Abstract
I. Introduction
II. The Problem of Conflicting Duties ... A. Sources of Inside Information ... B. Conflicting Functions/Conflicting Duties ... 1. The Duty to Retain Corporate Confidences ... 2. The Firm's Duty to the Investing Public ... 3. The Firm's Obligation to Its Retail Customers … C. Building a Wall
III. Administrative and Judicial Treatment of the Wall ... A. The NYSE Position on Broker-Dealer Directorships ... B. The Merrill Lynch Proceeding ... C. The Slade Case ... D. Exchange Act Rule 14e-3
IV. The Approach of the Federal Securities Code ... A. Introduction ... B. Recommendations of Securities to Customers ... C. Fraudulent and Manipulative Activity ... D. The Code and the Wall
V. The Chinese Wall and Liability for Insider Trading ... A. An Aside to Common Law ... B. The Policies of Rule 10b-5 ... C. Rule 10b-5 and the Chinese Wall ... 1. Broker-Dealer Recommendations ... 2. Investing for the Firm's Own Account ... 3. Broker-Dealer Directorships
VI. The Chinese Wall and the Multi-Service Firm's Obligations to Its Trading Customers ... A. The "Dual Master" Paradigm ... 1. Inside Information and Retail Customers ... 2. The Effect of a "Restricted List" ... B. The "Conflict of Interest" Paradigm
VII. Conclusion
Recommended Citation
Larry L. Varn,
The Multi-Service Securities Firm and the Chinese Wall: A New Look in the Light of the Federal Securities Code,
63 Neb. L. Rev.
(1984)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol63/iss2/2