Abstract
This article seeks to resurrect the “causal theory”‘ of the criminal law’s excuses. While the causal theory fits some of our most important and most humane moral intuitions in a way that no other theory of the excuses does, it gets little play in current criminal theory. This article argues that criminal theory should give causal theory a second look.
I. Introduction . . . . . 1117
II. Causal Theory Defined . . . . . 1119
A. The Claims Made by Causal Theory . . . . . 1120
1. The First Claim: The Excuse Accepts a “Causal Account” . . . . . 1120
2. The Second Claim: The Excuse Expresses the Control Principle . . . . . 1123
B. Causal Explanation and the Criminal Law’s Excuses . . . . . 1126
III. The Contemporary Critique . . . . . 1131
A. The “Overbroadness” Formulation . . . . . 1132
B. The Underlying Objection to “Partial Determinism” . . . . . 1133
IV. “Provisional Determinism”—A Plausible Partial Determinism . . . . . 1135
A. How the Critics Overstate the Case Against Partial Determinism . . . . . 1136
B. The Anxiety That Makes Us Partial Determinists . . . . . 1140
1. “Existential” Anxieties: Threats to Our Aspirations for Our Selves . . . . . 1140
a. Loss of “Control” . . . . . 1142
b. Loss of Stature . . . . . 1144
c. Loss of the “Self” . . . . . 1147
2. Social and Political Anxieties: Corruption of Attitudes Toward Others . . . . . 1148
a. Corruption of Social Attitudes . . . . . 1148
b. Corruption of Political Attitudes . . . . . 1150
3. Epistemic Anxieties About Causal Accounts . . . . . 1153
C. How Anxiety Makes Us Provisional—and Thus Partial—Determinists . . . . . 1155
V. Some Motivation for Revisiting Causal Theory: The Disturbing Features of the Compatibilist Criminal Law . . . . . 1157
A. Compatibilist Criminal Theory . . . . . 1158
B. Disturbing Features of the Compatibilist Criminal Law . . . . . 1162
1. The Arbitrariness of the Compatibilist Criminal Law . . . . . 1163
2. Artificial Criteria for Blame . . . . . 1167
3. A Morally Complacent Criminal Law . . . . . 1170
4. Unresponsive to Advances in Our Understanding of Human Behavior . . . . . 1172
5. Resistant to Criticism of Social Conditions . . . . . 1174
C. Shaking Off Compatibilism and Looking for New Alternatives . . . . . 1175
VI. Conclusion . . . . . 1176
Recommended Citation
Anders Kaye,
Resurrecting the Causal Theory of the Excuses,
83 Neb. L. Rev.
(2004)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol83/iss4/4