Agricultural Research Division of IANR


Date of this Version



American Journal of Agricultural Economics 94:4 (2012), pp. 823-837; doi: 10.1093/ajae/aas018


Copyright © 2012 Joshua D. Woodard, Alexander D. Pavlista, Gary D. Schnitkey, Paul A. Burgener, and Kimberley A. Ward. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association. Used by permission.


Can the availability of poorly-designed government insurance alter technology adoption decisions? A theoretical model of technology adoption and insurance incentive effects for a high- and low-risk technology is developed and explored empirically using a unique dataset of skip-row agronomic trial data. A multivariate nonparametric resampling technique is developed, which augments the trial data with a larger dataset of conventional yields to improve estimation efficiency. Skip-row adoption is found to increase mean yields and reduce risk in areas prone to drought. RMA insurance rules have incentive-distorting impacts which disincentivize skip-row adoption.

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