Abstract
This Note begins by briefly exploring the development of the Confrontation Clause over the last thirty years, followed by a discussion of the holding in Melendez-Diaz and a summary of the Court’s responses to arguments made in opposition to its ruling. Part III begins by identifying a significant issue on which the Court’s ruling left inadequate guidance: Who must testify in order to admit the contents of the analyst report? Oftentimes, several technicians are involved in the analysis of a single sample, yet Melendez-Dias fails to identify which of these analysts alone would satisfy confrontation requirements, leaving open the possibility that multiple analysts must testify in order to admit all the contents of a lab report. Section III.B proposes and discusses how jurisdictions can take legislative action in order to preemptively resolve this issue. Melendez-Diaz does not require the testimony of every analyst involved in the testing of the substance. In fact, the testimony of a single analyst may be sufficient as long as this analyst participated in the testing of the substance and possesses adequate knowledge regarding the equipment used and the methods employed. This Note proposes that jurisdictions adopt statutory language identifying the characteristics of this “testifying analyst,” which would allow for the admission of the lab report through the testimony of a single analyst.
Recommended Citation
Ryan Sullivan,
The Aftermath of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009)—Identifying the Analyst Who Can Satisfy Confrontation,
89 Neb. L. Rev.
(2010)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol89/iss3/6