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Motivation and moral theory: An inquiry concerning theoretical implications of the action guiding nature of morality
Abstract
Morality is commonly thought to offer guidance concerning how we ought to behave, what we ought to do. We might say that morality is practical in character. Some have thought that the practical or action-guiding nature of morality precludes moral objectivity, that the action-guidingness of morality entails some form of relativism. Two arguments have been developed along this vein: First, some have argued that moral judgments, say my judgment that I ought to help someone in desperate need, have a unique tie to motivation: Having such a judgment, it is thought, entails that one is, at least under normal circumstances and to some degree, motivated to act. Some have argued that this unique motivating capacity of moral judgments rules out the objective truth of moral claims. Second, some have pointed out that to be morally obligated to perform an act is, among other things, to have a reason to perform the act. This claim, in conjunction with an instrumental view of reasons--the view that all of our reasons are ultimately grounded in our basic desires--offers another argument against moral objectivity. Herein, I flesh out these arguments and respond. Ultimately, I reject the first argument for I reject the essential claim--that moral judgments have a uniquely strong tie to motivation. In response to the second argument, I reject the claim that to have a moral obligation is, among other things, to have a reason, and I reject the instrumental view of reasons. Both arguments, I conclude, fail. In the light of these considerations, the objectivity of ethics survives attack. However, a price has been paid. Under certain circumstances, one may have no reason to live up to one's moral obligations.
Subject Area
Philosophy
Recommended Citation
Yarnell, Patrick Henry, "Motivation and moral theory: An inquiry concerning theoretical implications of the action guiding nature of morality" (1998). ETD collection for University of Nebraska-Lincoln. AAI9838604.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/dissertations/AAI9838604