•  
  •  
 

Abstract

I. Introduction . . . . . 2

II. The Nature of Civil Conspiracy . . . . . 6

A. Civil Conspiracy Distinguished from Criminal Conspiracy . . . . . 6

B. The "Non-Tort" of Civil Conspiracy . . . . . 9

C. The Reason for the Non-Tort Character of Civil Conspiracy . . . . . 10

D. Consequences of the Non-Tort Character of Civil Conspiracy: The Underlying Duty Requirement . . . . . 12

1. Criticism of the Underlying Duty Requirement . . . . . 12

2. A Possible Defense of the Underlying Duty Requirement . . . . . 14

3. A Better Defense of the Underlying Duty Requirement . . . . . 16

III. The Agent's Immunity Rule: An Overbroad Defense to Civil Conspiracy . . . . . 20

A. The Agent's Privilege Theory . . . . . 22

1. Propriety of the Agent's Privilege as a Defense to Interference Claims . . . . . 22

2. Impropriety of the Agent's Privilege Outside the Interference Context . . . . . 26

B. The Single Legal Actor Theory . . . . . 30

1. The Single Legal Actor Theory in the Antitrust Context . . . . . 31

2. The Single Legal Actor Theory in the Criminal Context . . . . . 33

3. Comparing the Single Legal Actor Rules in the Criminal and Antitrust Contexts . . . . . 35

4. Whether to Apply the Single Legal Actor Theory to Bar Common Law Civil Conspiracy Claims . . . . . 36

a. Applicability of the Single Legal Actor Theory to Interference Claims . . . . . 37

b. Inapplicability of the Single Legal Actor Theory to Intentional Torts Generally . . . . . 39

5. Should the Agent's Immunity Rule Apply to Individual Principals? . . . . . 42

IV. Understanding Why Courts Apply the Agent's Immunity Rule . . . . . 43

A. The Fallacy of Agents Conspiring "With" the Corporation . . . . . 43

B. Courts Unnecessarily Overstate the Scope of Agents' Immunity . . . . . 45

C. Personal Gain as a Proxy for Intent . . . . . 49

V. Conclusion and Recommendations . . . . . 53

Share

COinS