Electrical & Computer Engineering, Department of


Date of this Version

Winter 11-21-2011


A THESIS Presented to the Faculty of The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska In Partial Fulfilment of Requirements For the Degree of Master of Science, Major: Electrical Engineering, Under the Supervision of Professor Mustafa Cenk Gursoy. Lincoln, Nebraska: December, 2011

Copyright (c) 2011 Bo Liang


In this thesis, game theoretic analysis of wireless communication networks has been performed. Game theory provides valuable tools can be used to solve problem of conflict and cooperation in wireless communication networks. Game theoretic tools can be applied to multiple layers of wireless networks. First, we consider power control issues at the physical layer of wireless networks. A game theoretic analysis for resource allocation policies in fading interference channels in the presence of quality of service (QoS) constraints is performed. We model a two player non-cooperative power control game and assume that both transmitters and receivers know the channel side information. The transmitters in this game are selfish and rational with QoS limitations and average power constraints. We prove that there is a unique admissible Nash equilibrium of this non-cooperative power control game. Secondly, a pseudonym change game which is used to protect location information in mobile networks has been proposed. In mobile networks, in order to track the location of mobile nodes, an adversary will monitor the pseudonym of each node. Therefore, mobile nodes are encouraged to change their pseudonyms in mix zones to increase their location security level and get rid of the tracker. However, pseudonyms are costly so some mobile nodes may not cooperate and change their pseudonyms when they already have high location security level. In order to achieve an optimal security level, game theoretical models have been used. The goal of each mobile user in this game is to maximize its location security level with a minimum pseudonym change cost. We consider non-cooperative incomplete information game, where mobile nodes do not know their opponents’ payoff function and types. We numerically demonstrate that a mobile user becomes selfish when the pseudonym change cost is small. Oppositely, if the cost is high, mobile nodes cooperate more. A game-theory-based anti-tracking protocol is also proposed at the end.

Adviser: Mustafa Cenk Gursoy