Part I of this article examines the historical evolution of antitrust laws, specifically as they have been applied to the market for corporate control. Part II examines the current judicial opinions advanced which reject the application of antitrust laws to the market for corporate control, including the supposed nonapplicability of antitrust laws to the sale of stock and the implied revocation of the antitrust laws by virtue of the enaction of the Williams Act. Part III addresses the inability of the Securities and Exchange Commission to regulate the market for corporate control via the Williams Act in that there is no inherent conflict between the Commission's disclosure requirements and the policy of antitrust laws. Part IV analyzes the quantitative economic effects of the diminution of competition in the market for corporate control and examine its aggregate effect on shareholders.
Joshua M. Fried, R. Preston McAfee, Melanie S. Williams, and Michael A. Williams,
Collusive Bidding in the Market for Corporate Control,
79 Neb. L. Rev.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol79/iss1/3