Evaluating sex offenders under sexually violent predator laws: How might mental health professionals conceptualize the notion of volitional impairment?

Authors

Cynthia Calkins Mercado, University of South FloridaFollow
Robert F. Schopp, University of Nebraska College of LawFollow
Brian H. Bornstein, University of Nebraska-LincolnFollow

Document Type

Article

Date of this Version

March 2005

Comments

Published in Aggression and Violent Behavior, 10:3 (March–April 2005), pp. 289-309. Copyright © 2004 Elsevier Ltd. Used by permission. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/13591789

Abstract

This paper examines the significance of the Supreme Court’s Hendricks and Crane decisions, with focus given to how mental health professionals may conceptualize the notion of volitional impairment. The Hendricks decision authorized postsentence civil commitment for sex offenders having a mental abnormality or personality disorder, rendering them likely to engage in future acts of sexual violence. In the Supreme Court’s majority opinion, Justice Thomas implied that the Kansas Act was legitimized by limiting the class of offenders eligible for this specialized form of commitment to those who are “unable to control” their dangerousness. In Crane, the Court ruled that while the Hendricks decision does not require that a sex offender be completely unable to control behavior, it does require proof of serious difficulty in controlling conduct. In evaluating the meaning of this decision for mental health professionals, this paper notes the decline of volitional impairment standards in the insanity defense, summarizes case law regarding sexual predators and volitional impairment, and further reviews the empirical and theoretical literatures exploring the notion of volitional impairment.