U.S. Department of Agriculture: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

 

United States Department of Agriculture Wildlife Services: Staff Publications

ORCID IDs

Rosenblatt https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7241-2109

Cook https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7000-8727

DiRenzo https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5264-4762

Campbell Grant https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4401-6496

Arce https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7622-3791

Pepin https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9931-8312

Rudolph https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7124-4649

Runge https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8081-536X

Shriner https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0349-7182

Mosher https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8458-9056

Document Type

Article

Date of this Version

2024

Citation

PLoS Computational Biology (2024) 20(7): e1012263

article doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1012263

data doi: 10.5066/P9TZK938

Comments

United States government work

Abstract

Emerging infectious diseases with zoonotic potential often have complex socioecological dynamics and limited ecological data, requiring integration of epidemiological modeling with surveillance. Although our understanding of SARS-CoV-2 has advanced considerably since its detection in late 2019, the factors influencing its introduction and transmission in wildlife hosts, particularly white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus), remain poorly understood. We use a Susceptible-Infected-Recovered-Susceptible epidemiological model to investigate the spillover risk and transmission dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 in wild and captive white-tailed deer populations across various simulated scenarios. We found that captive scenarios pose a higher risk of SARS-CoV-2 introduction from humans into deer herds and subsequent transmission among deer, compared to wild herds. However, even in wild herds, the transmission risk is often substantial enough to sustain infections. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the strength of introduction from humans influences outbreak characteristics only to a certain extent. Transmission among deer was frequently sufficient for widespread outbreaks in deer populations, regardless of the initial level of introduction. We also explore the potential for fence line interactions between captive and wild deer to elevate outbreak metrics in wild herds that have the lowest risk of introduction and sustained transmission. Our results indicate that SARS-CoV-2 could be introduced and maintained in deer herds across a range of circumstances based on testing a range of introduction and transmission risks in various captive and wild scenarios. Our approach and findings will aid One Health strategies that mitigate persistent SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks in white-tailed deer populations and potential spillback to humans.

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