Abstract
In recent years, commentators have noted the propensity of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to refuse to defer to administrative agency decisions 2 and, more specifically, to remand such orders back to the agency, 3 with several commentators specifically considering the D.C. Circuit's treatment of orders issued by the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board").4 Much of this scholarly literature has focused on such questions as whether judges on the court are voting according to their policy preferences, 5 whether a remand without vacatur is an allowable and desirable mechanism for judicial review of agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),6 and the relevance of specific characteristics of NLRB policymaking to judicial treatment of the agency.7 None of this literature has considered, in any detailed fashion, the principle of administrative law that the D.C. Circuit has frequently relied upon in refusing to enforce and remanding many NLRB orders-the Chenery remand doctrine-and whether the court has properly applied this doctrine in its case law. This Article attempts to fill this gap.
Recommended Citation
Matthew Ginsburg,
"A Nigh Endless Game of Battledore and Shuttlecock"1: The D.C. Circuit's Misuse of Chenery Remands In NLRB Cases,
86 Neb. L. Rev.
(2007)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol86/iss3/2