Abstract
This Comment explores the growing conversation surrounding artist rights and music ownership, catalyzed by Taylor Swift’s public dispute with Big Machine Records. Swift’s efforts to reclaim her work have spotlighted the complexities of U.S. copyright law, particularly the distinct rights afforded to sound recordings versus musical compositions under the Sound Recording Act of 1971. By examining derivative works and their required standard of originality, this Comment argues that a narrow interpretation of copyright protections for derivative works, as outlined in 17 U.S.C. §§ 103 and 114, is essential for fostering creativity and safeguarding artists’ rights. Through an analysis of legislative history, judicial precedent, and the broader implications for originality, this paper underscores the importance of protecting artistry while balancing the rights of creators and producers.
I. Introduction
II. Defining “Derivative Works” ... A. Sound Recordings ... B. Films and Dramatizations
III. Congressional Intent Regarding the Scope of Rights in Derivative Works
IV. Issue of Originality ... A. Issue of Originality in Sound Recordings ... 1. Originality as Supplied by the Performer ... 2. Originality as Supplied by the Producer ... 3. The Value of Originality to the Consumer ... B. Issue of Originality in Dramatizations
V. It Is Necessary to Narrowly Interpret 17 U.S.C. §§ 103 & 114 ... A. Judicial History of a Narrow Interpretation ... B. The Use of a Narrow Scope in Practice
VI. Conclusion
Recommended Citation
Margaret Fouberg,
Who’s Afraid of Little Old Me? The Record Industry: Protecting Creativity and Promoting Artists’ Rights Through a Narrow Scope of 17 U.S.C. §§ 103 and 114 Rights for Derivative Works,
103 Neb. L. Rev. 715
(2025).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol103/iss4/6