Nebraska Academy of Sciences
Date of this Version
1982
Citation
Transactions of the Nebraska Academy of Sciences, vol. 5 (1978)
Abstract
This paper examines the consequences of Feyerabend's thesis against the notion of scientific method. It is claimed that he has a strong case. Comparisons are made with other contemporary philosophers of science such as Kuhn and Lakatos. A result of the case against method is that science appears not to be a rational enterprise. This conclusion is resisted. Nevertheless, in order to show that the rationality of science is compatible with Feyerabend's thesis, it is necessary to switch from a conception that ascribes scientific rationality to the individual scientist to a conception in which rationality is ascribed only to the enterprise of science as a whole. Then, scientific rationality is a social, or perhaps structural, property and our science actually has it to a large extent.
Comments
Copyright by the author.