Graduate Studies, UNL

 

Dissertations and Doctoral Documents, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 2023–

Accessibility Remediation

If you are unable to use this item in its current form due to accessibility barriers, you may request remediation through our remediation request form.

First Advisor

Alice Kang

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)

Committee Members

Andrew Goodhart, Courtney Hillebrecht, Ross Miller, Uchechukwu Jarrett

Department

Political Science

Date of this Version

4-21-2026

Document Type

Dissertation

Citation

A dissertation presented to the faculty of the Graduate College at the University of Nebraska in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

Major: Political Science

Under the supervision of Professor Alice Kang

Lincoln, Nebraska, May 2026

Comments

Copyright 2026, Noah Schimenti. Used by permission

Abstract

This three-article dissertation discusses the competition for power and resources in regimes with weak or nonexistent democratic accountability. I begin with an overview in the introduction and then turn to the individual articles in each chapter. In chapter 2 I investigate the composition of post-conflict transitional power-sharing governments. I hypothesize that a greater number of rebel organizations included in the transitional government is associated with increased corruption levels. Using data on 44 post-conflict countries, I find little support for this hypothesis; the number of rebel organizations in the transitional cabinet has no effect on corruption levels.

In chapter 3 I investigate corruption dynamics in authoritarian regimes by examining the stability of authoritarian cabinets. I hypothesize that higher cabinet turnover rates and shorter average ministerial tenure are associated with decreased corruption levels. I find support for both hypotheses using a sample of 112 countries.

Chapter 4 examines the ability of opposition parties in electoral authoritarian (EA) regimes to gain legislative seats. I hypothesize that mobilization of anti-system civil society organizations (CSOs) leads to increases in opposition seat share by increasing the vote share opposition parties receive and increasing opposition unity. Using data on 80 EAs, I test whether there is a direct relationship between CSO mobilization and opposition seat share in the legislature. Then I test for two indirect relationships: whether increases in anti-system CSO mobilization correlates with increased vote share for opposition parties and opposition unity. I do not find a direct relationship between anti-system CSOs and opposition seat share. However, I find evidence supporting the two indirect mechanisms: increased vote share and opposition unity are associated with increased seat share for opposition parties.

These three chapters provide insight into how elites in regimes with weak democratic accountability utilize the resources available to them to compete for power. Elites in government use their position in power to develop patronage networks and accrue resources. Elites opposing the government use information and CSO support to build up credibility with voters and undermine popular support for autocratic leaders.

Download

Share

COinS