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In "The Correspondence Hypothesis," (Philosophical Review), Bruce Goldberg argues that the correspondence hypothesis is an illusion because "B's having the same thought as A" does not entail "B's having the same set of mental or neurophysiological properties, i.e., brain state or process, as A." If Goldberg is correct, a telling blow has been struck against the construction of information processing and psycho linguistic models created with the intention of later incorporation into neurophysiological models of brain functioning.
However, while Goldberg is correct in pointing out that two individuals can be said to have the same thought and yet not have the same set of mental or neurophysiological properties, his more important conclusion, viz., that the correspondence hypothesis is an illusion, does not follow. His conclusion results from: (1) construing the correspondence hypothesis to mean, "If the thought is the same with respect to content, then the set of neurophysiological properties is the same," which is insufficient for the purposes of the scientist; and (2) failing to notice that there is sufficient reason for claiming that both private and public modes of thinking may share properties in common.