Abstract
Contemporary constitutional theory rests on the mistaken assumption that judicial decisionmaking is a unitary activity. In Part II of this article, I present the theory of constitutional revolutions, a theory involving a dualistic conception of constitutional methodology. Part III illustrates how the theory of constitutional revolutions explains some of the Marshall and Warren Courts' critical revolutionary cases. In Part IV, the article demonstrates how important controversies in constitutional jurisprudence can be fruitfully reinterpreted and resolved by applying the theory of constitutional revolutions. Finally, in Part V, the theory of constitutional revolutions demonstrates the futility of relying exclusively on coherence theories when interpreting constitutional law.
Recommended Citation
Robert Justin Lipkin,
The Anatomy of Constitutional Revolutions,
68 Neb. L. Rev.
(1989)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol68/iss3/3