Agricultural Economics Department
Document Type
Article
Date of this Version
4-1-2003
Abstract
This study builds on previous work by Giannakas and Fulton (2003, 2000) on the economics of output quotas in the presence of cheating by examining the efficiency of the policy in transferring income to producers as well as the optimal regulatory response to enforcement costs and farmer noncompliant behavior in a decentralized policy making environment. Analytical results show that enforcement costs and cheating change the transfer efficiency of output quotas, the level of intervention that transfers a given surplus to producers, the socially optimal income redistribution, and the social welfare from intervention. The incidence of the policy is shown to depend on the relative political preferences of the policy makers and the policy enforcers making the consideration of the decentralized policy making structure critical in analyzing output quotas in the presence of cheating.
Comments
Published in Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization Vol. 1 [2003], Article 11. Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007. Copyright © 2003 by the authors. Used by permission.