The Influence of Schematic Knowledge on Contradictory versus Additive Misinformation: False Memory for Typical and Atypical Items

Authors

Robert J. Nemeth, University of Nebraska-LincolnFollow
Robert F. Belli, University of Nebraska-LincolnFollow

Date of this Version

2006

Comments

Published in Applied Cognitive Psychology 20 (2006), pp. 563–573; doi: 10.1002/acp.1207 Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Used by permission.

Abstract

In the current study, we examined the influence of schema consistency on contradictory and additive misinformation. Sixty-four participants were shown a series of still photographs of common scenes (e.g., a kitchen), were later exposed to narratives containing misinformation, and were then tested on their memory of the photographic scenes. In addition, participants were asked to reflect on their phenomenological experience of remembering by giving remember/know responses. Participants reported greater false memory for schema-inconsistent items than schema-consistent items. The findings failed to replicate Roediger, Meade, and Bergman (2001). Explanations for the discrepant findings are discussed.