Abstract
I. Introduction . . . . . 116
II. Admissibility to Prove Knowledge as Part of a Mental State Required for a Crime or Civil Claim . . . . . 121
A. Fact Patterns in Which Admission of Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Knowledge on the Occasion in Question Can Be Justified . . . . . 124
B. Fact Patterns That Raise Greater Dangers of Jury Misuse of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence . . . . . 136
1. In general . . . . . 140
2. Illustration: admissibility to rebut a "mere presence" defense . . . . . 144
3. Illustration: admissibility to prove unlawful intent in prosecutions for possession of illegal drugs with intent to distribute . . . . . 148
C. Fact Patterns in Which the Relevance of the Uncharged Misconduct Evidence Depends on "Doctrine of Chances" Reasoning . . . . . 160
III. Admissibility to Prove Knowledge as Circumstantial Evidence of an Ultimate Fact Other than a Required State of Mind . . . . . 165
IV. Conclusion . . . . . 169
Recommended Citation
David P. Leonard,
The Use of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence to Prove Knowledge,
81 Neb. L. Rev.
(2002)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol81/iss1/3