Unicorns, Guardians, and the Concentration of the U.S. Equity Markets

Authors

Amy Deen Westbrook, Washburn University School of LawFollow
David A. Westbrook, University at Buffalo Law School, State University of New YorkFollow

Abstract

I. Introduction

II. The Republican Equity Market of the Twentieth Century ... A. Law as Response to Marketplace Power in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries ... B. Corporation Law and the Threat to the Republic ... C. Securities Law, Disclosure, and Bureaucratization … D. Participation

III. Private Equity Markets ... A. Introduction ... B. The Rise of the Private Equity Market and the Relative Decline of the Initial Public Offering Market ... C. Reasons for the Rise of the Private Equity Market and the Decline of the Initial Public Offering Market ... 1. Cost ... 2. Deep, Nonpublic Pools of Capital ... 3. Interest Rate Environment … 4. Modest Capital Requirements of New Businesses ... D. Requiem for the Public Equity Market?

IV. The Contemporary Public Equity Markets ... A. Introduction ... B. Rise of the Institutional Investor ... C. The Shift from Actively Managed to Passively Managed Funds ... D. Possible Consequences of Institutional-Investor Dominance ... E. Guardians

V. Conclusion

Recommended Citation

Amy Deen Westbrook and David A. Westbrook, Unicorns, Guardians, and the Concentration of the U.S. Equity Markets, 96 Neb. L. Rev. 688 (2017)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol96/iss3/5