Philosophy, Department of
Date of this Version
6-2003
Citation
Published in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81:2 (June 2003 ), pp. 155-174; doi: 10.1080/713659629
Abstract
Many philosophers think that dispositions are necessarily intrinsic. However, there are no good positive arguments for this view. Furthermore, many properties (such as weight, visibility, and vulnerability) are dispositional but are not necessarily shared by perfect duplicates. So, some dispositions are extrinsic. I consider three main objections to the possibility of extrinsic dispositions: the Objection from Relationally Specified Properties, the Objection from Underlying Intrinsic Properties, and the Objection from Natural Properties. These objections ultimately fail.
COinS
Comments
Copyright © 2003 Taylor & Francis, Inc.; published for the Australian Association of Philosophy. Used by permission.