanges and communications between enterprises of the two sides;

4.4.3 establish a China-Africa Joint Business Council in co-ordination with the Chambers of Commerce of African countries and professional organizations, so as to put in place a dialogue and consultation mechanism with African enterprises and promote economic co-operation and trade between them; and

4.4.4 establish a China-Africa Products Exhibition Center in China to promote two-way trade and facilitate access for African products to the Chinese market.

4.5 The Ministers state importance of providing better and preferential access to the Chinese market for African exports of commercial importance.

4.6 The Ministers agree to ensure better access to each other's market, in the context of multilateral trade liberalization and progress made with due regard to regional integration arrangements in Africa.

## 5. Investment

5.1 The Ministers pledge to encourage mutual investment by their enterprises, the exchange of experience in business management, the setting up of joint ventures or sole ownership enterprises, including small or medium ones and the establishment of joint business for a, as key factors in the China-Africa economic partnership.

5.2 The Chinese side will set aside special funds to support and encourage investment by well-established Chinese enterprises in African countries to set up joint equity or co-operation projects adapted to local need in terms of job creation and transfer of technologies.

5.3 The Chinese side agrees to share with African countries its experience in the field of investment promotion relating to the establishment and management of free and special economic zones.

5.4 The Minister agree to identify their complementarities in order to invest in common projects through bilateral and/or trilateral co-operation channels.

5.5 They agree that the Joint Business Council to be established between their public/private sectors will be aimed at organizing regular business meetings among their economic operators and professional organizations as well as training seminars on doing business with special focus on their market specific aspects.

5.6 The Minister express their readiness to develop further, as necessary, the finance schemes needed to implement mutual investment and economic partnership between China and Africa.

## 6. Co-operation in Engineering and Other Infrastructural Projects

6.1 The Minister positively appraise the co-operation between the two sides in engineering projects in African countries. The Chinese side will continue to encourage well-established Chinese enterprises to participate in economic and infrastructure construction and development projects in African countries. It also expresses its readiness to make available its modern and appropriate technologies, as well as managerial expertise, in various areas such as engineering contracting, technical and management co-operation. It will also encourage these enterprises to enhance co-operation with their counterparts in Africa and employ, as well as train more local people, including the usage of locally available resources. In such co-operation, the Chinese side may also consider accepting various forms of payment such as payment in kind, to ease African countries' financial burden and help increase their export to China.

## 7. Financial Co-operation

7.1 Noting that co-operation between financial institutions of China and African countries has just started, the Ministers express their determination to encourage them to vigorously look into the possibility of co-operation in such forms as parallel and co-financing arrangement. They believe that it is imperative to continue to enhance financial co-operation between China and the African Development Bank Group (ADB), the Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (PTA) and other multilateral financial institutions in Africa, in particular to implement the bilateral agreement on technical co-operation concluded between China and the ADB.

## 8. Debt Relief and Cancellation

8.1 The Ministers note with concern that the heavy debt burden not only seriously hampers the economic growth of African countries, but also causes worsening social problems. They welcome the international efforts for debt relief or cancellation over the past few years and call on developed countries and international financial institutions that are main creditors to fulfil their commitments at an early date. The momentum on debt relief over the past years must be maintained and developed.

8.2 The Chinese side notes that African debt to China does not constitute the bulk of the continent's debt stock and that China is herself a developing country and a net debtor. Notwithstanding this, the Chinese side expresses its readiness to help relieve the debt burden of African countries. In this connection, the Chinese side undertakes to reduce or cancel debt amounting to 10 billion RMB yuan owed by the heavily indebted poor countries and least developed countries in Africa in the coming two year. The details will be discussed through bilateral channels.

8.3 The Ministers recognize that China, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, is a significant partner in developing support around the issue of debt relief for Africa.

## 9. Tourism

9.1 The Ministers acknowledge that tourism is an important economic activity which has the potential for generation financial resources that will help Africa's accelerated economic growth, the creation of employment opportunities and the alleviation of poverty. They agree to co-operate in promoting tourism and undertake to encourage investment in the development of tourism infrastructure and capacity, with specific focus on the development of small, micro and medium enterprises.

## 10. Migration

10.1 The Ministers agree that their respective governments will facilitate the processing of applications for work permits and visas, in line with the existing legislation and policy pertaining to migration, and that deficiencies will be addressed within the framework of bilateral agreements.

## 11. Agricultural Co-operation

11.1 The Ministers express their readiness to share their respective countries' experience in various fields of agricultural development and fisheries.



11.2 Realizing the vital importance of agricultural development to eliminating poverty and ensuring food security, the Ministers are determined to take all the necessary measures to ensure successful co-operation in this area.

11.3 The two sides also agree to further explore effective ways of trilateral co-operation among China, African countries and the relevant international institutions such as the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

## 12. Exploration and Utilization of Natural Resources and Energy

12.1 Cognizant of the importance of their respective natural resources, the two sides agree to co-operate in the use of such resources. China agrees that Africa needs to benefitiate its agricultural, mineral and metallurgical resources, in order to generate industrial economic activities. In this regard, China agrees to promote investment in, and exploration and beneficiation of metallurgical resources and that such beneficiation should be done in Africa.

12.2 The Ministers agree to facilitate the exploration and beneficiation of such resources on a reciprocal basis with due consideration to sound environmental practices.

## 13. Scientific, Technological and Cultural Co-operation

13.1 Aware of the importance of scientific, technological and cultural co-operation, the two sides commit themselves to:

13.1.1 enhancing co-operation in the areas of basic and applied research, and development and transfer of technology;

13.1.2 supporting the upgrading of Africa's indigenous technologies;

13.1.3 working together for the extension of technologies already developed and employed, such as utilization of solar energy, disaster prevention, management and relief, as well as development of water resources, so as to make them serve the economic revitalization of both China and African countries; and

13.1.4 increasing cultural exchanges, particularly the exchange of visits by high-level cultural delegations and sports and art groups, setting up more art exhibitions in each other's territory, and making a greater effort to study and promote each other's culture.

## 14. Co-operation in Medical Care Public Health

14.1 Recognizing the positive role of the Chinese medical teams in Africa and grateful for the efforts of the Chinese government in this regard, the African Ministers welcome

the commitment made by the Chinese side to send more medical teams to African countries and they promise to create suitable working and living conditions for these teams.

14.2 The Chinese side agrees to give positive consideration to the requests of African countries and promises to continue to provide them with medical equipment, facilities, medicine and more training to local medical personnel, and promote co-operation in the use of traditional medicine and pharmacy, so as to ensure more fruitful results in such co-operation.

14.3 The two sides agree to conduct co-operation in such areas as reducing infant and maternal mortality rates, and preventing and treating HIV/AIDS, malaria, tropical and other diseases.

## 15. Education and Human Resources Development

15.1 The Minister agree to expand co-operation in education and human resources development. The Chinese side pledges to:

15.1.1 grant more scholarships to African students to study in China, continue to send teachers to Africa to help local institutions of higher learning improve their disciplines and specialties, and set up channels of communications between universities of the two sides for the study of the Chinese and African civilizations; and

15.1.2 establish an African Human Resources Development Fund and gradually increase financial contribution to the Fund for the training of professionals of different disciplines for African countries.

15.2 The two sides agree to work out country-specific training plans through appropriate channels, identify specific co-operation projects and facilitate their implementation.

## 16. Environmental management and Bio-diversity

16.1 The Ministers support international efforts towards environmental management and sustainable human development. The two sides express their commitment to the key elements of the various environmental conventions and undertake to forge closer co-operation and joint participation in capacity building for integrating environmental management in national development.

16.2 In pursuit of this, China and Africa undertake to co-operate in all fields of environmental management, including pollution control, bio-diversity conservation, protection of forest eco-systems, fisheries and wildlife management in order to ensure economic and sustainable human development.

## 17. Trilateral Co-operation

17.1 The two sides stress the importance of the development of trilateral co-operation to achieve the objectives contained in the present programme of co-operation and the promotion of Sino-African relation, notably within the framework of South-South co-operation. They note that such an initiative will lead to the effective utilization of available financial resources for the further development of human and natural resources of the countries involved.

## 18. Co-operation on Arms Control

18.1 The Ministers express deep concern at the large influx of small arms and light weapons to conflict areas in Africa and agree that this constitutes a threat to peace, security/stability and development on the continent. They pledge to fully co-operate at international level to prevent and combat the problem of illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons.

## 19. Multilateral Co-operation

19.1 Convinced of the pivotal importance of closer South-South co-operation under the current circumstances, the two sides agree to:

19.1.1 strengthen co-operation and consultation at multilateral level such as the UN System, UNCTAD, and the WTO, so as to safeguard the common interests of the developing countries; and

19.1.2 co-ordinate positions in reforming multilateral economic and trade regimes and formulating relevant rules, with a view to increasing the collective bargaining capacity of developing countries, and make joint efforts towards the democratization of international relations and the establishment of a just and equitable new international economic order.

19.2 The Ministers agree to work for the reform of the United Nations and particularly the UN Security Council that will be geographically representative. We call for the recognition of the legitimate place due to Africa in the Security Council, the organizations and specialized agencies of the United Nations system.

## 20. Follow-up Mechanisms

20.1 The Ministers agree to establish corresponding committees for follow-up actions of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation at Ministerial level.

20.2 The two sides agree to set up joint follow-up mechanisms at various levels. Under these mechanisms, the Ministers will meet in three years time to evaluate progress in the

implementation of the Programme, Senior Officials in two years time and Ambassadors resident in China on a regular basis. The Senior Officials Meetings and the Ministerial Conferences will be convened in China and Africa on an alternate basis within the framework of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation.

Appendix L: Address by Mr. Olusegun Obasanjo, President and Commander-in-Chief of  
the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria at the 10th Plenary Meeting of the  
54th Session of The United Nations General Assembly

Thursday, 23 September 1999

---

A little over two decades ago I addressed this Assembly as head of a military Government in Nigeria. On that occasion the focus of my statement was the urgent need to terminate colonial rule in Namibia and Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, and dismantle the racist apartheid South Africa. Today it is a great source of joy for me and my delegation that a distinguished son of Namibia is presiding over the affairs of the fifty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly. My delegation assures you, Sir, of its full cooperation and unwavering support throughout your tenure

May I also convey through you, Sir, our deep appreciation to your predecessor, Mr. Didier Opertti of Uruguay, for the able and efficient manner in which he conducted the proceedings of the fifty-third session.

Our appreciation also goes to the Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan, for his visionary leadership and the invaluable work of the Secretariat under his stewardship.

Permit me also to warmly welcome, on behalf of my country and delegation, the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of Nauru and the Kingdom of Tonga, which have just joined this family of nations.

I stand before this Assembly today very proud to be the leader of a Nigeria that has successfully managed the transition to democracy after a decade and a half of military rule. I would like to seize this opportunity to express the profound appreciation of all Nigerians for the international support and encouragement which combined so effectively with the relentless determination of Nigerians themselves to reconstruct and transform their country into a vibrant democracy.

Our Administration has raised the hopes of Nigerians, and their expectations are correspondingly high. We are well aware of the enormity of the challenges that we face. But we are fully resolved to tackle our numerous social, economic and political problems head on. And, by the Grace of God, we will not fail.

Since assuming office some four months ago our administration has put in place an institutional framework for the purpose of reconciling competing interests and groups in our society. Our democratic institutions are now operating effectively within the system of checks and balances enshrined in our Constitution. Furthermore, we have opted for a policy of inclusiveness in all our political appointments, with a Cabinet, for instance, in which all registered political parties are represented, thus moving away from the divisive practice of winner takes all.

Our Administration has initiated policies aimed at revitalizing the economy in order to create an enabling environment for investment and economic growth. We have also put in place an appropriate legal framework for the protection of foreign investments and repatriation of legitimate profits.

Other measures that we have taken include a vigorous anti-corruption campaign; the promotion of transparency and accountability in public life; the abolition of decrees and regulations which hindered the inflow of foreign investment; the generation of opportunities for employment and income savings for domestic investment; and the privatization of key State enterprises, such as electricity and telecommunications; legislation and other measures to redress obvious cases of neglect and injustice done to ethnic minorities, particularly in the oil-producing areas of the Niger delta region, and to deal with the problems of the environment; investigation of past human rights violations, with a view to promoting and protecting fundamental freedoms; and strengthening the capacity of the law enforcement agencies to promote law and order, as well as security, and to deal more effectively with the problem of drug trafficking.

Africa is indeed proud and glad to see the end of this century coincide with the total elimination of colonialism and the twin menace of constitutionalized racism in the southern part of the continent. The United Nations deserves our warm commendation for the crucial role it has played in this process.

Let me also pay tribute to the thousands who lost their lives in the struggle for freedom so that those of us alive today can proudly say we have the destiny of the continent in our own hands. It is, however, a destiny which poses monumental challenges in our effort to improve the quality of life on our continent. We must strive to alleviate the grinding poverty and material deprivation that has persistently remained a feature of our political freedom.

As we approach the dawn of the new millennium, the defining feature of our increasingly interdependent world is accelerated globalization, and the liberalization of production, trade, investment and finance.

But for us in the developing world the reality today is quite different. Globalization, in its various manifestations, is already experiencing a troubled relationship with the imperatives of development.

It is rather tragic that Africa, the least developed of all the regions and the least able to cope with external shocks, has borne the brunt of the adverse effects of globalization of the world economy. There are grim statistics which indicate that the well-known marginalization of the African continent has turned into delinkage from the global scene.

Since 1992 Africa's exports and imports as a share of world trade has declined from 4 per cent to 2 per cent. Africa's development is presently straitjacketed by a debt burden of around \$300 billion. The continent is experiencing import compression, weak productivity and low output. On the average, factories that are still operating do so at less than 30 per cent of installed capacity. Africa's share in total foreign direct investment inflows to developing countries has dropped from 11 per cent in the late 1980s to less than 5 per cent in the second half of the 1990s, and to a meagre 1.2 per cent of world foreign direct investment flows in 1997.

This trend has continued, despite the efforts of African countries to implement far-reaching economic reforms and maintain macroeconomic stability, particularly through the introduction of a more open and business-friendly investment environment, and the provision of incentives to attract foreign investment.

In the quest for a better and fairer management of a globalized world economy, it is now incumbent upon us to direct our searchlight on the unsatisfactory evolution of the multilateral trading system. In participating in the historic Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations that ushered in the new rules-based trading system, the developing world had hoped that the new trading regime would enhance their trading fortunes, facilitate their effective integration into the world economy, and arrest their marginalization from the global trading system.

Unfortunately, however, the vast majority of developing countries, particularly in Africa, have so far been unable to reap the benefits arising from their membership of the World Trade Organization. Africa's trade prospects continue to be hampered by the nonimplementation of the special and differential provisions that favour developing countries, and the increasingly protectionist measures that are being imposed against their export products. Besides, the paucity of technical and financial assistance that would have enabled the developing countries to take advantage of the limited market access opportunities that exist continues to deepen Africa's marginalization in the globalized world economy.

Without doubt, the biggest monetary and financial obstacle confronting developing countries is the chronic debt overhang. According to United Nations figures, the global debt of all developing countries stood at \$567 billion in 1980, and \$1.4 trillion in 1992. In that 12-year period these countries made foreign debt payments totalling \$1.6 trillion. Now, out of the 41 countries which the World Bank describes as heavily indebted poor countries, 33 are African countries, a group that some believe is richly deserving of its own special category: severely indebted low-income countries. Today in sub-Saharan Africa every man, woman and child owes \$357. This is a continent where millions live in abject poverty, earning around \$100 a year, or 27 cents a day. Some African countries now spend as much as four times on servicing debts as they do on education and health care. Some countries spend up to 40 per cent of their national budgets on debt servicing. Furthermore, it is reliably estimated that for every dollar given in official development aid, \$3 go back to the rich countries in debt service payments.

I make bold to assert that calling for debt relief for developing countries is not a plea for charity, but is an urgent matter of social and economic justice. It has to be redressed if there is to be peace and stability in the twentyfirst century. Therefore, we propose definitive debt cancellation, not just reduction or rescheduling of the debt service regime. Eligibility should be limited to unpayable debts, which for Africa means the bulk of the \$300 billion current stock of debt. There should be debt remission that is not predicated on the institutionally harsh conditionalities of structural adjustment programmes. There should be recognition on both sides of the bargaining table that lenders and borrowers share joint responsibilities for debts incurred in circumstances that are morally questionable in the first place. Debt cancellation should benefit ordinary people.

Nigerians rightly expect democracy to yield perceptible dividends in their lives. Our Administration will, however, find the task of meeting this expectation virtually impossible without substantial reduction of our debt burden, especially as we call on the same citizens to make the sacrifices that are implicit in the recent measures aimed at prudent management of our national economy.

I wish to invite the attention of the Assembly to the related issue of illegal capital flight from Africa. It is an open secret that much of Africa's wealth has been illegally siphoned out of the continent by corrupt regimes and unpatriotic individuals working in collaboration with foreign partners. Nigeria and many African countries would be able to pay off large portions of their debts if only they could recover some of the capital illegally stashed abroad. We thus believe that now is the time to collectively deal with this issue.



In this regard, Nigeria calls for a concerted effort by the international community, through an international convention, for the repatriation to Africa and the developing world of all capital illegally transferred from these countries. Such an international convention or agreement is legally feasible and morally sustainable. It will compel participating banks to disclose the source of the illegal accounts they hold, repatriate them to the countries of rightful ownership and subject the guilty parties to the full weight of national and international law.

It is with a heavy heart that I raise the issue of the HIV/AIDS pandemic throughout Africa. Our continent is bearing the brunt of this terrible disease that now kills around 2 million Africans annually, thus officially overtaking malaria as Africa's number one primary healthcare problem. This situation is even more frightening in that it has now left 6 million children orphaned in the eastern and southern parts of Africa. In West Africa the disease has been spreading just as rapidly. Unlike malaria, which is location specific, HIV/AIDS knows neither climatic nor regional boundaries. Global cooperation is an imperative if we are to succeed in dealing with this scourge.

Among the immediate challenges facing Nigeria and Africa today is resolving the many conflicts raging on the continent. Today, as many as 19 sub-Saharan countries are engaged in armed conflicts. The negative impact of these conflicts in human, social, economic and environmental destruction does not need to be described here. Nigeria and indeed the entire West African subregion have devoted considerable human, material, political and diplomatic resources to the resolution of these crises in the subregion, starting with Liberia and subsequently Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. Similarly, efforts are being made in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Angola towards peaceful resolution of their conflicts.

Indeed, African leaders at the recent summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Algiers, and at the urging of the Nigerian delegation, agreed to declare next year as the Year of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa. By this declaration, we have dedicated ourselves to making the year 2000 the year when Africans direct all their efforts into effectively eliminating armed conflicts on their continent. We hope to build on the fresh momentum for peace occasioned by the budding peace initiatives in Congo, Sierra Leone, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Angola.

We are also agreed on the overriding need to uphold codes of decency, ethics and minimum standards of decorum among African Governments and their leadership. Gone are the days when the OAU turned a blind eye to the excesses and abuses of power by member Governments. Forceful and undemocratic changes of Governments will no longer be overlooked or tolerated. We intend to condemn in absolute terms all violations

of these codes and to ostracize their perpetrators. It is our duty and moral responsibility to treat our citizens decently and humanely.

My country has always believed that the threat to international peace and security from any corner of the globe should be considered a threat to the peace and security of the world as a whole. While the maintenance of international peace and security remains the primary responsibility of the Security Council, the Charter provision for the complementary role of regional and subregional groups has also proved to be critical to the maintenance of peace at the regional and global levels. The establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) is a clear testimony of our commitment to subregional peace. As the record shows, ECOMOG succeeded in putting an end to the Liberian war in 1997, reinstating the democratically elected President of Sierra Leone in 1998, and bringing about the current Peace Agreement for Sierra Leone signed in Lomé in July 1999.

The time has come, however, for the Security Council to assume its full responsibility, specifically in Sierra Leone and other conflict flash points in Africa. For too long, the burden of preserving international peace and security in West Africa has been left almost entirely to a few States in our subregion. The non-implementation of the Peace Agreement and Nigeria's continual burden in Sierra Leone is unacceptably draining Nigeria financially. For our economy to take off, this bleeding has to stop. The United Nations needs to do more in providing logistics and financial support to assist regional peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, as well as enhancing the welfare of refugees worldwide without discrimination.

My delegation believes that it has never been the purpose of the United Nations Organization to prescribe democracy and change for its members and yet make little or no progress in the democratization of its own organs, such as the Security Council. My delegation accordingly urges the General Assembly, during this session, to conclude deliberations and reach agreement on the modalities for the reform and expansion of the Security Council so that the Millennium Assembly will adopt them next year — and not later.

How can the United Nations continue to perpetuate and justify a situation where Africa is the only continent without a permanent seat in the Security Council? In order to promote reform and democratization of the Security Council, Africa, with 53 Member States, should be allocated at least two permanent seats — commensurate not only with the continent's size and population, but with its track record also of contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security.

I wish to reaffirm our belief that the United Nations is the most universal body ever designed for collectively resolving humankind's common problems. Our Organization has come a long way since its establishment 54 years ago. Although created in a different era and under different circumstances, and in spite of numerous constraints, the United Nations has continuously sought to adapt itself to the changes in the international political arena. It has been able to accomplish this to some degree, but it remains an institution whose working methods, procedures and administrative structure have in many respects become outdated.

Yet the world as we know it today without the United Nations would be inconceivable. For it has come to symbolize hope for a better and more secure future for many, particularly in the developing areas of the world. Indeed, though a majority of our countries could not be members when the Organization was created, we are today its strongest defenders and advocates of the ideals for which it stands. We believe in the family of nations, and within that family the strong members have the responsibility to protect and strengthen the weaker members.

At the close of the twentieth century and the beginning of the third millennium, there is a need for stock-taking and for proper assessment of the implementation of previous resolutions emanating especially from the major world summits and conferences which took place in this decade. Such an effort would bring us closer to the realization of the purposes and objectives of our Organization. In this regard, I stand before the Assembly and pledge Nigeria's continued contributions and positive commitment to the ideals of the Charter of the United Nations.