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Executive compensation--cost control and investment incentives
Abstract
This dissertation examines the effect that paying executives with stock related compensation has on reducing agency problems within the firm. Nonparametric Wilcoxon tests produced results which indicate that capital investment increases significantly after the introduction of stock based executive compensation plans. In addition, the same test statistic produced evidence which confirms the notion that managers increase their control over costs after adoption of such plans.
Subject Area
Management|Economic history
Recommended Citation
Sigler, Kevin Joel, "Executive compensation--cost control and investment incentives" (1989). ETD collection for University of Nebraska-Lincoln. AAI9013628.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/dissertations/AAI9013628