Graduate Studies, UNL

 

Dissertations and Doctoral Documents from University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 2023–

First Advisor

Jennifer McKitrick

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)

Committee Members

Daniel Claes, David Henderson, John Brunero

Department

Philosophy

Date of this Version

2025

Document Type

Dissertation

Citation

A dissertation presented to the faculty of the Graduate College of the University of Nebraska in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)

Major: Philosophy

Under the supervision of Professor

Lincoln, Nebraska, December 2025

Comments

Copyright 2025, the author. Used by permission

Abstract

Michael Devitt argues in Realism and Truth that positive semantic issues are not constitutive of realism concerning the mostly impersonal external world. This is motivated by his second maxim which prescribes that the metaphysical (ontological) issue of realism is to be (sharply) distinguished from any (positive) semantic issue. Devitt’s argument is that his view of realism, entitled ‘Realism’, doesn’t entail and isn’t entailed by any doctrine of truth.

This dissertation presents a critique of the argument indicated above and, thereby, Devitt’s second maxim. I present Devitt’s account of Realism and his overview of theories of truth. I next present Devitt’s argument for why Realism isn’t entailed by and doesn’t entail any positive doctrine of truth. Using Devitt’s discussion of deflationary and correspondence theories of truth, I develop a view which I entitle ‘Mere-Deflationism’. I argue that Mere-Deflationism is a semantic doctrine and that Realism entails it. I conclude that Realism is an adequate form of external world realism only if it is not distinct from any semantic issue.

I expound a semantic objection to Realism from nonfactualism that Devitt considers. Concerning the existential statements which are partly constitutive of Realism, one can assert these statements and yet not be ontologically committed to instances of kinds indicated by the predicate-like terms when these terms are taken descriptively. This enables antirealists to affirm Realism by embracing a nonfactualist-like semantic theory. Devitt responds to this possibility by developing a non-semantic criterion for determining ontological commitment. I argue that this non-semantic criterion doesn’t alleviate the concern and is inadequate. I conclude that an antirealist can adhere to Devitt’s doctrine Realism. From this I argue that Realism is not an adequate form of external world realism. Again, I derive the conclusion that Realism is an adequate form of external world realism only if it isn’t distinct from any semantic issue.

Advisor: Jennifer McKitrick

Download

Included in

Philosophy Commons

Share

COinS