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State Power in Multilateral Contexts: Voting Strength in the Multilateral Development Banks
Abstract
International organizations use a variety of voting procedures. Some of these procedures are based on the logic that all states are equal (e.g., the UN General Assembly). Other voting procedures distinguish some states as “more equal than others” by granting them more influence in decision-making (e.g., the UN Security Council). The multilateral development banks use weighted voting to apportion influence among their members to grant some states more influence than other states. Weighted voting is a method whereby states are allotted votes based on some criteria such as the amount of a state's contribution of capital. However, the number of votes held by a state—its voting weight—does not fully describe the state's influence over voting outcomes. This is because voting weights do not explicate the ways states can combine into winning coalitions. This dissertation assesses how the weighted voting systems of the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and the African Development Bank impact members' abilities to influence the formation of winning coalitions. Using a cooperative game known as the Johnston voting power index to measure voting power, results are presented for every 5 years starting in 1970. The multilateral development banks divide most members into “voting groups.” Within each group, a member is elected to represent the entire group at meetings of the Board of Directors. In order to capture this dynamic, voting power is first calculated within the voting groups and then, at a second stage, calculated for the Board of Directors. This compound game provides results that denote a member's relative influence over outcomes. A methodological chapter presents the compound game used in the four data analysis chapters. The results indicate that formal institutional rules do not always engender intended results. Although these institutions are designed to grant all members a voice in decision-making, the manner by which voting occurs results in discrepancies between voting weights and voting power. In other words, the members of the multilateral development banks do not have the amount of influence they are designed to have. A handful of larger members (e.g., the United States and Japan) effectively dominate, in terms of voting power, decision-making. Smaller members (e.g., Kiribati) have no formal influence over outcomes. Interestingly, many states that do contribute substantial sums of capital also have little formal influence (e.g., Norway). In the conclusion, several problems associated with weighted voting in the multilateral development banks are discussed in reference to the notion of good governance.
Subject Area
International law|Political science
Recommended Citation
Strand, Jonathan Richard, "State Power in Multilateral Contexts: Voting Strength in the Multilateral Development Banks" (1999). ETD collection for University of Nebraska-Lincoln. AAI9952694.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/dissertations/AAI9952694