Social Contact Patterns Can Buffer Costs of Forgetting in the Evolution of Cooperation

Authors

Jeffrey R. Stevens, University of Nebraska-LincolnFollow
Jan K. Woike, Max Planck Institute for Human DevelopmentFollow
Lael J. Schooler, Syracuse UniversityFollow
Stefan Lindner, Technical University of BerlinFollow
Thorsten Pachur, Max Planck Institute for Human DevelopmentFollow

ORCID IDs

0000-0003-2375-1360

Date of this Version

2018

Document Type

Article

Citation

Stevens, J.R., Woike, J.K., Schooler, L.J., Lindner, S. & Pachur, T. (2018). Social contact patterns can buffer costs of forgetting in the evolution of cooperation. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B, 285, 20180407. (doi: 10.1098/rspb.2018.0407)

http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/285/1880/20180407

Supplemental material is hosted at https://figshare.com/collections/Supplementary_material_from_Social_contact_patterns_can_buffer_costs_of_forgetting_in_the_evolution_of_cooperation_/4116911

R. Stevens, Jeffrey; Woike, Jan K.; J. Schooler, Lael; Lindner, Stefan; Pachur, Thorsten (2018): Supplementary material from "Social contact patterns can buffer costs of forgetting in the evolution of cooperation". The Royal Society. Collection. https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.c.4116911.v1

Comments

Copyright 2018 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society. Used by permission.

Abstract

Analyses of the evolution of cooperation often rely on two simplifying assumptions: (i) individuals interact equally frequently with all social network members and (ii) they accurately remember each partner's past cooperation or defection. Here, we examine how more realistic, skewed patterns of contact—in which individuals interact primarily with only a subset of their network's members—influence cooperation. In addition, we test whether skewed contact patterns can counteract the decrease in cooperation caused by memory errors (i.e. forgetting). Finally, we compare two types of memory error that vary in whether forgotten interactions are replaced with random actions or with actions from previous encounters. We use evolutionary simulations of repeated prisoner's dilemma games that vary agents' contact patterns, forgetting rates and types of memory error. We find that highly skewed contact patterns foster cooperation and also buffer the detrimental effects of forgetting. The type of memory error used also influences cooperation rates. Our findings reveal previously neglected but important roles of contact pattern, type of memory error and the interaction of contact pattern and memory on cooperation. Although cognitive limitations may constrain the evolution of cooperation, social contact patterns can counteract some of these constraints.