Law, College of
Title
The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st-Century Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal
Document Type
Article
Date of this Version
2000
Abstract
More than half a century has passed since the New Deal, the era known
for ushering in the modem administrative state, where broad-sweeping
regulatory powers were delegated to over a dozen new executive agencies
pursuant to a raft of social legislation. Until the later years of the New Deal,
courts were highly suspicious of socially progressive legislation, and, for that
matter, any legislation that upset common law systems supporting private
property rights and freedom of contract. Regulatory enactments were
especially vulnerable to invalidation for delegating policy-making authority to
an executive agency or other non-legislative entity. Such delegations were
considered a constitutional offense under the nondelegation principle of
separation of powers.
Yet just last year, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the D .C. Circuit, a court
widely recognized as the veritable hub of administrative law jurisprudence,
opened a new chapter in the post-New Deal era by breathing life into the
nondelegation doctrine. In American Trucking Assns v. EPA, the court held
that the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") had overstepped its
constitutional boundaries and usurped legislative prerogatives in issuing
national ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS") for ground-level ozone
and particulate matter under the Clean Air Act.' According to the court, the
decision was unconstrained by any "intelligible principle," even though the
EPA had considered a full range of data regarding the air quality level
"requisite to protect public health" with an "adequate margin of safety," as
directed by this detailed and comprehensive statute.
At the heart of the American Trucking decision lies the court's belief that,
absent clear congressional parameters, an executive agency like the EPA
would have unbridled power to send entire industries hurtling over the brink
of economic ruin. Although the court couched its decision in terms of a
search for intelligible principles, upon closer scrutiny, the opinion seems to
have little to do with a lack of legislative or administrative standards.

Comments
Published in ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL 32 (2000), pp. 941–1049. Copyright © 2000 Sandra Zellmer.